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Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

OCTOBER, 1918.

THE LARGER SELF.

J. DASHIELL STOOPS.

MODERN individualism set up the individual as an abstract unit. This process began with Nominalism in the fourteenth century and culminated in the Enlightenment. Clear knowledge, analysis, understanding, "intuition," "pure reason," seemed to consume the very will to live. The old ethnic impulses were pulverized away in the refining process of reason. But Darwin's epoch-making work has taught us to look within the psycho-physical organism itself for the ultimate springs of action both individual and social. Even in the sphere of animal psychology the dim outlines of a moral order are discernible in the other-regarding impulses and protective activities of the animal family and other forms of gregarious life. We have come to see the human individual in the light of his relation to his animal and prehistoric human ancestors. The individual in himself, with his unique, absolute rights, his self-centered rationalistic conception of personality is rapidly giving place in our thought to a very different sort of individual. The individual of our twentieth century biology and psychology is an individual whose living organism is stored with parental, gregarious and sympathetic impulses, giving unmistakable evidence, that his ancestors were of the gregarious and not of the solitary type. The bark of the dog is an echo of the primitive wolf-pack. The horse's nibbling at his master who is

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combing him is, as Darwin observes, evidence of a prehistoric gregarious life in which animals reciprocally combed each other with their teeth. Monkeys protect each other's skin and fur against vermin. All the ages of domestication have not inhibited the instinctive disposition of the dog to bolt his food, an overwhelming evidence of his pack origin. In the same way the prolongation of infancy is indicative of man's gregarious origin. His helplessness is synchronous with the evolution of individual development which was made possible only through some form of protective group life.

This interpretation of the individual is the very antithesis of the eighteenth century view. The earlier view looked upon the individual as a unique center of will and reason which bore only "external" relations to the various forms of group life. The present view sees a complex of interacting instincts as a given background from which and through which develop by a long and circuitous process the will and the reason as the individualizing elements of experience. The common, racial brain-patterns are the true *a priori* outlines which the developing individual will and reason must follow in man's evolutionary ascent.

Of course those who still hold the eighteenth century point of view,—and most of us still do,—those who think of an individual in himself whose being is necessarily "limited" by the growth of institutions, will regard the development of a biological psychology as limiting, as subordinating, as annulling human freedom and individuality. The exact opposite is the truth. It is only through the individual's functioning in a complex group that the differentiating of a specialized will is made possible. The solitary type of animal is as keen in his way as the animal of the gregarious type, but the wider and richer intellectual life of man could never have originated in the narrow channels of the solitary animal type of life. Elasticity, individuality, have been made possible only because the increased survival value of group life permitted individual variation. The life of the solitary animal was neither sufficiently secure nor wide

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enough in its range to put a premium upon useful variation from hereditary types of behavior.

The self of individualism is the product of the older rationalistic psychology, a psychology founded on individual introspection. But the self of modern biological psychology is not co-terminous with volition and reason. Volition and reason represent the individual aspect of the self, the higher, human, phase of experience. But there is another, an historically earlier, a psychologically deeper, aspect of experience,—the racial, instinctive phase of experience. This racial phase of the mind is as old as animal life and it is as deeply implanted in our nature as in that of the animal. In this racial level of the mind are the instinctive roots of both egoism and altruism, of individual and of social behavior. Here are the fundamental ground patterns which link the individual to the world of his fellows. And it is this aspect of experience that individualism has overlooked. It is not so much that we need a new view of society as that we need a larger view of the human self. The unique self of historical individualism is the result of a comparatively new individual self-consciousness which has not yet adjusted itself to the older, racial elements of experience. Ethical devotion to a unique consciousness of self which has not learned to test itself by the older racial patterns of experience is a form of sentimentalism which is not only dangerous to society but gives to the individual a false conception of himself and of his place in the scheme of life. Rationalism, for example, insists on opposing the instincts to the will; the former are "animal," the latter is "spiritual." But instinct and emotion are opposed to the free development of the rational will only if the will be defined in a narrow individualistic fashion. The family, the state, the world of industry and of religion, are not the product of the "individual" reason; they are the product of the reason interpreting and directing the deeper racial instincts. An individualistic ideal of conduct evolved through introspection will of course find its "inner," its higher interests "limited" by the racial pre-

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dispositions inherited from an animal ancestry. On the other hand a will which interprets its function not in an *a priori* manner but empirically fashions its ideals on the racial patterns provided in the instincts will not regard itself as "limited" by an animal ancestry. It will rather find in these instinctive patterns the rough outlines through which it may enlarge itself by identifying itself with the larger life of the race.

The rationalism of the eighteenth century, with all its individualism, regarded all forms of social organization as the product of the reason. From the time of Socrates reason has been defined as an operation of the mind which in some mysterious way evolved "universals." Sensations were regarded as discrete units. In themselves they were treated as absolutely chaotic. The only unity in the world of sense-experience was imported into it by the "universalizing" process of thought. But biology and comparative and genetic psychology have made this rationalistic account of experience absolutely unreal to us. If we try to kill a spider, or watch a hill of ants; if we study a bird rearing her young; if we acquaint ourselves with the unwritten code of behavior of the wolf-pack, we see that natural selection has preserved certain uniform rules of the game of life. We do not see the disconnected and confused world of sensations with which our traditional rationalistic philosophy has made us acquainted. Instead of this "blooming, buzzing confusion," we see creatures coming into the world with already established "action-patterns" which give form and order to the earliest sensations and feelings. And these instinctive ground-patterns of behavior are precisely of the same sort in us men as we observe in the animals. They not only exist prior to experience, to intelligence, to reason, but because they are prior to reason and because their patterns are fixed independently of the individual, these instinctive ground-patterns or action-patterns constitute the rough outlines which behavior must take. Indeed they are, they constitute behavior, so far as its broad outlines are concerned.

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Now it is the inheritance of these action-patterns from our animal ancestors which gives us the rough outlines which our human behavior must assume. We are gregarious, we share our comrades' emotions, we love individuals of the opposite sex, we work together to destroy our enemies and to preserve our social groups for precisely the same reasons that animals do. We do these things because it is natural to do them.

When we attend to new things, when we analyze, when we think, we always experience strain and, if these processes be continued, we experience fatigue. Such processes are highly unstable because they involve the newest, the latest, the individually acquired cerebral habits. But when we fight, play golf, swim, hunt game; when our pulse beats more rapidly at the sound of fife and drum; when our hearts warm at the sight of a flag; when we experience uncontrolled tendencies to run at the sound of such words as fire! or murder!—we experience a releasing of forces hidden within us whose power to respond sweeps aside all our individually acquired tendencies, our reason and will, like chaff before the wind.

The *a priori* ends of conduct are not stored in the individually acquired connections of the cerebrum; they exist in the deeper action-patterns which are racial in origin. How old the race is we do not know, but the individual is but three score and ten years. We do not know if any of all the reactions acquired by the individual's seventy years of experience modify the racial patterns of behavior which are nature's original endowment. Our individual minds are complex eddies within the larger stream of racial experience. The "intuitions" and *a priori* truths of individualistic rationalism,—once so precious and valuable,—seem to us officious and presumptuous. Free imagery, poetic and scientific imagination, symbolic thought, the representative use of universal ideas, have actually made our human world. Not to be able to live in this world of abstract ideas is to be less than human. Nevertheless this whole world of free imagery is but the long-circuiting

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of the will to live whose fundamental ground-patterns are stored in the individual by natural selection in the form of instinctive predispositions. The individual as an individual does not necessarily count in the long run. Thought and will are not in themselves necessarily worth while. Only those individuals whose thought has learned to interpret aright the ground-patterns through which alone nature has made life possible and whose will has been trained in loving obedience to these laws of nature,—to use Huxley's words,—can permanently count in the world.

Reason and will are just as real elements of experience as instinctive dispositions. This is a point which the newer biological type of thought of our own age is apt to overlook. Nevertheless individual variation, rational selection, thought and will, must prove their worth in terms of race value. The individual self must still be regarded as an end and never as a means,—as the eighteenth century has forever made clear. But our conception of the individual self must be enlarged to include its organic relations to the family, to the state and to the race. Only an individual of this type can be an end in himself.

There is a social motive behind the current emphasis on realism. The various idealisms of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whether of the analytic type of Berkeley or of the phenomenalistic form of Hume or the voluntaristic form of Fichte, were weapons of warfare which the human mind used in its fight for freedom. Idealism meant a justification of the human intellect in its attempt to deal with the hard and fast objective facts of the external world. Today this type of idealism is used only as a form of defense against materialism. Our age is realistic, rather than idealistic. This means on its social side that the individual will and reason are a part of a deeper and wider and more permanent nature process. As idealism emphasized the inner, mental, rational side of nature, realism is now emphasizing the objective, biological, unconscious aspect of nature. Berkeley and Hume and Fichte are too self-conscious, too introspective to fit the

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mood of our biological age. This does not mean that introspection is wrong; it is as rare and as precious as ever. But the old emphasis is too onesided, too inadequate to express the world as we know it to-day. A will which is chronically conscious of being "limited" by "external" reality is a will which is on the defensive; it savors of the pathological. The reflex motor patterns of digestion, circulation, respiration; the instinctive patterns of fear, anger, gregariousness and parental affection, do not originate in the "ideas," the consciousness, the will of the individual mind. As soon as we become intelligently aware of our own behavior we find a real world given to us through these inherited motor patterns with which our brain is stored. And this sort of experience is conducive to a realistic attitude toward the world. As we develop more rational control over the processes of the mind a more idealistic world view will be possible. But our own age has emphasized the unconscious instinctive ground-plan of our experience so that our philosophy has taken the realistic turn.

J. Dashiell Stoops.

Grinnell College.

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THE ENTHRONEMENT OF PUBLIC RIGHT.

E. THACKRAY.

GLADSTONE, the author of this ringing phrase, was a distinguished student of the works of Bishop Butler and the good bishop in a sermon on the Natural Supremacy of Conscience declared:—"Had it (conscience) strength as it had right; had it power as it had manifest authority it would absolutely govern the world." But it seems necessary to inquire into the meaning of our terms and to ask what exactly we expect to gain by enthroning justice, empowering conscience, giving might to right. Is there then something defective about these spiritual entities;—justice, conscience, right, so as to put them in need of a physical backing; or is it better to think of them as defying all physical force in the spirit of "Fiat Justitia ruat coelum?" Then again when we talk of justice, conscience, right, we cannot avoid some personal implications for we are at once faced with the question;—whose justice, conscience, right?

It is important to raise such questions as these at the outset if we want to understand the gravity of the issue instead of assuming that we are dealing with such a simple affair as the opposition between right and might. This popular way of expressing the antithesis must be received with caution, for it suggests a very unreal and abstract state of things, since we never actually come across in real life anyone who is an embodiment of pure right and reason without any connection with might or the arm of flesh, nor on the other hand do we ever meet a man who is a sheer embodiment of brute force without any rational self-defence. But Bishop Butler suggests that conscience has all right and authority, but no power, or at least no commensurate power such as it might be supposed to desire. Yet if my conscience, or some one else's for that matter, were to be dowered with world control, what about other peoples' consciences and rights? I may be by hypothesis, a saint,

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but history teaches that the rule of the saints has not always been a happy or ideal form of government and certainly not democratic.

Then, of course, we remember that we are to deal with the enthronement of *public* right, and we shall find that before we can enthrone it we shall have to discover what it is, and that will be a more laborious process than the interrogation of some individual conscience. We shall have to deal with what may be called race conscience, national conscience, trade conscience and perhaps many more public consciences, and these public consciences are likely to come into conflict for a long time yet before they finally beat their music out, so that we must not cherish unreasonable anticipations as to what will happen immediately on the cessation of war. For moreover we must bear in mind that these consciences of Europe will struggle together, not merely as moral, but as physical forces, or at any rate as consciences with powerful organisations and interests behind them. And so the struggle is always a twofold one, not between right and might for these belong to different "universes of discourse" and could never meet each other even in conflict, but between might and right on the one hand and might and right on the other. The present conflict in Europe is both a conflict between two sets of armed forces and also between two opposing ideals of life and government according as we view the conflict from one point or another but it is not strictly speaking a case of right versus might. What is the cause of the tragedy and the root of the problem is that there are right and might on both sides and in passing judgment on the war as a whole we have to determine where the balance lies. To illustrate the complicated nature of the problem it may be pointed out that the existence of might in the shape of what is called "man power" establishes some right to a proportionate share of the world's wealth and on the other hand the verbal expression of some conception of right suggests the further possibility of its expression in terms of force. And so we have to deal with all sorts of public de-

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mands from the primitive and physical one for a place in the sun to the highly sophisticated spiritual demand that place should be found for a nation's "culture," that is its language, traditions, form of government, religion.

Now if we look upon public right as resulting from some arrangement or compromise between various peoples possessing more or less conflicting rights it must follow that the arrangement or compromise will be liable to be changed according as any one of the parties thereto may make such progress or show such signs of decay that its relative position to the others is materially altered. In fact it is conceivable that serious injustice might be done to a people for example whose birth-rate had greatly increased and whose intelligence and energy had shown remarkable advance by confining them to certain fixed territory and to the terms of an old treaty. A peace settlement must of course have an element of permanence about it, but it need not be as unalterable as the law of the Medes and Persians. For example a hundred years ago, after the Napoleonic upheaval, European peace terms were arranged which were intended to last forever. It was fondly hoped at that time that the nations would all observe the policy of non-intervention and strictly suppress anything in the form of revolution or change, which was then thought to be the root of all evil.

But we have been learning better since then, and instead of regretting that the terms of the Vienna Congress of 1815 have been set aside by stormy conflicts for national unity (as when Italy in 1860 began the policy which resulted in her winning back from Austria, Lombardy, Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and finally, Venetia and from the Bourbons the rest of Italy; and when the Balkan States began to win their independence of the Turks in 1878) the regret is all on the other side, namely, that these national changes were so impeded and so incompletely successful. Another example of the need for change is to be found in the case of the United States and its devotion to the right embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, with its insistence that, as the

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United States does not interfere in Europe, so Europe must not be allowed to interfere in the New World. This sacred and long ruling doctrine is now being reconsidered, since the links that bind the New World and the Old are much closer now than they were in the days of President Monroe and in view of the increased commercial and social intercourse between the two hemispheres it is impossible to maintain neutrality.

Bearing in mind then the continual need for change in the character of international settlements, can we attach any meaning to the enthronement of what is only temporarily right? Or are we left to contemplate the repeated dethronement of what has been previously enthronement? This would not seem to make for reverence and allegiance. But we may surely make a distinction between right in general and the concrete and practical embodiments of that right from time to time in certain territorial, commercial and political arrangements. The great thing to achieve is the recognition by all civilised powers of the supreme authority of public over merely private right, of the peoples' interests over the interests of any one class, and of certain broad moral principles over even the nation itself. When this is attained we need not be greatly perturbed if nations do not immediately agree upon what exactly is public right at some particular place and time. Their common loyalty to Right will eventually teach them at least the way to agreement, namely by negotiation and discussion rather than by force of arms. The only hopeless attitude is that of the nation that should declare for

> "the good old plan
> That he may take who has the power
> And he may keep who can."

But it can scarcely be said that any modern wars since Napoleon have been fought simply on this "good old plan" for even the strongest powers and the most ruthless statesmen have seen the immense advantages of at least appearing to have right on their side and by some move in the

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diplomatic game to put their enemies in the wrong. This formal respect for the right and pragmatic enthronement of it is all to the good as a basis for something more, even when the allegiance to such a throne is not whole-hearted but based largely on fear and self-interest.

But what has been lacking hitherto has been the established prestige of a permanent throne. The throne of public right has been too much in the air. It has had no publicly approved representatives on the earth, and no earthly centre, consequently at a critical time it has been usurped by a Louis Napoleon or a Bismarck who has brought it into captivity to his own national will. Such a procedure would scarcely be possible if a throne were established in the only sure way a throne can be established, namely by the suffrages and the co-operation of free peoples, and vested in certain well chosen representatives whose lives were completely devoted to the great task of international government. This government might have as its permanent seat the old and famous city of Constantinople, for the chief reason that it is the strategic key to the "Balkan cockpit" and would be most accessible to the peoples living there, who might wish for genuine advice and help in regard to their many difficulties. This would constitute some reparation for the cruel neglect on the one hand, and the mischievous interference on the other, of which the Powers have been guilty from time to time in the Balkans, gaining for themselves the reputation of being, not puissances but impuissances since their action or inaction has been dominated by a slavish fear of one another.

A further reason for the choice of Constantinople is that to put this city and the neighbouring Straits under the control of an International Government would be much more satisfactory than to put them under the sole control of Russia. It is true that some promise had been made to Russia to include Constantinople as part of her share of the war spoil. But that was surely conditional on our having this spoil to dispose of. Moreover we have now to deal

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with a new Russia to whom the prospect of a share in the International Control would be satisfactory, especially if she were granted the dignity and importance of policing, with her Black Sea fleet, the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and thus being able to afford if necessary a ready protection to her fellow Slavs in the Balkan peninsula. It is almost certain too, that Germany would be less opposed to such a settlement than to the one to which she thinks the Allies are committed. At any rate it would be possible to claim that, so far as Constantinople and the Straits were concerned, the Allies were not aiming at any selfish aggrandisement, but only at a perfectly disinterested and complete rectification of centuries of Turkish misrule. Then again, Constantinople would be a fitting seat of an International Government or a League of Nations because of its position at the gates of both east and west, and it is fairly obvious that the peoples eligible for the benefits of membership of the League and capable of taking a share in the burden and honour of government would not be confined to Europe. The gates must be left open to both America and Japan and in fact to any nations that sincerely desired to enter them. It must be admitted that a city placed like Constantinople would be a more suitable and attractive centre for world-wide relations than for example The Hague, which would be somewhat overshadowed by the older capitals of Europe (London, Paris and Berlin), although its magnificent peace buildings might perhaps be used for an international Parliament of Labour.

But the most pressing reason for this choice of Constantinople would be the importance for a secure throne of public right of granting the privileges of nationality to peoples that have long deserved and claimed them, but who have not been able to win them for themselves. These are chiefly the peoples living in the near east, of which Constantinople may be said to be the capital. It is true that in 1912 the Balkan peoples formed a League against the Turks, but such a League was of a very precarious character, being really subject to the will and pleasure of the sur-

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rounding great powers and liable to be broken up by defections due to suggestions, threats or bribes from the outside.

(NOTE. The Balkan League was broken by the German powers objecting to Serbia having the seaboard territory she most wanted as part of her share of the League's victory over the Turks, and on Serbia receiving as compensation part of what Bulgaria wanted the same powers stirred up Bulgaria to fight her former ally.)

What is wanted is something much stronger than a league of small powers that are not able in spite of their league to call their souls their own, namely a league of all the powers such as would make the smaller leagues and alliances and balancings unnecessary, since within it each member would possess a full and free expression of nationhood in the form of self-government, or in the cases where the people themselves did not desire complete autonomy but preferred to remain under the wing of some other power there would at least be granted local government, and an unfettered life in accordance with the language, traditions, occupations, and religion of their race. No arrangement could secure for the world a permanent peace which did not rest upon this basis of justice for people craving a free national existence. These cravings for national unity and liberty have been shamefully ignored both in the making of wars and in the making of peace.

(NOTE. For instance, in 1875, what could have been more moderate and reasonable than the demand of Serbia and Montenegro from Turkey for religious liberty, native militia, the right to give evidence, the fixing of the scale of taxes and their regular collection? Turkey felt bound to consider such a request and even promised to give Christians a share in the administration of the vilayets but without any intention of fulfilling such a promise and so rebellion followed which led to a European war. This war was settled by the Treaty of Berlin with scant respect for nationalist demands, since Turkey in spite of her atrocities was still left at Constantinople in charge of millions of people utterly alien to her in both race and religion, all

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because that was the only way we could think of for keeping Russia in her place and so preserving the balance of power.)

Any such peace or balance is essentially unstable because the suppressed passion for nationhood is bound in time to find some disruptive voice. Hence for the motto of "Peace with honour" we should seek to substitute "Peace with justice"; justice to every constituent nation in the community of nations. It is hard for a Britisher with his inborn sense of sovereignty, living as he does in the security of seagirtness, to understand the uncertainty and cringing that is part of the heritage of a small people with no very definite geographical boundaries and with powerful neighbours all around. Sometimes the small nation has been forcibly condemned to impotence (falsely called neutrality) by being disarmed, although this has produced the same feeling of humiliation and resentment as when a man is deprived of his physical manhood. No League of Nations can be strong that is not strong in the respect and trust of the youngest and smallest nation in it, and such a nation ought to be able to state its case before a properly constituted international authority with as much ease as the most insignificant workingman is able to approach his trade union. It is a foolish notion that nationalism is somehow opposed to internationalism and that patriotism is weakened by cosmopolitanism or humanitarianism. If these should clash, then they at once become suspect as counterfeit and not real or healthy sentiments. The nationalism that is uninspired by internationalism is like the individualism which has no respect for public law, and the Hobbist doctrine of no law beyond the will of the state spells anarchy. So that in talking about the granting of self-government to the peoples that have a right to it, we do not contemplate freeing them from the operation of the moral law or the law of nations in their dealings with the rest of the world. In fact a small nation will soon see the advantage of cultivating the society of other powers when that can be done on equal terms. A League of Nations

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should furnish all the safeguards we can reasonably require against the possible dangers of a freely granted home rule.

The distinction made above between an unchanging respect for Public Right and the territorial, political and other changes that may be made from time to time, in accordance with this respect, may be applied to the regard for the principle of Nationality which also may be consistent with many changes and readjustments. A peace settlement will not necessarily be lasting in proportion to the number of changes which it may make in the map, for, as it was said of the Treaty of Berlin, we may change much but settle little, so that it would be well for us to lay more stress on the sacredness of the principle of Nationality than to be in haste to make doubtful applications of it. We may suitably emphasise this principle of nationality by asserting its superiority to the claims of military and commercial necessity on the part of some great power. For example we should unhesitatingly support the claims of Belgium as against the German plea that the city of Antwerp and Belgian coal are essential to her, just as we should support the claim of Alsace-Lorraine (if properly ascertained by plebiscite) to autonomy or to be made a part of France as being a higher claim than the German need of her iron ore.

So too, we should have to question the right of France to push her boundary to the Rhine and the claim of Italy upon Mahometan Albania, because such claims if granted would add to the confusion, unrest and danger of having large populations under an alien government.

(NOTE. What promises much for a wiser outlook upon and saner dealing with matters belonging to national unity and self-government is the way in which the world has recently been surprised and impressed by the strength of the British Empire on its foundation of home rule. Then as the war has driven people back upon history, the discovery has been made that resort to plebiscite which is now often put forward as a means for ascertaining the will of a country in regard to any proposed transference of its allegiance—that such plebiscite was agreed upon and carried

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by Louis Napoleon and Cavour in the sixties with very satisfactory results.

It may fairly be said that never before was the small power so courted and perhaps never before was there so much genuine respect for its desire of full nationhood.)

Something more needs to be said about the character of the proposed League of Nations; the conditions and advantages of membership. It would scarcely be advisable to begin by making membership compulsory, when there is a possibility of making it so attractive that nations will count it a privilege to join. The greatest privilege which this international government should secure for every constituent member of it would be the privilege of a fair hearing in case of any grievance and a whole-hearted combined defence against any unrighteous aggression on the part of any nation whether member of the League or no. The first and supreme purpose of the League would be to put an end as speedily as possible to what Mr. Lowes Dickinson has called the "European anarchy." It must be said in fairness to European statesman that the anarchy has been largely the result of the absence of any properly constituted government and not in defiance thereof. There has not been a spirit of positive disorder but on the contrary, a longing for a well-ordered peace, if that could be so established as to leave room for national growth and change, and yet there has been lacking the trust, the courage and the democratic impulse to establish such an authority. The national development that has to be allowed for, is chiefly along the economic line, and the disposition has been manifest among the younger nations like Germany, and those with a scanty seaboard like Austria, not to enter into any arrangement that might stunt their growth or fail to satisfy their economic needs. During the last century treaties of peace have been regarded as the best terms possible at the time, but by no means binding so soon as ever one of the parties thereto should feel strong enough to make a bid for better terms, and there has been no recognised trustworthy authority to take in hand the revision of treaties when the

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circumstances under which they were made have materially changed, and so we have had not simply one historical "scrap of paper" but a litter of them. What is wanting then is a revising authority of international standing and universal respect, that will take in hand from time to time the needs of a changing world, so that the revision of a treaty may be as bloodless an operation as the revision of an act of Parliament. The principles that would determine the revision of treaties are, besides the principle of nationality according to which, as we have seen, there should as far as possible be home rule granted to all those who want it and have shown themselves willing to live together and suffer together—besides this there is the principle of freedom of access to the sea, freedom from capture of all non-combatant vessels and as far as possible free trade, although it may be granted that on some commodities a temporary tax might be charged for revenue purposes or for the purpose of encouraging a new industry. What, however, is not justifiable, is the putting on of a tax for political purposes which amounts to the boycott of an enemy with whom we are supposed to have made peace. Let taxation have purely economic motives behind it, and we may not get very far wrong before we could reconsider the position, but when in the intensity of our bitterness and hate we give permanent shape to our feelings in the form of an international trade boycott, we are not merely on wrong, but on highly dangerous lines; lines which lead almost inevitably to future war.

Indignant outbursts on the duty of punishing a criminal nation, or even of exterminating it after the Old Testament fashion, are intelligible only in the psychological sense but not when they are regarded as the expression of a serious purpose. Such outbursts would in time die away, as people began to realise the monstrousness of exterminating millions of their fellow-beings, and the injustice of punishing the innocent for the guilty, unless we had fixed the passing hatred by translating it into permanent trade regulations such as those that were unanimously passed at Paris in

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June, 1916. These Paris resolutions seem to be intended primarily to weaken the Central Powers so as to prevent them from ever raising their heads again for war, and only secondarily for the promoting of commercial prosperity among the Allies. In fact it is certain that if a tariff wall is erected to shut out Germany some of the Allies must suffer. It is hard to think of a restored Belgium without her German trade, or of Serbia without any dealings with Austria, and we are led to wonder where if not to Germany Russia will dispose of all her wheat, if Britain is under an agreement to buy that commodity only from her colonies. This mixing up of trade and war is likely to be disastrous. If it be contended that the above arrangement is intended only for five years, the reply is that it is likely to take as long as that to dispel the enmity and suspicion that have been generated by the war and which would of themselves prevent trading to any great extent without any legislation. If this is to be counted an advantage then we may reckon upon it in any case. But five years of legally enforced separation between the Allies and the Central Powers would not only stand in the way of the healing influence of time, but would invite the forces of intrigue, intensify the unrest, increase the armaments and (what would be most deplorable of all) would tend to make the Germans feel completely justified in their belief that her enemies had been all the time trying to annihilate her and that what they had failed to do by war they were bent on doing by boycott. And so we should fall back into the old condition of Europe as an armed camp, and Germany would be sure to find some weak link in the armour of the Allies in some member of the Allied group that was suffering from a real or supposed slight. That slight would be magnified until it would seem important enough to justify defection, and defection would inevitably lead to war. (Compare the Germany-induced defection of Bulgaria from the Balkan league.)

So we conclude that the way of the Paris resolutions is not the way to secure the enthronement of public right, since they would lead to a deep sense of wrong and mutual

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fear instead of faith. "Be just and fear not," advises Thomas Cromwell, "since justice is established in fearlessness and trust." Then let there be no narrow-minded fear and spite in our international structure. Let us remember to make it a league of peoples, and if we take as I think we are entitled to do the attitude and feeling of the soldiers on both sides towards each other as typical of the general attitude and feeling of one combatant nation towards another, we may confidently open our doors of commerce to all who choose to enter them and from our league of peoples exclude none who are anxious to forget the shameful days of destruction in the all-absorbing work of restoration.

Although such confidence has been described as a gamble with human nature one fails to see how "gambling" of this kind can be avoided. To take every precaution ("protection" is the economic word) is not less speculative and unfortunately the speculation behind it, as to the selfish motives of other nations, is one that is utterly ignoble and irreligious, and moreover tends to produce in others the evil nature which it begins by assuming. Nothing is to be gained in that way and the burden of self-protection is likely soon to become intolerable. The other gamble, namely on the possibility of our enemies turning out at least as honest as ourselves, may of course lead to disaster but it could never lead to shame, and there is more than a sporting chance that it would lead to an understanding that would ripen and a co-operation that would become irresistibly powerful. Still it is possible to have such safeguards as would greatly minimise the disaster of a misplaced confidence. If our enemies were permitted and were willing to enter a league of nations open to all civilised powers, there would certainly have to be conditions and concessions applicable equally to all, although it must be confessed falling most lightly upon those nations most used to a democratic form of government. The successors of the founders of the Holy Alliance would find it less congenial to enter such a European concert than the founders of

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the Balkan League, but signs and rumours are not wanting of a willingness on the part of the present war lords to take the people into confidence and partnership. This democratic basis must be the *sine qua non* of any new union of states for the feudal system of government has become utterly discredited and positively dangerous. For it is doubtful whether most of the wars of the last century would have occurred but for the dynastic reasons that lay behind them and the delicate sense of an infringed honour which so readily attaches to a royal house. The house of Napoleon has shown a remarkable and fatal sensitiveness to its own dignity, *e.g.*, Louis Napoleon's resentment at being addressed by Czar Nicholas as "friend" instead of "brother" and at being denied in the same quarter the title of Napoleon the Third had no small share in bringing about the Crimean War. This element of danger can and must be eliminated from our League of Nations if we expect the League to secure a perfectly fair consideration of and reverence for public right.

But, while the danger to be feared from royal pride and theories of the divine right of monarchs is by comparison passing away, there has arisen another danger of a more subtle and formidable kind which threatens the throne of public right. It is the danger that has come from the less royal but equally powerful families of financiers and traders, who seek the protection and blessing of government on their special enterprises because these are said to indicate the greatness of the nation or even the "march of civilisation." Some historian has said that Henry VIII was able to hide his wandering passions under the cloak of large national policy and so our large bondholders in Egypt, Morocco, Tripoli, Transvaal, Persia, Mexico, China, the Balkans, have discovered in their private interest and profit a singular identity with the interest and profit of their country whose flag they have so loyally waved and whose fleet and diplomatists have rendered them such notable albeit, risky service;—risky, however, not to the aforesaid bondholders, but to the owners of the fleets and the pay-

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masters of the diplomatists; namely the people themselves whose friendly relation with other peoples receives thereby a shock or a strain or a snap. What has then become of the divine idea of public right? It has been submerged in the cunningly engineered service of private interests.

Will it not be possible for a league of nations whose accredited representatives have been specially set apart for the high work of international government, and are in constant communication with each other, to keep a careful eye on the export of capital to places rich in natural resources, rich in cheap labour but poor in government? If some plan were thought out before the place had been too far "penetrated" a good deal of irritation and bitterness might often be avoided, and the consideration that would tell most powerfully would be the consideration of public right; public not merely in the sense of being confined to the civilised nations of the League but in a sense to include the right of the poor natives to a fair reward and proper conditions for their labour. No authority could insist on this recognition of human rights with so much dignity and weight as an international authority, which would also have a far larger opportunity of securing uniformity of custom in the grave matter of the employment of inferior races.

The promptness with which every serious situation might be dealt with, if there were an authority specially constituted for that purpose, would be a great gain for it is the neglected trouble, the long festering sore that becomes so difficult to deal with. It is possible that too much stress has been laid upon the power which a league of nations would have to impose delay on prospective combatants. There might be instances when delays would be favourable to such cool reflection as would dispel the sudden war cloud, but there are other instances and these the more numerous when delays would be dangerous, and when the violent solution could not be averted merely by being put off. There is a story at the end of Edith Durham's "Burden of the Balkans" of a young Albanian upon whom by the law of the mountains was laid the duty of blood revenge, but

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the Abbot of Mirdita persuades him after much wrestling and prayer to swear *bessa* (peace) for at least a year, then again for another year and another, congratulating himself by saying;—"Every year that puts off the starting of more blood feuds is so much to the good." But listen to the end of the story:—"In a lonely valley a woman's voice shrilled from the rocks above, a long melancholy recitative; a rhythmic, barbaric chant in strange harmony with the landscape. 'Someone is dead,' said Jin. 'She is telling all about him and what he did.' He hailed the nearest herdsboy. 'A man has been shot,' he said." That was all. Monsignor the Abbot had failed even after several years of success and the point of the incident is that no adequate settlement could be obtained in that way, apart from some effort to establish public justice in place of private vengeance.

The so-called civilised nations of Europe are after all very much in the same position *nationally* as the wild men of Albania are *individually*, since they all follow the law of blood feuds and carry the stone in the pocket from generation to generation.

The time is surely ripe for the establishment of an international court of public justice which shall be maintained by and submitted to by all nations that wish to leave behind the horrors of anarchy. But now arise some questions as to the nature of the "sanction" possessed by this international authority that is its power to inflict penalties. Some legal writers, *e.g.*, John Austin have considered that there is no such thing as international law, because there is no authority to enforce it. Austin held that every law must have some monarch or government behind it to announce it and enforce it, and as we have not yet reached the golden age of the "Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World," we have no authority to publish and enforce the law of nations, and therefore they are not laws at all in the strict sense. But this centering of law in some authority like the King who "can do no wrong" leaves out of account the important nature of custom in the evolution of law. In

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some early stages of society this customary law seems strong enough to enforce itself, and even in highly organised communities people are held powerfully together by an unwritten law for the breach of which there is no legally enforced penalty. In the same way nations have been held together by laws of chivalry and humanity which have had no other sanction than the approval of mankind. These laws have been grouped by jurists under the title of "jus gentium" which has usually been associated with the laws propounded by philosophic lawyers under the title of "jus naturale." The point of all this is that to propose to set up an international government with international law is not to suggest something entirely new, but only something more systematic. This desire for more system receives emphatic illustration in the American suggestion of a League for enforcing peace. Such a league may well be held to be necessary in view of the barbarities daily practised by some incorrigible members of the community of nations which call for sudden and decisive pressure. Still in spite of these everyday facts one may question the wisdom of making too prominent the "enforcing" side of an institution whose operation can begin only after the war. It might be far more satisfactory for the League Executive not to have the direct command of any sea or land forces, but to concern themselves entirely with the rights and wrongs of any issue that is brought before them instead of being guided, as has been the case hitherto, by the non-moral argument of the number of ships and army divisions there are ready to back up any decision that may be arrived at. This, of course, has always made a considerable difference to the decision.

The details of this international institution, which is so urgently called for, may well be left to the practical statesmen and men of affairs since the best methods will often have to be found by experiment, "Where there's a will, there's a way," and if there is a good will we may trust it to find out a good way, so that in this paper attention has been called to those broad features of the subject which might excite good will to bestir itself to meet the palpable need of

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the world for a supernational or human form of government working by means of the national institutions as far as possible, but adding that note of detachment and humanity by means of which the claims of nations to a place in the sun, to self-government, to freedom of thought and of trade, leave to colonise and to grow, might be considered and adjusted before the throne of public right.

E. THACKRAY.

WHITEFIELD-NEAR-MANCHESTER.

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AN INTERNATIONAL WAR CHEST.

H. T. WEEKS.

IN the schemes for a League of Nations suggested by the English League of Nations Society and by the American "League to Enforce Peace," the clauses are confined to eight. A treaty is to be made binding the signatories to use peaceful methods for dealing with all disputes arising among them. They are to be settled by an International Judicial Tribunal or a permanent Council of Inquiry and Conciliation, and they agree to jointly use economic and military forces against any of the members who go to war before submitting the dispute to the appropriate court. They are to unite in any action necessary to compel obedience to the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal, and mutual defence against attack is provided for. A permanent International Conference to formulate and codify International Law is to be established, while any civilised state desiring to join is to be admitted.

The manner of applying their economic and military forces is not worked out in detail. Presumably these details would be settled later when the League is in being. But is it not imperative, if the League is to influence the peace arrangements, that these details should be discussed and some *modus operandi* arrived at in order that the League should be in a position to start at once, on the conclusion of peace. A Conference of the Nations forming the nucleus of the League should be called together immediately to discuss these details. Their conclusions could be rejected or ratified by each nation later. Or, committees could be appointed in each Nation to work out details for future comparison and adjustment. Wise statesmanship would not leave these matters in abeyance, but having accepted the idea of a League of Nations, the details of its harmonious working should be thought and worked out.

The objection to the League is sometimes raised that

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owing to constant petty quarrels between the smaller states, the forces of the League would be mobilised and demobilised continually at great expense and dislocation of normal life. Also the smaller states contiguous to the territory of the Great Powers would not care to join the League, or subscribe to the arrangements for mutual defence, because a seceding Great Power could overrun their territory, make it a cock pit and inflict incalculable injury on them before the rest of the Nations had got their armies into full swing. These two considerations point to the necessity of providing an International Executive with a standing army at command, fully equipped and ready for action at a moment's notice.

The question of Unity of Control for such a force again would require thoroughly working out and adjusting as we see from the difficulties at once occurring over the proposal for a Supreme War Council.

There is one point which possibly is worth considering—the cost of maintenance of this army. Of course, if as a result of the enormous cost of the present war disarmament all round down to a simple force to maintain internal order is arrived at, the international standing army need not be large, and therefore the cost might be moderate. It would have to be stationed at various strategic points and these will want carefully arranging by the International Conference. Any movements or massing of these International troops in the direction of any probable outburst of trouble would have to be distinctly understood among the Nations, as partaking of a non-aggressive character and in no sense justifying reciprocal warlike moves. Some safeguard would have to be provided against the Generalissimo taking matters into his own hands. Actual hostilities might be commenced only by the proclamation of the International Executive to the army by accredited civilian members of the International Conference. Each Nation of the League would contribute a share apportioned to its population and wealth. Each Nation of the League would send its quota of men and equipment. For perfect co-ordination we

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should possibly have to try to get over the language difficulty by making the study of French or Esperanto a part of the training of each unit. Each nation would support its quota—but there would be need of a war chest in case of trouble. This might partake of the nature of an insurance premium. The payments would be continuous and more or less uniform from each member of the League. The total sum available could at once be utilised in case of emergency. These contributions might accumulate as years go on and let us hope with practically no calls for its use. What is to happen to the Fund? It would have to be vested in the joint Conference of the League. It would also have to be invested by them in securities which could be easily realised into gold or commodities. It might perhaps be lent to various nations for purposes of development. They would agree to issue Bonds bearing a rate of interest which would accrue to the war chest. They might use the loan say for harbours, railways, a channel tunnel, canals or mining and general development, naturally at spots and in districts approved of and sanctioned by the Joint Conference of the League. Or the League might construct and itself administer works of international importance. In the event of secession from the League, the loans would become due to the League and the League would take over and control the property until the loan was paid off. In the event of defiance of the League the same thing might happen. Thus this Fund might become one of the best means of cementing the League together and avoiding the possibility of defection on the part of lukewarm members.

H. T. WEEKS.

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THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONALISM AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

JACOB R. KANTOR.

IN THE political thought of the day we observe a furious beating of wings against the bars of internationalism, with the characteristic failure of accomplishment. Internationalism is the all powerful attraction for the hopes and fears which have been generated by the present world struggle. That a scheme of union of at least the leading nations will overcome the present evils of men has become almost a universally accepted doctrine. For the wrongs of this war are so enormous and so many that they cry loudly for relief. Not only is the world suffering from horrors of the field, which are accepted as inherent in the institution of war, but there are the vast restrictions and oppressions of individuals at home. Among the many characteristic war phenomena the unbearable conditions imposed upon the several civil populations are greatly magnified in the present world calamity. The cause of so much discussion concerning the organization of nations is found then in the great need for some cure of the present ills of society. The prevention of war and its attendant calamities appears to be a favorable prognostication, if only the nations can be somehow united. The futility of most of this discussion is inevitable because it succeeds admirably in avoiding concrete conditions, and consequently remains in the realm of fancy.

If from the outset we exclude such suggestions for internationalism as are merely vapory expressions of the belief that something must be done, we still find that most of the remedies suggested to bring about better understanding between nations are naive and hopelessly valueless. It is proposed to overcome all the evils of national hatred and war by adopting common customs of various kinds. Some individuals hope to organize nations by merely adopting a

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common, commercial language, and a common system of coinage. Others propose to reduce national boundaries entirely, to make one nation of all. Such theories imply a total lack of understanding of the psychology of groups, and a failure of appreciation of the values of varying social, artistic and intellectual attitudes. Suggestions for various types of leagues of nations are made *ad libitum*, with strange neglect of facts concerning the practical possibilities of international relations.

So far as the ethical aspects of the problem of internationalism are concerned, there is a hopeful specification of what must be brought about in the way of improvement. We face the problem of securing moral conduct on the part of nations. To do away with the disasters of national strife, nations must be brought into a moral atmosphere; they must act only in such ways as to make for the common welfare and happiness; they must establish definite rights for all, and provide adequate defense for those rights. It is entirely safe to assert that only when there can be found between nations relations of social understanding, beside mere commercial tug and pull, can there be a harmonious and moral world order. If there is to be a recognized morality among nations, there must be an organization of interests, a conscious interrelation of benefits and obligations. Only in this way can be avoided the present obnoxious diplomacies, the intrigues, and the brutal, and almost always miscarrying wars of aggression. Only by a mutual understanding between nations, can there be an efficient and satisfactory organization of the sources of the world's material welfare, their transmutation, and distribution. The scheme is in a way known to us in the realm of cultural values, in which the products of art and learning are most liberally dealt with in an organized way.

The events of the past few years have brought to us in an extremely vivid manner the insufficiency and harmfulness of the viewpoint that nations determine their own modes of behavior. We have observed the assumption of prerogatives and rejection of obligations on the part of nations

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under the plea of military necessity. The doctrine of national self-defense presupposes an autonomy and an independence of the rights of other nations, which is entirely contrary to fact, and to our private moral attitudes. The national self which is implied here is certainly not the group of people who bears the national name, for it is an indisputable fact that those people cannot be so isolated from other people as to make possible the implied struggle for existence. The economic and cultural interests of the various groups are entirely too closely bound together to make plausible the need of a defense of one people against another. The co-operation between nations which is absolutely necessary for industrial, sanitary and medical purposes belies the theory that nations can live only at the expense of others. The growing complexity of civil life is drawing even the farthest geographically distributed people into a living alliance. We must conclude that it is always a government which claims military necessity, and political insight teaches us that such a government is an enemy of its own governed. This government is usually a hierarchy of rulers, or the economic control class, at any rate not the people of the nation. A different standard of conduct for states than for individuals will be maintained so long as people fail to realize that after all it is individuals who act for the sake of persons of the group, and not for a class under the disguise of the "state." The realization that an individual is merely another name for a social being, or a social unit, will inevitably tend toward social harmony and co-operation.

The problem of international morality may be summed up then in the need for a reduction of the disparity between private and public morality. The solution of such an issue is clearly indicated in an organization of nations; so that each one will have a corresponding place in the world group, as individuals have in their respective groups. This will impose upon nations unequivocal obligations of conduct. The point is fairly made that it is idle to discuss the morality of nations unless some means of organizing them into an

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inclusive group is provided. We must now inquire into the means necessary to bring this organization into existence and determine what is involved in the task of bringing nations into a recognized moral society. It is apparent that there must be an inclusive society, but the question comes up as to whether the mere fact of inclusion guarantees moral conduct. It is perhaps not idle to ask whether on the whole persons who do live in an inclusive society are more moral than nations. Not even the most sentimental optimist would betray himself into such a belief. Take almost any nation, and observe the conflicts and struggles between individual and individual, class and class, and between individual and class. It is not good logic to argue that there might be lack of social organization within a nation, since that would imply that what is meant by group inclusion is an absolute, moral order. Even if we avoid confusing mere group contiguity with morality, we can still point to the positive advantage of the inclusive society, which is that the possibility of moral order is never wholly lacking. It is evident that within a nation there are always definite conditions which make for some kind of moral coercion. This brings us to the central problem of social organization; namely, how can the forces of moral control, resident in a social group, be brought to bear upon the members. This is the fundamental problem of moral control, and is anything but easy to solve. The comparatively simpler task of preventing robbery and quarrels among members of a nation has not been concluded, or perhaps even begun. To accomplish much more, namely the positive organization of social and economic needs among individuals of a more or less homogeneous group, is a tremendous task; to do this for nations as nations is to multiply the difficulty a thousand fold. But this difficulty is not at all disheartening, especially since it forces us to face the fact, that at bottom, the problem of the morality of nations is very similar to the problem of the morality of individuals. Furthermore it offers us a glimpse of the only genuine meaning of social organization, which is the socialization of individuals. A

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moral society must always be a voluntary group of self-conscious persons. This is a matter which unfortunately has been overlooked. Our psychology and ethics have been so zealous in denying the natural individualism of man, and affirming the essentially social character of human nature, that they have neglected to profit by some of the important consequences of those discoveries.

We may distinguish two meanings of the term social. One refers to the natural fact of the herd nature of men. In this sense the social man, as a consciously behaving animal, is a product of the interaction of a number of similar individuals. The other meaning of social refers to a condition of men, who have developed to a self-conscious realization of affinity with and responsibility for other conscious beings, who may or may not yet have developed to the stage of self-consciousness. This second condition, that of socialization, is not a condition imposed upon persons, but a conscious development, consequential to the interaction of individuals. The implication here is that we may hope to bring about a genuine, social organization, if we shape our plans with reference to the individual. Is not this at bottom the clue to the significance of President Wilson's distinction between the German government and the German people? We cannot help but realize that as persons there must be much in common between the members of all states. Genuine, social organization must somehow cut across the boundaries of states or nations, and bring the people into co-operation. The idea suggested here found expression in the recently published aims of the Inter-Allied Labor Conference, which looks forward to an inter-human labor co-operation. There is no doubt that something like this must occur to make workable a league of nations, which has the positive object to look after social and economic needs. Only in so far as we can bring about the conscious interrelation of individuals can we transform our nations from "nature states" into "political and social states." When we learn to think in terms of socialized individuals, there will be an automatic reduction of the discrepancy between public and private morality.

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Since the problem here is one of moral conduct, a prime requisite for any accomplishment is the highest kind of self-consciousness. This fact is somewhat obscured in recent writings by an overemphasis of the fact that ideas and moral sentiments of men are the products and reflexes of social institutions. There is grave danger that this will lead to evil consequences in our attitudes toward the functions of nations. The overemphasis of institutions offers too frequent occasion to overstress the nations as nations. It seems that just here lies our disapproval of the German nation, whose people, it is claimed, are carried away by ideas and sentiments dictated by a social institution. In the German system individuals have an insufficient power in the formulation of their institutions; they are conspired against and influenced to accept certain moral sentiments, —the non-morality of states for example—which are created by special organizations of political rulers who are not considered as entirely interested in the well-being of the people.

Any valuable and workable social organization must come as a result of co-operation between human individuals. The only hopeful basis for a harmonious social order is the reflective attitude of persons concerning their rights and obligations. Any social organization, which is not a product of the conscious interaction of actual individuals, is doomed to failure. The truth of this is beginning to be appreciated by the more enlightened supporters of social reforms and is brought into evidence by the advocacy of the democratization of industry, which is proposed after a fair trial of stressing action through group institutions, as manifest in labor laws. Of course all ideas and sentiments must be products of social organization, but so far as this social organization is built upon anything but a conscious formulation of ideas and moral sentiments, it cannot be the criterion of morality, public or private. It is certainly true that the problems which lead to ideas and moral sentiments are directly imposed upon the reflecting individuals, but they transform these problems in effecting their solutions.

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This is in no sense a subjectivistic viewpoint; it is merely stressing the inevitable interaction between the individual and the group. Since all moral sentiments and reason are finally the activities of persons, it turns out that when the institution is too far stressed, some individuals are absorbing the group. If in the problem of social organization the insistence is upon the inclusion of individuals, it is more probable then that no one will be left out. With the emphasis first and always upon the individual, we arrive at a genuine democracy. It is not an arbitrary matter whether we emphasize the individual or the institutions. Democracy is committed to an empirical philosophy, and that means always that concrete material must be the primary consideration. It is obvious that human persons constitute such material.

Since social organization is a problem centering about the individual, whatever genuine social progress we may expect must come from the enlightenment of persons. This important point argues forcibly that leagues of nations be leagues of persons. As long as we insist upon nations, we lose sight of their actual content and structure; we stress formal organization, rather than concrete organization; we stress nations rather than men. We can see in every line of past history that this is partly the cause of all social miseries. It is almost unbelievable what the consequence would be of thinking not in terms of national welfare but in terms of human welfare. To think in this way would remove the occasions for disputes arising from exclusive ownership or control of natural resources, and routes of travel and commerce, since the power and prestige of nations drop out of account. In specific groups this sort of thinking would mean that all benefits would accrue to all persons within a nation. To think in terms of persons instead of classes would mean—to name some concrete facts of our own country—the abolition of petty party strifes, the increase of the number of navigable rivers, and the decrease of palatial village post offices. In other words, the benefits of human association would be more evenly distributed. Perhaps no better ex-

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ample of the effect of a developing self-consciousness can be cited than the sovereignty of the Swiss people. We can trace the supreme democracy of Switzerland, with its increasing benefits for all the people, directly to the self-consciousness of individual citizens. Because the Swiss are conscious of themselves as men in relation to other men, they can maintain their confederation with its heterogeneous groups of many languages, social traditions and religions, as the pride of all freedom loving men. It is because the Swiss appreciate the value and dignity of human personality that their social institutions have reached such a wonderful state of efficiency and service.

The problem of state morality becomes reduced to the problem of education, since the development of self-consciousness is the process of acquiring information and intelligence. Progress of a political and social or ethical sort can come about only through the development of proper cultural attitudes. Men must be brought to realize the significance of human nature in all its varied phases. They must understand history correctly, which means to understand the faults and failings of nations and social institutions in the course of their development. As a result they would grow to appreciate more the functions and purposes of institutions, and their relation to the individuals they are designed to benefit. Self-consciousness of individuals depends upon an understanding of economic values; the vanity of luxury, the futility of unfair competition, and the absolute necessity of interhuman mutual aids must be taught as daily lessons from actual observation. The work of education must advance continuously so that the citizens of a nation may not be thought too ignorant to know their needs and to provide for them. A prime requisite for citizenship is the capacity to check the servants of the state. To hold this up as an ideal would mean much in the way of pointing out specific measures of political reforms, instances of which have been worked out in Switzerland. The proper education for citizenship would bring about such a state of enlightenment of individuals in a group that they would

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abolish the secrecy now attending upon group relations, especially of the diplomatic sort. This would prevent classes in power from carrying on their high-handed anti-public activities, hidden from the public under the guise of preventing other nations from knowing their plans. When the men of the world are those really concerned in commerce and government, nations will be able to deal with each other in broad daylight. When treaties are honest and fair there is absolutely no necessity for secrecy.

Because of present social conditions the program of education as it is here hinted at must seem huge in its proportions, but we must anticipate the puny objection that it is impossible to accomplish. During the course of the present war we have all seen the marvellous work of educational campaigns. We have all learned a lot in a short time concerning the value of economic mutual aid, and general social co-operation, even when the aim was not the establishment of a league of nations. If we should establish sincere educational campaigns in the avowed interests of permanent and universal human co-operation we could learn more, and with greater ease.

The facts of the present war indicate that a start has already been made toward the attitude that the problems of states are the direct problems of the people. In the first place, perhaps as never before, the issues have been stated in terms of people and not government. There has been an enormous flood of literature concerning the self-determination of peoples, even of the Africans. So persistent have been the suggestions for the improvement of the conditions of peoples, that we may hope for some permanent interest in human welfare. In the second place the present struggle is bringing out more than ever the importance of individuals in actual group activities. We are told that the war must be fought by women and children, as well as men, by workingmen and farmers, as well as soldiers, in short by all the people. This contrasts with situations in which the state hired a certain number of men and guns to carry on some enterprise of aggression and plunder. We are reaching

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the stage where each individual in the group must be considered a part of the organized effort to accomplish a given result. This is carrying over into the realms of industry, commerce, and transportation, the league of nations which has been a fact for some time in the realms of art and science. The next stage should be one in which each person will be conscious of his place among the members of human society. When states become groups of self-conscious individuals, who realize their international relations of mutual aid and obligation, a war of aggression will certainly be less possible. And may we not then hope for a general amelioration of the outrages resulting from the immorality of states?

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ETHICS IN MODERN FICTION.

VICTOR S. YARROS.

EXTRAORDINARY claims have been made by contemporary novelists and dramatists in behalf of fiction, or imaginative literature generally, as an agent or instrument of social and moral reform. The idea that fiction is an artistic and intellectual luxury does not satisfy our militant and progressive novelists, who not only resent any attempt to force on them rules of "composition" and form, notions of economy and unity and coherence, but repudiate and violate restrictions having reference to scope and subject-matter. Unlimited freedom is demanded by them in the name of the service they alone are capable of rendering to the cause of social reconstruction and progress.

The leader of this group is H. G. Wells, a wide-awake, impressionable and restless novelist. In a recent essay he wrote: "The novel is to be the social mediator, the vehicle of understanding, the instrument of self-examination, the parade of morals and the exchange of manners, the factory of customs, the criticism of laws and institutions, and of social dogmas and ideas." If the novel is to be and do all this, it follows that, as Mr. Wells further says, "the novelist is going to be the most potent of artists." He will, of course, tell stories, and take some pains to make them interesting and attractive—for on no other terms are readers to be procured—but his chief object will not be to amuse, to banish boredom, but to elevate man and society. The novelist will "present conduct, devise beautiful conduct, discuss conduct, analyze conduct, suggest conduct, illuminate it through and through."

Now, novelists have always presented conduct—good, bad and indifferent conduct. Not a few have "illuminated it through and through" without "discussing" it and "analyzing" it in pages or sections of polemical and didactic writings. But it is precisely for the liberty of stopping

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at any point, interrupting the narrative and delivering a sermon or essay on a relevant topic that Wells and others are boldly contending. Again, novelists have always criticized laws and institutions, dogmas and ideas, but it appears they have done this too timidly, too indirectly, too artfully. Laws of form and composition have hampered them more or less, and this handicap must be thrown off!

Frankly, if the emancipated novelists and dramatists expect support or even sympathy from theoretical or practical sociologists, they are likely to suffer disappointment. Serious thinkers and earnest social reformers care for literary and dramatic art far too much to rejoice in, or even remain indifferent to, the degradation and disfigurement of the novel or the play. They do not think, moreover, that such degradation and disfigurement would prove, either in the short or long run, of any perceptible benefit to Social Science, or to scientific or philosophical thought.

There are certain social services that the artist can render without violating the laws of his province. By stimulating the imagination, by exciting interest, by arousing pity and compassion, by provoking thought and discussion, by making men and women uncomfortable, discontented, ashamed, determined to "do something," the true artist can contribute his share toward the eradication of an evil and the solution of a grave but neglected problem. It was legitimate for a Dickens to deal with the horrors of the debtor's prison, or with the scandals and injustice of the law's delays and senseless technicalities. It was legitimate for a Victor Hugo to describe the last hours of a convict condemned to die, in a bit of thrilling fiction, for the purpose of strengthening the movement for the abolition of capital punishment. It was legitimate—pace Professor Paul Shorey, as we shall see,—for Mr. Galsworthy to hold, in "Justice," the mirror up to the nature of our system of law, justice and prison-discipline.

These are a few illustrations out of many that show how artists, while remaining artists and satisfying the demand

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for unity, economy and form, can promote the cause of reform and progress. But what is the method, the procedure, of these artist-reformers? They present pictures, they depict reality, they portray life as it is, and if morals are drawn and lessons extracted from these pictures and tales, it is life itself that teaches the morals or lessons. Of course, the artist, in going to life, must select typical cases, rather than exceptional ones. If hard cases make bad law, unusual and rare cases make bad art. The readers remain cold and indifferent. They feel that an illegitimate assault is being made on their emotions. They resent the trick, the utterly artificial arrangement of the facts of the situation. It is only when the artist deals honestly with common and familiar experience that he is capable of arousing sympathy and stirring his public to action.

But, if life faithfully pictured teaches its own lessons, then the deliberate and didactic preaching and teaching of the artist is superfluous, gratuitous, needless, offensive to the taste of his cultivated readers or auditors. The novel, the drama, is no place for arguments, discussions and polemics. *Arguments* against capital punishment should be addressed to legislators and would-be legislators, to influential executives, to civic bodies, to political assemblies. The artist cannot interrupt his story to present statistics, to institute comparisons, to refute misconceptions, to meet objections. The notion that you can beguile people into reading arguments in novels when they will not read them in pamphlets, newspapers or sermons, is baseless. The sacrifice of art for the sake of social advantage is almost invariably a vain sacrifice. The story is marred, while the hoped-for benefit fails to materialize, for the reader learns to skip.

The sociologist or the scientific reformer, therefore, will not ask of the artist the useless sacrifice of his art. He will appreciate the artist's aid when given, but he will demand that it be given within the limits assigned by the rules of artistic composition and form. He will not expect the artist to do work for which art is not fitted. He will not

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expect the artist to insert editorial or magazine articles, or analytical arguments, into the pages of a narrative. He will, therefore, shake his head doubtfully at Mr. Wells's promise, or threat, to discuss and analyze conduct and make the novel the particular vehicle of direct criticism, advocacy and reconstruction.

Let us, after these general observations, undertake a brief comparative study of two of the most famous and successful of current examples of sociological fiction. One of these, Mr. Galsworthy's tense drama, "Justice," will illustrate the right method, while the second, Mr. Wells's "Research Magnificent," a shapeless and formless novel, will illustrate the wrong method, "how not to do it"—how not to use fiction as a vehicle for social criticism.

The title of Mr. Galsworthy's play has an ironical sound. The author doubtless intends his auditors and readers to ask, after the last tragic scene, "Is this our law? Is this our justice? Is this our way of correcting and reforming criminals, or of safeguarding the public interest? Can we do no better than this in this age of pragmatism, new realism, science, radical innovations, bold and fearless inquiry into origins and meanings?"

Professor Paul Shorey, in a recent lecture, complained of the intellectual "dishonesty" of Galsworthy in this social drama. But Professor Shorey has an erroneous idea of the playwright's intention or implied moral. Mr. Galsworthy does not condemn punishment and correction as such; he does not overlook society in his compassion for the criminal; he does not indorse the notion of personal irresponsibility; he does not advocate non-resistance to evil and aggression within the body politic. Neither does he shirk the main problem or commit the blunder of selecting a rare, exceptional case. Just what does he do? The answer depends on our interpretation of the plot.

Here is what takes place. A young clerk in a London law office forges his employer's check and steals a sum of money. The offense is his first. In committing it he yields to almost irresistible temptation. He is a weak, not

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a vicious, character. An intelligent judge and jury would, under an intelligent law, inflict a mild but sufficiently deterrent punishment on the young clerk. The too mechanical system inflicts on him a severe and degrading punishment.

Certainly there is a difference between a rational penalty and an irrational one, between a penalty calculated to deter and a penalty calculated to embitter and poison a criminal's mind. The student of criminology is aware of the difference.

Galsworthy's play undoubtedly stimulates thought along this line and suggests fruitful questions. Granted that young Felder (certainly a type) deserved restraint and correction, what form should that correction have taken? Was solitary confinement a rational form of discipline? Did it tend to strengthen Felder's weak will, to impress upon him the need of resisting temptation, or the sanity and fairness of society's aims in sending him to jail? Work, a chance for study, an opportunity to use his brains in prison, to co-operate, perhaps, in maintaining discipline among the convicts—it is such things as these that tend to reclaim convicts and render them safe and useful members of society after their release. Auditors feel and say these things while watching the trial and prison scenes.

So far, then, "Justice," by holding the mirror up to nature, teaches common sense lessons. Our sympathy with the convict is not maudlin; it is thoroughly rational and worthy.

And what happens next? The convict is at last freed. He has suffered terribly and unjustly for his sin, his weakness, his folly. How does organized society meet him in his effort to rehabilitate himself? How do the police treat him? What is done to protect him from idleness and temptation?

Mr. Galsworthy again gives us certain episodes and scenes—typical, honest, lifelike episodes and scenes—that answer these questions. The dramatist does not utter one "didactic" sentence. But the final scenes are as eloquent

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as any sermon on "after treatment" of convicts, especially of convicts much sinned against by the law and by careless society. "Justice" is true art, if not exactly high or subtle art. It is honest and significant art.

But what is Mr. Wells's "Research Magnificent"? Form it does not even claim. It is a loose, inartistic narrative with many asides, comments and polemical observations. Its plot has no center and no unity. Scenes are laid in several places, and any other places would have served as well as those chosen by the novelist. There is nothing "inevitable" in the development or climax. Everything is manufactured, invented. As to any lesson or moral, none emerges. Mr. Wells evidently has certain notions concerning aristocracy, true and false, and concerning the obligations of a true and high-minded aristocrat. We may or may not sympathize with these ideas. At the best, they are nebulous and insular. But the story itself, with all the incidents and adventures imagined by the author, leads to no definite or firm conclusion.

Here is the story in a nutshell. A young and intelligent Englishman, whose mother divorced his provincial and commonplace father and married a titled surgeon, finds himself at the threshold of life the possessor of a large fortune. *Noblesse oblige;* the young aristocrat and millionaire feels that he owes service to society in return for his independence and affluence. To do nothing, to amuse himself, to waste time and talent, seems to him not only dishonorable but doubly dishonorable in an aristocrat. Therefore he decides to fit himself for a part worthy of his powers and opportunities. So far so good. But the young man finds that he is deficient in physical courage, and how can a man be useful without courage? It becomes necessary to develop his courage, and the author puts him through various "stunts"—pardon the colloquial word—with that end in view. Of the need of moral courage, we hear nothing. Perhaps every aristocrat is born with moral courage! Let that pass, however.

The proper physical equipment having been secured, the

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young aristocrat starts out to study men and institutions, governments and economic and social systems. He visits Russia, among other adventures, and we get some very superficial and journalistic pages on the Russian revolutionary movement. The aristocrat learns nothing worth while in Russia—of course not. He pursues his futile travels and "investigations," and the last scene is laid in South Africa, where there are strikes, riots, capital-and-labor problems, as well as bewildering race problems. The young aristocrat and "researcher" learns nothing there, either. Again, how could he? But he gets shot in a street riot and dies of the wound. The research thus ends abruptly and futilely. The young man had reached no conclusions and was not ready for any noteworthy rôle in society. Had he lived, traveled and investigated for another decade or two, he might or might not have found himself, have decided to join this or that party, school or movement. Just why he is cut off by his maker in his prime, we cannot tell. Accidents happen, and tourists with missions may get shot in street riots and violent strikes. But many more escape and betake themselves to pastures new.

What, precisely, does this story teach us? Nothing whatever. Was there conscious irony in Mr. Wells's title—"The Research Magnificent"? Hardly, for Mr. Wells is not the man to content himself with ironic hints. He demands unrestricted freedom of comment and discussion, as we have seen. He demands the fullest recognition of the novelist's right to stop and analyze character and conduct. In this novel he strangely refrains from exercising this right where such exercise might have been most useful. The young aristocrat was plainly naive and foolish in his notions of social research. He need not, in point of fact, have left London. Russia and India and South Africa severally have baffling and interesting problems galore, but a young Briton intending to enter parliament, or write books, or deliver lectures, by way of playing his part and rendering service to humanity, has plenty to do at home

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studying the British land question, the British system of taxation, the wage system, the platforms of the Labor and Socialist parties, the problem of Ireland, the problem of popular education. The young aristocrat might have found abundant occupation in studying the Fabian tracts on rent and interest, the defence of so-called individualism by Mallock, the theories of Spencer and of the Liberty and Property Defence League. Russia and South Africa can teach a young and anxious Briton nothing *fundamental.* The fundamental and essential problems of government, industry and society are the same everywhere—at least, the same in all civilized and advanced countries. The social researcher would better stay at home, mingle with the various classes, elements and strata of his own land, avoid needless complexities and realize how difficult and intricate the problem of social justice is under the most favorable circumstances. There are bitter and violent strikes in London and in Manchester. There are riots in Dublin and in the Ulster counties. It is the business of a "free" novelist like Mr. Wells to make this plain to young and earnest men of independent fortune and leisure.

The fact is, thousands of men and women, young and old, aristocratic and plebeian, hard-working and persons of leisure, are and long have been conducting the "research magnificent." Some of them have reached conclusions, while others are still at sea, oppressed by doubts and misgivings. It is strange that Mr. Wells should have failed to realize and bring home this simple truth.

The first duty of analysts and interpreters of character and conduct, let me repeat, is to make sure that the character and conduct are typical, worth interpreting. Peculiar, pathological instances are of no value as a basis for generalizations. Social fiction and the social drama should concern themselves with the normal, the significant, the truly symptomatic. The right interpretation of significant phenomena is as difficult as it is necessary to the statesmen, the reformer, the moralist. Let men of letters study and interpret social, economic, and moral phenomena, for it is

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true no human activity or interest is alien to them. But they must never forget that they are artists first and interpreters in the second place. Their business is first of all that of telling a good story, of conceiving and developing an interesting and alluring "plot." When they turn essayists, preachers, partisan controversialists or commonplace philosophers—as most of them do when they subordinate art to sermonizing—we get neither literature nor helpful interpretation.

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EUTHANASIA.

HERBERT L. STEWART.

IN a characteristically mordant passage Mæterlinck has poured scorn upon what he regards as a superstitious timidity of the medical profession.[1] He refers to the doctors who exhaust every scientific method in order to prolong a life which is plainly forfeit to some hopeless and excruciating disease. He stigmatises this use of knowledge as "enabling mankind only to die in greater pain than the animals that know nothing." If such scruple be right, why, he asks, are opiates constantly administered, which dull pain at the price of weakening the final resistance? Is it not inconsistent in a doctor to give morphia as an analgesic, but to refuse under any circumstances to prescribe a lethal dose? For the morphia even in so-called "safe" quantities will often hasten the end. Mæterlinck finds the explanation in those lingering religious fears which the scientific practitioner is now ashamed to acknowledge, because the corresponding beliefs have died away, but which, like many another vestigial relic of obsolete mental habits, can influence conduct long after they have ceased to form part of a creed. Medical men, it seems, are still subconsciously not less terrified than Hamlet of "something after death." At all events they act *as though they were convinced* that the ills we know not of are so great as to justify us in deferring them at any cost in present torture. "Of two evils, to avoid that which they know to be imaginary, they choose the real one." Although the chief pain of death is in the tedious expectation of it, yet the horror of that which is not in itself to be dreaded has become a pretext for extending the very circumstance by which alone one's latter end is made genuinely horrible. And the prediction is, of course, offered that in time science

[1] The passage is in Chaps. VI–X of his book entitled *Death*.

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will repudiate this cowardice, and facilitate rather than delay the happy despatch.

In this article no account will be taken of what Mæterlinck so contemptuously dismisses as "barbarous prejudice." The problem will be faced quite apart from those motives or prohibitions that are drawn from religion. This limit will be observed, not in the least because the writer acquiesces in this purely secular attitude, but simply for the sake of clearness, and to secure the advantage of considering one question at a time.

The very completeness of the case which our nimble critic makes out might well suggest to him that it is worth while to look at it again, and to ask whether in view of so widespread a feeling in this age of loosened religious apprehensions there is not more to be said than he has himself allowed for. If the argument is internally so rigorous as at first sight it appears to be, may there not be a doubt about some latent presupposition which has been taken as so obvious that there is no need to prove it, or even to mention it? The moment we view the matter so, we notice that Mæterlinck assumes as the only relevant consideration an accurate balancing of pleasures and pains. And to take this for granted will evoke vehement protest from not a few of the least theologically minded moralists of our time.

Common thinking no doubt assumes the same. The everyday pessimist thinks his case against life has been made clear once for all in the lines of Byron:

> Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
> Count o'er thy days from anguish free,
> And know, whatever thou hast been,
> 'Tis something better not to be.

Or again, in words more precisely appropriate to the problem before us:

> The silence of that dreamless sleep
> I envy now too much to weep;
> Nor need I to repine
> That all those charms have passed away
> I might have watched through long decay.

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It is a short step from this to the question whether there are no cases in which release may be artificially accelerated. But are there no grounds for the prevailing "prejudice" except fears of hell?

Now it is plain that if we have no principle in mind but the calculus of pleasures and pains, we shall become much embarrassed with other problems besides that of Euthanasia. This is only one of a group which surround the opening as well as the close of life. Should the embryo be destroyed when childbirth would be exceptionally perilous or exceptionally exhausting? Is it right to rear an infant that is congenitally deformed? What degree of guilt belongs to the crime of abortion, when no special danger is dreaded, and the object is merely to escape inconvenience? If we discount as mere prejudice the common conviction of an inviolable sanctity in life, the answer to these puzzles will be made still harder than it has yet been. It will vary with the temperament of the person judging, with the degree for instance of his personal sensitiveness to pain, and with his estimate of the sources from which a human being may become able to derive pleasure. Who knows whether the hedonic result will be positive or negative if we choose to preserve a mother with unimpaired vitality rather than a sickly mother *plus* a normal babe? Who can tell whether the birth that is prevented would have been the beginning of happiness or of misery? Who can decide whether the deformed child would have enjoyed the world less than a robust one? And it seems quite impossible to set limits to the pleasure calculus in such a fashion as to use it only in respect of those whose acute disease has brought them to the brink of death. Does not a like principle apply to those whose chronic ailment forbids the hope of permanent cure, but not the expectation of a long continued and futile invalidity. Why should we shorten the term for the senile paralytic but not for the young victim of a deep-seated tuberculosis?

If, however, the advocates of Euthanasia owe the force of their argument to over-simplification, those on the other

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hand who denounce Euthanasia often escape the sting of the problem by artfully misstating it. For example, they draw a sharp distinction between actively causing death and merely withholding that medical or surgical treatment by which death would be delayed. They would not administer a dose of opium which they knew would be fatal, but they would refuse to perform an operation whose value would be no more than temporary. Sometimes they seem to invoke the old casuistical argument, so much derided by Pascal, about "directing the intention." "A military man," says the monk in *Provincial Letters*, "may demand satisfaction on the spot from the person who has injured him,—not indeed with the intention of returning evil for evil, but with that of preserving his honour." Thus it is suggested that a drug may be given with the design of relieving pain, even though any pharmacist would have had a shrewd guess that the effect would be lethal. Surely one is responsible for the consequence of one's action, in so far as that consequence was foreseen, even though it was not explicitly aimed at. The surgeon who declined to remove an appendix in a normally promising case would not be guiltless of the death which he knew how to prevent. It may be, indeed, that there are some deaths which should not be prevented. But can we say that he who, when in charge of a patient, conduces to a fatal issue by his wilful omission is less accountable for it than he who brings it about by his wilful performance?

To put it so may seem like the tyranny of a harsh logic, fit only for those little minds which Emerson reproached for their narrow determination to be "consistent." A multitude of persons would, beyond doubt, passively watch that approaching doom which they would not for worlds lend a hand to precipitate.[2] And let no athlete of logic deny that their mind is honest and their purpose is pure.

[2] *E.g.* the famous Chicago case of two years ago, when a surgeon declined to save by operation the life of an infant whose mind would necessarily be defective. Many persons who approved his "leaving nature to take her course" would have heartily condemned a deliberate infanticide.

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Yet as Lord Morley has recently reminded us, great thoughts, though they come from the heart, must go round by way of the head. It does seem useless to whittle our problem down, to make ourselves think that we have solved it when we have only taken means to verbally disguise it, or when we have managed to confuse it with some other problem which, rightly stated, presents no difficulty. One judges with clearness upon it only in proportion as one makes the alternatives sharp, unambiguous, uncompromising. We have to picture the physician at the bedside of a patient whom he is morally certain that he cannot save, but whom he is similarly certain that he can for some time keep alive. Every medical man has met with such cases. Probably not a few medical men have acted in regard to them upon a principle which they would have been afraid to formulate even to themselves. They have taken palliative measures which "involved enormous risk, but were justifiable in such desperate circumstances," while in their hearts they suspected that the last agony would thus be abbreviated. When they thought about it after the death, they would have hated to lay down any universal maxim, felt perhaps no slight general uneasiness, but consoled themselves with a sort of instinctive feeling that "on the whole it was for the best." Surely it would be advantageous that one's mind should face the facts in their nakedness, and state a rule of which conscience need not be ashamed.

The revolutionary advocates argue thus:

Here is a suffering invalid, who has nothing to look forward to but a short time of ignominious and extending distress. The values of life have for him departed finally and irrevocably. He has full use of his faculties, but they waken each day to a darker prospect. His pain is not merely personal; it is shared sympathetically by those dearest to him and he knows well that for his own sake they hope the end may not be far off. He is moved by no individual whim, but by the considered judgment of the medical expert that all thought of improvement is vain.

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Why may he not summon his doctor, state his reasoned wish, secure an unbiased concurrence on the part of his family, and give his written sanction to the sole expedient of mercy which the circumstances permit? Is not this the generous and the far sighted thing to do? We applaud the man who sacrifices himself on the battle field, on police duty, in the ward of the infectious hospital, that others may benefit. What distinguishes this case from those? May we not even bring it under the majestic law, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends?"

It is always worth while in an ethical enigma to look back at the history of man's ideas on the subject. Modern Eugenism, for instance—always a little self-conscious in its intellectuality—is wont to put forth its more extreme proposals as if they were the pure outcome of advanced scientific insight. The truth is, as all historians are aware, that thoroughly uncultured Sparta was "advanced" in just the same fashion, and, as anthropologists have of late assured us, that the systematic selection of infants to be reared is carried out by primitive savage tribes with a sociological resoluteness that would put Mr. F. H. Bradley to shame. To know this should suggest to the Eugenist a fresh self-examination. He should make sure that he is really aiming at that social improvement in which each will be the care of all, not reverting to that social crudeness under which the individual was a mere instrument of the tribe. Killing the aged and infirm is an ancient custom of the Hottentots, and they defend it just on Mæterlinck's ground of an intelligent compassion. The Chukchi speak of "the friendly stroke which lets out the scanty remnant of existence." The outworn Melanesian chief begs to be put out of his misery when he is no longer fit to sustain his old prowess, and his relatives think it a disgrace if they have left him to the slow decay of nature. The Hawaiians, the New Zealand aborigines, the Australian Blackfoots are unanimous, if not on "birth-control," at least on the social need for a stern sifting of the cradle that the racial type

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may not degenerate. Infanticide and abortion in the Græco-Roman world were regarded with indulgence, and often with approval.

But closest to the problem we have set out to discuss was that puzzle about suicide which so exercised the minds of the Roman Stoics. De Quincey in an astonishing paragraph tells us that the only book ever written in palliation of suicide was Donne's *Biathanatos*, and notes the curious fact that the author should have been a Christian divine! Was De Quincey quite unacquainted with Pliny's *Letters*? Case after case is there recorded, in which the argument is developed on both sides, and we are left in no doubt as to Pliny's personal view. What should be done in a situation of incurable disease was much discussed during that sombre, introspective period of Roman society under the early Cæsars. We read of Titus Aristo, who summoned a council of physicians to tell him whether his ailment was hopeless, announcing that out of regard to his friends he would make a fight for life so long as he had a fighting chance, but that if no chance remained he must not be prevented from anticipating his fate.[3] The deathbed of Tullius Marcellinus is described as the scene of a similar grim debate, and the decision is reached that suicide is the only rational course.[4] Seneca insists that here is one of the few cases in which each may fitly follow his individual impulse, for a man's life at least is his own, and he is as much entitled to choose how and when he will give it up as to select the ship in which he will sail on a journey or the house which he means to inhabit.[5] That there remained a refuge from humiliation of which even Nero could not deprive his victims was the chief comfort of many a Roman noble under the Terror. Those who preferred to quote Epicurus rather than Zeno dwelt upon the axiom that each man may choose whether he will await Death coming to him or whether he will go to meet Death. Epictetus bade

[3] Pliny, *Epistles* i, 22.
[4] Seneca, *Epistles* lxxvii.
[5] *Ibid*, lxx.

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his disciples remember above all things that "the door is open," that like boys at play when we are tired of the sport we can decide to end it, and that while this alternative remains we should not both continue and complain.[6]

The old Stoics were far indeed from that bald hedonistic calculus which, in the passage I have referred to, seems to be endorsed by Mæterlinck. They had much more in mind than a weighing of rival amounts of pleasure. What they contemplated was a life which had lost its prospect of dignity, of worth, of civic action. They felt reluctant to make themselves a deadweight upon others. They looked upon disease less in its character of painfulness than in that of degradation. In a word, what they had in view was the preserving of that Roman *gravitas* from which all the Roman virtues were supposed to spring. And Donne in the passage quoted by De Quincey took a similar attitude. He held that choice was permissible, but not a capricious choice, and that the guilt of choosing wrongly had various degrees of heinousness. He argued that just as the killing of another may, according to circumstances, be murder, or man-slaughter, or justifiable homicide, so he who kills himself must have the ground of his act investigated before we can say how he should be judged.

Now it is undoubtedly a fact that the new sense of inviolableness in life was introduced by the Christian religion, and that it was there connected closely with the doctrine of a future state. This, however, does not mean that the value of the new principle is for ever bound up with the truth of the doctrine on which it originally rested, so that those who have moved away from this part of the Christian creed must, if they are logical, sit light by the corresponding part of Christian practice. There are many instances where a moral plane, reached at first in obedience to a dogma, has been kept for excellent reasons which the dogma did not, at least directly, contain. The first great movement of the Church against slavery—the movement which led to multiplied manumissions and the pledging of eccle-

[6] Arrian, i, 24.

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siastical treasure to ransom prisoners from enslavement—had its origin in the belief that all mankind have immortal natures, redeemed at the same infinite price. The protest against war and against the gladiatorial show arose from the feeling that none may send another unsummoned into an eternity for which his soul is unprepared. The impulse of charity was rooted in the hope that by giving alms to the poor the giver would acquire a holiness which fitted him for the inheritance of the blessed. But the deepened humanitarianism remained long after men had begun to interpret equality as a rule for this world apart from all thought of the next, long after a less rigorous view had been taken of judgments to come, long after the relieving of distress had ceased to be relied on as a means to the selfish acquisition of merit for the donor. In the same way our belief in the sanctity of life may well be independent of those theological considerations which first gave rise to it, and might even without inconsequence survive their total abandonment. The question is, what value has this sentiment of inviolable reverence for mankind to-day? Mæterlinck's airy confidence in answering it is that of one very insufficiently skilled in the ethical interpretation of the past.

I beg to submit regarding our problem the following considerations:

(a) Let us avail ourselves of the light that is always cast by putting an extreme instance. If in a hopeless case a sufferer's distress reached the utmost limit of excruciation that was compatible with continued consciousness, if no anodyne were available by which it could be assuaged, if it were likely to be long drawn out, and if the sufferer himself, fully apprised of the facts, were pleading for release, it seems certain that no one, except under the compulsion of those religious terrors which we have agreed to exclude from the inquiry, would condemn the doctor who forestalled death. More than this, it seems not less certain that our humane sentiments would make us condemn the doctor who refused to do so, and that those humane persons

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who did not condemn him would be either consciously or unconsciously governed by religious restraints which they were endeavouring to disguise under another name.

But the argument from an extreme instance is always liable to be confronted by the argument from the other extreme. Young Prothero in *The Research Magnificent* cannot understand how Benham had courage to cross a field against the menace of a bull. He asks how far such foolhardiness would go. Suppose it had been an elephant? A mad elephant? A pack of wolves? Benham aptly retorts, "Well, suppose in *your* case it had been a wild cat? A fierce mastiff? A lap dog?" So when Mæterlinck asks us where we mean to stop in the way of palliating timidity we may ask where he means to stop in the way of heroic daring. Would he connive at a happy release for the pneumonia patient against whom the chances seemed to preponderate? Would he kill because the cure must be tedious, or painful, or of dubious success? Would he allow a *liberum arbitrium* to the individual's own estimate of surplus pleasure and pain? Would he gratify the habitual melancholic, or yield to the fretful demand of the victim of *ennui?* It is quite certain that he would not defend Euthanasia for all persons to whom, either in a momentary mood, or even by constant temperamental preference, death seemed the more agreeable solution. Still less would any surgeon with a conscience consider the propriety, even if the patient asked for it, of ending a life because it had become burdensome to his nursing relatives. Plainly then there are some considerations other than those of the hedonistic calculus, by which the acceptance of this tremendous responsibility has to be decided.

(b) The result is not more definite if we include the consideration as to whether a life has permanently lost its prospect of "usefulness" or "dignity." Such matters are, as a rule, far beyond our coarse scales of measurement to appraise. There are dignities, and there are even high social uses, which belong especially to the last scene. It is not only when thought of as the entrance to a new career

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that majestic impressiveness surrounds the final parting. The concluding chapters of Plato's *Phædo*, although lit up with no such radiant confidence, present a picture that has been gazed upon by the best men with reverence for more than two thousand years. How much less precious would have been the legacy of Socrates to his circle and to us, if there had been any failure in his fortitude, or any clutching at a wretched anodyne! And would there not have been greater excuse for thus anticipating an unjust sentence than for shirking the common lot of mankind? One need make no large assumptions of evangelical piety to see in the aged who calmly await their end, or in the young who bear up without repining against the ravages of premature decay, an example of patient endurance and of the highest sort of moral courage which this fretful world cannot afford to lose. If the cynic calls this an unreal idealisation of what in practice is only sordid and distressing, there is not a rural doctor or a rural clergyman whose experience will not put such cynicism to shame. Perhaps the lesson taught by such obscure heroes in their death is more than all our most subtle moralist will ever teach by the admonitions of a lifetime.

(c) There seems to be no doubt that the advocates of Euthanasia indulge in much rhetorical exaggeration about medical helplessness in the last stages of a painful disease. I speak as a layman, and with the desire to be corrected if I am wrong. But it is surely a fact that scientific advance has placed resource after resource at the physician's disposal, by which, when cure cannot be expected, suffering may be more and more efficiently checked. If one sort of analgesic is too dangerous for the special case, others are available. Nor is it really improper to say that larger risks may be faced in proportion as the distress is extreme. In all sorts of situation risk is legitimate in the ratio of the good that may be achieved. But there is a world of difference between accepting a remote chance if it is a *real* chance, and taking measures under the pretence of chance where there is no chance at all. On the whole it seems

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certain that those poignant cases so often presented to us as if they were habitual are in truth among the very rarest exceptions in medical practice.

(d) Even if we were clear about the principle, the application of it would be full of difficulties. It would, of course, be necessary to state with the utmost rigour, and to embody in legal formulæ, the terms upon which medical men might exercise their new and most alarming powers. The effect of such an announcement would extend far beyond the circle of those who had any desire to take advantage of it. It would be received with horror by very many persons who would think of themselves as presenting to the eye of the world cases that were *prima facie* suitable for such treatment. Their minds would dwell upon it with the more morbid persistence just as they grew weaker and less able to appreciate the limits by which the lethal authority was hedged about. For them the whole relationship between physician and patient would be degraded. An affectionate confidence on the part of the invalid towards those who care for him is the basis of all successful healing. How many infirm persons will look upon their doctor not with confidence but with a terrified distrust, once they realise that he approaches them for any other purpose than to cure? Once they understand that he may probably be weighing in his mind whether on the whole he ought not to suggest that they be quietly and mercifully killed? It is idle to say that under no circumstances would such a step be considered without the patient's consent and even the patient's initiative. Is he to look forward to his last weeks with the thought that the world expects him, as a man of intelligence, to face the dilemma about a "useful" or a "useless" life? Is it to be impressed on him that he has to choose when he shall cease to be a charge and a trial to his relatives? That an exhausted and nerve-racked sufferer should have to feel this option resting upon himself, that he should think of those around as silently criticising his irrational cowardice and judging him—like Charles II—for being "such an unconscionable time in dying," that

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he should recognise in each new visit of his medical adviser another occasion on which his own obstinate vitality is being reviewed and deplored—all this constitutes a picture from which the most coldly scientific might recoil. A new pang will be added to old age if one has to keep probing one's conscience as to whether the will to live has not some admixture of selfish inconsiderateness. A new distress will poison the ministries of the sick room if one has any ground to suspect that the tender offices of friendship are rendered amid a protesting sense that it is not reasonable that they should any longer be imposed. A new terror will surround the deathbed if the expert attendant must be expected to come, not with the eager enthusiasm of a healer, but with the unflinching scrutiny of Eugenics, and the frigid impartialities of Race Culture.

(e) In this, as in a multitude of moral problems, it is not enough to ask ourselves how the arguments are balanced in some rare and extraordinary case. We must ask whether the remedy which we establish as a special resort for special need would not in all likelihood be misapplied in other and most unsuitable cases. I am far indeed from suggesting Kant's maxim that conduct must be bad if it cannot be universalised. Often what is right for A who is exceptionally placed would be wrong for B whose position is not exceptional. But A ought to consider the probability in this imperfect world of his example spreading where its effect will be thoroughly evil. He must often sacrifice something to which he may feel personally entitled, because he could not obtain it without causing harm to his neighbour. For instance, nine-tenths of the plausible case for a widely extended facility of divorce would break down if it were remembered that for one unhappy marriage where good would be done by a more flexible law there are a dozen marriages in which such a precedent would be, not indeed legitimately, but none the less disastrously abused. Moral compromise, as Lecky called it, is of the very essence of our duty to our neighbour. And though all the considerations I have so far urged were to be discounted,

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there would still remain much force in the argument that a permission of Euthanasia would inevitably lower mankind's regard for the sanctity of life, would introduce the habit of casting up advantages and disadvantages, and would expose us in the gravest sphere of all to those dangers by which the casuist is notoriously beset. Nicholas Bulstrode in *Middlemarch*, watching by the bedside and allowing himself to think whether the death of the patient would not on the whole be "for the glory of God," is no doubt an appallingly extreme example. But the risk of abuse is plainly real, and the abuse if it should occur is frightful to contemplate. The plea about a man's laying down his life for his friends may well be met by the plea that he should keep his life lest he set his friends a pattern by which mankind's most precious quality of fortitude will be weakened, the all too seductive spirit of self-indulgence will be reinforced, and the dishonesty of seeking reasons to forsake the former and yield to the latter will be more and more diffused. Perhaps the present, time when circumstances have made us hold the individual life cheaper than ever before, is specially unsuited to such an experiment.

It is not, however, my purpose to advance any dogmatic position, so much as to set forth certain aspects of our problem which have been less emphasised than their importance seems to deserve. The case for the innovating school is easy to maintain, so easy indeed as to arouse a very legitimate suspicion of its depth. The modern psychologist is quite at one with Condorcet in his remark that men preserve the prejudices of childhood, country, and age, long after they have recognised all the truths by which such prejudices should be destroyed. But it is not less true that the inveterate traditions of mankind contain as a rule some principle which is by no means wholly absurd. No doubt senseless prejudice is always tenacious. But it does not follow that all tenacity of belief in men who cannot justify themselves by reasoning is the result of a prejudice that is intrinsically senseless. In a poignant case the argument for suicide may seem dialectically complete. Yet who

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does not feel with "godless Billy" in *Lavengro* that after all suicide is both undignified and unheroic? Perhaps the upshot of our survey is to make us feel less confident in a logic which would set at naught the slowly consolidated resistances of the common conscience, and more respectful to a tradition which logic did not form, but which—often to our intense surprise—it is forced in the end to vindicate.

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ART AND THE DEMOCRACY.[1]

HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER.

A TIME of warfare, and of such warfare as that which shakes the world to-day, when all the nations have turned from their accustomed pursuits to perfect themthemselves in the one dreadful craft of mutual destruction, can hardly fail to appear to most men an inappropriate and inauspicious moment for the public discussion of the meaning of art in society. The pursuit of art is so pre-eminently a pursuit appropriate to peace, and, as many of us are inclined to think, of the leisure and opulence of peace, that the mere naming of it in the presence of warfare, except to point the moral of what war destroys, excites us to impatience. Let us concern ourselves with the business of the hour, the business of men, we say; when the morality of the world is at stake is no time to be dreaming of beauty, or for the painting of a paradise of the fancy.

Assuredly there is in this attitude enough of truth to draw our sympathy and to make it incumbent upon one who persists in diverting our attention from the sour business of war to less pressing matters to show that the diversion is not inopportune. That, I hope to be able to do. And by way of preparation I should like to put the question as to what would be your attitude toward the consideration of beauty if this present vast war were convincingly felt to be the first flare of the swiftly approaching conflagration of the world, and of the total destruction of all mankind. If you felt yourself to be, or to be about to be a participant spectator in that awful and final spectacle, the ekpyrosis, and, having some philosophy, wished to obtain therefrom the last benediction of life, of what character would be the good that you would seek, if not the magnificence and sublimities of the spectacle itself? Nay, have you never in

[1] Presidential address before the Western Philosophical Association at Northwestern University, March, 1918.

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imagination dreamed that the men of that fearful hour would have in its fiery glory consolation for all the prizes that go with a slower decay, and have you not, for the moment, longed to share in their splendors? Surely, life gets its values not from its humdrum and routine, but from its insights and its inspirations—those rare and intemporal accessions of experience when the clouds of illusion part and float away and the breadths of the heavens stand revealed in all their quiet majesty.

And if such be the final values, by what lesser measure can we judge the immediate? In going to war our problem is a moral problem, and our search is for the great good. We allow ourselves to become absorbed in the business in hand primarily because we are convinced that it is not our final business nor the terminus of human experience, but is preparatory to other and nobler affairs; and if, for the moment absorbed, we are impatient of looking far ahead, this is because we are so confident that there is to be a future in which there will be time enough for the realization of what nature yet can give or art achieve. The near duty is one of clearing the ground; let the builders come after,—we say.

And yet—I speak to philosophers—is there one lesson that men should have better learned than the need of foresight? Above all, where the stake is a moral one, men must ever be thinking of the good if ever they are to recover it. The ruin of the warrior is to forget his cause, and of the man to forego his vision of the perfect life. And in such an hour as this, an hour of war, when changes are swift and moral currents treacherously fickle, men should cling to the guidance of the past and clear their minds to the future as a steersman holds to his charts in stormy weather.

My purpose in analyzing the relation of art to democracy is not to turn forgetfully from the present crisis of the world, but to present and defend a thesis, the understanding of which I regard as important for the attainment of the best in life whether in war or peace, and as certain to be of profound significance if clearly realized in the period of social

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reconstruction which is inevitably coming. That thesis I will briefly resume in advance of my discussion.

The problem of conduct, as I view it, is a problem of discovery, carrying on into the social world that double invention of inner and outer, self and other, which marks our first experiments in sensation in infancy. A man cannot live to himself, and remain a man; but neither can society live without men who embody something more than the social structure: men must indeed be citizens in order to be men, but citizens must also be men in order to be citizens; no true polity can be formed of directors and servants or of general staffs and "cannon fodder"; a true polity can only be a fellowship, that is, a democracy. But fellowship means free association; it rests upon the independence, and hence to some extent the idiosyncrasy of the individual. Its agreements, therefore, must be not merely mutual understandings, but sympathetic understandings. In a very precise sense a democracy must be an *entente cordiale*—with the adjective as important as the noun. The maintenance of such an emotional understanding must always be a delicate problem—as all fine conduct is delicate; and for it every instrument of intellectual communication and spiritual communion which man has devised must be kept bright and keen,—and the arts are the subtlest and most delicate of them all.

Such is my thesis, put in the bald manner. There is, to be sure, one important phase of it—an image which is at its core—which I have not mentioned. But this, I trust, my argument will make apparent.

I.

There is a well-known painting, representing the kerchief of Saint Veronica imprinted with the countenance of the crucified Christ, which the artist has so designed as to create a striking illusion. Apparently the eyes of the Christ are closed in death, but as you contemplate the picture, you become aware that they are open, gazing with a grave and solicitous penetration into your own. There is

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nothing sudden nor startling in the transformation; it is no spectacular miracle; but, as if in answer to your meditations upon the aspect of death, you discover in death's place an intent, though veiled life; and with no effort of the imagination, you give yourself into its possession, seeming (without distortion of nature) to participate in a transubstantial communion of spirit with spirit.

To me this picture is a fine symbol of the essential truth of human life. We open our mortal eyes with unpremeditating curiosity; our sight is caught by outlooks flaming with lights and colors, or fading into sombre shadows, bright with the hues of gaiety or dark with tragedy; and even as we gaze, gradually these varied sensations model themselves into the regal features of Nature, whose veiled regard we responsively meet, striving to pierce to the spirit behind the still countenance. As by grace, as by miracle! —for never could this be were it not that we are endowed from birth with an eye of faith, looking, with a belief ineffable to logic, for some revelation within the flame of sense of a spirit kindred to our own—kindred, even if divine, and compassionate. The poignancy of things human, and all that makes of the world a riddle, is this untaught and unswerving faith that the configurations given us by the senses are real only as symbols and our eager determination to penetrate to their meaning.

The thing we call a man is no stark material body, nor its existence but a drifting phantasmagoria of pulsating cells caught up into the dissolvent unity of a contagious peristalsis. Man, in his physical being, is to the physicist a transient complexus of number and motion; to the physiologist, an amazingly dramatic interplay of many-celled communes—trade-guilds of the bodily commonwealth, whose adherences to their hereditary crafts is health, whose rebellions we term disease; while to the psychologist (if he be purist) man appears as a cinematographic sweep of sensations, full of flares and stops, now dense and smooth, now breaking into fragmentary incoherencies,—though always with some tantalizing relevancy of the parts never quite

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obscured. But to the metaphysician a man is something of an altogether other character. In his physical being he is an encasement, a carapace, a thing of cumbrous plates, narrowly creviced by the organs of perception, bunglingly contrived for the amphibious nymphhood of the soul. The real man, saith the metaphysician, is the being encarapaced, whose purblind senses, like the feverish antennæ of insects, desperately strive to feel out the essences of the world; or, changing the figure, he is the prisoner in the donjon-keep tantalized by the shafts of light piercing the lancet-windows far above and awed by the thin re-echoings of his own weak voice; or, nobly, he is the sage drawing the coverlet over the closing apertures of death-dimmed eyes and sending as his thank-offering to the god of healing the sacrificial cock, brave herald of the morn. Man, to the metaphysician, is essentially an effort; and the character of that effort, when it is truly defined, is neither for enginery of rigid nor artistry in phantasmal matter, but ceaselessly and intently for penetration of the fleshly screen of reality and insight into its heart

Wonderful indeed it is, that, though imprisoned from birth, the soul is thus conscious of its prison. Stretching, craning, peering, it strives for light, and still more light; and it expends its strength and its ingenuity in the endeavor to create and refine keener instruments of penetration and ever more powerful glasses of reflection. Superb among all these instruments are language and reason; for the whole refinement of experience through abstractive thought and the whole dazzling mintage of speech rest upon a confidence in values, in things not grasped but meant, as if the whole world were bullioned by a store of pure gold of which our minted coins are true certificates. But more than this, these certificates, like coins, are communicable and exchangeable and heritable. For it is the most obdurate, as it is the most marvelous, of all our faiths, that the redemption values of this universe are social and ideal and sustained by an eternal commerce of souls.

For though physically immured, though insulated by

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dense matter, the spirit of man is by nature gregarious, possessed of an insupportable longing for comradeship, and ever pathetically struggling to perfect its obstructed communication with fellows whose presence is known by faith only. All that we mean by love—aye, all that we understand by hate, too,—is inner measure of this faith; and all that we mean and understand by reason and by the whole gift of speech is its outward burning. We mortals, by the flesh, are separated from one another as by interplanetary spaces; but we surmise the unseen presences of kindred spirits, and we devise shrewd apparatus whereby, charged with our mating passion, our calls are imperiously sent abroad, while in the ceaseless perturbations of the sensitive receiver we eagerly puzzle out the half coherent responses. Moreover, and most mysterious of all the attestations of our yearning for fellowship, as we grow in body—wrestling like Jacob with the Angel of the Lord—we metamorphose the body; until in time, the physical form and countenance themselves become instruments of communion, character and desire alike written in their lineaments; so that of all the books of men, none are so subtly symbolic of the soul as are men's life-inscribed and life-prophetic features. Here, indeed, is transubstantiation, and, whether by holy or by baleful light, transfiguration.

Life, in all that can be called spiritual and that is in all that is truly life, is a struggle for expression and for the recognition of expression in a world whose one high virtue is fellowship. We are born, under stars beyond our ken, with a faith, for which reason can give no justification save that reason itself is its evidence, in the reality and rights of our citizenship in a cosmic democracy. Being so born does not give, let it be understood, assurance of participation in the citizen's benefits. Engrossment in sense means expatriation; selfishness is suicide. No man can be a true philosopher who knows only the closet; none a living artist who is immured in a tower of ivory; nor even the anchorite human and holy save God is with him in his cell. But all these, and all men, will find the treasure of freedom and

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the boon of inspiration only in reaching out beyond self and sense, aspirants that they may be sharers in the state, and counsellors of the high *res publica* of the world.

II.

Mortal men are imprisoned men, and mortal life is a struggle for liberation through fellowship. This is the metaphysical truth of human nature, as saints have seen and philosophers have portrayed it; and if we study human activities from the points of view of such a presupposition, we find them all, in their various departments, taking on the form of language: all, industry, politics, science, art, religion, in their manifestations appear as modes of communication, by which men express their impressions of the nature within which they are born and shadow forth to one another the desires and aspirations which this nature generates within their own souls. Life is a struggle for liberation through fellowship; its first condition, therefore, is mutual understanding; of which, in turn, the prime condition is a language which can convey the subtleties of experience from mind to mind.

The arts are the great instruments of this intercourse; and art, as a whole, may be best defined as the communication of imprisoned souls. This is true of the industrial arts, which express our practical and material needs. It is true, again, of the communicant edifices of religion and science, in which we express the valuations in terms of goodness and truth which we set upon the world. But in an especial sense it is true of the fine arts, which give our evaluations in terms of beauty; for it is these arts which, in last resort, form, as it were, the grammar of sense, and, by reason of the variety of their images and their character as imitation, serve to symbolize the other values. The practical, the good, and the true, all finally receive their communicable values from the fact that the mirrors of the senses, enlightened through art, may set upon them a gloss of beauty which is at the core of all desire and becomes the veritable gold of all spiritual commerce. Plato, with a double truth,

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likened the artist to one who holds up a mirror to all creation, catching therein the fleeting reflections of the images of things ideal: for it is surely the imitative art which most of all unfolds to us the phantasmic character of this painted world, and leads us, with more supple intelligence, to penetrate to those living ideals which are as much veiled as revealed by its outer figures.

All the conscious achievements of men's conscious desires are, in a true meaning, art. But with a very special meaning the fine arts are art *par excellence*. For it is their unique office to provide that final appeal by means of which the structures of industry are made dramatic, science is shown harmonious and whole, religion becomes communicant, and all civilization is given its panoramic power. More than this, and beyond all, it is these arts that limn for us the pageant of nature, portraying what in sense transcends sense and humanizing the superhumanity of all things remote. Whether it be in nature or in human nature, if we see structure, unity, harmony, it is with the æsthetic eye, and as a gift of that power, at once impersonal and intimate, which through the arts enables us to participate in all creation.

The very forms of the several arts illustrate their essential purpose. Vision, hearing, language—these are the antennæ of our intelligence, whereby we explore the flavors and fibres of environment and establish our remote connections with kindred pilgrims. The sense of vision is, to a unique degree, the mind's parable. Our most ordinary speech is full of expressions which show our intimate dependence upon sight in the formation of ideas and judgments. We ordinarily think of the higher powers of the mind as being supersensible, and indeed they are so; but for the communication of supersensible truths it is upon the metaphors of physical vision that we ultimately rely. The "light of reason," the "light of faith," the "eye of the mind," "spiritual vision,"—these are phrases so common that we are hardly aware of their metaphorical character. Hardly less concealed is the reference to the sense of sight

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in such words as "insight," "intuition," "reflection," "speculation," "imagination"—words which designate the subtlest and most supersensuous of the mind's powers; while again, for that inward state which marks the height of human experience, whether it be in the perception of Truth or of Beauty or of Goodness, we have but the one word "illumination." In a related fashion, the sense of hearing furnishes many of the tropes of metempirical thought: harmony is the true image of the necessary connection of ideas and of logic as it is the natural image of cosmic order and the singing spheres; rhythm makes clear to us the cycles of consciousness as it does the cycles of all creation. And finally, language, the "gift of tongues," has seemed to man from his primitive beginnings to be in some mode oracular and divine, while supreme among all the tropes of religious philosophy is the conception of the Logos, the "Word," as the participant image of the spiritual reality of the universe.

Thus, in their natural character, vision and hearing and language have a double relationship, giving them the native quality of symbols. They are, therefore, not private in the manner in which touch and taste and smell are private. These latter senses are intimately associated with the nutritive functions of the body, and hardly pass beyond such functions in their significance; they have to do with a chemical rather than a physical world, with a fluid rather than a structure; and they are all conceivably a possession of shell-enclosed mollusks. The sense of sight, *per contra,* reaches out to that which limitlessly transcends the body, to the fixed stars and to galaxies beyond the galaxy, while at the other extreme it is ineffective if the body be too nearly approached, holding its objects, as it were, at arm's length. Hearing, again, is the sense recipient, and is isolated as no other sense is isolated; for touch and sight, like taste and smell, commonly test and corroborate one another, but audition has no such natural ally; for which reason it seems abstract and ideal and impersonal in a degree beyond vision itself. Lastly, the very essence of language is commu-

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nication; it rests upon the assumption of a transcendental world, spirit communing with spirit, out of all dimension.

It is these, then,—vision and hearing and language—that are the agents of our liberation from a narrowly bodily life; and it is wholly to be anticipated that through these should come our most intimate, because our least selfish, evaluations of life—what is called the impersonality of art, but is in fact only its unselfishness. Consider the fine arts severally. Plastic and pictorial art is but expressive vision. The painting and sculpture and formal monuments which strew with magnificence the pathway of civilization surely represent a kind of imaginative restoration of the inner reality of nature as men have apprehended it; the pillars and arches of the forest, pyramidal mountains and columnar cliffs, have given the image of a world architect, as the manifold modellings of living forms and the shining fantasies of the skies have given the image of a divine sculptor and a celestial painter; and it is through interpretation of these outer images, projected to a cosmic scale, that men have come to a comprehension of their own lordlier selves: the image of Strife touching earth and sky is the measure, says Longinus, not of the Titan, but of Homer. Our modern art of painting, rich and gorgeous in all our galleries,—what is it, if it be not the varied reflection of the spirit of an age in which man has deemed himself, as never before, to possess a friendly mastership, based on comprehension, over a world of nature grown dear through a new intimacy? Science, in our day, has conducted us to the very portals of nature's deep sanctuaries; but it is art, and above all the painter's art, which draws the last veil from her face.

The other arts, for other fields of nature, perform a like office. It is perhaps daring to speak of an emotional life of the world as an objective fact of the cosmic reality; yet I believe it to be true that the world possesses such a life, whereof our own human emotion is but a revealed and shared portion. And it is the art of the musician to make this creditable; it is his to find in his own emotions, and in their expression, the keys which open to our understanding

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the emotional changes of that universe in the midst of which we come into being. Certainly, there are few problems of æsthetics more difficult than is the analysis of the attraction of music,—which all men agree to be emotional, and yet in some sense impersonal. This is a paradox, for in our psychological descriptions emotion is the most purely personal of all psychic facts. But the paradox is surely resolved if we assume, as I believe we must, that the art of music is not a mere expression of private feeling, but a discovery of universal feeling,—and of feeling so universal that its tones and chords are harmonisonant far beyond the range of merely human experience. To this degree, at least, I am with the Pythagoreans.

Of poetry it is surely not necessary to speak with detail. What it adds to logic is obvious to all men. Plato, had he judged according to his own practice, would have said that it is the image of the Good, measured by Truth and Beauty and Law; and we, in our more psychological manner, can but reiterate that it is through poetry—understood in the broad, as creative literature, that we express that life of sentiment, which holds a middle place between ideas and emotions, for it is compact of both, and thus develops the whole motive of human conduct on the side that we name ideal. Poetry participates in the character both of the visual arts and the musical, uniting impression and expression, thus in its essential form portraying the subtle give and take of all higher experience.

Such are the several arts, each a type of communication, in that truest sense in which communication is participation. In their forms they are diverse, to such a degree that it has been a puzzle to æstheticians to say what they have in common, what, indeed, is art. But on the view which I have expressed, this question receives an answer. Art is the communication of imprisoned souls; but it is that form of communication which is communion. Its forms are due to its instruments—vision, hearing, language. Its meanings are the multiplex tempers of human experience, the colors of all life caught in crystal and disseminated in pris-

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matic play. Its understandings are the eagerness of our sympathies, whetted to imaginative penetration because of our embodied solitude. And its aim is to throw the whole world into its true psychical perspective, drawn from the vantage of human nature, but leading out to ultra-human horizons. In the interplay of expression and reception it creates, first, an ecclesia of man, whose image stands idealized on the high altars; and second, beyond this that broader communion of man and his creative world which is materially imaged in human states and societies and ideally in the city of God.

III.

If life, in its humane essence, have that character which I have ascribed to it, of being a struggle for liberation from the solitary confinement of bodily and animal nature and for the formation of a great spiritual republic in which men shall come to an understanding of one another and of their own more human selves through their subtler acquaintance with the world; and if the arts, and all art in its unity, serve that purpose which I have affirmed, of catching up from the dross flow of experience those elements which can symbolize its mutual values, thus establishing that intercourse which alone makes humanity conscious of its quality and alone makes its republican union possible;—then assuredly, there is some intimate connection between the forms of political states, as history has shaped them, and human realization of the true human good. Art, if it be the key to man's expression of his humanity and the instrument of its appraisal, can, in its achievements, never be less than an index of his success in the battle for humanity; and its association with this type of political state or that will in some measure be an attestation of political and moral values.

The history of culture furnishes a broad illustration of this connection between the power of art and the spirit of humanity. What is heritable in civilization is chiefly its art—chiefly its ideal expression. Political power is notoriously evanescent; economic strength is only less so. But whatever of dominion and riches the human spirit attains

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is prized in its own day and preserved in days beyond, forming in its long assembling the hereditament of culture: the broken marbles and torn papyri of the past are more precious than all the pearls and purples of kings and emperors.

In the assignment of such treasures history reveals a simple plan. Art rises to its climaxes of excellence in closest association with political and religious movements—with those periods and forces in which men are most lifted up out of the narrow and animal self and into their humaner ideal self. It is in the effort to express moral conviction—using the word moral in the wide sense in which it expresses all conscious valuation of custom—that art arrives at its floruits. Periclean Athens, Augustan Rome, Florence under the Medici, Holland under the House of Orange, Elizabethan England, the France of Louis Quatorze,—these are some of the great periods, marked by or following, be it observed, in each case a struggle for internal order or for external independence. "Liberty," said Milton, and he uttered no finer saying,—"liberty is the nurse of all great wits." The florescences of mind which I have enumerated are not all free in the same sense, some of them hardly free at all in our political sense of freedom; yet all of them are at least periods of conscious national independence, and of independence made conscious by the historical proximity of a threatened destruction or disruption. Furthermore, two of these periods represent the acknowledged climaxes of European art. Athens, from Marathon to Chæronea, from the birth of Socrates to the death of Aristotle, and Florence, from the incursion of Charles of Valois to that of Charles the VIII, from the exile of Dante to the martyrdom of Savonarola,—these two cities not only produced poets and artists, philosophers and saints, that are the very pattern of supremacy, but they also discovered and defined democratic liberty. On the other hand, if we take Rome under Augustus and France under *le grand monarque*—which of all monarchical periods glitter most with genius,—it is evident at once that the thought is

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weaker and the expression is more superficial, nay, artificial, than in the great eras of democracy. In these autocratic periods, representing social relaxation after peril and dissension, a philosophy of expression, a drama of manners, satire, ornament in art and life, replace the severer and sincerer striving for truth which marks the more troubled politics of the democracies. To put the matter by concrete comparison, the difference between the critical spirit of Aristotle's *Poetics* and Dante's *De Eloquio Vulgari*, on the one hand, and that of Horace's *Ars Poetica* and Boileau's *L'Art poétique*, on the other, is not that the latter are not concerned about truth and beauty, but that the truth and beauty which is their concern is infinitely less significant and less prophetic than is the austerer thinking of the citizens of democracies,—and this where the concern is primarily one of formal art. In periods of great political achievement men become highly socialized, that is to say, highly conscious of their human powers; and a great art is the natural consequence of such political greatness. Yet it is worthy of note that the highest artistic excellence falls to the democratic states,—partly, we must suppose, because of their more generous conception of liberty, and partly because it is the democratic state which attempts the most complex realization of our social humanity.

But it is not alone political humanity that is served by and that inspires art. In the growth of civilization, there arises early that sense of solidarity which we call national consciousness and which manifests itself in that communion of ideals which is the essence of nationality. But in a later growth nationalism is overpassed by internationalism, of which the primary and to our own day the most vital forms are religious. The world owns three great international religions—Buddhism, Muslimism, and Christianity;—every one of which has at its heart the pulse of democracy, and is in a true sense to be described as a communion. Each of these religions has given rise to a great symbolic art. Indeed, what tithe of our artistic achievement would be left, if all that is inspired by these religions were taken from us?

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For religion, perhaps because its meanings are subtler, is most of all dependent upon art for its communication: the religious prophet,—Buddha, Mohammed, Jesus,—speaks in parables, and the altars of temple, mosque, and church shine with double-meaning tokens and the images of compassion. Salvation through faith is the great dogma of each of these religions; salvation through faith is the great dogma, also, of democracy, and indeed of human nature; wherefore it is small wonder that through many centuries and in many lands minaret and spire have lifted up mute signs of human trust in a universalized humanity, or that every device of imaginative expression should have been brought to the service of so moving a conviction.

"Liberty is the nurse of all great wits." Democracy—not in any narrow political sense, but in that sense in which it means simply men's common faith in the manhood of men—is the inspiration of art; and it is in proportion as the conception of democracy passes outward from the political and onward into the religious,—that is, in proportion as it becomes more truly spiritual, and more a communion, that art gains in breadth and vigor,—of which there is needed no better illustration than the beauty and richness of the Gothic art of the Mediæval ecclesia. Indeed, what religious faith adds to political faith is already before us on the pages of history. The political state is, in its essence, merely moral. It may be inspiring, as Athens, for a brief hour, was inspiring; but in the end it is not truly living, and the impression it gives is architectural and fixed. Its supreme temple is a temple of Justice, as Plato saw, and the Romans, with their courts, realized. But untempered morality tends always to simplicity and rigidity; hence, to unloveliness and to the loss of the power to inspire. Plato, with the moral state only in his eye, would banish art from its boundaries, except such simpler arts as might minister to the determined structure of the state. But we—before we can give allegiance—demand, with Adeimantus, that justice be shown to be the fairest.

Human nature, when it fully discovers its own needs, is

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complex in its demands. Justice is beautiful, and the virtues of the just state, which is the political state,—courage and temperance and wisdom,—these also are fair and shining when beheld in their untarnished truth. But there are other virtues springing from other than political communions,—the Christian virtues, which are the virtues of a consciously imperfect, and therefore of an aspiring world. Justice must be tempered with mercy, for the reason that men are enfeebled by ignorance, even when they seek the fair. Faith and hope and, more than all, charity represent something beyond a political morality; they represent modes of conduct that can never be expressed in laws, for the reason that they can never be abstract and certain, but must be, always, concrete and experimental,—in a word, æsthetic. Life, as we experience it, is temporal and experimental, and it calls for temporizing as well as for regulative virtues. This is what religion adds to politics, and what, in its most beautiful form, Christianity adds; for it is the great teaching of Christianity that adventure and chivalry are truly and eternally spiritual. Man is a viator, said the Mediæval doctors; life is a pilgrim's progress; the hero is an errant knight, owing an allegiance and owning a faith.

This contrast, Greek and Christian, of the virtues of the political and of the religious man, is the fundamental one of an abstract and merciless justice versus a tempered morality, of Law versus Art. We feel that virtue and beauty should invariably agree, but in our experience they often seem to draw in contrary directions; and then it is that we condemn the inspiration of the polity as insufficient and turn to religion for something more profoundly satisfying. Temptation, it would appear, is a part of the order of nature, even our own nature; and it is only religion that deals fairly with temptation, consoling it with charity. Plato had glimpses of this truth, when he turned from his dialectic to his myths, and Aristotle gave it his own characteristic formulation. "Poetry is a higher and more philosophical thing than history," he says; and it is so for the

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reason that it can convey the tempers as well as the facts of life, and so bring in our own souls the purification of understanding; and the tragic hero should be "a good man, suffering through frailty or error," because life is struggle and a problem, a struggle for the good and a problem of mutual understanding,—not but the illustrative solution of some natural law.

IV.

Let me return upon my theme. Life, I began by saying, —human life is in its essence an effort: the effort of a soul imprisoned in its own natural realism to escape into what is no less its own, even though never selfishly its own, humane idealism. The escape is never effected, the realism never truly evaded, for the good reason that a man is an animal, bound by animal senses and appetites. On the other hand, the idealism is never exhausted nor could be without the animal losing the nature of man; for its idealism is not only the great communion of humanity, it is itself what makes man humane. To put the matter in Aristotelian language, the *zoön politikon* which is man gets its humanhood from what is political in its constitution—understanding "political" in its broadest and most spiritual significance.

It is this humane idealism, striving to establish the human polity, which comes to expression (and this was my second point) in the forms of art. Art is the ritual of the communion, and the symbol of its mystery. Being a ritual and a symbol, art is, however, necessarily double-natured—participating alike in sense and idea,—and therefore in no small degree equivocal. A certain blindness and fumbling is inherent in all symbolism, which art, least of all, escapes, for the very reason that its symbolisms probe so far. The expression of beauty is dissatisfying because of the very greatness of the undertaking, and indeed the noblest of such undertakings are the least complete.

Nay, what is nobility if it be not a recognition of incompletion? The goods that men recognize are not at all harmoniously attainable; in the realization of some, others are made impossible; and it is just in their willingness to sur-

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render what is privately and personally dear in the interests of what is publicly important and spiritually precious that men are endowed with nobility. Of which the expression is that life of cities and states and of great religions, whereof the heritable images are the works of their artists. Upon this, also, I have touched, indicating that not only is there a higher virtue in the political man than in the private, and in the religious man than in the political, but also that the office of the artist becomes more important and significant in proportion as the virtue to be communicated becomes more subtle: in brief, that the symbol of Justice is at once more simple and less moving than the image of Faith, and that even a political society which rests on faith, as does democracy, makes a more sensitive use of art than is aught that but ministers to the glitter of autocracies.

Such has been my argument. From its statement there are to be made, I think, certain clear deductions. The first of these is that life and art are complex for the same reason: namely, that in both there is a mixture of the real and the ideal, a contradiction of the given and the intended. Art, we are told, is the criticism of life; and this can only mean that art is our most self-conscious expression of human nature. From this self-consciousness it gains that power of communication between individuals which, in the end, amounts to a mediation between man's private and animal and his public and spiritual desires—a mediation never quite successful, for the reason that the two can never be wholly in harmony.

This leads to my second deduction. Art, to be true, must represent the problem of human frailty. This was Aristotle's great judgment, founded upon the insights of the Greek tragedians. Goodness and beauty do not actually coincide in human experience; justice is not inevitably the fairest. Our faith in the universe (for we have a faith which is as ineludible as is our aspiration after humanity and of which this aspiration is the expression)—our faith in the universe is not borne out by the facts of experience, at least,

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not with rigor and satisfying completeness. We men are embogged in evil to such a degree that at times it is only our struggle for freedom that keeps us aware that we are men. This is the fact which makes tragedy, and instils in us that fearful sense of doom which ever impends upon the throne of beauty. Yet in one thing we may take heart. Tragedy was a simpler and more expressible thing for the Greek than it is for the Christian; for to the Greek the antagonism of goodness and beauty was a discrepancy of human and divine law, of the political with the religious communion: and this the Christian has solved in placing the emancipating above the regulative virtues and in giving to faith (of which charity and hope are but the present and future tenses) the last reprieve to salvation.

Let me re-state this last point, for it is important. It is not command and obedience but problem and free choice that make true morality: the parable is a more penetrating lesson than the commandment. Reason calls for strict justice; but nature tempers all stringencies of form,—including that of justice, including those of reason. For reason itself, truly understood, is but choosing; vital reason, therefore, and the only reason worthy devotion, is a choosing between balanced, problematical issues,—a choice in which the judgment rendered involves some loss of ponderable significance. The reasonable life is set in a context of problem; and human nature, if it would be rational, must be beset with dubieties. "They are not skilled considerers of human things, who imagine to remove sin by removing the matter of sin," says Milton; and it is equally true that an implacable reason, drawn to no error, could be but reason's whole denial, mechanical and meaningless. As with reason, so with justice and her kindred virtues: they are needed only in the face of trial and peril; they are significant only when experimental; they are beautiful only when touched with some sacrifice. It is faith alone that can make authentic such choices, proclaiming which is the lesser and which the greater good,—faith alone which makes the final purification of reason a love of truth, the

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final purification of conduct a love of the good, the final purification of our whole ambiguous life a love of beauty.

Human nature rests frankly, and for its very existence, upon the number and importance of its problems. It is moral because it is tempted; it is rational because it is puzzled; it is gifted with faith in the unseen because it is helplessly absorbed in the seen. These are not paradoxes, but obvious facts; and they are facts which have direct bearing both upon our estimates of the values of our forms of association, political and ecclesiastical, and also upon our conception of the probabilities for the expression of these values in the arts. If we base our judgment upon history, we must say that it is in democratically organized societies that science, morality, and art have come to their finest attainment. In the light of the analysis which has just been made, this is altogether what ought to be anticipated of the future. For it is in democracies that the problemic nature of life is most present and most recognized; in democracies that reason is most alert, and solutions are least near. In the autocratic state the moral rule is simple and rigid, and art is but its witty exposition. But in democratic societies, with their never ending contests of wills and desires, the law is never stated and never complete; virtue and beauty never wholly coincide; and art never satisfies the problem of their reconciliation.

It is this very failure of fulfillment which makes the cultivation of the arts, and in particular of the fine arts, of such deep concern to democracies. The democratic state —let me repeat—is the state above all others which recognizes the complexity of the human element in human nature: political manhood. It is the democratic state which gives the greatest degree of individual responsibility to its citizens, and therefore recognizes the variety of moral interests and the importance of selective reason. It is thus the democratic state which encourages the greatest range and intensity of human intercourse. The thing we call freedom of speech we justly feel is a primary token of the liberal state. But it is surely in place to point out that

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this freedom is no merely individual or private privilege; it does not exist as the consequence of an act of license, and it does not signify merely a release from the inhibitions of caution. Rather, free speech gets both its quality and its value from the fact of a certain milieu of established intelligibility,—a community of ideas resting upon community of experience and pointing to a community of purpose. Free speech is essential to democracies primarily because democratic citizens are one another's judges and encouragers in a task which is being created by a common assent even while it is being performed.

And all arguments which can be urged for free speech repeat themselves for the cultivation of the arts in democratical societies. The arts are but forms of discourse which appeal to other than our verbal intelligence. Because of their power to give emotional, aesthetic, moral, religious values to ideas,—that is, to convert ideas into sentiments, and hence make them moving,—they are of the greatest consequence in such a pragmatic society as democracy must ever be. The ecclesia of democracy is in an especial degree a church militant, ever contending with its own imperfections, and thereby ever discovering the unguessed possibilities of human insight. In a fair sense the true democracy may be described as a congregation of artists. The citizens are ever reading the face of nature and giving forth their imitations of it, in the intense effort to make themselves known to their fellows; and as a reward, they are ever discovering in the countenances and deeds of their fellow men the reflected images of their own souls. This is the public life of the state in its best realization and most perfect office: devoted to the creation of that communion of the understanding which is the holiest of all sacraments, since in delivering human nature from its baser elements it reveals in the finer man's portraiture of God.

V.

At the outset of my discussion I chose the Christ of the miraculous kerchief as an image of human life, showing by a

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symbol that duality of regard which is to be found in most of our conduct and in all of our reflection. There is an escape—so the kerchief seemed to say—from that web of sense and passion which we name a body into the serener life of idealized desires which we call humanity and believe to represent our worthier selves. But this humanity—as the image suggests—is no outward physical thing, nor no institutional thing; rather, it is spiritual and metaphysical, and it is of the nature of a great communion, open to all men who by inspiration or effort make the discovery of their own profound faith in it. It is a communion partly conscious, no doubt, in all the states and societies, political and religious, organized by men,—perfectly conscious in none of them. But those societies in which it is most conscious, and therefore truest, are democracies, whether they be civil or ecclesiastical; for it is in democracies that men are most put upon their mettle, as individuals, and most trusted with one another's interests, as citizens. Democracy is, therefore, in a special degree spiritual; and because spiritual, free. For those who understand it, its ends will not be sought in material welfare, nor in those co-operative efficiencies which are most possible when ends are simple and mechanical—as warfare, for example, is simple and mechanical. Neither will they be sought in institutional pomp, nor in monumental splendor, nor in any showy surfeit of private appetites and ambitions. But they will be sought—where alone democracy is meaningful—in those arts which most show men's loves for the impersonal, and which most lift them up from the material self.

Physical forms, on such an understanding of life, are valuable in proportion as they express some temper of metaphysical things, in proportion as they are symbols that further the understanding. That is why works of art, and especially of those fine arts whose objects have no value save expression, are the most significant and precious of all works; and that is why, out of the past, we painfully piece together the broken fragments or edit the torn pages that tell what men once loved. But more than this, even

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the bodies of men are moulded by our human desire for communication and take on the forms of desire, and their countenances become imprinted with the quality and genius of the state in which they live: so that we say of one human face that it is that of a democrat, of another that it is aristocratic, of another that it is imperious—representing institutions engraved into the flesh.

Portraits, indeed, are the most convincing of political lessons. As I turn the pages of Anton Hekler's striking collection of *Greek and Roman Portraits*, I am impressed once and again with the fact which Plato makes the heart of politics—that the character of the citizen images the character of the state. The Greeks were democrats, not by right of the perfection of their democracy, but by the right of its discovery, and the fact is written and underscored in the humanity of their countenances. Nor is this character to be found merely in the features of the acknowledged great—the compassionate Euripides of the Naples Museum, the calm-eyed Pericles, the idealizations of the beautiful soul of Socrates transforming a grotesque mask: these, indeed, are such images as only a people inspired by nobility could produce; but in the collection it is faces of the unknown that are most moving, men and women, youths and elders, all touched with a beauty that is never serene, for it is the beauty of mortal men gifted with a vision of things higher than mortal. Turn, then, to the faces of the Romans. Cicero's is the finest of them, with a bitter, patrician refinement,—far, in the scale of humanity, from the grave solicitude of the Vatican Demosthenes. But the emperors—Claudius as Jupiter, Commodus as Hercules, the theatrical Nero of the Uffizi,—even Augustus, the best of them, what is he as compared with the images of Alexander? While as for the unknown, there is a hard, encrusted brutality that repeats itself through a seeming impossibility of variations. There are, to be sure, exceptions (astonishingly few): Romans who might be Greeks, Hellenistic Greeks who might be Romans. But in the main, it is cold formality as against an eager and wistful beauty,—men and women alike.

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I cannot believe that this difference is an accident of race. Rather it is a product of ideals and of the institutions which embody them. The Greeks discovered democracy, and although they had little more than a glimpse of a promised land, it transformed their bodies as well as inspired their art. The Romans, early yielding to that blindness which men call practical sense, or in politics the politics of realities, thereby lost all that was noblest in the civilization which the Greeks handed on to them, and entered upon a course whose steady degeneration is preserved to our view in their protraits. It is, of course, difficult to pass judgments upon one's contemporaries with the clarity with which judgments upon the past may be pronounced,—least of all when the matter is the subtle one of spiritual expression. Yet it seems to me certain that one who is sensitive to artistry will find the ancient contrast repeated in the modern world, and for the same fundamental cause. What nation among us, if not France, is the leader in the finer arts, as she is in that high and political conception of humanity which is their inspiration?

I have yet a word to add. For in emphasizing the fact that man's spiritual inheritance is his participation in the great commune of humanity, I may seem to have denied that it has any perdurable meaning for the individual. This is far from my intention. For I firmly believe that just as it is democracy which most keenly awakens the individual to the fullness of that effort which is his life, so I believe that it is in the fulfillment of democracy, in becoming a citizen of the spiritual commune, that the individual finds himself most truly and directly. I should put it in this fashion: that in the true democracy all the citizens are, as it were, naturalized through their discovery of the ideal citizen—a kind of Platonic man, who is the type and pattern of what they most value in human character. In serving this Platonic man, they serve the best that is in their own souls and the best that is in one another; while from a converse regard, the existence of the pattern may be taken as the highest expression of that faith of man in man which

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is the sanction and crown of all democracy; it is through the image of perfection that men are saved.

Surely it was such an ideal that inspired the artists of Athens. They beheld their fellow citizens each touched with the spirit of Athena, each ennobled because of the spark of the goddess,—and with no loss of individuality, but rather with their individualities eternally enhanced because of their membership in that city. Not Æschylus nor Pericles nor Socrates nor any other was the ideal Athenian, though each participated in his nature and each, as best he could, conformed his character to that nature. How richer a man he was than any pattern Roman!—richer, because more a man, because more humane, as democracy is than empire. And if we turn to that democracy which in our recorded history has proven so vastly nobler than any political society,—if we turn to the great ecclesia which has created Christendom, can we learn any other lesson than that the most exalted of spiritual missions is still the portrayal of the pattern Man, and that the last word of human wisdom must still be Ecce Homo!

Hartley Burr Alexander.
The University of Nebraska.

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RELIGIOUS WORSHIP AND SOCIAL CONTROL.

JOSEPH ROY GEIGER.

IT IS possible to distinguish at least two aspects of religion. In the first place, there are the immediate appreciative experiences which constitute direct and first hand contact with the divine. From this point of view religion is a mode of experiencing which exists in its own right. It is controlled by a type of interest as definite and as engaging as that controlling any other of the outstanding pursuits of human life, however complex it may prove to be. Like other human interests it has its roots in certain instinctive needs and desires. Its affective quality is a feeling of worth or a sense of value. But there is another aspect of religion, namely, the reaction of the immediate appreciative experiences constituting the religionist's sense of the divine upon the other areas of his experience. From this point of view, the function of religion in its relation to social practice in general may be said to be the maintenance of such a direct and vital contact with the divine as to induce the acceptance and practice of the standards of value embodied therein. The specific character of the reaction of religious experience upon other areas of experience in any given period depends upon the character of the values or ideals constituting the divine in that period and at that level of culture. For example, in the Middle Ages religious values were other-worldly, and the appreciation of these values worked itself out in a manner of life that was ascetic and monastic. In striking contrast, the religious values of our modern period have to do with the world that now is; and the reaction of the experience controlled by these values has been in the direction of a practical humanitarianism. The mystic and the saint have been replaced by the reformer and the 'social worker.' And indeed, it must be said that the church is fast losing sight of the devotional or appreciative aspect of its life, and is becoming more and more a center of social service.

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Now this tendency on the part of conventional religion to shift its center of gravity to extra-mural activities to the neglect of the appreciative or devotional aspect of its life is regarded by many with entire satisfaction. To others, however, it has its dubious aspects. It denotes a dearth of religious ideas and ideals. It bespeaks an impoverished type of religious experience. It harks back to an order of religious values belonging to the past. The church's program of social service has back of it the doctrine of the 'Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man.' This doctrine is not an adequate statement of our present-day religious values. It reflects a social order which we have left behind. It represents the hypostization of conditions of dependence and limitation which we to-day refuse to recognize as belonging to the nature of things, much less to set up as religious ideals. The time was when it was an adequate statement of important qualities in religious experience. Reference is made to the rise of democracy in the eighteenth century. The social ideals on which the eighteenth century democracy rested had their roots in an *a priori* theory 'of natural rights.' The 'rights' of man on the basis of which it was proposed to construct all possible forms of government were deduced from what was conceived to have been man's 'natural' state before he was brought under the authority of social and political institutions. That is to say, these 'rights' were given; they were donations to man from an inherent and unalienable humanity. Man was as dependent as ever. And these 'rights' were given once for all. Men might come and men might go, but their 'rights' went on forever. Nothing could change them; nothing could happen to give them new content or meaning. It is not to be wondered that the democracy based on such a conception of man's metaphysically fixed and finished 'nature' proved inadequate to meet the demands made upon it by the expanding life of subsequent times. But what is important for us to note is that the doctrine of the 'Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man' was

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appropriate to a religious experience having its context in such social conditions. Theologically speaking, men were still entirely dependent on a power not themselves. Whatever new there was in their religious experience in the way of emotional satisfaction as a result of conceiving God as their Father and mankind as their brethren was given. The new religious values were donations vouchsafed by a divine paternalism or a human fraternalism. They were once for all the sort of things to be expected from such relationships. If other things seemed good and desirable in the way of industrial co-operation and social justice, calling for attitudes and activities other than those growing out of the relation of man to God as his Father, or to humanity as his brethren, these other good and desirable things, together with the attitudes and activities appropriate to them, lay outside the scope of religion. Religion need not, to be sure, exhaust itself in the emotional satisfactions to be realized from the relation sustained to God and humanity. It might give concrete and practical expression to its doctrines if occasion seemed to warrant it. It might practice charity, philanthropy, humanitarianism—these are the things to be expected in a world where all men are dependent on God and where some are more highly blessed than others. But as for inquiring into the whys and wherefores of a social order in which certain classes are dependent on certain other classes, and in which all classes are dependent on a power not themselves, whose favors are to be had by petition and faith and child-like obedience, with such an inquiry religion would have nothing to do.

But however adequate the ideas embodied in the doctrine of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man were for the religious experience of the nineteenth century, these ideas are not adequate for the religious experience of to-day. The social context in which religion now functions gives promise of a new type of social organization, a new democracy, handicapped by no preconceptions as to the 'natural rights' of man nor by any preconceptions as to his natural needs, capacities or obligations. To support this

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promise of a new and better democracy there is the ever-growing conviction that social life and social development are not guided from without or directed from above; that these constitute a process that is self-determined and creative, and that the rights which are natural to man are those which have proved themselves in terms of social worth within this process. And the assurance with which the new democracy will face the future and undertake the solution of its problems will not be the sentimental optimism or the dogmatic certainty of the eighteenth century society. Democracy has learned by bitter experience that men may have rights and yet be the victims of injustice and oppression. The possession of 'rights' fulminated for mankind before society with its moving, changing, growing life began, somehow has not availed to secure to men actual well-being in concrete social situations. Democracy has found that the only 'rights' worth having are those which are achieved within the process and with reference to the situations in which they are to operate; that 'rights' are functions which articulate themselves in connection with a 'social dialectic,' and always imply certain counterparts in the way of capacities, needs, obligations and the like. And whatever assurance the new democracy will have with reference to its future will be grounded in the fact that no 'rights' ever are given; that these must be achieved, and achieved in such a competition with other possible 'rights' as is calculated to carry the life of society along,—to raise it to higher and higher levels. In the process of achieving their 'rights,' men have learned the art of living together, and have come to realize all their satisfactions and values in so living. The successful issues of social intercourse, with all the ways and means devised for making these possible, have given rise to a freer spirit, a social idealism, a moral venturesomeness, which is ever devising new ways and means for effecting other prosperous issues of social life,—for realizing new social values. And it is this social idealism, this moral venturesomeness, objectifying itself through the methods and achievements of science that will furnish the

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new democracy with its motive power and fill it with hope for the future.

Now it is obvious that this new type of social organization, this new democracy, 'making itself, lifting itself through its very imperfections—through the struggle of these with one another—to planes of more effective realization,' must have a profound bearing on our future conceptions of the divine. If we are justified in assuming that the social context in which religion functions determines the character of religious values and indeed, fixes the content of the God-idea at the several levels of culture where this concept appears, we may say that the God of the future must be a 'democratic God'; that whatever else we mean by the divine as it is now constituted, we must mean a power that is, in a very fundamental sense, we ourselves. The most effectively divine power or agency in the world to-day is the social consciousness of a genuinely democratic community. It is the social consciousness as the ideal embodiment of the hard-won values of mankind that is effecting whatever of good there is in our present-day life and civilization. And this effectiveness of the social consciousness in controlling and directing the movement of things is nothing more than is to be expected in view of the increasingly effective methods for creating and conserving social values and for bringing these to the consciousness of the community. Progress in the life of the community as in the life of the individual is conditioned by the availability of the meaningful aspects of past experience for the solution of present problems. But this condition is fulfilled only as the meaningful aspects of experience are idealized, that is, taken up into consciousness as permanent ideas and attitudes. And it is obvious that in the case of the community these ideal embodiments of life's meanings and values must be socialized. They must be available to the community in its corporate capacities; they must become permanent and effective parts of the social consciousness. To this end, there must be such methods of social control and such devices for social intercommunication as are calculated to

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create and sustain a social consciousness, a corporate sense of common interests and common values. And such methods and devices are at hand. The inventions of science, furnishing as they do the implements of industry and the instruments of social intercourse, are placing men in the midst of an immeasurably more intimate and intricate life than they have known before, and, what is of greater moment, are making them conscious of their common life thus created and sustained. Growing out of this new social consciousness, this new sense of the intimacy and intricacy of life's relationships is an intense moral earnestness, an anxiety for the general welfare, a social idealism which demands to be informed as to the ways and means of social control. Responding to this demand, science and education are at last coming into their own. Everywhere there is a new appreciation of the institutions of culture, a new insight into their real significance and their full possibilities. This is what we mean by the social and scientific point of view. It is the most hopeful sign of the times, and is destined to become increasingly effective in defining social ends, in creating social values, and in bringing the community to a full consciousness of these ends and values.

Now the function of religion with reference to the 'democratic God' must be obvious. The empirical and practical values constituting the divine as it exists to-day must, in the first place, become the actual sources of religious satisfaction; and in thus serving the ends of religious aspiration and worship they will in turn become the instruments of moral control. But it must be just as obvious that conventional religion is not prepared to function adequately in either of these directions. Its channels of approach to God, its means of contact with the divine too often turn out to be but blind alleys, ending in disillusionment. Its forms of worship, its technique of praise and prayer do not appeal to many, at least, of the most sincerely disposed. Wrought out with reference to values long since become valueless, they now serve in many cases to obstruct and distort religious experience. The religionist

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of to-day asks for bread, and is given a stone. He is in search of that which is morally significant and spiritually worth while, and is confronted with much that once had meaning but now is without moral significance or spiritual worth. In the meantine, disillusionment, disappointment and despair with respect to religious realities is the order of the day.

And this is not all. In thus failing to afford emotional contact with the divine, conventional religion fails also to provide that inner type of moral control which should define its reaction on social practice in general. In consequence of this, resort must be had to various means of external control. Penal systems, eugenics, social service, philanthropy—these are some of the clumsy and ineffectual extremes to which society has been driven in lieu of the inner control that should emanate from a vital appreciation of social values. Of course, it is not to be expected that such inner control shall ever be so thorough-going as to require no supplementation by external methods. Doubtless, the poor,—and the sick and the sinful and the dependent—we have with us always. But it cannot be determined beforehand what limits there are to a programme dedicated to overcoming the prevailing conditions of dependence and limitation. And certainly religion should be satisfied with nothing less than this as an ideal.

But the forms of worship employed by conventional religion not only fail to effect any appreciative contact with contemporary social values, with the social control that should follow therefrom; these forms actually serve to inhibit the progressive and constructive tendencies in the experience of the worshiper, and to reinforce the conservative and non-progressive tendencies. And this is not to be wondered at. As has been pointed out, these forms and ceremonies and rituals speak a language that is foreign to present-day experience. They reflect a social system long since left behind. They represent the hypostization of conditions of dependence and limitation which we now refuse to recognize as belonging to the nature of things,

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much less to set up as religious ideals. They place a premium upon such things as blind credulity, simple childlike faith, abject dependence, and dumb acquiescence. They contemplate a source of good and an order of values whose control is capricious and arbitrary. They presuppose a moral dualism which, if accepted by the worshiper, must disrupt his experience, and make it forever impossible for him to be at one with himself. Finally, they induce a type of righteousness that is self-complacent and condescending, and whose fruits are the various forms of 'social service.'

The influence of all this on the broad minded, forward looking religionist is unmistakable. He is a man of faith, but his faith is active and creative. As a worshiper in the conventional church, however, his faith becomes a matter of 'simply trusting, that is all.' He has a 'sense of dependence,' knows the joy of 'companionship,' experiences the 'consolations of prayer.' Only, his 'sense of dependence' is a feeling of interdependence, a feeling which is at once the foundation of his moral character and the source of his moral well being; the joy of 'companionship' is for him a consciousness of contact with a higher and better self, a contact which expands his interests, reinforces his purposes, and sustains his energies; and the 'consolations of prayer' are to him the satisfactions which come to those whose natures it is to reflect, to appreciate, and to be reverent. And yet, as a conventional worshiper, this feeling of interdependence reverts to a sense of a private, personal relationship between himself and another Being. The companionship which he experiences is fraught with a mysticism that is well nigh uncanny. And the prayers which should console him are for the most part plaintive petitions for miraculous interventions which no one expects to happen.

But the influence of conventional worship on the conservative, non-progressive religionist is just as unmistakable. Here, however, the influence is to be seen in the reaction of religious experience on the other areas of experience. For example, one's pursuit of social or economic ends may be devoid of any regard for considerations of

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justice or equal opportunity or the right to self-realization. As a conventional worshiper, however, the religionist will be moved to certain acts of social compensation. He will contribute his money, and perhaps his time and influence, to the support of movements designed to overcome, or at least, to mitigate conditions for which his social and economic practices are partly responsible. And it isn't that he is a member of a religious organization which accepts his contributions by way of making the best of a bad situation in whose creation it had no part. It isn't that the church merely acquiesces in and tacitly approves of 'service' and 'up-lift' and 'reform' as forms of social and moral compensation. The fundamental values embodied in the church's conception of the divine, and held out to the religionist as the sources of his emotional satisfaction and the sanctions of his social practice are themselves feudalistic; they imply an hierarchical structure of reality; they represent conditions of dependence and limitation as belonging to the very nature of things. And appreciative contact with these values actually serves to reinforce a type of social practice that is feudalistic. The churches are full of devout communicants whose methods of conducting their business and whose standards in dealing with their competitors, their employees and the public, are about as far removed from the democratic ideals of justice and equal opportunity and self realization as could well be imagined. These devout religionists are not necessarily hypocrites. They are the mainstays of the church. They are devoted to the church's social program. And they are possessed of good consciences, withal. What manner of men are they then? How is one to account for them? One must account for them by saying that they are intellectually and emotionally oblivious to the new order of social values and ideals. And one of the agencies responsible for their moral backwardness is the church, with its empty doctrines and out of date rituals.

The church must rehabilitate the devotional or appreciative side of its life. It must not content itself with being a

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center of social service. Its true end is to be a source of emotional satisfaction and moral inspiration. It must set for itself the task of creating a new type of religious experience. It must concern itself with inducing the acceptance and practice of standards of value which will reduce its erstwhile efforts at 'service' and 'up-lift' and 'reform' to a desperate last resort. To this end, it must revise its creeds and rituals. A new set of symbols and a new type of imagery must be forthcoming. New bottles must be provided for the new wine.

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DISCUSSION

NIETZSCHE'S ETERNAL RECURRENCE.

Dr. Dolson's friendly and appreciative review of my *Nietzsche* in the current *Journal* suggests a further word of comment on two points.

"Great," she says, "he [Nietzsche] is, but to place him beside Kant is to give him more honor than is his due"—this after speaking of my "prophecy" of a pre-Nietzschean and a post-Nietzschean period of philosophy. The "prophecy" may, I grant, have been ill-advised—though my language was, "I do not wish to prophesy, but I have a suspicion, etc."—and I distinctly say later, after discussing the question whether he was a philosopher, "no one imagines that he was one in the sense that Kant and Aristotle were." My feeling in the passage alluded to by Dr. Dolson was simply that he was like Kant in some ways—in his question-producing character, so that those who fail to reckon with him, particularly with his ethical and social criticism, will be sooner or later out of date—though unlike him enough in other ways.

Again, Dr. Dolson thinks that I fail to point out the determinist implications of the theory of eternal recurrence. But I devote a special paragraph to the discussion of them (p. 175). Further, she records her own view that Nietzsche regarded the theory as a touchstone for men "precisely because it could contain no moral stimulus." With all respect for one who was the first philosophical student of Nietzsche in America—or at least the first writer upon him[1]—I am somewhat astonished at such a view. Undoubtedly Nietzsche was aware of the depressing aspect of the idea of recurrence—at first it overwhelmed him. The question was, could it be endured? But instead of facing the inevitable in mere blank bravado and thereby proving that "you are a Dionysiac pessimist and worthy to bring about the superman," as Dr. Dolson conceives, Nietzsche urges rational consideration of the matter, seeking out how the *fatum* can be made endurable

[1] I make this qualification because I hear from Professor Wenley of the University of Michigan that he gave a course on Nietzsche at Ann Arbor in (he thinks) 1897–98, though, he confesses, dropping it after a single trial, finding Nietzsche altogether beyond even an exceptional class.

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—how it can be even welcomed. In other words, a problem arises and it is to live a kind of life that one would *like* to live again—and again and again. "The question in connection with everything that thou willst do is: is it of such a character that I can wish to do it innumerable times?" This question, he thinks, may be the gravest kind of a determinant in practical life. The idea of recurrence turns out thus to be capable of a transforming influence on conduct. "When thou incorporatest the thought of thoughts within thee, it will transform thee." (See these and other passages in my book, pp. 170–4.) How the matter, and the order of it, lay in Nietzsche's mind appears in his pedagogical precept to the effect that the higher outlook for humanity and the ethical legislation growing out of it should come first—and *then* the doctrine of recurrence, which otherwise would be for most men unendurable.

How this moral transforming effect of the idea of recurrence is compatible with Nietzsche's determinism is another question; perhaps he forgets his determinism in *acting* (taking a practical attitude) as some of the rest of us do ours—or perhaps his determinism was not of that exterior and fatalistic character which Dr. Dolson seems to suppose. "Knowing that in spite of all your futile struggles your life is determined down to the slightest detail"—so she paraphrases his view; but (1) I do not think that Nietzsche would have put down as "futile" the struggle for the higher order of man (in and by which life got meaning and measureless desirability for him), and, (2) theoretically speaking, he would probably have regarded the struggle itself as a link in the deterministic chain.

Personal explanations are usually in poor taste, but I may perhaps be pardoned for saying, in gentle remonstrance with Dr. Dolson, that I had no desire to make out a case for Nietzsche in my book, but simply tried to present him as he really was—*looking at him from the inside*, and not as the critics usually do.

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Silver Lake, New Hampshire,
July 28, 1918.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

AN ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE. By Felix Adler. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1918. Pp. viii, 380.

The peculiar interest of Dr. Adler's book is found in its frankly personal point of view. If ethical principles are to be deduced from pure reason, it should matter little who deduces them provided his thinking machinery works smoothly. But if when all is said the last test is: "Do they enable one to face life bravely and look upon its westering day with serenity? Do they encompass friendships and all the relations of man to man? Do they suggest new tasks and larger vision as well as sum up past wisdom?"—then ethical philosophies must gain weight in proportion as their authors have faced large and varied experiences. Instead of relying upon an ethics of "common sense" or of "reason" written by a single author, would not ethical theory at the present time gain greatly if "methods of ethics" were written by many hands representing various vocations, various ages, various groups?

The particular philosophy here presented, its author tells us, had as its contributory sources Hebrew religion, Emerson, the teachings of Jesus, the system of Kant. The conception of a "something holy in each human being" early seemed to focus what was most important. The task of life took at first a somewhat negative formulation. "Since the world presents innumerable examples of the grossest violation of human personality (*e.g.*, prostitution and exploitation of laborers), the business immediately in hand is to make an end of these violations. There was as yet in mind no positive definition of personality." Social reform, which at first seemed the one thing needful, soon disclosed various defects, among which "provisionalism," or concentrating upon immediate and rather external ends to the neglect of the supreme end, was most glaring. The need of clear definition of "the holy thing" in others or in me, of "the supreme end or good to which all the lesser goods should be subordinate and subservient," became insistent.

The view of life ultimately reached owes its perspective, if not its elements, largely to vocational problems and contacts.

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Philanthropic and educational activities, public addresses, solemnization of marriages, consoling the bereaved, present a wider range of human experiences than falls to most ethical students. In particular the large space devoted to "Frustration" as a major problem tells its own story. The ordinary college teacher may be conscious of his own limits and is likely to find at times his own plans baffled; but his contacts with the young do not force him to meet frustration as a typical lot of his fellows.

The central problem, however, persisted: What gives worth to man? Kant's deduction of this worth from universal law-making capacity was rejected as inadequate. Instead, a justification was found in the two-fold nature of mental action—positing a manifold and at the same time apprehending this as unified. The ethical world must present both these aspects; it must remain both many and one. Each member will differ uniquely from the rest. There will also be a determinate relation between the ethical units, viz., "reciprocal universal interdependence." The unity of the ethical world consists in this—that the unique difference of each shall be such as to render possible the correlated unique differences of all the rest." "It is as an ethical unit, as a member of the infinite ethical manifold, that man has worth." And this worth I do not *find* "in others or in myself." "I *attribute* it to them and to myself." "The method of 'salvation,' the distinctive feature wherein this system differs from others, may now be briefly stated. So act as to elicit the unique personality in others, and *thereby* in thyself."

Book III considers applications of the theory of personal life under the captions of Shadows of Sickness, Sorrow, and Sin, Rights to Life, Property and Reputation; Book IV considers the social institutions, Family, Vocation, State, International Society, and Church. These books are less easily summarized. The principle, "Property is the control of external things for the maintenance and development of personality," is basic. No one has ethically a right of property in great fortunes like those accumulated under the modern system of industry. Whatever is in excess of one's needs rightly estimated, is not appropriate to one, not proper to one, and not his property (192). The solution of the labor question is to be sought by an adjustment of wages with reference to the end to be served. Adequate nourishment as to quantity and quality, suitable dwellings, educational opportunities, etc., are all indispensable to the rendering of serv-

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ice even by "common laborers." Special vocations may require special instrumentalities. Vocations are given interesting treatment. Vocational instead of geographical representation in the legislative body is recommended. It is "the appropriate expression of the organic idea of the state." International progress will not be brought about automatically by growth of trade and science. "The sense of national sin, or of national guilt, must supply the motive force." The realization of the common task of the more advanced peoples to liberate the potential spiritual life of the less advanced is the most hopeful new turn in the history of humanity." Acceptance of this task would "overcome the antagonism and discords among the civilized nations themselves." This is the final application of the author's central principle which shows itself here as in so many other places, fruitful and prophetic.

Of the many features of the book which suggest comment and comparison I select its view of ethical method. The author probably would not wish to have his method called pragmatic; yet in so far as the test which he suggests for his principles is their fruitfulness in meeting the problems of life, rather than their deduction from the mental principles of unity and plurality, it may fairly be called experimental. And the alternatives thus offered invite nice consideration. Granted that the human mind has the two constitutive principles or "functional finalities," unity and manifoldness, does this fact guarantee the ethical worth of anything? As a "fact" it must no doubt be reckoned with, yet one cannot help speculating on how far the converse is true, namely, that the principles of unity and manifoldness—so far as they are significant for ethics—are themselves dependent upon the positive and rich stimulations, responses, and relationships of human society. Do unity and plurality produce fine and intricate human relationships or do they develop to real effectiveness only in the presence of these? And if both they and these reciprocally determine each other can ethics be based on the one any more properly than on the other? And in either case how far can any fact *as fact*, whether it be in the constitution of the mind or of society, carry us? Does the fact as such guarantee an ideal, and if not what is the relation between the two?

This last question is raised again by the view taken as to worth. The worth of man, and of every man, is the central conception. But this worth is not found already present in people—

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certainly not in all people. "Judging from the point of view of bare fact, many of us could very well be spared." Rather, I *attribute* worth to others and to myself. "And why do I attribute it? In virtue of the reality-producing functions of my own mind. The pressure of the essential rationality within me . . . drives me forward." The query which this account raises is: How far does "essential rationality" drive us on to construct ideals or attribute worth, and how far is it the process of human life, the pressure of actual human beings, loving, sinning, suffering, creating, struggling, which evokes the rationality? That morality implies a synthetic creative process I believe is true. I am not clear that we gain by using the somewhat ontological term "reality-producing function," or by speaking of our ethical goal as achieving reality or truth (pp. 121–24). In other words, how far do we gain by connecting the ethical process with the logical and metaphysical, and how far do we risk losing or confusing its essential character if we go along this path? Religion as usually interpreted seems to favor the connection. Yet does not the idea of an ethical religion invite us to make the ethical determine the reality—or our reality, that is the reality of the world we hope little by little to bring about—rather than the reality determine the ethical. Or must we, with Russell, adopt as the free man's worship an attitude of defying the universe, and escaping from it into mathematics or other similar realms? Dr. Adler's efforts to find his own solution for this old problem will appeal to the thoughtful and despite his own caution against pragmatism one cannot regret that the author left earlier absolutism and tried to frame a theory that would meet life by changing his universe as well as by accepting it.

Perhaps it would not be unfair to say that the book as a whole records a re-shaping as well as the testing of a theory by the need of dealing with actual situations. The active and widely useful life of the author is itself as truly source as result. In the last analysis each will build in part his own philosophy of life, but many will find help in their task by Dr. Adler's sincere and thoughtful work.

J. H. Tufts.

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MORAL VALUES: A STUDY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT. By Walter Goodnow Everett, Professor of Philosophy in Brown University. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Pp. xiii, 439.

We have here an idealistic theory of morality presented in attractive literary form, which will doubtless make an appeal to a wider public than the standard works of this kind have been able to reach. Like Paulsen's *System of Ethics*, with which this book shows many points of agreement, it discusses fundamental problems in a manner that does not put too severe a strain upon the mental processes of the general intelligent reader; like that popular manual also, it makes the subject living and real by connecting it with vital human interests. After all, ethics is nothing less than an obstinate attempt to interpret the moral life, to understand its claim on us; and since every educated human being is bound to reflect upon the meaning of it, sooner or later, ethics becomes a practical necessity to him. Professor Everett's volume will benefit those who feel this need and stimulate them to seek further help from works which go more deeply into the matter than can be expected from an introductory text.

Professor Everett has entitled his book "Moral Values," using as a sub-heading: "A Study of the Principles of Conduct." The idea of value is for him the basal conception of ethics; "no other term, such as duty, law, or right, is final for thought; each logically demands the idea of value as the foundation upon which it finally rests." Ethics attempts to unify the facts of conduct by means of the idea of value; it deals primarily with what is, and finds all its data in the moral experience of the race. "No ideal 'ought' can have any meaning, either in theory or in practice, separated from what actually exists. If by the study of the moral experiences of men all moral judgments can be reduced to universal principles, then such principles will be valid for all future conduct" (p. 17). This view would, perhaps, be satisfactory if ethics confined itself to a mere historical interpretation of morality, although in that case the values or principles underlying the codes of the past, present, and future would not necessarily be the same. To be sure, if, as Professor Everett tells us, the principles of morality which have guided, consciously or unconsciously, the moral struggles of the past are embodied in the codes with increasing perfection, then we may discover from history the

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values which the race held high; and if it could be shown that these values are basal values, that their acceptance is an inevitable necessity of human nature, then our task as ethicists would be completed and our science would rest upon a solid foundation.

I am not certain, however, that this is Professor Everett's final judgment in the matter, for he also tells us that morality is progressive and that we may reach a higher level of value than has been attained thus far; the fact appears to be that the moral philosopher may be ahead of his time, sit in judgment upon the values of his age and find them wanting. The code changes, he says, as the conception of human welfare changes. The *standard* itself is progressive. "This standard recognizes that morality is strictly organic to the needs of developing life, but it does not mean that a standard is wanting at any stage of the process" (p. 327). Nevertheless, "to infer from the historical progress of morality that all codes are equally good, or that one may safely reject the conscience of one's own day and race, is a conclusion wholly without warrant." Our author makes the historical progress of civilization the court of last appeal between conflicting ideals and codes of morality. *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht.* If this means that ideals triumph and are defeated in the course of history, we must sorrowfully agree; but are we prepared to say that the triumphant ideal is the true ethical ideal? Would the victory of the philosophy of might make it right? "Those ideals," says Professor Everett, "which in the light of the most adequate experience, fail to meet human needs will, we may hope, be slowly rejected" (p. 334).

Yes, but the ideal of humanity, kindness, and justice may fail to meet the needs of a people lusting for world-empire and be very quickly rejected. A people that rides roughshod over other peoples may live and thrive and be satisfied, and yet be bad. We cannot give up the evolutionary conception of morality: our ethical values are not static, they grow. But unless there is something constant in the development of our moral values, the study of the historical process will end in moral scepticism. Professor Everett evidently believes that there is such a constant element:

"If the sceptic finally asserts that his own nature is so unique as to require a moral regimen fundamentally different from that of his fellows, the fact of such a degree of uniqueness may be challenged" (p. 333). "The structure of man's nature, as con-

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scious and spiritual, grounds laws just as real as those of physical life, and just as truly objective" (p. 332). (See also the passage on p. 259, quoted below.) Age "knows that it would be impossible to attain the goal of life in disregard of social factors and psychological laws that are universal."

If this is so, is it not reasonable to infer that the values which have come to consciousness in human history will not be lost but will be deepened and extended, and that *human reason* is the court of last appeal in judging these values? Our author answers this question in the affirmative when, in another connection, he declares: "There can be no doubt that the general verdict of mankind would always be against any so-called movement of progress, if it could be demonstrated that its ultimate and net result was a reduction in the amount of human happiness. . . . As an ideal, man will tolerate neither an unholy happiness nor an unhappy holiness. . . . Further, both happiness and perfection are constantly used as norms of judgment" (pp. 170 f). The assumption here is that although the moral codes may change, the ethical standard remains the same for reason, and that the verdict of history has no validity against the verdict of right reason.

Professor Everett's analysis of the value-experience does not seem to me to be adequate. One of its essential elements is said to be "the enjoyment of relatively permanent and widely diffused states of agreeable consciousness" that result from the fulfillment of existing desire. "Used in this latter sense, satisfaction is one of the best terms for the feeling of value, especially for popular use, since it is generally understood to mark those experiences of well-being that arise from the higher individual and social activities" (p. 121).

"At least one element which is essential to the very idea of value, positive or negative, is found in the affective states as agreeable or disagreeable" (p. 125). A being "without any capacity for experiencing feelings of pleasure or displeasure, but with the cognitive and volitional activities unimpaired," would find our vocabulary of approval and disapproval wholly unintelligible. "Somewhere, and at some time, all acts must find their value in an inner world of satisfaction, which is expressible psychologically in feelings of the pleasure-displeasure series" (p. 128). It is true that value-judgments or value-experiences are, like all experiences, accompanied by feelings of pleasure or displeasure; but

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are these feelings merely the result of an existing desire? and what are the other elements essential to the idea of value? The worth-experience appears to be a unique attitude of mind which has its own vocabulary, not translatable into hedonistic terms. To feel a pleasure and to place a value upon a pleasure are not the same. I do not understand Professor Everett to reduce the value-experience to hedonistic terms, and I do not think it incumbent upon him to offer an exhaustive psychological analysis of the worth-attitude, but it would have been helpful if, having taken it up at all, he had gone into the subject somewhat more thoroughly. It is clear, however, that whatever the psychology of worth may be found to be, he conceives ethical evaluation as something intuitive:

"We have already pointed out that value, although describable in various ways as an immediate experience, is an ultimate term of ethical thought. And we hold that there is at least one intuitive, or immediate and axiomatic, judgment concerning it, which may be expressed as follows: 'The good is worthy to be chosen.' No proof of this proposition can be given; it can only be stated in other words, as when we say that we are so constituted as to prefer good to ill. It is not the business of ethics to ask why man's original nature is as it is. The *what* and the *how*, not the *why*, are here significant" (p. 259).

The book ends with a chapter on "Morality and Religion" in which the ethical values play the chief rôle. "The ideal of religion, which men are always seeking, must involve that interpretation of the world which is truest, and that adjustment of conduct which, in view of this interpretation, will yield to humanity the richest values" (p. 385). If we should become convinced that the world is, on the whole, bad instead of good, then the task of diminishing the misery of existence would constitute a religious attitude.

In other words, there may be a conflict between our ethical values and our methaphysical interpretation of the universe, in which case we hold fast to our values. "If we find that it is impossible to harmonize the meaning of human life with the world-order as a whole, we should then regard positive religion as the loyal effort to fulfill the spiritual destiny that has been assigned to man" (p. 387). "The central insight . . . which is vital for all religion and morality, is that the laws of spiritual life which hold within the kingdom of human values are no less valid because

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they are not laws of the whole empire" (p. 419). The sufficient vindication of our ideals "lies in the fact that they enrich and ennoble man's life" (p. 419). "Even though our little planet, with all its life, were to become uninhabitable, or to be swept entirely out of existence, it would still be true that these ideals had been no fiction or illusion of the fleeting moment, but genuine realities organic to the whole of Being" (p. 420).

It is evident that faith in our ethical values constitutes the backbone of Professor Everett's religion. On this faith is based the belief in God and the belief that "the world process as a whole is worth while, that it contains more good than evil" (p. 421). And in the same faith is rooted the firm conviction that there can be no conflict between truth and our moral and religious ideals: "The deepest and most precious faith, the faith none can afford to lose, is the faith that to discover the truth about reality and to follow this truth loyally, will in the end lead to the highest good" (p. 420).

We have here a noble ethical religion, but I do not think that the individual *must* recognize, in case he finds it impossible to harmonize the meaning of human life with the world-order as a whole, as our author says he may, that "all that blossoms and grows" in "his own garden" is "watered by streams from the eternal hills and nourished by the all-pervading life" (p. 421). He will recognize it if he believes in an "all-pervading life" and in the organic relation of his ideals to the *whole* of Being, and if he is convinced that his ethical values are values which the all-pervading life will realize in spite of the crack of doom. He may hope that all this is true; but if he has genuine moral faith, he will hold fast to the good and go down fighting for it, believing that there was something worth while, after all, in the unfriendly universe while it lasted, something worth enduring even though it had been but a faint and passing glimmer in the eternal darkness. And this heroic ethical faith, I think, expresses the spirit of Professor Everett's thought. Many will refuse to give to it the name of religion; but it forms an essential part of advanced religions as well as of the world-views of materialists and agnostics.

FRANK THILLY.

Cornell University.

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LOGIC AS THE SCIENCE OF THE PURE CONCEPT. By Benedetto Croce. Translated from the Italian by Douglas Ainslie, B.A. (Oxon.), M.R.A.S. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1917. Pp. xxxiv, 606. 14s. net.

Though the *Logic* is the last of Croce's important writings to appear in an English dress, its general point of view has for some time been well enough known even to those who have not studied it in the original. Apart from it the rest of Croce's system is scarcely intelligible, and the help it gives to the understanding of his other writings is not the least part of the value of this translation. Naturally it contains little of immediate ethical interest, but it ought to be read by everyone who desires to appreciate Croce's ethical system, or his æsthetic, or his recently translated book on Hegel, and incidentally it throws a good deal of light on the very curious interpretation of Marxism which he put forward in the volume of essays which Mrs. Meredith translated, even although these last were written before the first draft of the *Logic*.

The dominant purpose in all Croce's work is to prevent the absorption of history by the natural sciences, and at the same time to combat the tendency of the latter to extend their methods to include whatever the subject-matter of philosophy may be supposed to be. Bergson's aims, of course, might be described in almost identical terms. But the difference in method between the two writers is enormous: the former's point of view is altogether in keeping, the latter's hardly at all, with the classical tradition of what *Logic* should be. Croce distinguishes the pure concept—the "concrete universal"—from the pseudo-concepts, and resolves the latter into two sorts: the class concepts of natural science and the abstract concept of mathematics, both of which are practical devices and ought not to pretend to truth, for reality escapes them. This very familiar criticism of science leads up to a point of view of unusual interest for several reasons. One is Croce's peculiar doctrine that error is an affair of the will, the theoretical faculty being incorruptible; and another the penetrating discussion of the nature of history which is the basis of its final identification with philosophy. No separation, that is, can be made between judgments of fact and judgments of value, for the latter are only determinations of what the reality of the fact is. Philosophy brings men into touch with the things that really matter: its object is the pure concept, which is everywhere

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and always; so that the *Logic* is primarily a vindication of the seriousness of logical thought.

This point of view is worked out in great detail, with considerable historical reference and much discussion of the sciences. The vigorous polemic in which Croce indulges against the formal logicians is amusing; but the unfortunate thing about it is that a mind so acute as his could produce criticisms of modern formal logic which would at least be interesting and might even be of immense value, if only he took the trouble to find out something about it. This process might very well begin by his considering what he really means when he says that the ultimate end of mathematics is enumeration and calculation, and how much of mathematics would be left if this were true.

As a whole this is a most entertaining book, written with great vigour, a decided charm, and an unusual felicity of literary allusion. The translator tells us that he "has striven in every way to render the *Logic* the equal of its predecessors in accuracy and elegance of translation." In this he appears to have succeeded.

M. W. ROBIESON.

Belfast, Ireland.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BENEDETTO CROCE—THE PROBLEM OF ART AND HISTORY. By H. Wildon Carr. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London: 1917. Pp. x, 216. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

This is in all respects a book for which to be grateful. It is extremely well-written, and (considering its subject) clear and unambiguous. Moreover something of the sort was badly needed. Though Croce had considerably influenced recent philosophical thought in England, no book and hardly any articles explicitly devoted to the exposition of his doctrines had appeared. The delay was worth while, since a philosopher of the ability of Mr. Carr has been induced to undertake the task. His study has been made directly from the Italian text, and as appears from the bibliography which is included as an appendix, he has been at pains to acquaint himself with all Croce's writings, amongst them some which though very important have not been translated. He even gives an extract from a speech about Karl Marx which Croce made in the Senate. This enables him amongst other things to give some account of less well-known elements in the system, such as its bearing on the problem of religion; against which Croce's main charge is that it is a philosophy of history. "It is essentially the conception of a transcendent and not of an

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immanent life . . . an imperfect and immature attempt to present reality, and must therefore yield place to philosophy."

Mr. Carr has been so devoted an adherent of M. Bergson's philosophy that it was natural to expect a criticism of Croce from this point of view. There is nothing of the sort. The volume is almost entirely expository; and in only two places does it seem possible to trace the influence of Bergson. One is in the discussion of the economic activity, where Mr. Carr talks a good deal about the intellect and identifies it with that form of mind which has devised pseudo-concepts; the other is in that of history. But in both cases Mr. Carr warns the reader he is interpreting somewhat freely. For the most part he gives an extremely individual and wonderfully faithful account of Croce's doctrine, helped out by admirably translated extracts.

We may suppose that the sub-title indicates Mr. Carr's mode of approach to his subject, and the direction of his interest in him; and how he thinks he is related to Bergson may even be conjectured. That the two have a good deal in common is plain. They agree in their criticism of science and their insistence on the concreteness of art and history. It looks, in fact, as if Mr. Carr were inclined to treat what Bergson means by intuition as equivalent to what Croce calls mind. "It seems to me," he says, "that the truth of the theory wholly depends on the recognition that reality, or mind, is the kind of continuity we name duration" (p. 192). Not much argument is required to show the plausibility of such a position; but since it is only a conjecture, it would be pointless to suggest criticisms, beyond drawing attention to the difficulty of understanding what Bergson means by truth and the absence from the present volume of any discussion of Croce's characteristic refusal to admit that error is a failure of the theoretical activity, with the result that responsibility for it is cast on the will. If Mr. Carr will remember that Dr. Bosanquet has pointed out that Green meant by timelessness precisely what Bergson means by *durée*, he may be encouraged to pursue still further his labors in philosophic synthesis. And since M. Bergson himself, I believe, has discussed certain questions of art and sociology and history in his recent Gifford lectures, we may perhaps shortly be in possession of explanations which make possible a peace by negotiation among quite a number of philosophical combatants. Then perhaps they will unite against their common enemies.

Belfast, Ireland. M. W. ROBIESON.

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MARRIED LOVE: A NEW CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION OF SEX DIFFICULTIES. By Marie Carmichael Stopes, D.Sc., Ph.D., Fellow of University College, London. With a Preface by Dr. Jessie Murray and Letters from Professor E. H. Starling, F.R.S., and Father Stanislaus St. John, S.J. London: A. C. Fifield, 1918. Pp. ix, 134. Price, 5s. net.

This book is doubly important. It is not only a brief, candid, yet idealistic account of sex processes and the physical side of marriage, it is also an exposition of an original theory of women's erotic periodicity: a theory which Dr. Marie Stopes proposes to define and elaborate in a technical medical treatise, and on which she asks her readers to supply available data whether *pro* or *con*. As she says, this generalised statement "may be of great medical and sociological value," and it is to be hoped that further researches will be made on it.

Briefly summarised, Doctor Stopes' theory, which is based on investigations and records of many individual cases, is that, in adult "normally healthy" women, there is a natural recurrence of more or less definite and ardent sexual desire at intervals of a fortnight: that these "crests of the sex tide" occur, as a rule, immediately before the monthly period, and eight or nine days after its close; that in women who are undervitalized or overworked, only one of these desire-crests is at all acutely or consciously felt; and that of course in many cases "a woman may never have experienced any spontaneous sex-impulse at all." Further, Doctor Stopes insists on the distinction to be drawn between this fortnightly sex-rhythm, and the menstrual cycle, which itself is subject to infinite diversities in individual women, and she states explicitly that the crests of the fortnightly wave may extend over three or four days. She allows for the individual variations of sex in women, and also for the effect of outside influences, in the following striking and poetical simile. "Woman is so sensitive and responsive an instrument, and so liable in our modern civilised world, to be influenced by innumerable sets of stimuli, that it is perhaps scarcely surprising that the deep underlying waves of her primitive sex-tides have been obscured and entangled, so that their regular sequence has been masked in the choppy turmoil of her sea, and their existence has been largely unsuspected and apparently quite unstudied."

The book also contains a fine vindication of birth-control, and the very sane and fundamental statement that "the very restraint

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which adds to a man's strength up to a point, taxes his strength when carried beyond it." Also (p. 43), "it seems to me never justifiable to spend so much energy and will power on restraining natural impulses, that valuable work and intellectual power and poise are made to suffer."

Whatever view may be taken of the fortnightly theory, there is no doubt that the chapters on "Mutual Adjustment," "Modesty and Romance" and "Sleep" contain much admirable advice and badly needed instruction, gracefully and happily expressed, and should be carefully read by husbands, wives and lovers. But two criticisms on the general attitude of the writer occur to me, very insistently. Firstly, the book is quite frankly based on observation of, and addressed to, the educated, prosperous and privileged classes. Doctor Stopes does not seem to admit that immense industrial, social and legislative changes are necessary, before the majority of her fellow citizens are able even approximately to develop and refine their erotic nature, sufficiently to follow her suggestions. Secondly (and closely connected with the first omission), she tends in her advocacy of "an ever nobler and tenderer form of life-long monogamy as our social ideal" to overlook the fact that the present legally sanctioned patriarchal monogamy rests on the subjection of women, and implies prostitution as a male "safety-valve" and the "double standard." Undoubtedly much of the distressing and wholly preventable unhappiness in sexual unions arises from men's ignorance of women's needs and natures: but an equally tragic amount of misery and misunderstanding arises from women's ignorance of men's needs and natures. Yet this feminine ignorance is inextricably connected with women's economic dependence and with the tyrannous demand for theoretical ignorance and anatomical virginity in the bride.

Doctor Stopes has shown in her fine remarks on richness and variety of active interests, on jealousy and on the social aspects of marriage, that she is far-seeing enough to realise some of the deficiencies of present conditions and present moral ideas. Will she not carry her researches and her conclusions further, to the very root of the matter?

F. W. Stella Browne.

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THE CHALLENGE OF THE UNIVERSE: A popular re-statement of the argument from design. By the Rev. Charles J. Shebbeare, M.S. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge; New York: The MacMillan Co., 1918. Pp. xxiv, 245.

The subject of this very interesting book lies somewhat beyond the scope of a purely ethical Journal, and it can only be briefly noticed here. The general line of argument may be compared with that of Mr. Balfour's *Theism and Humanism*. The scope of the work is somewhat more restricted than Mr. Balfour's, and it is not developed with so commanding an eloquence; but, partly for those very reasons, it may carry more conviction to some minds. Mr. Shebbeare's philosophical position had little or nothing in common with that of Mr. Balfour. It is connected rather with Plato and Hegel and with the idealistic movement in England. His contention is that the modes of order that we find in the world as we know it "point to a general conception of the Universe as a rational whole, such that all, even of its most evil elements, are ultimately subordinate to the purposes of good. Such an ultimate optimism may be held conceivably in a non-theistic form." "Yet . . . belief in God is the doctrine to which optimism most naturally leads" (p. xviii). God, however, as religion conceives Him, is not to be identified with the Divine Father of the poets. He is almost as unlike the God of *Paradise Lost* as he is unlike the Homeric Zeus. The God of religion is no mere character in the drama of history, external to us as are the other persons with whom we come in contact. He is rather the author of the whole; the poet who is at once each of the charcacters and more than any; the God in Whom we live and move and have our being; our own inmost self; the very principle of life on which our own life and individuality is based, whose will is at the root of all our most personal activities; the Giver even of the very strength by which we resist Him" (p. 102).

Obviously a view of this kind involves great difficulties, and most of these are carefully considered by Mr. Shebbeare. Notwithstanding all that has been written on the problem of evil in recent times, he has managed to handle it with a good deal of freshness and force. But probably the part of his book that will be found most interesting is the discussion of the presence of beauty in nature as evidence of an æsthetic plan. How far his argument will carry conviction at this point will depend partly on the extent to which it is recognized as being subject to change.

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Some may think, for instance, that he does not take sufficient account of the fact that our appreciation of some of the beauties of nature is of comparatively recent growth. The question how far secondary qualities should be held to have independent reality, appears to be also involved. But at least it cannot be denied that Mr. Shebbeare's treatment of this whole subject is candid and conscientious. His treatment of moral conceptions seems to me slighter and less happy.

As the book is not primarily intended for specialists, it does not contain much discussion of the views of others; but the author is evidently familiar with most of the important doctrines. Some of the recent writings of Mr. Russell are a good deal criticized, but never without sympathetic appreciation. In the reference to Kant on pp. 224–7, some account should surely have been taken of the treatment of design in the *Critique of Judgment.*

The book as a whole, and especially the part that bears upon æsthetics, is certainly well worth reading.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

London, England.

SHORTER NOTICES.

INTRODUCTION TO JURISTIC PSYCHOLOGY. By Prabodh Chandra Bose, M.A.,B.L., Provincial Judicial Service, Bengal, Calcutta, Thacker, Spink & Co., 1917. Pp. 417.

"Juristic Psychology is the study of the psychology of human behavior from the standpoint of the maker, the administrator, the interpreter, the expositor of law; of one who in any way deals with law or is affected by law." This is the author's definition of Juristic Psychology, and it would justify the inclusion of practically all human behavior—considerably more than most ardent enthusiasts would claim for it.

The work is divided into nineteen chapters in which the author discusses the following topics: Nature and Scope of Juristic Psychology; Life and Mind; Methods and Difficulties; Consciousness; the Subconscious; Selective Activity; Sleep and Wakefulness; The Senses; Perception; Memory; Some Laws of Mental Dynamics; Human Behavior; The Unsound Mind; Narration of the Witness; Psychology of Judgment, Judicial Truth, Judge's Mind; Psychology of Crimes; Psychology of Admission, etc.; Legal Consciousness, Psychology of some concepts relevant in Law; the Plaintiff's Mind, the Prosecutor's Mind, etc.

Western students who read this book will be troubled by what will appear to them as an over-elaboration of formal definition and by the mention of the forked twig (p. 36), which "is sometimes used to discover underground water or ore." The author employs the phrase just quoted in connection with a brief account of the sub-conscious mind in motor manifestations, and in such a manner as to leave the impression that he takes seriously the claims of the water witch. Beginning on p. 302 is the author's

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suggested classification of crimes under 23 heads—a classification that defies search for a single guiding principle.

Many peculiarities of the book are expressions of the oriental mind and not of western mental habits. Largely because of its peculiarities, including its literary style, western jurists are not likely to find in this book much that will satisfy their needs.

The author shows a high degree of familiarity with the literature in certain fields of psychological investigation. This is especially true of his discussion of The Selective Activity of the Mind, Memory and Narration of the Witness to the Judge and the Jury.

ROBERT H. GAULT.

Northwestern University.

WHERE THE GREAT CITY STANDS: A STUDY IN THE NEW CIVICS. By C. R. Ashbee. London: Batsford, 1917. One hundred and twenty-one illustrations and plans. Pp. 156. Price 21s. net.

Reconstruction will need some clear thinking and vivid imagination. Mr. Ashbee has made a notable contribution to both, for his book is something more than an artist's plea for a world more beautiful than ours. The argument is, briefly, that various constructive forces had been at work before the war. There were art influences such as impressionism, the sense of the historic past, the housing and town-planning movement. But these were obstructed by the dirt and noise and poverty and waste of city life. What is most needed, therefore, is a synthesis of city life by which a new world may be built. The guild idea in art and industry, the closer co-ordination of art and life and a real co-ordination of the town and the country—these are some of the elements out of which a better world may be constructed. Mr. Ashbee's ideal is democratic and his attitude implies a genuine understanding of the best meaning in internationalism. His illustrations and plans help his argument and he uses a most interesting series of quotations and references. His book is international, in a sense; but it will be specially interesting to citizens of the United States because of the author's admiration for the efforts that have been made there. Mr. Ashbee is not one of those shallow critics who imagine that America's religion is the Dollar. The book suffers from the disjointed arguments, and the different aspects of social reconstruction are not presented in such a way as to give one clear impression. The author's enthusiasm sometimes interferes with his perception of the crude economic facts of modern life, but as a whole the book is effective and valuable.

C. D. B.

EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION: A PROBLEM OF FORCES. By "Ironicus." London: The Cursitor Publishing Co., 1918. Pp. 161. Price 2s. net.

This small book is an attempt to express ideals of reconstruction. It discusses education, anarchy, arbitration, and contains a long chapter on production. The author is patriotic and imperialistic; he is well satisfied with the general trend of the development in British Government, and he emphasizes the need for a strong and effective social organization. The argument is not very clear; nor is there any obviously leading idea in the book. But this is perhaps due to the peculiar abruptness with which it is written. The separate sentences and paragraphs are persuasive and, although they would not meet acceptance among most of those who look for a real democracy, the author does not appear to be intentionally opposed to any form of progress.

C. D. B.

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CLEARING THE GROUND. By "Lumberman." London: Constable & Co., 1918. Pp. 312. Price 7s. 6d. net.

"Lumberman" reviews the state of England before the war, peace and its conditions, and the problems of the future in these closely written pages. On the first two heads he has little material to say; history cannot be written in the spirit of party journalism. The last two sections give "Lumberman" fuller scope. "The Peace" section is largely devoted to an attack on the League of Nations scheme, and he accepts with German resignation the doctrine that wars must always be. He is for the "knock-out blow" and the total disarmament of Germany. As regards present social and industrial conditions, many of his pages might be letters to the Press signed *Laudator temporis acti*, speaking as he does of the "sound grounding" provided by dames schools (p. 245) and the unreasonableness of expecting the people to give up the use of ale (p. 249), "for surely it is unwise to blame the good gifts God has given because they are misused by some." He has, however, some practical suggestions to recommend, such as a Patronage Board, and (to restrain political camouflage) an act making the law of the land apply to the deeds and words of politicians (p. 287).

D. R.

EUROPE UNBOUND. By Lisle March Phillips. London: Duckworth & Company, 1916. Pp. xii, 212. Price, 6s. net.

The war has raised a crop of political theorists and essayists in the philosophy of history, and Mr. Phillips, with his real distinction of style, is one of the most eloquent. Perhaps the rapid growth of theory is due to man's instinct to define and to establish some kind of order and sequence in the midst of chaos. Mr. Phillips sees his order in a recognition of the war as a significant contest between tyranny and liberty. In this he is at one with many thinkers, such as the author of *Humanity and Inhumanity*. He goes further, however, in claiming that the conflict of the two ideals is not only political but spiritual; and in the ultimate analysis he defines it as a conflict between philosophy (a human product) and religion; between the Renaissance and the ages of Faith! Opposed to the ideal of liberty, Mr. Phillips sets the Prussian ideal of domination. Prussia has worked out a tyrannic rule of life, and "to face the philosophy of freedom has brought forth the philosophy of tyranny." This has been said before, but never so eloquently and with such sure outline.

In the last three chapters, the author turns to the English aspects of his theory, and to the future; also to the weakness of modern liberalism and conservatism. In the last and most significant chapter he deals with the possibility of an united Europe, and with the best of our modern thinkers recognises the "inevitableness of unity as the test of political intelligence." And such a scheme presupposes the inclusion of Germany, since evidently there can be no united Europe in which Germany is not included.

M. J.

OUR ULTIMATE AIM IN THE WAR. By George G. Armstrong. London: George Allen & Unwin., Ltd, 1916. Pp. 224. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

The erection of an international authority for the control of international relations has presented itself as the necessary outcome, to many minds, of the present breakdown of our older methods of diplomatic control. There have been already a number of books on the subject, of which the most

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remarkable is Mr. J. A. Hobson's standard work *Towards International Government*, a book to which Mr. Armstrong owes much, and to which he constantly refers. Mr. Armstrong's book is an very able and lucid popularisation of the subject.

His reasoning is throughout dominated by the idea which as he tells us has been derived from Kant's treatise on *Perpetual Peace*. "Every state," Kant says, "for the sake of its own security, may—and ought to—demand that its neighbour should submit itself to conditions similar to those of civil society, where the right of every individual is guaranteed. . . . For states, in their relation to one another, there can be according to reason, no other way of advancing from that lawless condition which unceasing war implies, than by giving up their savage lawless freedom, just as individual men have done."

So far everyone who thinks is in agreement with Kant, and hopes, with the Prime Minister, for the substitution for force of a real European partnership established and enforced by a common will. It is inevitable, however, that in spite of Mr. Armstrong's vigorous advocacy and genuine argumentative powers, the difficulties in the way of a world parliament or even of a European federation would seem still to await solution. There is, for instance, the question of the exact scope of the federation; a *bloc* of united European nations would be undoubtedly considered a danger by non-European countries. In the earlier portions of the book, Mr. Armstrong restricts himself to Mr. Asquith's modest ideal of an European federation, but in the later, he sketches, following Mr. Hobson's lead, a world state and a world parliament of five hundred and twenty-five representative units. These units are chosen on a popular basis, so that in the case of China—if China were included—some drastic modification of the population basis would be necessary in order to avoid a swamping of the vast agglomeration of humanity in Asia. China, Persia, India and Egypt are not, however, included in the initial membership, and so the problem is deferred.

M. J.

THE SCIENCE OF POWER. By Benjamin Kidd. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. 306. Price, 6s. net.

The late Mr. Kidd, the well-known sociologist who died in 1916, left behind him in MS. a work written before the war, but revised during the war's progress. To him the war was the fulfilment of his prophetic denunciations of the processes of western civilization. The book has the intensity and the narrow outlook of a prophet, a man with a message. And that message is that "the civilization of the West is scarcely more than glorified savagery." He wishes to create a new mind and a new earth in a single generation by the power of collective emotion; and to him the future of the world lies in this organised use of "the emotion of the ideal." If modern Germany or modern Japan can change the spirit of a nation in so short a time, what infinite possibilities lie before us of securing a higher perfection? It is a new note, this glorification of mass sentiments.

"The will to attain to an end imposed on a people by the emotion of an ideal organised and transmitted through social heredity is the highest capacity of mind." With much that has dignity of feeling, the book is curiously uncritical, and Bernhardi and Harold Begbie jostle the names of Darwin and Galton in his pages as cited authorities. Mr. Kidd is, shall we say, the crank in love with his own warm rhetoric and fighting with phan-

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toms; seeing men and women as "the male of the West enveloped in a kind of monstrous aura of the fight which has become essentially and profoundly atavistic" and the "psychic centre of power in social integration." It is sociology touched with emotion.

M. J.

THE INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION. By H. E. Hyde. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. xviii, 94. Price 3s. 6d. net.

Mr. Hyde's book is one of the many written round the idea of a League of Nations. The author's thesis is that his scheme of international government is the best form a League of Nations could take and that its inclusion in our war aims would ensure the defeat of militarism. This program is a trinity composed of a parliament composed of representatives of all nations, a law court, presided over by judges elected by that Parliament, and a strong international armament. All plants manufacturing munitions of war are to be controlled by the International Parliament, and hence war would be impossible,—from want of powder.

M. J.

THE WORLD IN CHAINS: SOME ASPECTS OF WAR AND TRADE. By J. Mavrogor Sato. London: Martin Secker, 1918. Pp. 166. Price 2s. 6d. net.

The author in a prefatory note warns his readers that 'there may be some exaggeration' in his book. The exaggeration is evident in his epigrammatic statement of his case against Militarism and Capitalism, and makes it very agreeable reading. His chapter on Trade during the War, concluding with an appendix on some typical war profits, is well worth study. His remedy for international chaos is some form of international government, when its necessity is realized by the people, "for, as Rousseau might have said, where there's a general will, there's a way." And it is the International Socialists who must lead the attacks on war; for as Socialism had begun to educate the nation against Capitalism, it should educate Europe against Imperialism which is "only an allotropic form of Capitalism," manifesting itself in the exploitation of fellow-nations instead of in the exploitation of fellow-citizens."

M. J.

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MORAL EMPIRE. By Kojiro Sugimori, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Waseda, Tokyo. London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 248. Price 5s. net.

Mr. Sugimori, a Japanese with a remarkable command of English, tells us that we are in need of a new religion. As a member of a widely different civilization, he looks askance at the Christian virtue of humility. His doctrine is the realization of the individual self; "the sense of the dignity of one's own moral person is in need of being so strengthened as to stand above all things else." God is "the supreme value." His quarrel with Christianity is that it has divided conscience from utility, whereas "conscience and utility are the predestined partners in one and the same work, namely personal self-preservation and self-assertion. Passages such as these read like a small echo of Nietzsche.

M. J.

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THE STATE AND THE CHILD. By W. Clarke Hall. London: Headley Bros., Ltd., 1918. Pp. Price 2/6 net.

Mr. Hall has had a fairly long experience of the problems of child life as a magistrate in Children's Court. Unlike other books of the New Commonwealth series, this concerns itself with the practice rather than with the theory of the State's action. "Much has been done for the child, much is now being done, but the best is not being done," and Mr. Hall's book is remarkable for its practical suggestions conveniently summarized in each chapter, each one of which calls for the most serious consideration from the authorities. Mr. Hall's outlook is practical and unprejudiced, as when he ascribes a certain proportion of juvenile delinquency to excessive mental activity and high spirits.

N. C.

THE SELF AND NATURE. By DeWitt H. Parker. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1917. Pp. 316.

This volume bristles with a formidable array of time-honored metaphysical topics, and constitutes an implicit reply to the question concerning the persistence of the so-called philosophical problems. The author discusses the self, personal identity, the world under the captions of perception, space, time and causality, the mind-body relation, and the metaphysical status of universals. Mr. Parker apparently believes in the charge that man is a metaphysical animal, and says in the language of past centuries that man demands immortality and cosmic perfection. Philosophy as distinguished from religion is certainly not interested in the artificial problems of the world and self, which are non-existent excepting in the discussions. This book indicates why these problems continue to be written about; the relics are dressed up and adorned, so as to appear alive. This volume has in it some valuable, philosophical material, the discussion of relations for example, but on the whole it justifies the contention that to-day metaphysics really means religion.

J. R. K.

HOW TO FACE LIFE. By Stephen S. Wise. The Art of Life Series, New York. B. W. Huebsch, 1917.

Those persons who enjoy the Emersonian type of sermon as to the "art of living," may find some satisfaction in this brief sketch of youth, maturity, and age. "Give yourself to something great" is the banner flung before the adolescent. Instead of advising the youth to study and understand his "appetites and masterful passions," in order best to control them, the author is under the impression that by merely choosing "some standard of self-sacrifice" the young person will attain to the most holy and profitable way of living. Middle age is portrayed as the period of intellectual strength and moral firmness. Old age is the serene cogitation over the holy ideals pursued throughout life. The one refreshing note is the plea to avoid cessation of growth. "He who grows and learns dies not."

H. R. K.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM JAMES. By Th. Flournoy. Translated by E. B. Holt and William James, Jr. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1917. Pp. 244.

Professor Flournoy offers in this little volume a very sympathetic and popular treatment of some phases of the thought of William James. Hav-

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ing originally prepared his material as an address to replace one which Professor James was to deliver before the Association chretienne suisse d'Etudiants, Professor Flournoy precedes his discussion of James's philosophy by some biographical facts. The original address is expanded to include a chapter each on Pragmatism, Radical Empiricism, Pluralism, Tychism, Meliorism and Moralism, Theism and the Will to Believe. Perhaps because of the circumstances of its origin Professor Flournoy stresses what one might term the more religious aspects of James's thought. The author interprets Professor James's philosophic interests as an attempt to reconcile the demands of the moral and religious life with those of science. The book leaves one with the attitude that the author has not placed James in proper perspective among the more significant elements of his philosophy.

J. R. K.

MAN'S UNCONSCIOUS CONFLICT. Wilfred Lay, Ph.D. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. viii, 318. Price 7s. 6d. net.

A readable and popular presentation of the theories of Freud and Jung, as regards therapy and education. The "unconscious" is constantly referred to in the book as the "Titan," and this, an analogy from Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*, reads oddly.

M. J.

POT-BOILERS. By Clive Bell. London: Chatto & Windus, 1918. Pp. viii, 260. Price 6s. net.

Mr. Clive Bell's scattered essays on literature and art, published in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, the *Nation*, the *New Statesman*, and elsewhere are well worth collecting. There is Gallic candor and scholarship, and an entertaining absence of cant.

M. J.

PERSONAL LIBERTY: THE GREAT PROBLEM OF TO-DAY. By E. F. B. Fell. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1917. Pp. viii, 208. Price 5s. net.

Mr. Fell, who has stated his views in a book published some years ago, is the prophet of the independent value of personality, and Militarism and Socialism are regarded by him as equally hostile to Liberty and Personality. He criticizes the school that regards the State as the beginning, and end of the individual, for "it is obvious that such a State could have no morality, seeing that moral obligation has the same origin as religion, namely, the ultra-political, ultra-social divine revelation of the individual person" (p. 13). His moral basis is Christian, and he even goes so far as to say that if Christian morality is thrown overboard "all rational objection to tryanny or absolutism of any sort vanishes into nothing."

N. C.

THE CHARTIST MOVEMENT. By Mark Hovell, M.A. Edited and completed by T. F. Tout. Manchester University Press, 1918. Pp. xxviii, 327. Price 7s. 6d. net.

This close and documented draft of a history of Chartism is a valuable addition to the literature on the subject. It is a specialized history, attempting as it does to "dissect out the Chartist nerve and trace its ramifi-

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cations," apart from the larger political and social nerve centres. "Chartism," wrote Carlyle in 1839, "means the bitter discontent grown fierce and mad, the wrong condition therefore, and the wrong disposition of the working classes of England." There has been a general consensus of opinion in placing Chartism among the lost causes of history; but though the organization failed, its social program became absorbed into current opinion and as far as political machinery goes, the Chartists have won the substance of their claims. Of the famous six points,—universal male suffrage, voting by ballot, equal electoral districts, no property qualification for members of Parliament, payment of members are already now law, and all that remains unrealized is the claim for annual parliaments. But besides these positive achievements, there is the spiritual legacy of Chartism to be reckoned with. It was Chartism that first drew attention to the hardness of the industrial workman's lot, and to the gulf between the two "nations" side by side in England; and by this, in spite of its incoherences as a whole, and its apparent failure, Chartism being dead yet liveth. Mr. Hovell's book is valuable from its close study of the original materials, Chartist speeches and writings; and it is tragic that he was unable to finish his projected work.

N. C.

London, England.

SOCIAL EVILS AND PROBLEMS. Edited for the Church of Scotland Commission on the War, by Professor W. P. Paterson and Dr. David Watson. Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1918. Pp. viii, 376. Price 3s. 6d. net.

Papers on social problems, dealing with the sphere of influence the church should endeavor to occupy. There are chapters on impurity, the decreasing birthrate, rural depopulation, adolescence and the training of youth, and Christianity and international relations. There is a very full and sensible paper on gambling, by Lord Sandys, and a good paper on industrial problems, by Sir A. Steel-Maitland. It is stated in the paper on the decreasing birthrate that the true cause of this is the decline of religion, which is the measure of that article.

M. J.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

BARNES, HARRY ELMER. A History of the Penal, Reformatory and Correctional Institutions of the State of New Jersey. Analytical and Documentary. Trenton, N. J.: MacCrellish & Quigley Company, 1918. Pp. 654.

BARY, RICHARD DE. The International King: A War Appeal for Federal Union. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918. Pp. xiv, 68. Price 2s. net.

BELL, CLIVE. Pot-Boilers. London: Chatto and Windus, 1918. Pp. viii, 260. Price 6s. net.

BRADLEY, HARRIET. The Enclosures in England. An Economic Reconstruction. New York: Columbia University, 1918. Pp. 112. Price $1.25.

CAHN, HERMAN. Capital To-day. A Study of Recent Economic Development. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918. Pp. xii, 376. Price $2.00.

DRAKE, PAUL HARRIS. Democracy Made Safe. Boston, Mass.: LeRoy Phillips, 1918. Pp. x, 110. Price $1.00 net.

GRABO, CARL H. The World Peace and After. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1918. Pp. 154. Price $1.00 net.

HALE, ROBERT L. Valuation and Rate-Making. The Conflicting Theories of the Wisconsin Railroad Commission. New York: The Columbia University Press, 1918. Pp. 156. Price $1.50.

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HART, HEBER, K. C., LL.D. The Bulwarks of Peace. London, Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. xiv, 221. Price 3s. 6d. net.

HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST. Human Nature and Its Remaking. New Haven: The Yale University Press, 1918. Pp. xxvi, 434. Price $3.00 net.

HOWELL, ROGER. The Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1918. Pp. vii, 120.

HRDLICKA, ALES. Recent Discoveries Attributed to Early Man in America. Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 66. Washington; Government Printing Office, 1918. Pp. 67.

HYDE, H. E. The International Solution. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. xviii, 94. Price 3s. 6d. net.

"JASON." Past and Future. London: Chatto and Windus, 1918. Pp. xii, 192. Price 3s. 6d. net.

LAY, WILFRED. Man's Unconscious Conflict: A Popular Exposition of Psycho-Analysis. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. viii, 318. Price 7s. 6d. net.

LEFFINGWELL, GEORGIA WILLIAMS. Social and Private Life at Rome in the Time of Plautus and Terence. New York: Columbia University, 1918. Pp. 140. Price $1.25.

"LUMBERMAN." Clearing the Ground. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. x, 312. Price 7s. 6d. net.

MAVROGORDATO, JOHN, M.A. The World in Chains: Some Aspects of War and Trade. London: Martin Secker. Pp. 166. Price 2s. 6d. net.

THE NEW EAST. A Monthly Review of Thought and Achievement in the Eastern and Western Worlds. August, 1918. 12 Ichibei-cho Nichome, Azabu, Tokyo. Price 50 sen per copy; 5 Yen, 13s., or $3.25 per annum.

PETERSON, PROFESSOR W. P. and WATSON, DR. DAVID (Editors). Social Evils and Problems. Edited for the Church of Scotland Commission on the War. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1918. Pp. vii, 376. Price 3s. 6d. net.

RAWLINSON, A. E. J. Religious Reality: A Book for Men. With a preface by the Bishop of Lichfield. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918. Pp. xi, 183. Price 4s. 6d. net.

RIGNANO, EUGENIO. Essays in Scientific Synthesis. Translated by W. J. Greenstreet, M.A. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 254. Price 7s. 6d. net.

SMITH, NORMAN KEMP. A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason.' London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918. Pp. xviii, 615. Price 21s. net.

STORR, VERNON F., M.A. Christianity and Immortality. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918. Pp. x, 196. Price 7s. 6d. net.

TEGGART, FREDERICK J. The Processes of History. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1918. Pp. ix, 162. Price $1.25.

TOBIAS, R. B., and MARCY, MARY E. Women as Sex Vendors. Chicago,: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1918. Pp. 59. Price $.50 net.

WARTIME EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN THE MENTAL TRADES. Research Report Number 8. July, 1918. Boston National Industrial Conference Board, 1918.

WEYL, WALTER E. The End of the War. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918. Pp. 323. Price $2.00.

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ASSISTANCE DESIRED

Assistance is much desired in formulating a well organized statement of the motives which impell human beings in their conduct. After it has been determined what conduct is right for the child when in this, that or the other situation, the problem remains how to motivate the child as well as how to convince the child that it ought to act right. It is possible by intelligent argumentation to prove to a boy that he ought not to steal grapes from a neighbor's vine, and it is not difficult to decide that he ought to pass by the vine to school without stopping and picking grapes: but how can the boy be motivated to leave the grapes alone? And how ought he to be motivated in character education? Some statement of fundamental motives for conduct that is true to the facts of human psychology, sociology and ethics will have to be worked out in order that character education can get a fair start in its efforts to decide on procedures for motivation of children.

The following is submitted as a basis for criticism and advice:

MOTIVES FOR CONDUCT IN HUMAN BEINGS

These should be held in mind as the basis for motivation of conduct in children.

BODY, we seek comforts

THE MOTIVE IS THE HOME DESIRES

1. bladder (evacuations)
2. health (freedom from pain, buoyancy)
3. intestines (evacuations)
4. lungs (air to breathe)
5. mouth (thirst, taste)
6. muscles (activity, rest)
7. nose (smells)
8. sex organs (excitations)
9. skin (bath, warmth)
10. stomach (hunger)

BRAIN, we seek satisfactions through

THE MOTIVE IS THE ENVIRONMENT DESIRES

1. ears (hear things)
2. eyes (see things)
3. feet (go where interested)
4. fingers (feel things)
5. mouth (taste things)
6. nose (smell things)
7. voice organs (talk, sing)

PERSONALITY, we seek growth and maturity of

THE MOTIVE IS THE LIFE-CAREER DESIRES

1. our abilities
2. our activities
3. our associations and organizations
4. our friendships and loves (including home and church)
5. our harmony with life (including religious)
6. our knowledge
7. our possessions
8. our power
9. our recognition
10. our self-approval
11. our service to others (happiness and development)

Character education should be such as to strengthen in the child the influence for good of these three great motives—1) the home desires, 2) the environment desire, 3) the life-career desire, in order that they may be operative during adult life to control conduct on right lines and toward wise objectives.

Please send advice and criticism to MILTON FAIRCHILD, chairman executive committee, National Institution for Moral Instruction, 3730 McKinley street, Washington, D. C.

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE CONCEPT OF WORLD SECTIONS.

A. E. HEATH.

WHAT can most profitably be transferred to political theory, no less than to philosophy, from natural science is its method rather than its special results. A dim foreshadowing of this truth is to be found in Seeley's dictum that historians have given to history the conscientiousness of science, but not yet its arrangement. Now there is more in 'arrangement' than meets the eye at first glance. For many modern thinkers hold that it is precisely in the orderly and economical arrangement of facts that the power of the scientific method lies. In other words the effectiveness of science comes from its deliberate choice of a convenient conceptual symbolism. Its laws are shorthand expressions of the relations between facts in terms of the concepts used; and the power supplied by those concepts is that of enabling one to trace correlations in fields otherwise too complex to be handled. The crux of the whole method, then, lies in the choice of concepts.

In this paper I have attempted to show how the setting up of concepts in the domain of international politics is both possible and helpful in exactly the same way as in the natural sciences. The outstanding problem in this field can be simply stated: out of the present international anarchy has arisen the desire in all lands for some means of co-operation between nations to avoid wars which, in the

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present state of man's technical mastery over nature, threaten the destruction of civilisation. The idea of a League of Nations which shall replace the 'precarious equipoise' of states by some real partnership is based on this hope. Innumerable schemes have been devised. But what is more urgently needed than clear-cut schemes —ready to drop on the world like harness on a horse—is some concise and exact description of the human and historical difficulties which all such schemes have to face in the world of fact. That preliminary task is our present concern.

The particular concept whose utility I wish to illustrate in this analysis of the existing interplay of forces is that of *world-sections*. This I shall use as a kind of 'atomic' concept out of which others may be constructed as they become necessary. And side by side with the setting up of the proper descriptive machinery there will appear, as I hope to show, indications of the lines along which the main problem may be hopefully attacked.

By a vertical section of the world is meant any division of mankind into classes which are geographically limited in extension; the existence of different languages is a vertical section. By a horizontal section is meant a division into classes which tend to world-wide extension. Thus the industrial revolution was a horizontal section producing capitalists and proletarians in all lands. Like every other classification of the world of things, these sections do not give rise to rigid blocks with sharp outlines; nor is the main distinction between horizontal and vertical sections put forward as something absolute. None the less it is one which can be readily recognised in practice.

In applying this to the description of how the present aspirations towards some kind of international control have arisen, we may first note that vertical section, such as the intensification of national feeling, obviously has a general tendency to cut across the horizontal grain of internationalism. So forcible a vertical section as war, how-

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ever, not only accentuates the vertical division into states but also splits the world horizontally—like a blow on a crystal possessing horizontal cleavage. It creates the reaction which, from the time of Erasmus, has led men to seek the means of attaining a world-wide and permanent peace. This secondary cleavage has been aided in our time by the immense ramification of horizontal interests during the past fifty years. It is this which lulled men's minds to a false sense of security, and led them to feel that so violent a vertical section as war was impossible in modern civilisation. The persistence of such pre-war cleavage has definitely affected the course of events. It has been the line along which the war has spread, like lava in a rock, to cover the earth. In the New World the strain to which it gave rise has broken through the vertical barrier of the Monroe Doctrine. It is not surprising, then, that it is precisely here—under the impulse of the same force as accomplished that breakdown—that we find the strongest movement towards a horizontal statement of the questions at issue; and it is *the initial cleavage underlying this development* which converts the proposal of a League of Nations, for the first time in history, into a question of practical politics.

Now a nation is a vertical section whilst a league tends to the horizontal. Hence it is of no use our gauging the importance of whatever international tendencies there may be, unless at the same time we balance them against the vertical obstacles they have to overcome. As soon as the problem is stated in this form it is obvious that no horizontalism, however strong, is likely to sweep away the very real and virile national feeling of our time. Even if we ultimately judge that, so far as human foreknowledge can tell, the future is not to be one of harsh national *laissez-faire*, it is clear from the outset that neither will it be one of vague cosmopolitanism without vertical differentiation. Unity, if it is to be attained at all, will be through community of individual interests; not through abstract legal uniformity, as in the *Pax Romana*, nor through autocratic moral uniformity, as in the days of the Holy Roman Empire. There

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are too many natural divisions in the world for that. Failure to understand the drift of the times towards one such division—nationality—was the main weakness of the series of attempts beginning with the *Projet de traité pour rendre la paix perpetuelle* of St. Pierre, published in 1713. Some of his proposals are strikingly similar to modern ones, but it is clear that St. Pierre regarded the nation as merely a community bound together by allegiance to a sovereign. It is not surprising, then, that the failure of his project was followed by the natural development, in Rousseau's *Jugement sur la paix perpetuelle*, of attempting a peace by appeal not to princes but to the brotherhood of an enlightened humanity. The French Revolution with its triumph of the collective will over the divine rights of kings strengthened such hopes for a world peace, and Kant's treatise *Zum ewigen Frieden* (1795) followed a similar line. Enlightened self-interest and the growth of the moral idea, together with republican institutions would — he thought —mean that the people would never be for war. The immense driving force embodied in the growing idea of nationality rendered appeals to kings and to peoples alike unavailing.

It is recognition of this fact which has led in our day to the opposite view that, since we cannot afford to neglect the vertical section into nations, all that is necessary is a strong homeopathic dose of national division. All will be well, it is believed, if once the world gets itself parcelled out to satisfy the many claims to nationality. It is true that the forcible setting up of state sections not coincident with national divisions has been a fruitful cause of war. Yet Mazzini's vision of a world peace between free peoples has not been realised—a fact which modern history has scarcely exhibited as due entirely to the continued existence of autocratic governments. It must be said at once, however, that the liberation of nations would be a useful step; but it could only be a preliminary one. It represents a forward movement by its recognition of the often neglected distinction between nations and states. Non-recognition

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of this distinction has been the source of much confusion. We shall, therefore, attempt to reach as precise a statement of it as possible.

The opposition between vertical and horizontal section has application to smaller units than the world; it is present in every form of social grouping. No matter how primitive the group, there exists in it the possibility of vertical section—leading to individualism—side by side with the possibility of its horizontal antithesis, co-operation. Certain insect communities form examples of extreme horizontalism. Thus Prof. Julian Huxley has doubted whether the single ant, rather than the whole ant-hill, is properly to be regarded as the individual; vertical section seems to have disappeared. Now what makes an associated group out of an aggregate of individuals—a cricket team out of a casual collection of people—is the possession of a common horizontal purpose. A community is the result of an integration of many such partial associations; and a nation is one class of such integrated wholes. It may involve other vertical sections—race, language, geographical contiguity—but it does not necessarily coincide with them. Now from the fact that a nation is a sum of partial associations, it does not follow that it is any casual collection of such. It is, rather, a natural product of the group instinct; a result of that ancestral impulse to herd and community formation by the intensified use of which man has attained his superiority in the animal world. Aristotle seems to have sensed this in his view of the community as an essential to human life as such. "Man without his fellows is either a Beast or a God." And its 'natural' origin is borne out by the fact that it is the possession of a common historical tradition and unity of feeling which gives to a nation its varying but characteristic solidity. This does not imply that there is any mystical addition to the sum of its parts, such as seems to be suggested by sociologists like Durkheim. Nor need we regard it as the 'organic' collective mind of the idealist. The nation is a

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spontaneous natural unity much as a solid stereoscopic view (once caught) is a unified whole, in spite of its being nothing more than the sum of two separate aspects.

It is now possible to define what is meant in modern times by the state. It is the conscious organisation or tool, for attaining some of the purposes which relate the associated communities of which it is the organ. The nation is brought into being by common social purposes; the state is the always defective political machine for effecting some of them. If there were no horizontal community of aim (such as is produced by danger from external aggression) cutting across the national divisions of the Dual Monarchy, that state would fall to pieces. But *conscious will can build a state on very little common interest.* On the other hand the forcible vertical section of the Polish nation has left it without a state of its own, even though its unity of purpose has persisted. The state is thus a more artificial thing than a nation; it can be made and destroyed more easily. The striking lesson of the rise of Japan to power is an illustration of this truth; it shows that the modern state can easily be constructed and fitted on to non-European shoulders. Our problem will, then, ultimately become a world problem and not one for European or 'Western' nations only.

The distinction between the nation and the state has been much accentuated in modern times. When we come to the larger communities of our day we have to realise that increase in size introduces qualitative, as well as quantitative differences; it is not a matter of simple multiplication. We cannot, as Mr. Delisle Burns has clearly pointed out, assume that the modern state is only a larger but similar form of the Greek *polis* or the mediæval *regnum*. A common wooden shed multiplied in size a thousand times would sink under its own weight; to make such increase possible, qualitatively different material must be used. And one of the qualitative changes induced in states by their tremendous growth is their disjunction from the communities whose tools they are. But this has a vital

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bearing on our problem. For modern state-theory has tended to identify the state with the nation; and in actual practice the group loyalty of the nation has usually been diverted uncritically to the support of the state. Thus the state has slowly gathered power as an end in itself, and not merely as a means. In the event of war—however despicable the diplomatic excuses, however petty or mean the true state-motive—it has nearly always been possible to enlist the deeply inherent herd instinct of man on its side. A blow at the state is regarded as striking at the very heart of group solidarity; and all wars thus become wars of defence. It is this which has turned the vision of Mazzini into an unsubstantial dream.

We cannot legitimately conclude, however, that war is due mainly to the wickedness or incapacity of diplomatists and governing classes, the mere executive of states—any more than we can believe that militarism is due to soldiers. For the relation between the state and the nation is a reciprocal one. If war is one of the functions for which the state has been organised, the nation must have had a community purpose of which that function is the expression. As a matter of hard fact nations have sometimes found, as in the winning of Italian unity, that war was necessary for their defence or development. But to acknowledge that war is one of the functions for which the state has been organised is not to agree that it is its supreme function. If war is allowed to lord it over the humaner functions of the state it will seriously hamper them—like the military procession mentioned by Liebknecht, which held up the fire-engine in the streets of Berlin.

We may conclude our analysis of the main vertical barriers to internationalism by acknowledging frankly a fact which many thinkers of high moral outlook have wrongly supposed to be a conclusive reason for the continuance of war: that the external success of a state brings internal quickening and unity to the nation. We must firmly point out, in denying the conclusion whilst admitting the premiss, that even a legitimate defensive success has often given rise to

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the state-doctrine of pan-nationalism. The unity of Italy was followed by the sordid Tripoli campaign. It is one thing to be one, as a united family working for the weal of all; it is another thing to lose this goodly reality of unity for the deadly shadow of imperialism, by which is meant concern for external dominion. Yet so long as nations believe that they can only be great, or hold their own, by the destruction of others—so long will they be organised for war, and find it impossible to slacken their efforts in the mad race for power. If we cannot rise above the gigantic international *Schadenfreude* in which we live, the humane functions of the state will continue to be overshadowed by its function for war; and nothing can save us from a series of increasingly devastating conflicts.

When we pass to the opposite set of tendencies—those making in the direction of a horizontal world order—we are met at the outset by a series of forces which, though powerful, have up to now proved hopelessly inadequate to resist the vertical impulse of war.

Thus it was supposed that religion was slowly creating a stable horizontalism. But if we mean by religion the organised Churches, we find that, even within a single type such as European Christianity, innumerable vertical sects have arisen since the Reformation. This process was probably as essential to religious liberty as the contemporaneous rise of sovereign states to political liberty. But it has almost destroyed the horizontal influence of Churches. And if we draw a distinction between organised Churches and the spirit of which they are the embodiment, we find that even the latter shows—under the stress of war—a certain amount of vertical section. This is not surprising when we remember that religion has always appealed to that flower of the group instinct, self-sacrifice. Nevertheless, there is evidence of a reaction in all lands from the critical confining of group loyalty to the nation—a movement which is vital to religion if it is to justify its high claim to universality.

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The international solidarity of labour is another force which has proved ineffective. But it has not been completely destroyed, and may still have to be reckoned with. The failure of the Russian revolution was not so much due to the weakness of this force as to the fact that, in its later phase, it was an attempt to reach a final world order by converting the vertical war into a horizontal one. At the back of this attempt was the theory that there is only one constant and calculable motive underlying all the surgings of foreign policy, and all the groupings and regroupings of Powers—namely, financial interests. War, on this view, is not a breakdown of peace conditions but merely an uncovering of previously existing forces whose presence has hitherto kept the competing interests in dynamic equilibrium. From this it follows that the destruction of the capitalist system is a necessary preliminary to constructive peace. Now it is idle to deny that sordid financial interests have been behind many an idealistic call to arms. But battles are not fought between financial groups; they are fought between peoples. And there is no reason to believe that, even if capitalist exploitation could be swept away, war between peoples would cease; for the minor factor of aggressive finance merely brings into play the major factor of national feeling. If that factor can be enlisted on the side of peace, no selfish interest will be able to stand against it; if it cannot, nothing will save us from war.

But the most powerful of all the horizontal tendencies of our time has been the slow realisation of the full consequences of the industrial revolution. Scientific development has come from specialisation; its policy is "Divide and conquer." *Its division, however, is horizontal according to function;* and in consequence, wherever we get division of labour in a community it binds the whole group vertically together with strong bonds of interdependence. If you cut in two a primitive colonial organism which has very little cell differentiation, it will not be much inconvenienced; if you halve an animal whose cells have highly

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specialised functions, it means death to it.[1] Now, economically the world is one, its divisions are horizontal divisions of function, and vertical section therefore means economic disorganisation. Cobden and Bright realised the interdependence of the world's markets. Their lineal descendant, Mr. Norman Angell, has shown us the more intricate interdependence of the world's banks and exchanges. It is sometimes airily supposed that all this has been swept away by the war. That is not so. Undoubtedly the world shows greater powers of enduring the economic disintegration of war than was ever thought possible; but it is there, none the less. Indeed national dependence is made clearer than ever before. To give two examples only: England would starve but for the economic co-operation of other nations; and in modern industrialised warfare it is now seen to be a physical impossibility for any state to remain completely neutral. And yet, although this economic horizontalism is strong enough to survive war, it was not sufficient to prevent it. We must therefore grant full recognition to the fact that any purely economic and bloodless view of international politics, not taking into account the instinctive and confused and heroic motives of real men, can only give us results of partial value. Group instinct is rooted deeper in human nature than the biologically later economic interest. It carries with it a tremendous power of disinterested activity which has upset, and will upset again, all the calculations of the economists.

At this point, however, we must make a very important distinction between the strong sentiments of the group, especially when in danger, and the real truth of the matter. The ordinary man in any nation has a very distinct feeling of difference from members of other nations. This is fostered by his school-books and newspapers, by his prefer-

[1] It should be noted that section of more highly developed organisms is sometimes possible. Biologists regard this possibility as due to the capacity of the cells of such organisms to break down and revert to a more primitive homogeneous type.

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ence for the homely familiar, and by his spatial separation from foreigners. So arises an illusory view of the world as divided neatly into vertical sections. But the fact that we must take this illusion seriously into account does not in the least imply that we should be taken in by it. The truth is that in the modern world man is the centre of a conflict of group loyalties; he is under horizontal as well as vertical stresses. In the struggle between Dr. Stockmann's scientific conscience and his common interest with his fellow townsmen lies the tragedy of Ibsen's *Enemy of the People.* Professional solidarity brings an English professor of mathematics nearer to a German colleague than to an English docker. The continual conflict between men's class-consciousness and their loyalty to the nation may give rise to strikes in time of war; and on the other hand there is more than a suspicion that it has sometimes led a privileged class inside a state to avoid internal dispossession by making external war.

It is not, then, other-worldly idealism but cold matter of fact which forces us to the conclusion that our age is characterised by the rapid growth of horizontal tendencies. Every human activity by which man has raised himself to pre-eminence in the world has been intensified. Religion, philosophy, art, science—all come from man's conscious co-ordination of the experience he has in common with other human beings. They are unconditioned by time and place, and make their appeal across all vertical divisions. And it is their sum which gives rise to that growing common conscience of the civilised world, that *Sittlichkeit,* on which all our hopes of internationalism must ultimately be founded.

In our analysis we have been brought back again and again to one consideration: the possibility of man's group instinct, centred about his home and country, being diverted uncritically to the aid of any tendency to war. At first sight the solution of this central problem seems easy. We have only to persuade the mass of men that their true

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economic, or political, or class interests are seldom at issue in war. But the community has usually been engaged to the support of a war only when it was either an accomplished, or a fatally inevitable fact. And communities in actual danger do not think; they act.

Now if there were in existence a League, each member of which was pledged to allow what has been called a 'cooling-off' time—or period of consideration—to elapse before declaring war over any dispute whatsoever, then a great part of this danger would be avoided. For communities, though powerful when moved, are slow to move. It has always been a cause of complaint against them that they were too peace-loving, too content to ask only security from the state. We are not, for the moment, concerned, with the desirability of this inertia in communities, but only with the fact of its existence. For that fact makes it possible to convert what is now the great stumbling block to peace into a barrier against war. The anxiety of the governments of all the warring states to justify themselves in the eyes of their people is one indication of the strength this barrier would possess. And modern history provides us with examples of the fact that governments have time and time again found it necessary to set up mythical stories of actual attack before the nation could be moved. It is not, then, that group instincts are beyond human control; it is only that in present conditions they make for war instead of being directed to constructive purposes.

But has our analysis shown anything like the community of interest necessary to enable us to build up such a League? There is only one way of deciding that question: if there *is* a vigorous horizontalism it will have translated itself into legal enactments. When a group of discrete people possess sufficient community of interest to form a club, that interest finds its material embodiment in rules. Are there any horizontal world rules? Let us be clear, again, as to the exact issue. We are not discussing the efficacy of rules; we are only concerned with their possible existence: because if they exist the horizontalism which

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produced them exists, and may be strong enough to form the required basis.

Now from Grotius down to the Hague Conferences of our time there has been an uninterrupted development of international law. It has been argued that this is not law because it was not made by a supreme legislature. But as Sir Henry Maine has pointed out, a community need not wait until it has established sovereign authority before it can recognize the existence of laws. "What we have to notice," he said, "is that the founders of International Law, though they did not create a sanction created a law-abiding sentiment." The absence of a Court of universal jurisdiction has been lamented since the time of Dante's *De monarchia*, comments Sir F. Pollock. But, as he goes on to show, international law does not differ in this possession of only partial sanction from the early condition of all systems of law. Thus the Hague Conferences must be regarded not as an end, but as part of a process leading logically to international sanction.

The fact that international law is often overruled in war-time—although each state acknowledges its existence, in accusing others of breaking it—must not blind us to the miracle that it was ever kept at all without a permanent tribunal to interpret it. Our contention is that this ramification of law—and of treaties—between states shows that there is sufficient community of interest on which to found a League of Powers pledging themselves to refer all disputes covered by existing international law and treaty obligations to a permanent judicial tribunal whose decisions should be final.

The disputes which usually give rise to war are, however, over questions *not* covered by existing law—such as those involving national honour or vital interests. But conciliation is a well-established method in diplomacy. And it would involve no radical change of principle for the Powers to refer all disputes not covered by existing law or treaties to a standing council of conciliation—the Powers to refrain from war until its recommendations are pub-

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lished and for a certain time after. *A pledge to submit all disputes to one or other of these international organs would constitute a practicable minimum basis for what we may call a League of Powers.*

This would not yet be a true League of Nations; but even such a limited first step towards that end would have great advantages. It would provide, for the world and for its own people, an objective test of a Power's sincerity. It would bring into existence a normal routine of procedure for all disputes—an important matter; for peace, like literary inspiration and war, comes from preparedness. Finally it would serve as a nucleus around which otherwise vague aspirations to a world view for peace or war could crystallise. If only a few great Powers joined the League and made a horizontal, less parochial, statement of their aims, the rest would probably have to follow under pressure from their peoples. And the tendency towards a franker and more open diplomacy would have freer play; the disadvantages of secret treaties (even to the Powers concerned) being nowadays strongly realised by all peoples.

But a League of Powers as thus constituted would lay itself open to the very serious criticism brought against it by most of the historians who have discussed the question: that it would degenerate, like every other setting up of the machinery of order without any provision for changing conditions, into a futile attempt to petrify the world in the shape it chanced to have when the League was formed. And Powers could justify war as the only means of changing a *status quo* in which they had no place. Any League which aims at being a living thing must not, therefore, confine itself to avoiding collision between states; it must arrange for their co-operation in the difficult art of keeping pace with the times.[2]

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[2] Since this was written there has appeared, in the *English Review* for August, 1918, a striking and important article by Mr. H. N. Brailsford in which this view is strongly expressed. He writes "the penalty of rigidity in the State is revolution, as in the world of States it is war." The league must not be conceived as a mere external bond of a treaty of arbitration. For "that way lies

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We have already recognised that what binds individuals into a group is community of purpose. A mere static desire for peace would probably be sufficient to bring into being a League of Powers; but the common purpose needed to bring nations into active co-operation must be something more vigorous and more permanent than this. If such co-operation is for the attainment of a more effective legal order than the existence of a judicial body alone provides, the addition to it of a legislative organ would be quite a possible step. For it would merely be a systematisation of the international legislation by conferences which grew up in the last century. If, again, co-operation is wanted for the solving of administrative problems common to all states, it can be attained by the extension of existing international commissions. The immense network of international administration is little realised by the ordinary citizen. As Mr. L. S. Woolf has noted, "the very success of these experiments has served to cover them with obscurity." For each of these modes of co-operation the existing economic and financial horizontalism forms a sufficient basis. And there would be the hope that if such co-operation were developed it might lead to the recognition that 'irreconcilable national interests' often turn out, when frankly faced, to be not so irreconcilable after all; that they more often arise from the ambitions of small cliques of concessionaires than from true national interest.

But even if we view these possibilities in the most sanguine manner, the fact remains that any attempt to settle so-called 'political' questions by international co-operation, or arbitration, would meet with tremendous opposition. So obviously powerful a method of peaceful settlement as the international control of key industries and

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stagnation and, in the end, the inevitable insurgence of living forces against this death in life. Change is a biological necessity. The damning verdict on the old Europe is not that its suppressed impulses for change flamed at last into a universal war, but rather that its structure was so rigid, its power of self-adjustment so limited, that save through war no radical change was possible within it."

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danger zones, and the international distribution of vital raw materials, would be opposed by both financial and diplomatic interests. If any such attempt is ever made the only possible commission for dealing with those questions would be one which represented peoples—not Powers. It should be capable of impartial investigation, and should therefore represent all horizontal classes. A League of that type would cease to be a mere Holy Alliance of states and become *a real League of Nations*. The machinery for this presents great difficulties, but not necessarily insuperable ones; and once set up the dangers of vertical redivision would be lessened by the immediate emergence of horizontal parties.

It would at once be claimed that this involves interference with the sovereignty of members of the League. So it does; but you cannot have sovereignty and co-operation together.[3] In its every-day meaning, sovereign power is quite incompatible with any real "enthronement of the idea of public right" between states. For as soon as any will is subject to law, it loses its unlimited liberty of action —its sovereignty—and gains a corresponding control over the wills of others. What it loses in horizontal liberty (duties) it gains in vertical power (rights). This is the root paradox of civilisation: that loss of extensive liberty should bring gain in intensive development. The theoretical anarchist's claim to strict verticality could only lead to loss of vertical power itself; for the full development of the individual's particular bent requires the delegation of those activities for which he is not specially fitted, but which are necessary for his physical existence. Somewhere or other the humble ploughman must be providing the artist's bread. But if the individualist accepts the duties of other men he must accept also their rights over him. So with nations. Loss of sovereignty does not mean giving up individuality; it is the only way of safeguarding it. It is

[3] Unless by sovereignty is meant nothing more than relative political autonomy of states.

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the hard—the sanely virile—way. The weak and blustering policy of "security" only gives adequate return for its fearful cost if the state adopting it can stretch its tentacles from one strategic point to another until it possesses the earth. If there are to be rights at all, states must rely for their security on the goodwill engendered by performance of their duties, and on common action of peoples against anarchy. States must therefore surrender their claim to sovereignty, or else forego all possibility of public right in their relation with each other.

Into the discussions of philosophers on state sovereignty we need not enter. It will be sufficient to note that the pluralism of modern realists accords better with the picture of nations as interconnected, multicellular organisms which our analysis has shown them to be, than the absolute unity of the monistic philosopher. For in such pluralism there is no tendency to cling to unity to the extent of denying the obvious factual horizontalism in the world. Nor is there the danger, on such a view, of confusing the nation with the state; the artificial tool with the community life producing it. Nations, guilds, religions, communities—all these are what Mr. Graham Wallas calls will-organisations. For each member of a larger whole, freedom consists in a balance between rights and duties. And co-operation between either groups or individuals implies a guidance of activities so that their purposes are in the direction of the main current of horizontal desire. Such guidance is what we mean by democracy; it is the tendency to discover, and to organise for the attainment of, net resultant ends. There is, therefore, a very real sense in which a League of Nations as defined above is the only possible means of "making the world safe for democracy."

From the very nature of human groupings it follows that only a strong horizontal purpose can supply the motive power for a true and stable world league. Apart from the growing common will and economic necessity of all peoples to evade the crushing burden of war and armaments, there

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is only one such purpose wide enough; and that is an unpretentious and as yet dimly realised one—the enlistment of all peoples in the vast war against nature. In this struggle there is, as William James has pointed out, full opportunity for the satisfaction of man's instinct to disinterested devotion, ample material for a 'moral equivalent' to war. And though the purpose has at the moment small driving power, development would follow if a nucleus were provided about which it could crystallise—conscious will, as we have noted, being able to build upon very little common interest to begin with.

In this horizontal struggle against natural forces the nations are complementary to each other. For the supreme aim of intensive exploitation of the earth's resources can only be effectively attained by each nation's supplying its own peculiar product to the sum total of human activity, and by each receiving from that total what it lacks. Such a view, which has been advocated in detail by M. Yves Guyot and others in the *Journal des Economists*, is more than a political programme. It is the expression of a fundamental principle of scientific method, that only by the slow, co-operative accumulation of results can advance be made. Isolation means failure.

The great influence working against the recognition of this truth is the irrational myth of "the struggle for existence." I have referred to this as irrational because it is founded on misunderstanding of a scientific phrase, and is not commonly used in direct argument but only held as the tacit presupposition of other arguments—especially by practical men. It is so widespread that we should probably be justified in regarding it as the very hallmark of our age.

The myth consists in the belief that the struggle for existence means, in the animal world, a vertical struggle to the death between species. From this it is concluded that a similar struggle between communities is inevitable; and that however unreasonable and intolerable war may become it is "a choice between us and the other fellow."

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If a detailed survey of all the animals in any region is made, however, the picture obtained is not in the least one of vertical war to the death. The animals, after having selected their habitat by trial and error, spread themselves over the region in a complex patchwork of interlaced communities, showing a finely balanced system of interdependence and co-operation. Some animals prey on others of course; but the dominant factor which determines the survival of a group is suitability to the environment.[4] This has been illustrated again and again by zoölogists; and Darwin himself, when speaking of the success of one species over another, said "we feel sure that the cause lies as much in one species being favoured as in another being hurt." In other words the outstanding feature of animal communities is not the vertical war between groups but the horizontal war of the groups with nature.

The influence of this mere mistake in fact on the spirit of our time has been enormous. It seems much too small a thing to have had such consequences as a philosophy of imperialism; but so did the small but persistent influences of the uniformitarians seem too minute to explain geological changes to those who sought for explanations in more dramatic cataclysms. The myth is insidious and cumulative in its effect of psychological suggestion. It has bred the suspicion which leads to vain attempts at absolute security through overwhelming victory or through strategic expansion. So arises the attitude of mind which sees good in quantity of life and not in its quality. "Wider still and wider" is the cry; not better, or fuller, or wiser. These natural but baleful results can only be resisted by a clear disclaimer which will put, in direct form, the truth that nations are (in Prof. Forster's phrase) as necessary to each other as the two sexes; that each can contribute its unique achievement to the scientific exploitation of natural forces. Man's instinct to the physical struggle between vertical

[4] See, *e.g.*, Dr. V. Shelford's *Animal Communities in Temperate America*, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1913.

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groups may have arisen as biologically useful at a certain stage in his history; but it has outlasted its utility—like his appendix. Conscious control alone can remove such dangers to the race. But control can only come from clear recognition of the diverse forces producing the complexities of international politics. With the best will in the world confused thought will mean failure to harness the great forces at work. It is lack of foresight that has plunged us into catastrophe; and now, as Professor Gilbert Murray has told us, "the only remedy for bad thinking is to think better."

I have tried to show that a great help to better thinking is to be found in that same method of concept formation which has advanced so immensely man's power over the material world. And though I have not scrupled to express certain conclusions, it is the *method* of correlation rather than the results which I wish to emphasise. The stress that method lays on the need for understanding and descriptive power does not involve, I think, an undue reliance on the more luminous, rational part of man. For though instincts lag behind reason they ultimately grow in the mould of habit it sets for them. And thus an international organisation more in accord with the facts of the modern world would be not only the expression of, but also a real aid to, the transference of men's group loyalty to the larger whole.

A. E. HEATH.

CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND,

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"IN THE HOPE OF THE NEW ZION."[1]

H. M. KALLEN.

ZIONISM is the contemporary phase of an unyielding loyalty, a practical idealism, which is without parallel in European history for constancy, duration and force. Crossed by all the currents of aspiration and disillusion that were the changing mind of Europe for two thousand years, this loyalty or idealism remained, until recently, distinct in itself, the Jewish aspect, older than its setting, of that hunger for safety and happiness which, in the century before the beginning of the Christian era, gripped the civilization of the Mediterranean in an other-worldly grip, spread in later years to all Europe, and holds it, with all its mutations, to the present day. The hope of a new Zion was coeval with the moral surrender of the Stoic; it antedated the passionate otherworldiness of early Christianity; it confronted, and survived, the religious imperialism of the Church Triumphant; it underwent the impact of the newer protestant order, the challenge and fecundation of science and free thought, of naturalism and secularism, and it has emerged, more essentially continuous with itself, more essentially like what it was in its beginnings than any other aspiration or adventure which the great tradition of Europe knows. Of this tradition the biography of Zionism is an integral part, both soil and substance of its ancient roots, and leaf and branch of its spreading life, seeking the free air and the sun. Its nature is at once that of a vision, and that of an adventure. Of a vision, because it sets forth no in-

[1] The Zionist movement has been one of the most striking of the many vigorous assertions of national aspiration within the past months. It has come as a surprise to many and has not won complete assent among Jews. Is it of interest to Jews only, or has it international significance? At the request of the editor Dr. Kallen has undertaken to interpret Zionism. The present article deals with its past; a second will treat its present meaning and importance.

EDITOR

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carnate and existing society, no operating association of men. Of an adventure, because it never lost grips with reality, never was quite cut off from the spot of tangible earth which might be not only sought, but found and touched and loved, in the world of real men and real things. To make this spot of earth once more theirs in fact as it was in spirit, men and women of Jewish blood, generation after generation, during two thousand years abandoned their all and went adventuring toward the Promised Land. Zionism is simply to-day's phase of the unyielding effort of the Jewish people to make good the Promise of the Promised Land.

This Promised Land is no land of Beulah, no kingdom of Heaven in regions supernal. It is a definite piece of the earth's surface, of definite dimensions, bordering on the Mediterranean and lying at the junction of the three great continents of the eastern hemisphere. It has been the battle ground of the civilizations of antiquity. It has been the motherland of the dominant religions of the western world. The names of its mountains and its valleys, of its cities and towns and villages have been woven into the texture of the mind of Europe. For a thousand years its chief city was regarded as the centre of the very universe and all its places as holy places. Yet important as have been the rôle of these and of the land that holds them in the life of mankind, that importance is of small degree beside the rôle of this land in the life and labors of the Jewish people. It is from the latter, in fact, that the former derives. Palestine has been the centre of the Jewish theory of life and the Jews' outlook on the world. Their national tradition is built around it. Entering it, staying in it, being driven from it, returning to it, are the instigating motives of their historic narratives, of their prophetic books, of their psalms, their liturgy, their prayers, their collective endeavor in the community of mankind. No people in history has identified itself in joy and in sorrow, and always in aspiration, so completely with a single land, and a land which the great majority of their generations

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have known only in prayer, in idea, in vision, for a thousand years. This identification is itself a universally-accepted commonplace of the great tradition of the western world. The connection between the Jew and Palestine, the connection between Palestine and the Jew is customary, natural, a matter of course even to the least literate of Europeans. So, also, by and large, is the reunion of these two that have been separated.

I.

The original source of these commonplaces of the European mind is of course that body of varied documents, sacred to Jew and Christian alike, the Bible. A secondary, but equally potent source is Christian theology. According to the Biblical narrative, the history of the Jews as a people may be said to begin with the hope of the Promised Land, with the consciousness of a goal to be attained collectively, in return for the assumption of a collective obligation to a supernatural being. This consciousness in the course of time converted a congeries of tribes into a nation, and a nation into a self-conscious aspirant toward that righteousness without which must come disaster. Israel, in a word, is a "chosen people." Between him and Jehovah there is a contract. Israel is to devote himself to the exclusive service and worship of Jehovah: Jehovah, in return, is to lead Israel to the Promised Land, to keep him and to prosper him there. The service and worship of Jehovah and the prosperity and growth of the nation in Zion were functions of one another. How, under the influence of the changes from nomadic to an agricultural order of life, the nature and terms of the contract changed; how, under the propaganda of the prophets, from Amos to Isaiah, ritual in the service of Jehovah was replaced by righteousness; how national security became correlative, in idea at least, with social justice, are commonplaces of all critical histories of the ancient Jews. Already in Amos the prophetic philosophy of history is manifest: Divine Law requires justice and lovingkindness between men and

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states; disobedience of this law is followed by disaster, brought, through God's will by one state on another, all states and kings being merely the tools and servants of God. This philosophy is already ripe in the sermons of Jeremiah, but tradition accords supreme excellence to the expression given it by the second Isaiah. Applied to the domestic history and foreign relations of the Jewish state, it interpreted national defeat at the hands of enemies of Israel as the consequence of domestic iniquity, and national survival and national victory as coincident with domestic righteousness. Righteousness became the condition of political and military security. Expulsion from the Promised Land was, hence, the consequence of sin, and return thereto would be the reward of a return to righteousness.

Events subjected this philosophy to a drastic test. That it did not possess a monopoly over the thinkers of Israel may be seen from the theory of life promulgated in the Book of Job, which divorces fortune from morals altogether, but there is in the prophetic theory a certain compensatory dimension, a quality of consolation and justification, which renders it more relevant to the aboriginal hopes of men and Nature's disregard of them. Carried to its logical limit, it must lead the man who has been righteous but unfortunate all his life to the conception of another life and another world, beyond Nature, in which he will be fortunate as well as righteous, and in which the wicked will be unfortunate as well as wicked. This is precisely what Christianity, once extended beyond the bounds of Jewry, did. But the Jews then and there did not go so far. For them, reward and punishment were here and now, where sin and virtue were, and the hope of good fortune for the righteous was a hope for this world and not another. Particularly was this the case for a whole people, a nation, whose span of life outreaches the brief mortality of the individual. The people of Israel, banished from its land for its unrighteousness, should be restored for its righteousness. This was Jehovah's promise, and in this promise his people might take comfort. The restoration would be bodily, political, physical. It

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would install an era of international peace and international comity, the rule of law replacing the rule of force, the life of co-operation, the life of conflict.

And it shall come to pass in the end of days,
That the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established as the top of the mountains,
And shall be exalted above the hills;
And all nations shall flow unto it.
And many peoples shall go and say:
"Come ye, and let us go up to the mountains of the Lord,
To the house of the God of Jacob;
And he will teach us of His ways
And we will walk in His paths."
For out of Zion shall go forth the law,
And the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.
And He shall judge between the nations
And shall decide for many peoples;
And they shall beat their swords into plowshares
And their spears into pruninghooks;
Nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
Neither shall they learn war any more.[2]

Dithyrambs such as this, of different imagery, but of the same identical spirit and outlook, are scattered throughout all the prophetic books. They are the well-springs of subsequent Jewish speculation about the nature and destiny of the Jewish people, from the primal passions of the prophets, to the sophisticated formulations of modern Jewish theology-mongers. The conception of the "mission" of Israel, which the latter make so much of, springs from them, and the Jewish repudiation of that mission springs equally from them. They underly the Jew's loyalty to his law or *Thorah*, and the invincible optimism with which the mass of the Jewish people have clung to it. "This is the law" says the daily prayer, "which Moses set before the Children of Israel, according to the word of the Lord. To all who cling thereto she is a tree of life, and it is well with those who depend upon her. Her ways are ways of kindness, and all her surrounding is peace." The real

[2] Isaiah II, 1–5.

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and adequate practice of the law, however, the prayer-book also tells us can be achieved only in the Promised Land, nor can it prevail among the nations until the restoration to the Promised Land is accomplished.

This restoration, from the first exile in the seventh century before the beginning of the Christian era through the first millennium after it, is conceived in political terms. The prophets, indeed, are politicians and statesmen concerning themselves with both domestic and foreign problems, and using "the word of the Lord" as authority for their political doctrine and social policy. The "law" which they preached, as we have it in Deuteronomy and Leviticus, is an obvious response to the challenge of the injustices of ancient —and for that matter, of modern—society. The ideal of international peace under a general law for all nations is the outcome of the bitter political experience of a small state situated at the junction point between the competing military imperialisms of Asia and Africa. The prophets were nothing if not *realpolitiker* with a passion for the preservation of Israel for Zion and of Zion for Israel, and they grew to realize that the only device by which this could be secured was an international order and a single law. After the manner of the ancients, they attributed to this law a divine origin and sanction, and described its rule as the rule of God. But the substance of their vision is not other than that of the vision of all internationalists who regard the realities of the relations between nations and states and hope for their improvement. It was evoked by the same recurrent causes: how could it have other than the same essence? Their glory is, that they were the first in all the world to envisage and to utter that essence, but they uttered it, none the less, out of the fervor of their patriotism, and not because they had blurred the living diversities of mankind in an unreal abstraction, labelled "humanity." Prophetic "universalism" did not abolish the nations, it harmonized the nations; and was nationalistic to the point of giving to Israel a dominant note in the international harmony, and to Zion the foremost place. Indeed, when

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it was most "universal," it was most actively nationalistic, for the rhythms of deutero-Isaiah, the utterances of Zechariah and of Haggai framed the conspiracy to restore the independence of the Kingdom with Zerubbabel, servant of the Lord, scion of the House of David, for King.[3] Behind the conspiracy was an urge to independence and to freedom from the foreign yoke which never subsided so long as there was the semblance of a Jewish government in Palestine. When prophet gave way to priest as the master of the mind of Judea, it was the unconscious cause of the friction between the native and the foreign administrations. It underlay the successive resistances, both spiritual and physical, to Persian and Greek conquerors. It animated the Hasmonean uprising and found itself in the Hasmonean independence, and when the alliance with Rome which was to guard that independence became its ravisher, it took the form of the new schisms within the state; the resistance to Herod, the hope of a champion, of a Messiah like Judas Maccabæus; the rebellion against Titus and the final uprising and brief success of Bar Kochba. Even after the terrible revenge which the imperial government took for that uprising, the will of the Jews for a free Zion remained unbroken. Oppressed and persecuted by emperor after emperor, particularly after Christianity became the imperial religion, they had strength enough to join in the seventh century the invading Persians against the Romans, in the hope of re-establishing their ancient state. That hope was again disappointed. When the country reverted to Byzantium, the monks persuaded the Emperor Heraclius to exterminate the Jews. Those who escaped joined their brethren in Egypt and elsewhere in the mediterranean world, to hope anew.

The most lasting thing these exiles, like all their kind, carried with them was, then, this hope of the restoration to Palestine. It dominated the liturgy and the poetry of the exile; it governed Jewish policy and suffused the Jewish

[3] Cf. Zechariah VI, 9–15.

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outlook. It underlies the organization of the Jewish communal economy, contributing elements in the practice of the ritual and the observation of the seasons. For a thousand years it continued to be an aspiration of practical political import, re-enforced with religious faith. Wherever a Jewish community was to be found, then as now, the prayer could be heard, "for our sins have we been banished from our country and removed far from our land"; and the invocation for the return to Zion, for the re-establishment of the Davidic throne, for the realization of the prophetic pledge. We cannot, says the prayer, in our banishment serve thee according to thy commandment. "Next year in Jerusalem," is a change rung again and again in the Liturgy both of week days and Sabbath and holydays. It links itself with the political activities of the whole millennium: hardly a century passed in which the Jews of one country or another were not called upon by a self-proclaimed Messiah to gird up their loins and by miracle or militancy win back to Zion. In fifth century Crete, one Moses, assuming miracle, led his people into the sea, where most were drowned. David Alroy, again, in the twelfth century, actually succeeded in developing a military adventure strong enough six hundred years later to rouse the imagination of Beaconsfield, who made a novel about him. The expectancy of a political restoration, under the leadership of an earthly Messiah, was a commonplace in the mood of Europe. It is sharply evinced in the tenth-century letter of Chasdai ibn Shaprut to the King of the Chazars, a Jew by conversion; and it is literally accepted by non-Jewish Europe. For to the Christian mind, no less than the Jewish, Palestine is the Jewish land and the Jews are the Palestinian people, foreign to Europe, absent from their own land, and in the fulness of time to be returned to it. The equity of the Jew in Palestine has remained a strand in the great tradition of the Christian world. The return of this chosen people to this Promised Land was regarded by multitudes as an essential preliminary to the second coming of the Saviour, and the fulfilment of the forecasts of Chris-

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tian eschatology. To Christians of the first millennium this return was more deeply implicated in a system of supernaturalism than to the Jews, but however implicated, it was expected.

The development and final enthronement of a similar supernaturalism among the Jews was accomplished in the twelfth century. The position of the Jews in European countries grew steadily worse. Disability and persecution were multiplied, and the temper of the Crusades brought them to a climax. Under the circumstances, the notion of a naturalistic, though divinely predetermined, restoration which should be salvation from horror and evil, could not withstand the assault of misfortune. That restoration must come, the Jews of the world became more and more convinced: how else could Israel escape alive out of the inferno which the Church Militant had made for them of their lives? But that it could come out of their own strength, a natural eventuality of the process of history, was no longer conceivable. They were too weak, too battered, impotent against their persecutors. Only the might of a miracle could save them and restore them. And as the figure and mode of their salvation had already been established in tradition and legend as Messiah the son of David, this Messiah acquired a more and more supernatural character. Already in the beginnings of the Messianic legend there had been a potential differentiation between an earthly and a heavenly Messiah. The failure of the earthly Messiahship of the leader of the little sect that later developed into the Christian multitude led to the immediate compensation of the other-worldly ideal which is the Messiahship of the Christian; salvation from evil and happiness became heavenly things: earth was regarded as a trial and a transition, to be abandoned and spurned. The Messiah was God and the Son of God, miserable on earth but omnipotent in the universe. This ideal denial of real failure the Jews had refused to accept. They fought and hoped on for twelve hundred years. And when, finally, misfortune, and the infection of their intellectual and emotional setting made

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otherworldliness a part of their outlook, it did not become the overruling part. The Messiah became a supernatural figure indeed, pre-existing, and destined to conquer the enemy and persecutor and restore Israel by means of miracle, but, the end achieved was still to be a natural and historic end continuous with the rest of the movement of history, even if the means were to be discontinuous and supernatural. From the twelfth century on the self-proclaimed Messiahs are more and more miracle-workers, philosophasters, men of a psychopathic strain. Their moral and intellectual settings are misery, magic, and mysticism, the two latter being the comp'ement of, and escape from, the former. For the same reason the puerilities of the Kabbala became constitutional to their outlook and Kabbalism itself a dominant influence on the mind and fortunes of Jewry. But the misery and the compensatory supernaturalism reached their height in the seventeenth century. Their symbol was the false or pseudo-Messiah, Sabbattai Zevi of Smyrna. Only that he was a charlatan, weak and without integrity, not that he was a false Messiah must be regarded a reproach to him. All Messiahs are false when they fail, for the success of works, not faith, is the only proof of true Messiahship, and how is the success of works to be achieved by the means and attributes of the Messiahs of thaumaturgy? The importance of Sabbattai Zevi was due to the European character of his influence. Not only Jews fell under it. It touched statecraft and affected the policies of the world. It is the ironic and picturesque expiration of a period in the history of the European struggle for democracy.

II.

1648 is a momentous year in the history of Europe. It is the year of the Peace of Westphalia and of the formation of the Puritan Commonwealth in England. It marks the end of over a hundred years of warfare and the final overthrow of a political principle which had dominated Europe to its hurt since the Council of Nicæa, in the 325th year of

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the Christian era. This was so built into the social system of the Christian world that much of the history of this world might be described as a narrative of the methods hit upon or chosen to evade or oppose it. The principle might be designated, briefly, as the principle of religious imperialism. It was a new thing when it was promulgated. The ancient and pagan world knew nothing about it. It came to Europe as a logical implication of the Christian philosophy of life, and the status and fate of the Jews were closely bound up with it. Although the religions of the states of antiquity, Athens, or Sparta, or Corinth, or Judea, or Rome, were state religions, they did not imply intolerance toward the gods of other states, particularly when those states were not at war. Between these gods and their worshippers there was held to be a certain community, looking back to a community of blood, which gave the gods a prerogative and monopoly on the reverence and worship of the citizens, and the citizens a claim to priority on the good will and protection of the gods. All gods, as we see most conspicuously in the case of Jehovah, had certain tribal, civic, national, predilections and obligations, even when most universal and all-embracing in their divinities. They remained to a great degree chthonic, with larger powers and jurisdiction over special places, and very specific centres of worship and residence. The men of the ancient world expressed this divine economy by paying due reverence to the gods of the lands in which they travelled or sojourned. Even military conquerors, like Alexander, in a day so late as his, worshipped at the shrines of the divinities whose lands they had devastated and implored them for favor and co-operation. Later and more sophisticated times retained this sense of chthonic over-lordship, and the Romans made it a practice to remove the religious holies from the lands of their conquest to appropriate sanctuaries in Rome. The protective power of the divinities, it was supposed, would then accrue to the state of their domicile. Thus pagan Rome was not only tolerant of, but hospitable to, the diversity of religions, and of the

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nationalities of which those were among the distinguishing marks. The growth of the Empire, in fact, exercised in this regard a liberalizing influence, in that it necessitated a very large degree of differentiation between citizenship and cult. Because of the tribal background of the small city-states and of their tradition of blood-brotherhood and common ancestry, an alien could rarely become a citizen, even in Athens, the freest of them: he could only be a righteous stranger, as the Bible has it, a sojourner, entitled to justice, but not to participation in the intimacies of the state's life. The empire founded by Alexander, which had a sharply conscious missionary character, continued this tradition. Although it imposed Greek forms of political and social organization and Greek habits of life and thought upon the mediterranean world, it did not establish a common citizenship which should be detached from the local society wherein the privileges of citizenship had to be predominantly exercised. This was an achievement of Roman imperialism.

Roman imperialism, preoccupied from the outset with maintaining the Roman hegemony, the *pax Romana* of the Roman legions and the Roman law, left local customs and practices intact, indeed subsidized and encouraged them. Nationalities and cults flourished and had heyday in the Empire, so long as they were considered not to be dangerous to the state. Until the advent of Christianity there were no religious persecutions in Rome. There were police and military action against political criminals, who practiced or were supposed to practice a doctrine subversive of loyalty to the state. Otherwise, freedom of thought, of belief and cult were, as in some places in recent times, untrammelled. Had they not been, Christianism never could have made headway against its rivals. When, for reasons of his own, Constantine made Christianism the religion of the state, the Empire was thrown back to the position of the city-state which it had outgrown, and worse. This deteriorative reversion was inevitable from the assumptions of Christianity itself. For these assumptions the Judaism of

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the priests, as distinguished from the Hebraism of the prophets, has its own responsibility. So long as men admit that alternatives are possible to any theories or doctrines they may entertain, the qualities of intolerance and the arrogances of infallibility cannot develop. Experience remains the court of last resort in the judgment of truth. Truth remains a thing not primary but eventual, and this eventuality in the knowledge of what is true and what is false among alternatives, keeps them more or less equal, and bars intolerance. This was the case with the congeries of national divinities of most of the city-states of the ancient world. With hieratic Judaism there came, however, a difference. It assumed the sole and exclusive acquisition and possession of the truth, as revelation. Everything else, consequently, no matter what it was, nor how nor where it came from, had to be regarded as error. Truth being given finally and completely, its possessor was infallible, and debate, experiment, the whole intellectual enterprise, the scientific attitude of mind, became malice and perversity. Difference becomes either concealed agreement or blasphemous defence of error. For people to whom Holy Scripture was the sum and substance of all wisdom, the philosophers and scientists must needs be either its interpreters or its enemies, and were so held.

When the Christian sectaries made of the script which was the revealed word of God their own holy, adding thereto the New Testament, they also made their own the assumption of infallibility of hieratic Judaism. The adoption of Christianity as the state religion gave them the force wherewith to make this assumption effective. Citizenship became conditional on conformity to certain artificial standards of right doctrine, those opinions which failed to conform being *ex hypothesi* false, and the judges of the failure being the ruling class to whom the guardianship of the standards had accrued. The Jews were, by the implications of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, non-conformists, and hence without title to citizenship. Imperial edict deprived them of it in the year 339, and the bulk

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of them have remained thus deprived to the present day. In the course of time all infidels, non-conformists, dissenters, heretics, became automatically outlaws, and a large portion of the history of European civilization is the history of an attempt on the one side, to crush them out, by fire and sword, on the other side to compel their acquiescence by force or persuasion. No doubt other motives than the religious were involved; no doubt the latter was often used as an excuse for other types of greed and aggression, but until the Reformation and after, it remained the foremost in the consciousness of Europe.

To the consciousness of Europe the world was basically an Augustinian Epic. Eternal and Omnipotent God, it held, had created in six days' time a perfect world. This perfection would never have lapsed if Adam had not disobeyed the command of Eternal and Omnipotent God. His disobedience brought death into the world and all our woe. It caused his banishment from Paradise. The sin, original with him, became a hereditary constitutional and outstanding element in the nature of all his offspring. All, together with the world God made for them, were deserving of, and under God's justice were predestined to, eternal destruction, had God's mercy not prevailed against God's justice and provided atonement. At various times, hence, he manifested himself to a selected portion of the sons of Man, to the seed of Abraham, namely. To these he delivered his law, with the view of an eventual atonement for Adam's original sin, and the redemption of man from the penalty of it. Hence the incarnation and the crucifixion. These are the atonement, vicarious of course, but none the less the salvation of those predestined to believe. Such, predestinate from the beginning of time, are the citizens of the City of God, of the Church catholic, universal. All others are citizens of the City of the World. The Jews, particularly belong to this latter city. They had been God's first chosen. To them he had revealed himself, with them had made his covenant, to them had sent as Messiah his only-begotten son, who was only another form of himself,

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for the redemption of sin-cursed mankind. And they had rejected the Messiah and had had him nailed to the cross. For this God rejected them in their turn, and cursed them to live under the ban of his rejection, outcast from the community of the saved, plying forbidden vocations in disaster and dispersion until the second coming of the Messiah of Lord, and the restoration at his hands.

This eschatology, furthermore, was inextricably interwoven with the social system of the feudal order, a system that has its maximum ideal expression in the bull *Unam Sanctam*. It is a thing of logic tempered by rebellion, resting consciously in metaphysics as few social systems have. Its basis is the omnipotence of God, without whose sustaining grace nothing can be or come to be. But this sustaining grace is not regarded as being distributed equally and impartially among all the children of God. Existence is a hierarchy and its parts are related as the links of a pendent chain. Each hangs from the other, without which it would fall into the abyss. Since the greatest strain is on the highest link, in that must be concentrated the greatest power, and as there is no strain to speak of on the lowest link, least power is needed or belongs in that. The highest link, directly pendent on God, is the Pope, his vicegerent on earth, the visible symbol and concretion of the church universal. In him, consequently, must be the maximum concentration of the grace of God. From him it passes downward and outward, to the princes of the church and the temporal power, like light decreasing in intensity with its distance from the source, so that when it finally reaches the peasant serf there is enough left for the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, marriage and burial, but nothing else. Everybody in society depends on somebody higher up, and woe to the man who has no overlord to depend upon. He is a "masterless man," without status or right, the prey of any power strong enough to seize him.

The enforcement of this social system, save in the case of the serfs and the Jews, was never complete. The temporal struggled against the arrogations of the ecclesiastical power,

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emperor against pope, kings against emperors, noblemen of lesser rank against kings, cities against dynasts, and on occasion even the peasants rose. The great majority of these conflicts were, however, conflicts within a framework of unanimity. The hand of every man was against the infidel, the heretic, the dissenter, the non-conformist. The inquisition was as impartial as the temporal power was debauched. Religious imperialism was stronger than political imperialism and for a long time succeeded in maintaining by force as truly catholic a unanimity as, human nature being what it is, was humanly possible. One dissentient sect after an other arose and went down before this force, from the Arians, Lollards, Hussites, to the Huguenots. The Jews alone, in the heart of Europe, underwent without resistance a religous war waged against them by the whole of Europe, and survived it. They were the everlasting Protestants. But the conscience of Europe was not freed until the mutual interplay and rivalry of religious and dynastic interests brought about that military confrontation in religious terms which we know as the wars of the reformation. Those wars, quite as much a conflict of dynasties for empire as of doctrines for domination, and carried on almost continuously for nearly a century and a half, finally destroyed the imperialism of religion in Europe. They left the continent a desert, the feudal order shattered, the local sovereign an autocrat, and the peasantry almost destroyed. But particularly they left the mind of Europe free from the central fixation to which religious imperialism had compelled it, and both the misery and enterprise of Europe free for intellectual adventure. The destruction of the imperialism of the church converted it into the opportunist foe of the temporal power, and its theorists, like the Jesuit brothers Mariana and Suarez, opposed the people to the kings and superimposed the church on both. Protestantism itself, again, by setting the authority of the Bible against that of the Pope and abolishing intermediaries between God and the hearts of men, struck at all authority, political as well as ecclesiastical. The idea of the natural rights of man was

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used to confront the tradition of the divine rights of kings. Political doctrine took imaginative wings. The challenge to sovereignty was made effective in England by the genuine execution of a king. In the rest of Europe it became a potential menace, working in the background of men's thoughts, and bursting now and then into foreground in action.

But if men found themselves in real ideas of this type, they sought also to escape from the misery to which they were a response in a new lease of supernaturalism and a new magic. The substitution of the Bible for the church as the seat of authority in religion aroused interest, intellectual but by no means kindly, in the People of the Book and all their works. The Kabbala had almost immediately seized the wandering imagination of Europe. Its mysteries, letters, phrases and calculations, its pretensions to magical powers, allied as they were with hidden meanings attributed to the Bible, fascinated the imagination of Europeans, from Pico della Mirandola, to the latest English Biblitaster mulling in mysteries. This, together with the complete emotional and intellectual decentralization, could not but lead to anticipations of the Messiah. The time of the restoration of Israel to Palestine and of the second advent was held to be at hand. Kabbalistic calculations among Jews put it in 1648. And Christian millenarians put it in 1666.

Between 1648 and 1666—the era of Sabbattai Zevi's "mission"—came, however, one of the very darkest pages of the history of the Jewish people. Their status in Europe derived from two assumptions, both implicit in their alienation from citizenship in 339. The first was that they were members of a foreign nation, living in their own communities, under their own laws, and governed by their own hereditary or elective rulers. The stress thrown by theology on the absence of the Jews from Zion, the designation of their absence as a *Galuth* or dispersion, has obscured the truly national character of the Jewish community, national both in the political and the cultural sense. Men forget that absence from Palestine meant presence some-

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where else, and it happens that there has been hardly a period in the history of the Jewish people without the concentration of the greater part of them in a single continuous area, into a community organized and operating under Jewish law. That it was not sovereign, in the sense of being a war-making, peace-making community; that it was a subject-nationality, largely at the mercy of its neighbors; that it was hence a repressed community without freedom for its spontaneous energies, are matters of record. Nevertheless, it was a political entity, self-determined and with almost complete internal autonomy, and was until the nineteenth century dealt with as such by the masters of Europe and Asia. Such an entity was the Exilarchate of the House of David, which came into being with the Babylonian Captivity; such was the Nagidate in Egypt; such was the *Wa'ad Arbah* Arazoth (*Council of the Four Lands*) or Congressus Judaicus in Poland. The latter country, extending at the time when this Congress flourished almost from the Baltic to the Black Sea, was the great area of concentration for the Jewish people of Europe from the thirteenth century on. These Jewish governments acted for the Jewish people in all matters affecting their relations with their landlords, conquerors or overlords.

The *Congressus Judaicus*, indeed, was an echo of the Polish *saym* resting on a foundation of congregational units and achieving what was for the time a very high degree of democracy. It was responsible to the Polish kings both for the domestic and the foreign affairs of the Jews, particularly for taxes. It was the one agency that stood between the Jewry of Poland and the total destruction that menaced it with the Chmelnicki uprising in 1648. The Messianic afflatus of the period was largely a function of this uprising. An act of revolt and resentment on the part of the Ukrainian *khlops* or peasantry against the unbearable exactions of their Polish overlords, it struck hardest at the Jews. The Jews had been agents of these overlords, tax-farmers, factors and such, and they were the first to pay. Chmelnicki organized a Jew-hunt that ranged from

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Podolia and Volhynia to Lithuania and White Russia. He was followed by the real Russians, who had declared war upon the Poles. The Russians were followed by the plague. In the course of little more than a decade the Jewish people had lost 675,000 of their number, their homes were devastated, their property destroyed. Thousands fled to western Europe, other thousands sought safety in baptism. Without the help of the Jewry of western Europe, which came swiftly and generously, the *Congressus Judaicus* of Poland could never have reconstituted the economy of their nation. But the great comfort of their misery was the word out of the East of the imminence of the Messiah and the return to the Promised Land. They believed,—how, so miserable, could they help believing?—and their belief sustained them.

Religious doctrine had its own part in their misery. It was the second and other ground of their disability, a more terrible ground, for the position of the Jew in the European religious system, no matter what the sect, was regarded as determined by divine revelation and was a commonplace of faith that was taught to the poorest serf. The Jew was held to be eternally excommunicate from the gates of the common salvation, rejector of it, and cursed for the rejection. His existence, hence, could be maintained only on sufferance. Being beyond communion, he was without rights, civil or personal. The church might order his destruction, overruling even the will of the king, whose property according to the mediæval custom, the Jew automatically was. The church authorities in Poland were indefatigable in their efforts against the Jews and their faith. They drove them from the public service, assaulted the general principles of their charter, demanded and compelled sumptuary laws against them, both of dress and domicile, spread against them blood libels and levied on them illegal and extortionate taxes. The Reformation gave the church in Poland, as elsewhere, an added animus. Jewish influence was credited with causing the heresy, and any punishment short of death was not too great. "The

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Church," declared the Ecclesiastical Synod of 1542, "tolerates the Jews for the sole purpose of reminding us of the torments of the Saviour." Between 1648 and 1666 the Catholicism of Poland finished off the uncompleted depredations of Chmelnicki and his Haidamacks and of the Muscovite and his troops. The misery of the Polish Jews reached a depth so ultimate that their minds could not conceive of a salvation less so. The new Messiah was believed in with a fervor measurable only by the tragedy from which he was to save his people. The Jews of Ukrainia, writes the Christian, Galatovski, who flourished at the period, abandoned their all in readiness to be carried on a cloud to Jerusalem.

In sum then, between 1648 and 1666 the political, intellectual, and emotional condition of the whole European world was such that the achievement of the restoration of the chosen people to their Promised Land was generally accepted as the imminent precursor to a millennial change. The anticipation moved all classes of society equally, from the miserable and expropriated peasantry and Jewry, seeking in magic salvation from fact, to the most intellectual and scientific protagonists of that new adjustment of cosmic outlook which we call science. It is used by Mennaseh ben Israel in his successful attempt to persuade Cromwell to remove the ban against the settlement of Jews in England. "The opinion," he writes, "of many Christians and mine do concur therein that we both believe that the restoring time of our Nation into their native country is very near at hand." It is the subject of exchange between the Gentile scholar Oldenberg and the Jewish philosopher Spinoza. "All the world here," Oldenberg writes to Spinoza, "is talking of a rumour of the return of the Israelites . . . to their own country. . . . Should the news be confirmed, it may bring about a revolution in all things." And Spinoza, many years later, when the Sabbattian craze was already subsident, arguing in the Theologico-Political Tractate for the equality of all peoples before God, insists that whatever election the Jews were beneficiaries of was

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national and social, that it "had no regard to aught but dominion and physical advantages, for by such alone could one nation be distinguished from another." "Nay, I would go so far as to believe that if the foundations of their religion have not emasculated their minds they may even, if the occasion offers, so changeable are human affairs, raise up their empire afresh and that God may a second time elect them."

The significant thing about the whole Sabbattian adventure and the development that led up to it is the fact that nowhere in Europe was there any question that the Jews are a nation, that Palestine is "their own country," that the two belong together. Nor has there been any question in the European mind since.

III.

For Europe the Messianic expectancy was only a passing mood. Science, begun as an adventure, became an institution; its temper of interrogation and challenge forced everything under analytical scrutiny, from the least-regarded spontaneities of nature, to the most sacrosanct taboos of man. The eighteenth century incorporated into its common sense what had been daring imagination in the seventeenth, and its calm and satirical eye discerned underneath all the differences of race, faith, color, wealth, power, station, nurture and capacity, a "natural man" the equal and the peer of his fellows. Inequalities, it declared, were the artificial effects of the institutions of civilization; the effects of the state and the church, which, again, were the perversions of nature by the few in their immemorial exploitation of the many. One God, one law, one human nature are at the foundation of all life. Each man is the equal of every other man; each is equally and inalienably entitled with all others to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"; each has contracted the insurance of his title by consenting to the creation of government; each has been then defrauded by the government he has created of just that natural right which he had designed it to protect.

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Strip away government, the church, the economic order, and you abolish crime and poverty and the whole hierarchy of social inequalities. All these are man-made. They do not exist in nature, and they should not be tolerated by enlightened men. By nature men are citizens of the world, not of the state; followers of natural religion, not of this or that fabrication of priests; like lovers of one another, not haters seduced thereto by artificial diversities. They are equal and alike by nature; different only by nurture.

This teaching, common to England and to France, particularly to France, was not, of course, the pure deduction of science. It was quite as much, and perhaps more, resentment against the concentrated absolutism which had become characteristic of the state-system of Europe in the eighteenth century. In England alone had this failed to fix itself firmly, and the period from the restoration of the Stuarts to their final expulsion and the formulation of the Bill of Rights was a period of actual conflict between a dynastic absolutism grounding itself on the traditional divine rights of kings, and a democratic nationalism grounding itself on the scientific natural rights of man, with a final practical victory for natural rights. On the continent, the victory was entirely dynastic. States were conceived as estates—"l'état, c'est moi," was no paradox of a paranoiac king—and populations and territories changed hands in marriage and warfare conducted as the purely private and self-sufficient enterprises of royal privilege. Everything was property, including opinion. Thus, religious imperialism had not given way to tolerance. It merely had been replaced by religious nationalism. Citizenship remained an appurtenance of conformity to certain standard dogmas and beliefs. This, as Locke's essays on toleration attest, was as true in England as on the continent; and the winning of toleration was itself a political event compelled mostly by the political strength of the disabled religious minorities. Toleration is in substance religious democracy. Whatever may be the situation *de jure*, it is impossible without at least a *de facto*

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distinction between church and state, a distinction that becomes possible only when sects are so numerous and varied that the alternative to toleration is civil war. Over the major part of the continent of Europe religious nationalism prevailed to within the third year of the present war, and citizenship and church-membership were coimplicative and coincident. The greater the strength of this artificial coimplication, the more centralized and absolute the government which sustains it, the more complete, the more logical and systematic the theoretical repudiation which according to time, place and circumstances it undergoes. Such was the case in France. The theorizing of the Encylopædists, from Diderot and Voltaire to Montesquieu and Rousseau, carried to their logical limit the practical assumptions of Locke and the other authors of the English Bill of Rights. They made good in idea the shortcomings of the social facts.

That their logic should ultimately be extended to the Jews was inevitable. In England this extension had been proceeding in the normally piecemeal and muddling British way. Although it was not absolutely completed until 1890, it was begun practically with their readmission to England in Cromwell's day, and progressed in the usual English parliamentary fashion from then on. In France, the extension was shorter, sharper, more purely theoretical. First made in formal terms by Montesquieu, it received practical application and defence at the hands of Mirabeau and the Abbé Grégoire. During the revolution the two latter fought for it in the National Assembly against the clericals, and it was finally carried (1791) as an inevitable corollary of the constitution. The effect was formally to convert the Jews from a nationality into a sect: "Judaism," wrote Deputy Schwendt to his constituents in Alsace, "is nothing more than the name of a distinct religion." The Jews were enfranchised, not in their collectivity, as a corporate entity, a nationality, but individually, Jew by Jew, each as a "natural man," the equal of all other "natural men," without heredity, history, language,

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culture or social memory, a mere "now" in the temporal extent of the generations. The stripping of his selfhood which this required was of course an impossible price to pay for enfranchisement. It was suicide, and a nationality can only die or be killed but cannot commit suicide. Nevertheless the Jews of western Europe fancied that they could pay the price and survive as Jews. They accepted the responsibility of the affirmative to Napoleon's questions of 1806. Without this affirmative he would have withdrawn from them the civil freedom which the Revolution had won for them. Their yielding it initiated, so far as social history is concerned, the mental attitude and development of what is called the Reform movement in Judaism.

In this movement there is nothing primarily religious. It began with no great inspiration, no great vision and gospel of inner regeneration, which are the traits of genuinely religious reforms. Its beginnings rest in a political and social position, and to this day it has not advanced from this position. It stands still on the intellectual platform of the eighteenth century and the French Revolution, on the doctrine of natural rights and natural law and the rule of abstract reason. It strips from the Jew all that makes him a concrete human being, all his reality. It denies in its very form the existence of the social personality called the Jewish people. It substitutes for the vision of the Messiah, which sustained the Jews in the middle ages, the conception of "the mission of Israel," to justify such minimal differences as the organizers of Reform could not bring themselves to abandon. It restates, with an inverted valuation, the mediæval conception of the status and function of the Jewish people. Where, for example, Christianity declares that the Jews had been condemned by God to dispersion because of their rejection of the Saviour, the Reform Jews say, "The dispersion is a fact, but is not due to the curse of God, but to the realization of the divine purpose to bless the world." Where Christianism says, "Jews are dispersed and will continue as a living witness to the prophecies of the

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Bible which proclaims their dispersion," the Reformers assert that this dispersion is predestined so that the Jewish sectaries who have been chosen by the Lord, may be everlasting witnesses to the truth of the Bible and its prophecies. And where Christianism declares that this dispersion will last until the second coming of Christ, until the appearance of Christ as the Paraclete, the Reform sect declares that this dispersion is to continue until all men shall acknowledge the "Jewish God." In this way the movement has attempted automatically, under the rule that ideals are compensatory for facts, to convert what to Christians is the shame of the Jewish people into a merit. It did that, I think, on the whole, if I read the literature aright, with something like a broken heart. It wanted for the Jewish people the same values that other peoples in the world were getting. There is no question about the nobility of the intentions of Reform, and there is no question about the magnificent distinction of one phase of Reform achievement, not noticed by Reformers. This is the liberation of the Jewish woman, and if nothing else justifies it, that does. But once it has liberated the Jewish woman, it has done its whole work. The intention of Reform was excellent, but the method used, being contrary to the trend of social history, failed to achieve the results intended.

Other states slowly imitated France. Western Europe completed the enfranchisement of the Jews, severally, only toward the end of the nineteenth century. And this enfranchisement, of course, has the defects of its virtues, for Western Jewry took, with respect to the enfranchisement it sought, a position which was an acknowledgment that Jewish qualities, Jewish forms of life and thought were in Jews unworthy; that Jewish differences from their neighbors were, on the whole, inferiorities, and that Jews must become—except that they call their priests "rabbis" and worship in "temples" and not in churches—the same as the Gentiles. The Reform movement, therefore, has been what is called an assimilationist movement. That is, it has wanted for Jews not an equal but a similar happiness to

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that of all other peoples. And what it has accomplished in order to get this life and happiness has been to rob the enfranchised Jew of the self-respect of his birthright as Jew; has been to compel him to act on the assumption that the whole substance of the Jewish background and tradition, the organization of Jewish life with its implications, is a worthless thing, a thing to be abandoned.

This whole process rests on the illusion that equality is similarity. It is concomitant with the uncritical doctrine of natural right and natural law; with the resentment which this doctrine expressed against the artificial inequalities of the dynastic and ecclesiastical systems that robbed men of their due of freedom and happiness. The doctrine is compensatory, a protest, not a description. But in animating and guiding the French Revolution it served a high purpose. It enfranchised the peoples of Europe, even in the course of the Napoleonic attempt to enslave them. It awakened their dormant corporate consciousness. It led them to realize their nationality and to struggle for its freedom. To say this is to say that people "were becoming conscious, in trying to respond to the call of the Revolution, of what nature and habit and hope they and their neighbors were, and of how these were expressed in language and tradition, in memory and custom, in all that makes a community's cycle of life. The revolutionary call to Equality meant, for the daily life, the abolition of all caste and property distinctions. . . . The Revolution's call to Fraternity meant for the daily life, comradeship on an equal basis with anyone with whom communication could be effectively held—in truth with the neighbor near at hand, who speaks the same language and has the same background, who, by virtue of this sameness, *understands*. The revolution's call to Liberty meant, first and foremost, the overthrow of the traditional oppressor at home and the achievement there of self-government, the replacing of dynasty by commonwealth.

"Had the new French nation continued to treat the peoples its armies set free as peers, as fellow-citizens, not as subjects; had Napoleon not once more restored piratical

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imperialism to the place from which the ideas of the Revolution had driven it, the ruling caste of Europe could never have succeeded in duping their subjects into believing in the identity of their interests and the community of their cause. Even so, their success depended on a concession to the principle that sovereignty rests in the people. For the call to resist Napoleon had to be made through an appeal to self-appreciation, through a propaganda, sometimes inspired, sometimes spontaneous, exhorting the various peoples of Europe to consider the excellence and dignity of their ancestries, their cults, their traditions, their histories, their ways of living, their arts, and particularly their languages. The most conspicuous continental instance of such a propaganda is the series of 'Addresses to the German People,' by the philosopher Fichte."

But there were many others. It is part of the irony of the of the Jewish position that those Jews who were in contact with the great movements of the day, scions of the one people that had from antiquity on been champions of nationality against all imperialism and tyranny, should seek themselves to repress and destroy their own at a time when it was awaking to renewed life over the whole continent of Europe—in Greece and among the other victims of Turkish domination; in Germany; in Poland; in Ireland. That the restoration of Palestine to the Jewish people and the Jewish people to Palestine had even in this period touched the interests and hopes of Jews and Gentiles both, there is much in the record to show. An anonymous letter to the Jews of France, by "one of them," proposed in 1798 the creation by the Jews of the world of a Jewish council which should treat with the French government for the restoration of Palestine to its traditional people. "The country we propose to occupy" he wrote,[4] "shall include (subject to such arrangements as shall be agreeable to France) Lower Egypt, with the addition of a district, which shall have for its limits a line running from Acre to the Dead Sea, and from the south point of that lake to the Red Sea." He

[4] Cited by A. M. Hyamson in "Palestine," p. 165.

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pointed out the economic advantages of the position, situated at the juncture of three continents, and concluded "Oh my brethren! What sacrifices ought we not to make to attain this object! We shall return to our country, we shall live under our own laws, we shall behold those sacred places which our ancestors rendered illustrious with their courage and their virtues. I already see you all animated with a holy zeal. Israelites! The term of your misfortunes is at hand. The opportunity is favorable. Take care that you do not allow it to escape." Just how the opportunity was favorable is not known, but it is significant that the *Moniteur Universelle of 1799, 23 Germinal*, records a proclamation ordered in Constantinople by Napoleon, inviting the Jews of Asia and Africa to enroll under his banners for the purpose of re-establishing ancient Jerusalem. The failure of both the Western and Eastern Jewries to respond to these calls had probably no slight connection with the Napoleonic impatience and severity in 1806, when the Emperor practically compelled by his questions the Jews of his domains either to repudiate their nationality or to put themselves in a position to affirm it by force. The council of notables or Sanhedrin which he called repudiated it: the bulk of them came not from the free heart of France but from clericalist and priest-ridden Alsace. The writer of the letter of 1798 came from a freer-hearted and clearer-visioned time in the history of France.

Significantly, the one great parallel of this period issues a generation later from the world's other great seat of freedom and republicanism, the United States of America. It is there overlaid a little with elements of mountebankery and melodrama, and takes some time to come clear. But clear it does come finally, and its terms are remarkably similar to those of the letter of 1798. Its terms are promulagated by Mordecai Manuel Noah. Its first shape in his mind was that of a Messianic adventure tempered by the business of real estate speculation. Sensitive to the sufferings and disabilities of his people, he conceived the notion of founding for them on Grand Island, not far from Buffalo, a city of refuge, which he designed to call Ararat, and to establish

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himself as Chief Judge of Israel. He persuaded a Gentile friend to invest in the land, and in September, 1825, proceeded amid much comic circumstance and public comment to lay the corner-stone of his city in an episcopal church in the village of Buffalo. On the occasion he issued a proclamation, appointing commissioners, levying taxes, ordering a census and so on, and reviving and re-establishing the ancient "government of the Jewish Nation, under the auspices and protection of the constitution and laws of the United States of America.[5]" The enterprise was, of course, damned from the outset by its charlatanic character. At its core nevertheless was good sense and sound statesmanship. The idea persisted in Noah's mind, but it turned from a city of refuge on the North American continent to a complete restoration in Zion. To this he reverted repeatedly, always with the notion that the United States might act as the liberator. "The United States," he wrote in 1844, "the only country which has given civil and religous rights to the Jews equal with all other sects; the only country which has not persecuted them, has been selected and pointedly distinguished in prophecy as *the nation*, which, at a proper time, shall present to the Lord His chosen and down-trodden people, and pave the way for the restoration to Zion." This could be done simply by the guarantee of protection in the purchase and holding of land in Palestine. The idea met with the approval of John Adams, President of the United States, 1797–1801. "I really wish" he wrote Noah, "the Jews again in Judæa, an independent nation, for, as I believe, the most enlightened men of it have participated in the amelioration of the philosophy of the age; once restored to an independent government, and no longer persecuted, they would wear away some of their asperities."

"I wish your nation may be admitted to all the privileges of citizens in every part of the world. This country (America) has done much: I wish it may do more, and annul every narrow idea in religion, government and commerce.

H. M. KALLEN.

BOSTON, MASS.

[5] Cf., "Mordecai M. Noah," by A. B. Makover.

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THE GREAT WAR AND THE INSTINCT OF THE HERD.

I. W. HOWERTH.

DARWIN said, "Judging from the habits of savages and of the greater number of the Quadrumana, primeval men, and even their ape-like progenitors, probably lived in society." [1] But the relative weakness of early man, the consequent necessity and obvious advantage of co-operation in defence against his enemies, his success in the struggle for existence as shown by his wide diffusion, as well as the social disposition of the animals nearest him in the scale of life, make it almost a certainty that primeval men were social, that they lived in groups, that they possessed the herd instinct. While there is a difference of opinion, as McDougall remarks, as to the exact form of early society, as to whether it was a promiscuous horde or a group made up chiefly of blood relations, something after the nature of a patriarchal family, anthropologists are practically agreed that primitive man was gregarious in his habits.[2]

While we read without surprise that primitive man was gregarious, we are likely to forget that modern man, although many of his acts have lost their fixed and instinctive character, or been replaced by acts of will, is quite as gregarious as his primitive ancestor. This is clearly shown by his disinclination to solitude, by his normal forms of recreation, and by the disposition of men to herd together in towns and cities. Solitary confinement is everywhere regarded as a mode of punishment peculiarly severe, and is looked upon by many as a form of torture so peculiarly dreadful that it should be prescribed only in exceptional cases, and in civilized countries not at all. "Misery loves

[1] *Descent of Man*, Pt. I, Ch. 4, p. 78.

[2] McDougall, W., *Social Psychology*, p. 85.

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company"; so also does happiness. It is a sociological fact, then, confirmed by prison discipline, as well as by bachelorhood, that it is not good for man to be alone.

As to our modes of recreation, everyone must have observed that with most people the one essential condition of having a good time is to be one of a crowd. People flock together at the seashore, in public parks, and in places of entertainment and amusement. Many go to church, even, to see and be seen, to satisfy their herd instinct, rather than to profit by religious instruction. Again, the extraordinary growth of cities, not only in this country but in all civilized lands, is due not alone to economic motives but also to the blind instinct which drives men to seek the company of their fellows. Man, then, is a gregarious animal, as gregarious as the horse, the elephant, the ox, the buffalo, the sheep, the deer, the bee, or the ant.

Now the satisfaction of this gregarious or herd instinct in man has resulted in the formation of many and various social groups: families, clans, tribes, states, nations; and, within the nation, parties, professions, denominations, clubs, sects, classes, and the like. But the largest social unit thus far definitely formed is the nation. In times of peace its herdlike qualities are not conspicuously manifested, but in war, when the bonds of instinctive feeling woven in the loom of biological and social history, and "The mystic cord of memory stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone," as Lincoln expressed it,—when these draw the people together, herd phenomena begin plainly to manifest themselves. We call them manifestations of patriotism, but patriotism is at bottom an instinctive herd emotion. It is "the emotion of his national crowd in the heart of the individual citizen."

A nation, then, is a herd. This is not a fanciful analogy; it is a sociological fact, none the less real because in normal times it is only dimly revealed. A drove of cattle grazing peacefully on a plain is none the less a herd, although distinctive herd phenomena do not then conspicuously appear.

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Of course in calling a nation a herd we use the word in a purely scientific sense and with none of the disparagement that is implied by the phrase "the common herd."

Now in the recent world-war situation we had essentially a conflict of herds. We should therefore have expected that in such a conflict the usual and primary characteristics of the herd would be manifested. Let us turn to a brief consideration of a few of these characteristics.

First, then, the herd unites in the presence of danger. This is a well-known fact in the case of animals. Cattle or horses may be grazing peacefully apart, but at the sign of danger they draw together. Wolves fighting among themselves cease when threatened by a common foe; and I have heard it said that the same effect is produced by outside interference in a family quarrel. With nations the effect is the same. The North in 1861 was unified as by an electric spark when Fort Sumter was fired upon. As Nicolay and Hay describe it, "The guns of the Sumter bombardment awoke the country from the political nightmare which had so long tormented and paralyzed it. The lion of the North was fully roused. Betrayed, insulted, outraged, the free States arose as with a cry of pain and vengeance. War sermons from pulpits; war speeches in every assemblage; tenders of troops; offers of money; military proclamations and orders in every newspaper; every city radiant with bunting; every village-green a mustering ground; war appropriations in every legislature and in every city or town council; war preparations in every public or private workshop; gun-casting in the foundries; cartridge making in the principal towns; camps and drills in the fields; parades, drums, flags, and bayonets in the streets; knitting, bandage-rolling, and lint-scraping in nearly every household. Before the lapse of forty-eight hours a Massachusetts regiment, armed and equipped, was on its way to Washington; within the space of a month the energy and intelligence of the country were almost completely turned from the industries of peace to the activities of war. The very children abandoned their old-time school-games, and

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played only at soldiering."[3] Thus the North, which for historical, political and economic reasons had become a herd, was at once united by the attack of the South.

A similar effect was produced in Russia in 1812 by the invasion of the French army. "From the moment when Napoleon had crossed our frontier," wrote the Empress Elizabeth, "it was as though an electric spark had spread through all Russia; and if the immensity of its area had made it possible for the news to penetrate simultaneously to every corner of the empire, a cry of indignation would have arisen so terrible that I believe it would have resounded to every corner of the earth."[4] The psychologic effect produced upon a nation by a common danger is so well known that more than one statesman has aimed to create it by prescribing a foreign war as a certain remedy for internal dissensions. Bismarck had it in mind when by altering a telegram in 1870 he provoked the French to declare war against Germany. Seward's famous letter to Lincoln in 1861, advising war with Spain and France in order to unite the North and the South, is another example out of many. He wrote in "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration, April 1, 1861," "My system is built upon this *idea* as a ruling one, namely, that we must change the question before the public from one upon slavery, or about slavery, for a question upon union or disunion. In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to one of *Patriotism* or *Union* . . . I would demand explanation from Spain and France, categorically, at once. I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention. And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, would convene Congress and declare war against them."[5] Thus he planned to divert the

[3] Abraham Lincoln, a History, *Cent. Mag.*, Vol. 35, p. 898.

[4] Quoted by Le Bon, *The Psychology of Revolution*, p. 107.

[5] Abraham Lincoln, a History, Nicolay and Hay, *Cent. Mag.*, Vol. 35, p. 615.

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thoughts of the people from internal dissensions, and unite them in a common feeling against a foreign foe, that is, to utilize for political reasons the instinct of the herd. The herd tends to unite in the presence of danger. This is as true of the nation as it is true of a drove of cattle, a flock of sheep, or a pack of wolves.

Now, observe that the unity thus occasioned is a unity arising from feeling and not from thought. It is instinctive, not rational. This is plainly the case with animals. They do not reason, but they unite just the same. With man reason may be and is at times and in particular cases a check upon union; but with the multitude reflection quickly succumbs to a sense of common danger, or of injured national honor, dignity or prestige; and unity is effected, and effected quickly because feeling is contagious. This instinctive disposition to unite in the presence of danger is obviously an advantage in the struggle for existence. Without it a group could not survive in the presence of united aggression. A nation that stopped to reason and argue itself to a rational basis of union would be defeated before it began to fight.

We are not concerned at present, however, with the value of the herd instinct or the dangers arising from it. We wish merely to point out that it sufficiently explains the unity existing in the countries recently at war. The people of a country may be expected to unite against a common foe no matter what the national cause may be. The union is instinctive, spontaneous, a union of feeling and not of thought. Hence the unanimity of a people at war has nothing whatever to do with the justice or righteousness of their cause. This explains why the Germans were united in unrighteousness. It explains also why the pacific principles of the German social democracy melted away as soon as war was declared. These principles and doctrines were rational formulations, matters of the head, but the national sentiment expressed in *Deutschland ueber Alles* was a matter of the heart, and the heart is older than the head. It has been well said that emotionally we are hundreds of thousands of years old, while rationally we are embryos.

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The prevalent assumption, then, that the common people of Germany were driven into war by the ruling powers, or that there was during the war any essential difference in Germany between the national feeling of Kaiser and cobbler, was without foundation. The German Emperor expressed the real situation when he said, at the opening of the Reichstag immediately after war was declared, "We are all Germans now." The refrain in the German "Hymn of Hate," "we love as one, we hate as one" was the expression of a psychological fact based on the herd instinct. A recognition of the presence and power of this instinct would have prevented the expectation of an early revolution in Germany.

Before leaving this part of the subject we may observe that because of the instinctive reaction of the people of a country against the circumstances which provoke war, as, for instance, a national insult, a popular referendum of the question of peace or war, however desirable it might be on other grounds, would not be a sure mode of preventing war. In case of a real or fancied lesion of the national honor, dignity, or prestige, the people are even more likely to "lose their heads," that is, yield to the herd instinct, than are those in authority. Hence democracies are as prone to war as monarchies. The "king business" should be broken up, but war will not necessarily disappear with kings.

Another mistaken conception, entertained by some before the war, on account of their failure to recognize the reality and power of the herd instinct, was the idea that monied men, particularly those in control of the great banking interests, would not permit another war to take place. They had too much to lose. We see now how illfounded was this view. A knowledge of the herd instinct, and of the overwhelming power of herd feeling when once incited would have prevented that mistake.

So much, then, for the first characteristic of the herd, its tendency to unite. A second characteristic is its susceptibility to suggestion. This susceptibility is obviously a fact with respect to a herd of animals; it is peculiarly and con-

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spicuously so with respect to a human herd, especially a mob. In a mob any suggestions of fear, anger, enthusiasm, elation, depression, etc., sweep through it almost instantaneously, and bring forth an immediate response. Hence, the mob is notoriously fickle, sentimental, unreasoning; now brave, now cringing, now cruel, now kind. Specialists in crowd psychology have pointed out, what anyone may easily observe, that a man in a crowd is very different from the same man when he is an isolated individual. His conscious individuality vanishes in the unconscious personality of the crowd. The crowd, we are told, has a collective mind and a collective consciousness. It is dominated by unconscious elements; it is credulous and short sighted. Says Le Bon, "By reason of the extreme sensibility of crowds, their sentiments, good or bad, are always exaggerated. This exaggeration increases still further in times of revolution. The least excitement will then lead the multitude to act with the utmost fury."[6]

The truth of this observation is well illustrated by the doings of crowds in the French Revolution. With Liberty, Equality and Fraternity on their lips Frenchmen, under the influence of the crowd spirit, indulged in orgies of blood-shed and cruelty no less revolting than the sack of Belgium or the murder of Edith Cavell. Thousands and thousands of innocent people were massacred; men and women, even old people, were burned alive; women and children were violated and afterwards murdered; tender babes were torn from their mothers' arms and tossed from bayonet to bayonet; men were compelled to dig their own graves and suffer themselves to be buried alive. No wonder Madame Roland cried out, on her way to the guillotine: "Liberty, liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!"

Now in all countries, in times of peace as well as in times of war, we may expect that there will be occasional manifestations of the crowd spirit. Citizens who are ordinarily peaceable and inoffensive will now and then assemble in a crowd and, seized with the crowd spirit, commit the most

[6] The Psychology of Revolution, p. 102–3.

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fiendish barbarities,—condemn an accused man without trial, for instance, and perhaps burn him at the stake; thus enacting in civilized communities the identical barbarity which we are accustomed to think of as peculiar to savage tribes.

Because of the stupidity, passion, and consequent danger of crowds every nation should endeavor through education to fortify its citizens against the contagion of the crowd spirit, and those in authority should do everything possible to prevent the formation of crowds. President Wilson displayed a high quality of leadership in his direct appeal to the people of this country, as soon as patriotism began to manifest the spirit of the mob, to avoid such manifestations as unworthy of a free and intelligent people.

But in Germany it so happened that the mode of making war thought to be most effective was directly provocative of the crowd spirit. When the German army laid waste every foot of land over which it retreated, destroyed every habitation; when it shot down in cold blood its hostages, or even all the inhabitants of a street or village in which someone had committed a hostile act, it acted in strict accordance with the military principles laid down by the German Staff. *Schrecklichkeit* was a deliberate policy adopted by that staff, and with professedly humane motives. "Terrorism," said General von Hartman, "is seen to be a relatively gentle procedure, useful to keep in a state of obedience the masses of the people."[7] But when soldiers proceed to carry out that policy, when the butchery begins, then a company of soldiers becomes a mob fired by the mob spirit, and there is no limit to the atrocities it will commit. "Nothing could be done against the excited crowd," said a German soldier with some small remnant of pity, "for at such times they are not men but beasts." "One gets an idea of the madness of our soldiers," says another, "when one sees the demolished villages. Not a single house intact. . . . Sheer vandalism was present

[7] Militärische Notwendigkeit und Humanität, in *Deutsche Rundschau*, Vol. 13, p. 462.

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as well as just anger." Carrier, a wholesale murderer of the French Revolution, declared that he took an intense joy in seeing his victims suffer; that he never laughed so much or experienced such pleasure as in watching the dying grimaces of the priests he killed. And so a German soldier notes in his diary, "It is for me a mad joy when we can revenge ourselves on these rascally Belgian and French priests."[8] Accounts of the atrocities of the German army are incredible only to those who are unacquainted with crowd psychology, and who do not perceive the relation between the policy of "frightfulness" and the development of the crowd spirit.

But while the herd is always capable under excitement of extreme manifestations of the mob spirit, the general truth with which we are here concerned is only that it is highly suggestible. It is uncritical in its attitude and accepts the most improbable statements. This fact was well illustrated by happenings in all of the warring countries. In Germany, for instance, as soon as war was declared, stories of the poisoning of rivers, the infection of water supplies by cholera microbes, and of the omnipresence of foreign spies, were generally circulated and generally believed. Circumstantial accounts of the assassination of more or less distinguished German citizens were published, and wild excitement aroused thereby, when these same citizens were alive and well. The German newspapers of the time show that the patriotic delirium and spy mania of Germany worked great harm even to the Germans themselves. It was not greatly different in other countries.

So much for herd suggestibility. A third characteristic of the herd is its docility in the hands of leaders. The herd follows the leader. So does the crowd. In a mob a leader is almost sure to appear. So in times of stress and excitement nations look to their leaders, and accept as leaders only those who sum up in themselves the fundamental feelings and spirit of the group. Because they are powerful centers of suggestion these leaders exercise an uncanny

[8] Cited by T. de Wyzewa in *Revue des deux Mondes*, May 3, 1915.

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influence. They determine in large measure the action of the people. Their responsibility is therefore great. Their power to lead is also a power to mislead! and if in times like these leaders do mislead, they will deserve all the condemnation they are likely to receive from impartial history. In the light of the susceptibility of a nation to suggestion, and its disposition almost blindly to follow its leaders, it is foolish to say, as some do, that nobody was responsible for the great war. We were all responsible more or less, perhaps unconsciously. But the responsibility lay primarily with those who willed it, and immediately with those who, because of their position, power, and prestige, were able to make their will effective.

These, then, are a few of the characteristics of the herd, whether it consists of animals or of men: it unites, it is highly susceptible to suggestion, it is controlled by leaders.

Now, in these respects, and in others, all herds, all nations, are alike. Still there are wide differences among animal herds and there are also wide differences among nations. A flock of sheep, a hive of bees, and a pack of wolves are alike in some respects but their differences are conspicuous. The same is true of nations. They resemble each other in some respects but in others they are as widely separated as the poles. How are we to account for these wide differences among nationalities, particularly among the recently opposing groups?

We cannot here enter upon a comparison of the score of nations that were engaged in the war, or even of the various animal herds. Such a comparison would be interesting and suggestive. A comparison of nations would have to be based, not upon superficial manifestations, but upon the particular ideas and ideals which in them have become common sentiments, specially ingrained in the people, and thus able to control national action. These ideals, sentiments, and interests constitute the character of a people. "Behind the institutions, arts, beliefs, and political upheavals of each people, lie certain moral, and intellectual characteristics that determine its evolution. . . . This

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aggregate of psychological elements observed in all the individuals of a race constitutes what may rightly be called the national character."[9] The fundamental differences between nations, then, are differences in character, just as their fundamental resemblances are due to instinctive reactions.

Now if Germany as a nation—whatever may be said of its citizens individually—if the German herd displayed in the war a relatively low order of morality, the fact must be attributed to the sentiments and ideas that have become characteristic and dominant among the German people. What are these peculiar psychological elements? In a word they are the sentiments and ideas of militarism. Militarism has been the curse of Germany as it will be the curse of any other nation that adopts it.

We have now seen that because of the gregarious nature of man all the social units thus far formed, including the nation, are of the nature of herds, and manifest the characteristic herd phenomena; and that many of the conditions and events of the Great War can be understood or explained only on the basis of the herd instinct. It goes without saying that this instinct has served a valuable purpose in social evolution. Without it social cohesion would fail a nation at critical times, and unity of action, without a high development of the social consciousness, would be impossible. A significant tendency is revealed, also, in the group-forming influence of the herd instinct.

That tendency is toward the formation of larger and larger social groups. In the great world war we had the incipient formation of two groups of humanity larger than the nation, two overherds as it were, consisting of the nations allied on either side, and in which the primary phenomena of the herd began to appear. It is improbable that the victorious nations associated in the war, which fought together against a common foe, which thought and acted in unison in matters relating to war, which are more or

[9] Le Bon, G., *Psychology of Peoples*, pp. 5–6.

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less conscious of a common national purpose, will ever return to their former state of relative isolation and independence. They are more likely to remain united, to "form a more perfect union" to develop a distinctive character of its own. If this should be the case it will point to the realization of the dream of world union. Philosophers of all countries have predicted world-integration. Said Fichte: "It is the vocation of our race to unite itself into one single body, all the parts of which shall be thoroughly known to each other, and all possessed of similar culture. Nature, and even the passions and vices of man have, from the beginning, tended toward this end; a great part of the way towards it is already passed, and we may surely calculate that this end, which is the condition of all further progress, will in time be attained."[10] Kant described the goal of history as a world republic, the conscious end of which should be the well-being and progress of humanity as a whole. Perhaps the part played by the instinct of the herd in the progress of mankind toward a desired if not inevitable goal is not yet complete, and not fully appreciated.

But, be that as it may, and admitting the value of this instinct as a factor in group survival, it forms no satisfactory basis for a distant unity of nations, or for the unity of a nation of to-day. After all is said, the herd instinct remains an instinct, and it can play no higher rôle with respect to a nation than is played by animal instinct in the biological world. Among animals instinctive reactions often result in wonderful adaptations. But while instinct is itself a product of evolution, it does not produce evolution; it is a passive element; it creates nothing; the more nearly perfect it is, the more likely it is to lead to the destruction of the animal species possessing it if the conditions under which it was developed undergo a change. The very essence of an instinct, as Darwin remarked, is that it is followed independently of reason. Intelligence

[10] Quoted in *Contemporary Review*, September, 1901, p. 397.

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alone is dynamic. It is the factor by which instincts are modified, and instinctive impulses inhibited, restrained, and directed. It is therefore the only safe reliance of a nation. Knowledge alone can make the world safe for democracy; only the truth can make us free.

It is the fashion in certain schools of thought to exalt instinct and disparage intelligence. Goethe's lines, with reference to man,

> "Better he might have fared, poor wight,
> Hadst thou not given him a gleam of heavenly light;
> Reason he names it and doth so
> Use it, than brutes more brutish still to grow."

although uttered by Mephistopheles, are taken seriously. But without reason it would be absolutely impossible for man to determine his own progress and civilization. Intelligence is the sole means by which he may rise to the high possibilities of his manhood. Man, the individual, is therefore expected to bring as rapidly as possible all of his instincts and faculties under intelligent control and direction.

In like manner the nation should endeavor to supplant its purely instinctive activities, however useful they may have been in the past, by the ordered procedure of reflective intelligence. Said Galton: "A really intelligent nation might be held together by far stronger forces than are derived from the purely gregarious instinct. It would not be a mob of slaves, clinging together, incapable of self-government, and begging to be led; but it would consist of vigorous, self-reliant men, knit to one another by innumerable attractions, into a strong, tense, and elastic organization. Our present natural dispositions make it simply impossible for us to attain this ideal standard, and therefore the slavishness of the mass of men, in morals and in intellect, must be an admitted fact in all schemes of regenerative policy. The hereditary taint due to the primeval barbarism of our race, and maintained by later influences, will have to be bred out of it before our descendants can rise to the position of free members of a free and intelligent

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society."[11] Blind instinctive social action of whatever kind is evidence of a low stage of social development. Each nation therefore should strive, no matter what the exciting circumstances may be, to order its activities exactly as an intelligent individual controls the impulsive activities of his own life. Only thus may social unity be based upon righteousness and justice, suggestion be utilized in the interest of order, and the control of leaders be truly progressive.

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[11] Francis Galton, "Gregariousness in Cattle and in Men," *Macmillan's*, May, Vol. 23, p. 357.

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A DEFENSE OF NATURALISM.

ROGER SHERMAN LOOMIS.

NATURALISM is a word with as many phases of meaning as pacifism or patriotism, and about it rages nearly as fierce a conflict. When Zola issued his well-known pronunciamento that Naturalistic art was Nature seen through a temperament, he stressed the word "Nature." Nature and Nature only must be the subject of art: to face Nature frankly and openly, to present her dulnesses and stupidities and shames with scrupulous impartiality must be the aim of the artist. Now modern English criticism has preferred to call such full-length and unflattering portraiture of Dame Nature, even the emphasis upon her wry neck, bow legs, and squint eyes, by the name of Realism. Accordingly, when the critic nowadays quotes Zola's definition of Naturalism, he stresses the word "temperament." Naturalistic art is Nature seen through a certain temperament, or through a certain formula created by that temperament. Naturalism, we are told, is not simply a reproduction of the homely and repulsive side of Nature's physiognomy, but an attempt to read in it a certain character.

With Zola's profession faithfully to portray Nature the critics have now no quarrel, but with his practice of giving a certain interpretation of her character they and a great body of readers beg leave, more or less politely, to differ. Realism, though not admitted to so high a seat as idealizing poetry and romance, has been received into the company of the immortals, and Howells and Bennett are permitted to sit down to dinner with self-respecting critics. But Naturalism, Zola's interpretation of Nature, the high priests of criticism hold up to mocking and execration. Flaubert, Ibsen, Hardy, Moore, Brieux, and Masters were all at first denounced in the reputable journals as devils from the pit: and they are still ostracized by good society as if a sulphurous vapor hung around them.

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To the question, "What is this interpretation, this formula which brings down upon its enunciators the formidable wrath of the critics?" we are likely to receive several answers. The first genial and rubicund gentleman of letters whom we interrogate over a bottle of Burgundy is apt to reply simply: "These fellows are arrant pessimists. They do not assure us that 'God's in his heaven, all's right with the world.' They are notoriously addicted to depressing surroundings and unhappy endings. Literature should not upset one's ideas about anything, and should be either soothing, inspiring, or funny." Apparently, for all his assumed superiority the genial critic demands just about the same remoteness from the workaday world and the same comfortable ending as the tired business man, whom he professes to despise.

If we approach some gentleman who has perhaps felt a little more than our genial friend the brunt of pain and perplexity, we are likely to get a somewhat more illuminating answer. "Naturalism is Bestialism. Man is not a beast." To be sure, Zola has much to say of the Bête Humaine, and undoubtedly does stress in us the ape and tiger strains. But will anyone deny that the strains are there? Now and then a human being sprouts an atavistic tail or fell of hair. So, too, now and then, human beings commit atrocities at Louvain or East St. Louis. Let him that is without a streak of the beast in him cast the first stone at the Bête Humaine. After all, what most critics of this class object to is not the recognition of the animal, but the recognition of the animal as a serious problem. The emphasis on the beast in *L'Assomoir*, *Jude the Obscure*, and *Spoon River* shocks the conventional critic, who is accustomed to hear such things mentioned only over his after-dinner cigar: he feels it very deeply when he sees them in print where they can be read by ladies, and where apparently they are treated not as jests to roll under his tongue but as grit to break his teeth on. He is ready enough to recognize the beast, but only as a joke or a German. So long as it can be laughed away or blown to bits

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with high explosive, he is quite ready to appreciate it in his Boccaccio or his Bryce reports. But when the naturalistic author shows him the beast everywhere about him, in the office, the church, and the home, and by no means to be got rid of by such simple methods as laughter or trinitrotoluol, and he realizes that only a reorganization of all his ideas in the light of what sociological, economic, and psychological experts tell him can make this abundant *élan vital* galvanize rather than blast our society, he kicks like a Missouri mule and refuses to recognize the Bête Humaine.

Perhaps, however, we have put our question to some more rational critic and he replies that he confesses the beast in man, but that he also finds a demigod: Naturalism denies the demigod. True enough, if by the demigod is meant some infusion of a supernatural or mystical element into the beast. But if by the demigod be meant simply those qualities which men have ascribed to gods as their chief and worthiest title to worship—justice and love, beauty and reason—then, of course, the Naturalist does not deny the demigod, though like the Nazarene he often discovers him in the less reputable circles of society. Furthermore, he finds embryonic even in the beast all that is popularly considered peculiar to man—art, altruism, remorse, some of the simpler forms of reasoning and foresight. In the most primitive types of humanity he finds a religion claiming as much supernatural sanction as the Roman Church or Bahaism. When confronted, then, with the fact that even animals possess the supposedly divine traits, and that as divine revelation the totem pole and the Cross claim equal authority, the Naturalist comes to the conclusion that the supernatural is only a development of the natural, and that mystical experience, however valuable as a dynamic, is worthless as a directive. Only reason acting upon the facts supplied by experience can guide us to the truth.

Accordingly the Naturalist discards as obsolete three supernaturalistic concepts — Providence, absolute moral-

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ity, and freedom of the will. In his novels and plays Providence is represented as a blind bungler, conventional morality is scouted and even flouted, and man is displayed as a puppet worked by the forces of Heredity and Environment. It is about these three phases of the Naturalistic interpretation of Nature that the battle of the critics still rages. What may be said in defense of these tenets of Naturalistic doctrine—a cosmic order without justice, a morality without sanction or stability, and a will, free within limits to choose what it likes best, but determined as to what it likes best?

The idea of a Providence in the affairs of men, working out a sort of poetical justice, has, to be sure, a certain basis in fact. No one can help observing that certain acts cause pain, directly to himself or indirectly through others. The relation is far from being uniform and inevitable, but despite the exceptions certain general causal relations are recognized. It is obvious that to overindulge in Welsh rarebit or to spoil a child with petting brings its own retribution with it. But Nemesis as an instrument of God's jealous vengeance upon the mortal who dares disobey his fiat seems a superflous explanation of these facts. For it occurs to the Naturalist that a sane ethics calls only those deeds evil which generally bring suffering in their train: and if occasionally that suffering falls upon the evil-doer there is no occasion for seeking an explanation in some mysterious Nemesis. Surely never was an absurder piece of writing than Emerson's dithyramb on *Compensation*. To him it would be a cause for wonder and awful speculation that Providence had provided a dark brown taste in the mouth to balance the exhilaration of drunkenness, and had made fire burn to punish the child for putting its finger in the flame. The fundamental idea is worthy of the good old lady who thanked the dear Lord for providing such excellent harbors where the cities of New York and San Francisco were to spring up. Nemesis is a law, just as gravitation is a law; but like gravitation it is offset a billion times a minute by other laws: and inasmuch as it is

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therefore less successful than any human penal system in saddling the heaviest penalty on the worst offender, it scarcely deserves all the mystified veneration that has been lavished upon it.

Let us turn next to the Naturalist's morality. We have noted that whether an act is right or wrong depends upon whether joy or pain in the long run follows. This, in turn, depends upon the human and other sentient beings involved. These, in turn, will be affected by climate, heredity, education, and a thousand other things. Naturalistic morality differs, then, from orthodox morality in its relativity. The notion of an eternal code, confided by Infallible Wisdom to the visions of seers and the conscience of every individual, does not appeal to the Naturalistic thinker. If conscience be an infallible guide to right conduct, why did the conscience of 1700 encourage duelling, the conscience of ancient Sparta stealing, the conscience of many a zealous Jesuit lying, the conscience of the devout Mohammedan polygamy, and why was what we now regard as a loathsome sexual perversion practised unblushingly in Periclean Athens? The Naturalist has come to believe that conscience, an emotional assurance of the rightness of one's action, varies so uniformly with the social conventions about it that it can no more be relied on than a compass in the neighborhood of masses of iron. If the moral law is carved on tables of adamant for all times and all places, why is it that when the moral law interferes too severely with the right to life or happiness, we all by common consent make and approve exceptions thereto? We agree that the starving child cannot be blamed for stealing, the invalid must be kept alive by falsehoods, self-defense justifies killing, a noble purpose takes the taint from suicide. I know a clergyman, who had one of the greatest shocks of his life when I wrote him that I believed in comparative freedom of divorce, who yet not long after met with a case of domestic unhappiness, which not only led him to approve a divorce but actually to officiate at the remarriage of the divorced wife. The unpardonable sin,

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to use a manner of speaking, for the Naturalist is to let a taboo stand in the way of human happiness.

Naturalistic ethics, then, are hedonistic. The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the end and criterion of action. But the Naturalistic thinker does not believe that to obey each moment's passing whim brings the maximum of happiness either for the individual or for the group. He perceives that man is a highly complex organism, whose nature includes, besides the passions, a social instinct, an artistic instinct, and a reason. In the harmonizing of all these factors lies happiness. To give controlled expression to the passions and to sublimate them, to enjoy the pleasures of social intercourse and social approval, to do all things beautifully, and viewing all these things in their relation, to harmonize them by reason,—this is the art of living. Individuals here and there may attain degrees of happiness in spite of, even by the partial denial of one or another of these four elements. One may even kill the artistic impulse and yet live in moderate pleasure. But to deny the fundamental passions or the claims of society or of reason is to court destruction. On the other hand, to follow too eagerly the seductions of any one is to distort the growth of the organism, and evil results appear either in the later development of the individual or in the society which imitates him.

What does duty mean to the Naturalistic thinker? The root of the word supplies the key. Duty is simply the debt which the individual owes to society. If society gives him much,—wealth, power, education,—society has a right to demand much. If it gives him little, it should demand little. The product of the slum, the ten hour day, and the gin palace, owes nothing to society. Society's demand that he make himself an intelligent human being and refrain from burglary, rape, and murder is an impossible impertinence on the part of society; though society will doubtless continue to enforce the payment of loans which it never made. Duty, then, is simply a claim by society upon the individual.

Since, however, the individual craves happiness and the way to complete happiness does not lie in antagonism to

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society and wholesale infringement of social interests, it will always be expedient for him, no matter how little society has done for him, to work for social ends. On the whole, it pays to cash up when society sends in a bill.

What have the Naturalistic writers done for morality? We may admit at once that they have done more to throw down rotting conventions than to build up new moral and social laws. But the former service is not to be minimized. Zola built his ponderous engines of destruction up against the walls of clerical imposture and vice in many forms; Hardy battered at the undemocratic walls of Oxford colleges and laid bare the shallowness of revivalism; Wells in his Naturalistic period exploded the bladder of the patent medicine and the whole vast imposture of advertising; Galsworthy attacked a jingoistic patriotism, and enacted for us the farce-tragedy that is sometimes played under the title of "Justice"; and Masters in his *Spoon River Anthology* has pierced to the root of nearly every wrong and folly and sham that festers in the modern social body.

Greatest has been the service of the Naturalistic school to the cause of labor and the cause of women. There are Naturalists who have been indifferent or hostile to both, but they form a small minority. From Zola to Verhæren, from Arthur Morrison to Ernest Poole, the majority of Naturalists have insistently claimed for labor that right to the pursuit of happiness which is so tantalizingly offered in our revolutionary Declaration of Independence.

For women Naturalistic literature has done the enormous service of telling the truth and the whole truth about sex. Conventional literature gave glimpses of purple mountain peaks, encircled with clouds of gold; it told besides of a vast tract hidden by sulphurous vapors, where the unwary wanderer felt the earth's crust crumble beneath him, and sank into a seething cauldron. Conventional literature charted only the most obvious parts of this region: where the concealed dangers were perhaps greatest it gave no direction. It prescribed for women one entrance only, a gate called marriage, and gave many details of the route thither. But for all the tract that lay beyond or outside

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of it the details were meagre and sometimes false. Now all this region has been faithfully charted and published abroad. I venture to say the reading of half a dozen novels of the Naturalist school will exhibit more of the rationale of sex than any other body of literature ever written. Wifely subjection, the double standard of morals, prostitution, the seduction of working-girls, long sanctioned or condoned in much conventional literature, have received no quarter here. Among what school of writers are we to find one particular form of criminal folly so scarified as in *Ghosts*, *Damaged Goods*, and "Willard Fluke" of the *Spoon River Anthology*? Burke's famous generalization that no discoveries are to be made in morality breaks down before such a case. For while, doubtless, the ethical principle of which this is an application is as old as society, yet the perception of its application and the forcible presentation of the evil and its consequences, leading at last to recognition in our legislatures, is new and may be placed in large measure to the credit of the Naturalists.

Look at Tom Jones, the hero of what has been called by the conventionalists the greatest English novel. Tom is scarcely more than a slave of the moment's appetite. To be sure, he has too much sense of fair play ever to seduce women, but women have not the slightest difficulty in seducing him. The possibility that any of his adventures may have dire consequences is never faced, except when the sensational possibility of committing incest for a time horrifies him. This amiable gentleman, rather than soil his hands, resolves to sell himself to a lady in return for his keep. At last, he marries the chaste Sophia and rears a lusty brood. I should like to know what those who charge the Naturalistic novel with a predilection for feeble heroes and heroines have to say for this flabby protagonist of their greatest English novel. As a picture of random sex relations it betrays a facile optimism that no realist would be capable of.

Now by way of contrast let us look at a novel of the Naturalistic extreme,—*Sanine*, by Artzybasheff. The book is not a typical example of Naturalism, for the author derides the exercise of reason and humanitarian effort.

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But even though in these respects it falls short of the saner Naturalism characteristic of Zola, Ibsen, Hardy, and Masters, even though it glorifies sexual experiences as the greatest thing in the world, yet it is so far superior to *Tom Jones* as a criticism of life that it does not flinch from the tragic possibilities in such experience, and it makes a sharp differentiation between the putrescent Koprophagy of the garrison town and the artistic expression of a healthy desire. While in my opinion the author does not sufficiently recognize that human nature has other summits than those reached in the culmination of the mightiest elemental passion, and does not realize the limitations which society has a right to place upon mating, yet in his demand that passion be beautiful as a Greek statue is beautiful, and in his recognition of the woman, not as a plaything but as a personality, he admits the place of the artistic and social impulses and justifies his classification as a Naturalist. Neither *Sanine* nor *Tom Jones* gives us anything like an exhaustive study of sex, but *Sanine* penetrates beneath the crust of convention; *Tom Jones* does not: *Sanine* has an idealism of sex; *Tom Jones* has none.

The larger Naturalism, then, founded upon the view of happiness as the goal of life, of the all round development of the individual as the way, and of the golden mean as the guiding principle, has been gradually making over our morality, ridding it of the relics of primitive taboos, and establishing it upon the demands of human nature.

But the third fundamental principle of Naturalism, determinism, is a stumbling block to many. The conventionalist is sure to object: "Granted that Naturalism has laid bare the ulcers and cancerous growths in the body of society, and has been as plain-spoken as the Old Testament or Shakespeare about things that are never mentioned in polite society, it destroys all incentive to salve those sores because it denies the freedom of the human will. It so impresses on us the thorough corruption of society that we feel that it is condemned to an eternity of disease. We see these men, as one reverend critic phrases it, 'concentrating attention on the shadiness and seaminess of life, exploiting

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sewers and cesspools, dabbling in beastliness and putrefaction, dragging to light the ghastly and gruesome, poring over the scurvy and unreportable side of things, bending in lingering analysis over every phase of mania and morbidity, going down into the swamps and marshes to watch the phosphorescence of decay and the jack-o'-lanterns that dance on rottenness'; and we conclude forsooth that if this is life, there is no hope for the world."

Naturalism may at once plead guilty to the doctrine of determinism: but it does not admit that the doctrine is inconsistent with optimism of the future or that it robs man of incentive to moral action. The argument that optimism can be justified only by belief in an outside power pumping virtue into humanity by slow degrees is not convincing to anyone who realizes what is meant by potential energy. It is not necessary to believe that if a pound of radium could emit electrical energy for thousands of years it must be connected with a celestial dynamo. Neither is it necessary to believe that the human race is incapable of improving itself, however unhappy its present condition. No man can tell the potential energies latent in the human race, energies that may express themselves through reason, social feeling, and the love of beauty to make the superman. Determinism is no foe to an optimism of the future. Professor Santayana puts the theory admirably: "We are a part of the blind energy behind Nature, but by virtue of that energy we impose our purposes on that part of Nature which we constitute or control. We can turn from the stupefying contemplation of an alien universe to the building of our own house, knowing that, alien as it is, that universe has chanced to blow its energy also into our will and to allow itself to be partially dominated by our intelligence. Our mere existence and the modicum of success we have attained in society, science and art, are the living proofs of this human power. The exercise of this power is the task appointed for us by the indomitable promptings of our own spirit, a task in which we need not labor without hope."

The conventionalist pursues his point. "This all sounds mighty fine. But experience shows that a belief in the

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freedom of the will and moral responsibility is all that keeps us from wallowing in a sensual sty." As the Rev. Dr. S. Law Wilson puts it, "What, we ask, would be the effect of persuading the masses of mankind to believe that all the evil of which they are guilty is necessitated, and all the blame must be laid to the door of blood, or birth, or environment, or the tyranny of impulse? Indoctrinate the masses of our population with this pestiferous teaching, and there be some of us who shall not taste of death till we see the reign of moral anarchy and disintegration set in."

Now let us see what the real effect of acting upon the doctrine of free will is as contrasted with the effect of acting upon its denial. The theory of the freedom of the will, apart from its incompatibility with the generally accepted law of causation as implying an agent that, without being itself caused, initiates or causes action, involves the doctrine of complete responsibility. For if the will could have refrained just as well as not from the immoral act, no matter how powerful the pressure of heredity and environment, the man is absolutely responsible. His guilt has no extenuation. Punishment heavy and merciless is but his due. The only thing for society to do is impress upon him the enormity of his crime and urge him to repentance.

Now the old penal methods were in entire accord with this theory. Criminals were in prison to be punished. No treatment was too bad for them. The prison chaplain dilated on their essential wickedness, and told them that they had only themselves to thank for the plight in which they found themselves. If they would freely confess their guilt and accept the inspiration of religion, though society would not forgive them, God would. Now the results of such a logical application of the doctrine of moral responsibility to the criminal class are notorious. Everyone knows that the men who went to the penitentiary did not come out penitent, far less did they come out with any propensity to good. These men had learned what the doctrine of free will was in its application to them. Somehow there seems to have been a perverse conspiracy among criminals throughout the world to discredit the doctrine of free will and its corollary, moral responsibility.

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What, however, are the results of determinism as applied to these same men? Mr. Osborne, whose work at Sing Sing we all know, has without knowing it acted upon this principle. He has brought into the prison pleasure and social life and a system of stimuli in the form of rewards. He has created a society where the criminal naturally did his duty to society because society had done something for him. He has taught the men trades and made openings for them in the world, and as a result he has made citizens out of outlaws. Of his success there can be no question. What here the individual could not do for himself, environment did for him. It mattered little whether he thought his will free or not: it responded inevitably to the right stimuli. Little need have we to fear the spread of the determinist theory among the masses, if only we have intelligence enough to practice as well as to preach it.

The conventionalist once more objects. "But turn away from life to your own Naturalistic novels. Are they not shrieking in our ears that man is feeble and doomed to failure? Are not their heroes and heroines weaklings who fall unresisting under the bludgeonings of Fate?"

Now it may well be admitted that the Naturalists, in order to show where the rocks lie, have usually represented their human barks as breaking upon the reefs rather than gliding smoothly into harbor. But in doing so the Naturalists have done only what every tragic writer has done. If the Mayor of Casterbridge or Madame Bovary fell through a combination of defects of character with adverse circumstances, what else may we say of Hamlet and Lear? Are we to despise Tess of the D'Urbervilles because though she often showed great strength of character, at certain crises of her fate timidity prevailed over purpose? When the conventionalists begin to call the great tragedies decadent on the same grounds that they condemn the Naturalistic novels; when they scorn Desdemona because when her husband suspected her she did not call up the Pinkerton's detective agency of Cyprus and probe the matter to the bottom, and because on her deathbed she did not wrestle courageously, but murmured merely, "A guiltless death I

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die," then we may listen patiently when they apply these standards to works not in the classic tradition. Until then some of us are inclined to believe that these critics unconsciously act upon the principle that any stick is good enough to beat a dog with.

Dr. Johnson once said that if he had no duties and no reference to futurity he should spend his life in driving briskly in a post-chaise with a pretty woman. To such a declaration the appropriate Johnsonian reply is, "You lie, sir." If the Doctor would permit of any further explanation, we might go on to say: "In the first place, Fate might refuse. Fate, in the form of the pretty woman, might politely decline the invitation. She might prefer other company to that of the hectoring oracle of the Mitre, the polysyllabic proser of the *Rambler* papers: she might object to being referred to as an unidea-ed girl. In the second place, if the woman found it agreeable, the Doctor himself would soon have found it disagreeable. It may be an impertinence to presume that we know the Doctor better than he knew himself, but Boswell has made the claim possible. Now the Doctor had certain hereditary traits that would never have been satisfied for long with sitting in a post-chaise beside a pretty woman. He had too active a brain, he was too much of a clubman, and, as a matter of fact, despite all his complaints of indolence, he had an instinct for work. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that Samuel Johnson would have let the American Revolution go by without leaping from the post-chaise and scratching off *Taxation No Tyranny*. At the very least, he would have had to stop for a moment, stretch his limbs, and perhaps roll down a hill for the fun of it. Without disparaging the worthy Doctor's sincerity, one may say that, granted his pecuniary and other restrictions, he would have lived much the same life if he had had no theories of duty beyond what every social being holds, and no more reference to futurity than the desire that the rest of life contain as much happiness as he could put into it.

Moreover, one cannot help thinking that if Doctor John-

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son had exerted his great influence, not as a conventionalist and Tory, but as a Naturalist and democrat, the whole course of events in Europe might have been changed. His posthumous power might have offset the Bourbonism of Burke; England might not have thrown her strength on the side of that Holy Alliance of Prussian, Austrian, and Russian despotisms; the contagion of a liberal England and France might have liberalized Europe; and the world might have been made safe for democracy a hundred years ago. But it was not to be.

There are people who see in Naturalism the origin of this war and in the triumph of the Allies the vindication of Providence. Such a view is only possible through a misconception of the facts. The insane policies of German imperialism found ready support throughout the ranks of the German supernaturalists, and palliation in that inviolate citadel of supernaturalism, the Vatican. On the other hand, the bitterest and most courageous of the foes of German imperialism were a small group of atheistic socialists in Germany, whose creed was the creed of Naturalism. As for the victory of the Allies I can see nothing but a confirmation of Napoleon's blunt statement that God is always on the side of the heaviest battalions. The feeble succor afforded by St. Michael at Mons hardly leads one to rely much upon the heavenly powers for aid. The despairing prayers of millions went unheeded until material force came to the aid of spiritual yearnings. One who can believe in supernaturalism after this war possesses, indeed, a faith which indeed serves as an evidence of things not seen. Let him have his angels of Mons and be happy. But the rest of us, in this time momentous and critical as scarcely any other time in the world's history, can hardly afford to base our hopes for the future on any efforts but our own, or afford to direct those efforts by any but Naturalistic principles: for these must bring happiness in their wake, or *ipso facto* cease to be the principles of Naturalism.

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THE CREATION OF SOULS.

THOMAS D. ELIOT.

"To bring up a child is to carry one's soul in one's hands."—ELLEN KEY.

BOTH the advocates and the opponents of so-called "birth-control" need challenging. Its opponents are, most of them, adherents of a code of family morality which may be called roughly, the orthodox, Puritan, or Hebrew code, and their motive is fear of sin or punishment or perhaps of "race-suicide." Its advocates, on the other hand, are more afraid of over-population, poverty, degradation. Both advocates and opponents are largely negative in their ruling motives. Both attempt to interfere with spontaneous choice by parents in the matter of child-bearing. Codes based on interference or fear are apt, in the long run, to be anti-social.

Is it not possible to find some positive motives which, in a world without paupers and imbeciles, could safely be trusted to govern child-bearing in the interests both of the individual and of society without the interference of an arbitrary standard or of fear? Even if proof of the affirmative be not final, let us challenge the negative.

I.

We are more or less used to talking about reproduction as if it were a thing of the body merely. Our growing knowledge of reproduction in man has been largely through biology and medicine. Looking into the past, moreover—nay, even around us in the lives of the masses—we also find the fleshly side of reproduction foremost in the people's minds, to the forgetting of a side which the psychologist and sociologist can effectively stress. Bodies have been reckoned rather than souls; and even souls have been enumerated, rather than evaluated as subjective and social aspects of individual life. Religion and democracy have alike helped to this end by leveling all souls in a transcendental or theoret-

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ical sense until, unawares, we seem to feel that when a baby is born a father and mother have created a human being—have reproduced themselves. Good should come from challenging that belief, especially as it bears upon folk-thought about the limitation of offspring.

The act of reproduction among human beings is not complete with the passing down of physical heredity. The most significant attributes which distinguish man from beast are social and mental rather than physical. Until, therefore, and unless, each family's share of the cultural heritage of the race is thoroughly imparted to the child in the home, can we truly say that a father and mother have given the world a complete new person?

If bodily procreation is all that is involved in the birth of a new soul, then, indeed, let men spawn like fish: the gradual prolongation of infancy through the ages will have lost its meaning, except for mere physical care and protection. Public nurseries would then be the ideal homes.

On the contrary, if the development of the family and of the human home have meant anything for the advancement of individual character and of the race, it is this: that only through affectionate nurture and education can a child be brought to full stature of normal manhood and womanhood. Biologists and ethnologists tell us that the instincts of protection and care for offspring have had infinite survival value in preserving the accumulating inheritance of racial achievement in things conventional, industrial, religious, artistic, ethical. Families in which the love of children and the yearning to guard and teach them is strong seem to have won out, and in the long run to have outlived those families which avoided child-bearing and child-rearing, or slighted the training of the coming generation. We may therefore take it for granted that normal parents are those who want and love children. Those who do not crave parenthood do not, in a sense, *deserve* to crave it: as in Swedenborg's theory of damnation, their moral blindness carries its own reward, though they be not aware of their loss.

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One might even be so bold as to believe (in the face doubtless of many exceptions) that such unnatural parents are less likely to carry out in a fine manner the spiritual side of reproduction: that is, less likely to produce children clothed in their full social heritage and matured into rich human minds as well as healthy bodies. If this be true, society would surely be better off, on the whole, without the progeny and stock of such parents as through instinct or habit lack the desire for children. And, following the thought straight into the ethics of birth-control, if all such parents actually had their wish not to procreate their kind, that type might even conceivably tend to breed itself out of the race. Unwanted children and unwanting parents would be scarcer and would cease to be a serious problem.

If, then, it is socially good that normal people should reproduce their kind, but of doubtful outcome that those who dislike children should be forced by ignorance or "morals" to raise them, it would seem that, similarly, those desiring one, two, or any specific number, but no more, should, for the common good, be encouraged to have them, but not condemned for not having more.

Who, then, but mated men and women embodying in their individual judgments the collective standards and experience of their environment and generation as well as the instincts of their particular heredity, can best be left to determine how many of their kind they can or will reproduce? Only thus, it seems to the writer, can increase of population among economically and physically normal families be adjusted automatically for the welfare of the parents, of the offspring, and of society.

The writer is aware that the above argument seems to leave out economic as well as eugenic factors. It is true that the feebleminded multiply more rapidy than college graduates, and the poor than those most able financially to educate their children properly. These facts in regard to the extremes of society call for other measures which need not be taken up here except to assume for the sake of the argument that all persons whose heredity is demonstrably

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dangerous should and can be definitely isolated, and that celibacy or childlessness due to poverty should of course be reduced to a minimum. Nor is it needful to speak of sterility in this connection. It is claimed merely that while the principle may be modified by other principles in individual cases, it holds good, other things being equal, for the middle class or "mode" of society, and for the guidance of social ethics and behavior for that group.

If the above line of reasoning be sound, it furnishes an argument against any movement or doctrine in regard to human reproduction which brings pressure upon parents independent of their own wishes and standards of living. There may be other arguments strong enough at any given time to justify such propaganda, but with the passing of the justifying conditions the principle of freedom should and, the writer believes, does reassert itself in spite of dogma.

The sex codes of the Puritan or the Hebrew, the military demands of classic patriotism, the ancestor-cult of the Chinese, the marriage-lot advocated by Plato, the intimately regulated rabbit-hutch kind of home demanded by the mediæval religions, and the human stock-farm of the extreme eugenist or birth-control advocate—all these involve interference in the family relation by a dominant group claiming superior wisdom and demanding an artificial birth-rate. Out of the highest act possible to human nature and subject to the human will, each of these social tyrannies would make an involuntary thing—by force, by social pressure or by accident. Among the only group where compulsion is probably warranted—the defective and delinquent,—the orthodox morality has forbidden interference.

II.

Another major cause tends to make the Hebrew, mediæval, or Puritan code anti-social unless modified under present conditions. Its emphasis is largely anti-evil or prohibitory. Any purely negative doctrine or propaganda

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of conduct fails not only in being compulsory and repressive but in not providing adequate positive motives and wholesome outlets for the release and sublimation of those powerful and almost universal impulses which find their most normal expression in the free family.

This same criticism of negativeness, however, applies very seriously to much of the present propaganda of family limitation. It is deplorably "anti" in its tone and emphasis, and loses support, consequently, in many quarters where a more constructive and positive approach would find ready acceptance. If neo-Malthusianism[1] acquires a selfish or destructive tone, then increasingly we shall have "birth-control," and "family limitation," with the negative, restrictive, and selfish connotations of those phrases. Not that such an event would be altogether disastrous. At most, and at worst, this phase of the movement allows selfish parents to avoid having unloved and unlovely offspring; and at the same time it permits thrifty parents to adjust births to income. But these are negative aspects of neo-Malthusianism as a purely restrictive propaganda directed against over-population and crassly abnormal conditions. It is the writer's contention that such a propaganda, however harmless and beneficial many of its immediate results, will probably (unless balanced and upheld by more positive purposes and constructive ideals) ultimately stimulate violent and excusable reaction. Such a reaction would endanger the movement's own purposes by excluding it from "respectability" and from refined thought, speech, and writing. In a suppressed atmosphere the movement would become even more

[1] *Malthusianism* may be defined for the purpose of this article, as the group of doctrines according to which population increases faster than the food supply, and war, famine, poverty and plague are, in the absence of "prudential checks," the inevitable.

Result: *Neo-Malthusianism*, generally speaking, declares that these prudential checks are actually possible and operative, and, through increased knowledge and standards of living, serve in a measure to reduce the necessity and prevalence of poverty, disease, and other less humane checks to population.

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negative, and would acquire the morbid stigma and furtive flavor of immorality. Signs of such a reaction are already sufficiently obvious.

If, on the other hand, the real benefits in neo-Malthusianism are to be kept, and embodied in a future socialized morality, it must take as its ideal not so much the reduction of the birth-rate as the increase of full reproduction in the higher, human sense above defined, including "bringing-up." Not only "quality rather than quantity" must be its slogan, but "quantity of quality." Only such a gospel, incidentally, will serve to utilize and disarm the evil phases of a renewed impulse toward reproduction of "cannon-fodder" regardless of quality, which the world war brings along with its destruction of the fit.

The newer Malthusianism, then, will stress, not so much the prevention of conception, but as Aletta Jacobs has called it, "voluntary maternity," and the most complete expression of the life cycle of the sex nature. It will insist that procreation shall be an act of will and mind and conscience and education as well as an act of body. Once parents are known to have the means and knowledge of birth-control, they may then more justly be held completely accountable for the later care of their children, and public opinion will demand of them high quality.

III.

Even such a program will be branded in some quarters as "race-suicide." But such an accusation would ignore the economic corollaries of this newer ideal. For, given universal knowledge of contraceptives (or self-control, if you will), and a general opinion such as already widely exists for "more and better babies," the only barriers to reproduction would be (1) in selfish or illegitimate matings where childlessness would be in many ways a social boon rather than deserving of the term "race-suicide," and (2) in families that would be limited because of economic conditions preventing full reproduction, *i.e.*, where heredity is eugenic, but environment offers only inadequate nurture. Needless

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to say, the latter group greatly outbulk the former, yet those who prate of race-suicide argue from conspicuous cases of the former group that the knowledge of contraceptives will produce race-suicide in the latter group.

But what is "race-suicide?" Might it not be defined in the same broader spirit already used in defining reproduction? If those who make sure that they produce children reared to the full stature of manhood are thereby most truly reproducing human beings in the full sense of that phrase, surely those irresponsible parents who ignorantly, carelessly or selfishly bring into the world more children than can be reared to the full maturity of normal personality, are also self-murdering the soul of the race, just to the extent that they are deficient in carrying out their educational trust. And as for parents whose only motive for restraint of procreation is poverty: are not those men also race-murderers whose economic acts directly or indirectly force upon such normal, willing families that bitter choice of producing a child destined to defective heritage, or going without desired offspring? The same group which pays inadequate wages or salaries, whether or not it is logically conscious of its interest in the existence of a large labor-supply, is sometimes to be found supporting certain so-called religious and moral forces in condemnation of birth-control.

So long, however, as the birth-control movement attempts to dictate to parents who are physically fit, and so long as it remains negative, stressing the physical and materialistic motives, and solely polemic, it will give the opposition, however prejudiced, a justifiable ground for attacking it.

On the other hand, procreation may be presented as a constructive life purpose and reward, including its fullest meaning of voluntary parenthood reproducing itself in perfected human beings as the culmination of individual ideals and social responsibility. Such an ideal can be made practicable by economic, medical and educational

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reform. From such a positive propaganda society need fear no true race-suicide, physical or spiritual. Life, and life more abundantly,—such is the positive goal.

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THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY.

MAURICE DE WULF.

AT the present moment, when the question of the society of nations is discussed almost everywhere, it may be interesting to consider what attempts were made to realize it in the past, with the endeavor to study how human societies during the thirteenth century were formed into one single association. This effort to reunify society was the first since the disintegration of the Roman Empire.

The thirteenth century, which was the heart of the middle ages, witnessed the development of an original civilization, which makes this period one of the most interesting in human history. All that constitutes the peculiar greatness of humanity,—organization of labor and of economic life, institution of the family, of the city, of the "commune," of the state; production of art, science, philosophy; emotional life of morality and of religion;—all these complex, interpenetrating realities which form a civilization, and which determine the degree of its excellence, received during that century an expression such as it has never since recovered.

The thirteenth century is the consummation of mediæval life; it then presents itself to us in bold outlines. A new spirit pervades the policy of Kings; material prosperity increases; the rural population begins to breathe more freely; the sense of a common life in the cities awakens; art continues its triumphal march; Gothic architecture takes its place beside Romanesque; *chansons de geste*, hymns and sacred poetry spring to life on the lips of troubadours and in the cloisters; the painting of frescoes appears; sciences are constructed; philosophies flourish luxuriantly; customs characteristic of feudalism and chivalry—dignity of the individual, spirit of fair-play between adversaries in war, habits of courtesy—arise as the basis for relations be-

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tween laymen. Catholicism is the soul of the great social organizations. The church is everywhere, with its monks, its clerks, its bishops and its Papacy. The crusades follow one after another; and by them, the religious ideal is fed, the peoples are brought together, and attention is directed towards the East.

It is just at this time that the problem of universal peace becomes insistent, and the most distinguished writers, permeated by the sentiment of universal fraternity, strive to organize a kind of Christian republic, a society embracing all human beings.

To understand what constitutes this unity which they desired, and what its value was, we must transport ourselves into the thoughts of that time, and carefully avoid foreign parallels with the present time,—precisely as one who wishes to learn a foreign language must think in terms of that language, and not simply translate the words and idioms of his maternal tongue.[1]

I.

Centripetal Tendencies.

The "society of human beings" as it was sketched by the most refined intellects of the thirteenth century and imperfectly realized by the great leaders, cannot be understood unless we grasp certain characteristic marks, which give their quality to every kind of human activity of that time, and which therefore may be called *social characteristics*, namely, the need of order and stability, and the need of an international standard.

The need of ordering everything in accordance with principles of unity and stability, the search for systems which extend themselves over vast domains, is one of the conspicuous marks of a century which saw in the large, and acted on a large scale. Whichever way one turns, the ambition of initiators was prodigious, and everyone dreamed of *universal harmony*.

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[1] Cf. our study, *Civilisation et philosophie au 13th siècle*, in "Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale," July, 1918.

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The policy of kings was filled with this ambition. For, at this time, national unity began to vivify great states such as France, England, Germany, Spain. Now, this national unity was not able to realize itself, except by introducing principles of order, which brought under a common régime social classes scattered over vast territories, and previously subjected to local and antagonistic powers. The thirteenth century was a century of kings who were all organizers, administrators, legislators; they were builders of stability, who all moulded their countries and their peoples: Philip August and Louis IX in France; Edward I in England; Frederic II in Germany; Ferdinand III and Alphonse X in Spain; all had these traits in common.

In France, centrifugal feudalism became more and more feeble, and monarchical concentration grew steadily stronger. This concentration, which appeared under Philip August, became more and more evident under Louis IX, who perfected the work of unification begun by his grandfather. A lover of justice, respectful of the rights of others, and jealous of his own, he made no attempt to crush the feudal lords or the cities. There was nothing despotic in his rule, and he permitted all kinds of social forces to develop themselves.[2] His reign resembled the oak under which he held his court of justice; for the oak, the lord of the forest, likewise refrains from stifling growths of more fragile structure which seek protection under its shade.

Without attempting to establish a parallel between the policy and social condition of France and those of neighboring countries, one yet cannot fail to recognize that the stability realized by Louis IX recurs *mutatis mutandis* in England. According to the picturesque expression of Frederic Harrison, John Lackland rendered to England "the inestimable service of losing her French possessions."[3] There also the country organized itself from within out-

[2] *Luchaire, A.*, Louis VII., Philippe Auguste, Louis VIII., Tome III *de Histoire de France* publiée par Lavisse., 1902, p. 203 et suis.

[3] Fr. Harrison, A Roman Survey of the 13th Century. In: *The Meaning of History and Other Historical Pieces*, Macmillan, 1916, p. 161.

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wards. The *Magna Charta* of 1215 established a rule of liberty in favor of the clergy and the nobility; it produced an equipose between the powers of the king and the representatives of the nation. Parliament came to live. Intelligent princes, like Edward I (1272–1307) completed the conquest of the Island and perfected the national institutions.

Much the same took place in the Norman Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and in the Catholic kingdoms of Spain, which grew powerful at the cost of the Arab states in the south of the peninsula, and in which later the Cortes checked the royal power. Like his relative Louis IX, Ferdinand III, king of Castile, had centralizing conceptions. He organized a central administration of the state; and only his death prevented him from achieving legislative unity, which would have welded together the mosaic of peoples living on the increasing territories of Castile.[4]

Whereas in France, in England, in the Catholic kingdoms of Spain, and in the Norman kingdom of the south of Italy, royalty gained in influence, the Germanic emperor lost, to some extent, his authority;—with the result that the two types of government in the west, centrifugal feudalism and centralized Cæsarism, steadily approached each other, and the different European states became more like a single family. The German barons, bishops, and abbots were no longer the "valets" of the emperor; the feudal nobility gained more independence; cities began to show their power.

Even in Italy, which the emperors always claimed as their own, Frederic II, son of Frederic Barbarossa, had to reckon with the Lombard cities which were powerful principalities, seeking to shake off his yoke. In his person the family of the Hohenstaufen underwent defeat at the hands of the Pope.

Overlooking the peoples in process of formation, and the states which were striving towards an autonomous national

[4] Altamira, *Historia de España y de la civilisacion Española*, 1913, I, p. 385.

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life, stood the Papacy, which assumed in the person of Innocent III its most perfect mediæval expression. Its mission being above all regulatory, the Papacy pursued a religious and international policy, the effect of which on the whole century will be defined (IV).

But politics, whether of Kings or of Popes can but fabricate the mere skeleton of civilization. Its inner life circulates in religious and moral feelings, in social, artistic, philosophical and scientific doctrines.

Christian dogma and Christian ethics permeated the whole human fabric, no activity being exempted; they lent supernatural sanction to the life of individuals, families and peoples, who were all on a pilgrimage (*in via*) towards the heavenly home (*in patriam*). Christianity gave a consecration to those working in guilds, to the profession of arms provided the war be just, to ateliers of painters and of sculptors, to the building of cathedrals, to cloister schools and universities.

And in the whole of art, there was the same dream of universality, and the same attempt to realize rigorously the ideal of order.

The Gothic cathedrals, which are the most perfect flowering of mediæval genius, astound modern architects by the amplitude of their dimensions and, at the same time, by the logic of their plan. To make the edifice a mirror of nature, of the moral world, and of history, architecture calls to its aid sculpture, painting and stained glass. Immense shrines populate themselves with statues, with figures of animals, plants and foliage, with designs of every kind. The visible world is nothing more than a reflection of the thought of God. Mediæval artists thought that all creatures might find a place in the cathedral. Likewise, the cathedral is the mirror of science, and, in fact, all kinds of knowledge, even the humblest, such as fitted men for manual labor and for the making of calendars, and also the highest, such as liberal arts, philosophy and theology, were given plastic form. Thus without difficulty the cathedral could serve as a visible catechism, where the man of the

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thirteenth century could find in simple outline all that he need believe and know. The highest was made accessible to the lowest. And architecture has not been more social and popular at any other period of history.

Literary production of the thirteenth century does not rival the monuments of stone, but none the less it is not lacking in great endeavors. A work like the *Roman de la Rose* is a sort of encyclopædia of everything that a cultured layman of the middle of the thirteenth century ought to know. The *Divine Comedy*, a work which has not been imitated and which is inimitable, is a symphony of the whole time, and Dante informs us that he writes "the sacred poem to which heaven and earth put their hands."

Whereas the artists gave a new outburst of life to art, the intellectual classes were hungering and thirsting to know all, to assemble everything within the domain of knowledge, and after having completed the collection, to submit all to order.

There are different levels in the effort toward this order. Lower down, the encyclopædists of the time wished to make an inventory of all that is to be known. The jurists of Bologna brought together theories of Roman law and their applications to the middle ages. The most famous of these lawyers, Accursius who died in 1252, united in an enormous compilation, the *Glossa ordinaria*, all the works of his predecessors. About the same time, the *légistes* of Philip August translated the *corpus juris* into French; Edward I had a collection made of the decisions of the court of justice; and Jaime I of Aragon had a codification made of laws, called the *Canellas*. Furthermore, the canonists, at the wish of the Popes, continued the work of codification begun by Gratianus in his *Decretum*, and brought together the decisions of the Popes (Decretales) and the decisions of the councils.[5]

And finally and most important of all, the philosophers and theologians,[6] lovers of order and clearness, drew up vast

[5] Cf. H. O. Taylor, *The Mediæval Mind*, Macmillan, 1914, Vol. II, p. 292.

[6] Cf. our study on: Western Philosophy and Theology in the 13th Century, in *The Harvard Theological Review*, October, 1918.

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classifications of human knowledge, wherein every kind of thinking finds its place. Monumental *Summæ* display to us a philosophical conception of the physical and moral world, a general theory of the place of man in the universe in relation to God. At the same time, they contain a systematic exposition of Catholic dogma and of supernatural life. The order, for which the age was athirst, was nowhere better provided than in these monuments of doctrine, where all holds together, with implications and logical articulation; all that we have to say of the society of nations is nothing more than a chapter in this great assemblage of ideas, each of which is concordant with all the others.

The philosophy and theology which the theory of the society of nations presupposes, held a place of authority which gave it an *international* prestige. Accordingly, its adoption by the intellectual classes of western Europe was achieved without the slightest difficulty.

This brings us to *internationalism*, a second characteristic of the civilization.

II.

Internationalism.

All was ready, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, for a movement towards cosmopolitism.

No matter to what nation they belonged, thinkers of the thirteenth century accepted the same classifications of knowledge. Also they accepted almost without exception the *dominant scholastic philosophy*, of which individuals such as the Italian Thomas Aquinas, the English Duns Scotus, the Flemish Henry of Ghent offered different interpretations. It is true there were movements of opposition —averroism for instance,—but they could not compete with the cosmopolitan authority of the scholastic philosophy.[7] Similarly, there was no fundamental disagreement in respect to theological doctrine. Thus there was a kind of common atmosphere, a uniformity of thinking

[7] Cf. our *Histoire de la philosophie mediéval*, 4th edition, 1912. A German edition and an Italian have been published in 1913; an English edition in 1909.

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which permeated all philosophical systems. At that time, it was not the habit for one set of thinkers to make it their business to destroy the presuppositions which the other set had attempted to build up. We may say that this absence of predatory instinct among philosophers was characteristic of the time.

The great centres of speculative studies—Paris, Oxford—accept the same program and teach the same science. One system of education for princes, lords and clerks; one faith; one code of morals; one ritual; one hierarchy; one church; one sacred and learned language—the Latin—for the whole West. The Crusades had taught the barons to know each other. Commerce also established contacts between men of several countries, and predisposed men to a thinking which was no longer local.

The rapid extension of Gothic art is another example of common need. It disclosed a conception of beauty, not limited to any one people. The marvelous architecture and sculpture, which first saw the day in the Isle de France, passed almost immediately over into England, Spain, Germany;—and, as M. Mâle has taught us, it became "œcumenical."[8]

And finally, there were already existing executive agents accustomed to deal practically with international situations (IV).

S. Augustine left us this fine definition of peace: "It is order which gives us tranquility."[9] There was, of course, an abundance of comment upon this formula among the philosophers of the century, but the whole civilization was under its influence. Once everything is in place, and each thing is as it ought to be, a kindly repose hovers over all.

Everybody believed sincerely that the world had arrived at the end of a journey; a stability close to perfection seemed to have been attained. There was no one who was

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[8] Mâle, *L'art religieuse du 13 siècle en France*, Étude sur l'iconographie et les sources d'inspiration Paris, 1910, p. 5.

[9] Pax omnium rerum tranquilitas ordinis. *De civitate Dei*, L. XIX, cap. 13.

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not content, and this state of complacency lasted from the middle of the thirteenth century till the middle of the fourteenth.

It was under these conditions that the lawyers and canonists, the philosophers and theologians dared to attempt the realization of a wider organization, which should comprise, by the inclusion of single states, a universal society of human beings. Let us look at their universe through their eyes!

III.

The Society of Human Beings: Humana universitas.

God created all things; all things are subjected to His providence. He is the Sovereign, the King of the universe. Everywhere in His kingdom hierarchy and order prevail; yet all depends upon him and tends towards him. The angels, who are pure spirit, are arranged in degrees of perfection, but are all in his service and contemplate his infinitude. Man, spirit united with matter, dwells in a corporeal space, the earth, waiting until in a future he shall realize the supernatural destiny which the redemption of Christ has assured him.

The earth is the centre of the world, the immovable pivot around which the stars and the planets, riveted like nails of gold to the spheres, revolve. And because unity is always more perfect than plurality, the stellar system of which the earth is the centre is the only world created by God, whereas the plurality of worlds would seem less compatible with the unity of the Creator's plan.

Just as the earth is the centre of the universe, so man is the king of the earth. He is the end of the creation, and the most perfect image, here below, of God. Man is like a little world, *microcosmos*. In the words of Dante, he resembles the line of the horizon, where two hemispheres seem to meet.[10]

Formed to be happy—for, all beings strive to happiness[11]

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[10] "Recte a philosophis assimilatur horizonti qui est medium duorum hemisphæriorum," *De monarchia*, L. III.

[11] Bonum est quod omnia appetunt.

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—man has a twofold destiny: a temporal end which he must realize here on earth, and a supernatural end, in which he obtains a perfect vision and love of God, the right of approach to which he must gain while in this life.

Now, he cannot attain this temporal end and prepare himself for the supernatural end, unless he live in a society. Without society, he cannot meet the requirements of the material life, nor develop sufficiently his personality. He is a social animal, "animal politicum."

Moreover, a society cannot exist without a commanding authority. Society of the family (domus), of the village (vicus) which united several families, of the city (civitas) which consists of a larger assemblage, of the kingdom (regnum particulare) which unites a number of villages and cities—the commanding social authority represents in this collection the authority of God, from whom it derives its power, since it is the instrument of his providence.

The ideal, as S. Augustine says in the *City of God*, would be that society on earth should be an exact copy of the divine city where all is peace and unity. In respect of political groups, those which are greater than the family, it would be best that there should be but one in the whole world.

But such unity is impossible, because of discussions among men: masses of men, like masses of water, are the more dangerous as they are more abundant.[12] If there were no other reason, divergence in language is a sufficient cause of dissension—*hominem alienat ab homine*—for a man has a better understanding with his dog than with another man who does not understand his language.[13] So, different kingdoms are required, and the rivalries between those involve wars and all their evils.

The philosophers, theologians, canonists, jurists, publicists of the thirteenth century reproduce all these doc-

[12] Post civitatem vel urbem sequitur *orbis terræ*, in quo tertium gradum ponunt societatis humanæ, incipientes a domo atque inde ad urbem, deinde *ad orbem* progrediendo venientes: qui utique, sicut aquarum congeries, quanto major est, tanto periculis plenior. *De civitate Dei:* XIX, ch. 7.

[13] *Ibid.*

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trines of the *City of God*, which exercised such a fascination on the whole of the middle ages. But they wish to correct the defects arising from the plurality of states, by a unifying theory, the universal community of men, *humana universitas*, as Dante says.[14] They wish, at any cost, to recover, in spite of the several kingdoms, a unity of direction, such as guides the revolution of the spheres, the general government of the universe.[15]

No one at that time doubted that man has a double end to fulfill; and consequently everybody admitted that there must be in a human society two kinds of rules: a temporal and a spiritual. The spiritual hierarchy is very clearly constituted: above the groups in parishes, directed by the rectors, are the bishops; above the abbeys directed by the abbots are the heads of the order; above all is the Pope who represents Christ on earth. As for the temporal domain, above single states which were in process in formation, and which, for the most part, were governed by kings, the theorists proclaimed the rights of a *Single Monarch*. This was a political postulate. It was the Cæsarian dream which, from the time of Charlemagne, haunted the mind, and which was never more brilliantly defended.

One may read, in the *De monarchia* of Dante, the weighty considerations which the philosophical poet urges in defense of the universal monarchy, the political panacea which was to restore the golden age on earth. A single monarch, raised above the different kings of feudal Europe, was required to effect the unification of human society. There was no other method of establishing unity between the scattered groups of human kind, of subordinating the parts in the interest of the all.[16]

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[14] *De monarchia*, L, I.

[15] Humanum genus est filius cœli quod est perfectissimum. . . . Et cum cœlum totum unico motu, scilicet primi mobilis et unico motore qui Deus est, reguletur, etc. *Ibid.*

[16] Constat quod totum humane genus ordinatur. Bk. I, Partes humanæ universitatis respondent ad ipsam per unum principium. Humanum genus potest regi per unum principem. Now: quod potest fieri per unum melius est fieri per unum quam per plura.

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After broaching these metaphysical arguments, Dante enters upon practical bearings of the problem. This is, he says, the only method of avoiding contentions in the world.

Since he would be the most powerful ruler on earth, the Single Monarch would necessarily be just, and exempt from all covetousness. For, his jurisdiction would not be like these of the kings of Castile and Aragon whose kingdom is limited, but he would rule from ocean to ocean.

Not that the universal monarch need occupy himself with each municipality. There needs must be a number of kingdoms; for the Scythians, who live in a country where the days and nights are unequal, cannot be ruled by the same laws as the Garamantes who live at the equinox. Still there are interests common to all peoples of humanity, which can only be entrusted to a single ruler.[17] The universal monarch should preoccupy himself with universal peace, and it is from him that the kings of the single states receive rules for their conduct with this end in view. Recurring once more to a philosophical comparison which gives expression to his poetical temperament: this rule of conduct, he says, which should assure the harmony of human race should be dictated by the monarch to the single kings, just as the speculative intellect furnishes to the practical intellect the principles which guide our actions.[18] And Dante's conclusion is that, just as a man's peace with himself is the condition of his personal happiness, so likewise universal peace, *pax universalis*, can alone realize the happiness of the human race. Apart from this, Dante says nothing as to the functions of this guide, arbiter and judge.

Who is this single monarch? It is the German Emperor, consecrated by the Pope, considered by Dante as the heir of the Cæsars and of Charlemagne.[19] As to this identification, there is no divergence of opinions.

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[17] Ut humanum genus secundum sua communia quæ omnibus competunt ab eo regatur et communi regula guvernatur ad pacem. *Ibid.*

[18] Quam quidem regulam qui legem particulares principes ab co recipere debent, tanquam intellectus practicus—recipit majorem proportionem—ab intellectu speculativo. *Ibid.*

[19] Lib., III, *De monarchia.*

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But another question brought to pass a divergence of opinions between canonists and legists. We mention it only because it concerned this centripetal tendency of the time, this fascination of unity, and because one of the best known quarrels of the thirteenth century seems to us clearly connected with the philosophical controversy about the society of human beings: the Emperor and the Priesthood being distinct, and resting upon two heads, there was again a new *duality* which must be reduced at any cost to an inclusive unity.

Canonists, such as Innocent IV, Johannes Andreæ, etc., proclaimed the *subordination* of the Emperor to the Pope, that is, of the temporal power to the spiritual. Christ, they said, is the sole King of humanity, and the Pope is his viceroy on earth. Emperors and Kings cannot exercise temporal power except by a delegated power which is always revocable,—so that "the principle of separation was applicable merely to the mode in which these powers were to be exercised."[20]

Not so, replied Dante with all the legists. We are as desirous as you are of introducing unity of command over mankind, but this unity is the effect of a *co-ordination* between two distinct powers, each of which proceeds directly from God.[21] "Imperium et Papæ *æque* principaliter sunt constituti a Deo,"[22] and: "imperium non dependet ab ecclesia"[22] are the Shibboleth of the legists. At the best, Dante adds, since the temporal felicity is subordinated to the eternal, the Emperor owes a certain kind of respect to the Pope. Just as there is an obligation upon the oldest son to make sure that there is a respectful understanding between him and the head of the family.[23]

Thus, for the legists as well as for the canonists, human society is a single association in which order prevails throughout.

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[20] *Gierke*, Political Theories of the Middle Age. Translated by F. W. Maitland (Cambridge, 1913), p. 12.

[21] *De monarchia*. Lib. III.

[22] *Gierke, op. cit.*, p. 16.

[23] Illa igitur reverentia Cæsar utatur ad Petrum qua primogenitus filius debet uti ad Patrem. Lib. III.

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IV.

The Executive Agents of Internationalism.

Did the theory of the universal monarchy as maintained by the legists, and the theory of the omnipotence of the Pope, as defended by the canonists, remain nothing more than a subtle academical thesis? Or did they descend from theory in living practice? History gives the reply to these questions, and it is sufficient briefly to recall the answer.

Under the name of the Holy Roman Empire, the Kings of Germany desired to find a hegemony over the peoples of the West. They maintained, as Dante taught us,[24] that they were the heirs of Charlemagne, and that they were thus the heirs of the Roman Cæsars. Hence their claims upon the right to dominate Italy, and to dictate princelings, "reguli" of the West. Hence also the seizure, by the ambitious dynasty of the Saxons, and by the even more ambitious dynasty of the Hohenstaufen, of the right to nominate the bishops, the abbots, and even the Pope.

Everyone knows what the result was. At Canossa (1077) Gregory VII breaks the power of Henry IV, and delivers the bishops and the Papacy from the will of the emperors; a century later Alexander III resists the claims of Frederic Barbarossa; a few years after, Innocent III reverses the rôles, and disposes of the imperial crown to whomsoever he will. During the course of the thirteenth century, the Emperor, in the person of Frederic II, is once for all beaten. The kings of Europe, however, put up a vigorous resistance to the interference of the emperors. And even in the beginning of the fifteenth century, Antonin of Florence points out the same fact: "Although all the secular lords and kings should be subjected to the emperor, there are, however, many kings who do not recognize him as their superior, invoking either a privilege or another kind of right, or the simple fact, as for instance the King of

[24] Lib. II, III.

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France, the doge of Venice and certain other lords."[25] It might be added that the German Emperor was not the only one who asserted his right to the title of heir of Charlemagne, and that certain kings—for instance Louis VII of France[26]—laid claim to the same rights. At all events, he did not succeed in playing the rôle of a pacificator, such as Dante assigned to the universal monarch. Far from being agents of peace, the Hohenstaufen passed their lives in making wars in all possible directions. Pangermanic supremacy, in the thirteenth century, proved a complete bankruptcy.

The fact was that the true agents of international action were the Popes, the representatives of the Theocracy, which attained during the thirteenth century, the greatest potency of its authority. The kind of internationalism imposed by the Popes upon Christian nations, which were indistinguishable from the civilized world, was based upon the Catholicity of the Christian faith and morality, and upon the discipline of the Roman Church. Catholicity means universality. One head recognized by all is the guardian of the great ideal by which the society of the time lived. Gregory VII had already planned the deliverance of Jerusalem and the restoration of the Church of Africa.[27] His successors organized and encouraged the Crusades. Innocent III made use of the new mendicant orders for international and Catholic purposes. Doubtless, there were plenty of heresies after the middle of the twelfth century; they underlay society like the ground-swell of the ocean, not breaking through to the surface. The thirteenth century had not yet heard the warnings of the great dislocations which were to come, and the Catholic faith preserved its internationalism, thanks to the prestige of the Papacy.

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[25] "Quum omnes domini et reges seculares deberent esse sub Imperatore, multi tamen reges non cognoscunt eum ut superiorem suum, tuentes se vel privilegio, sive alio jure vel potius de facto, ut rex Franciæ et dux Venetiarum et alii domini." *Summa Theologica*, Titulus III. De dominis temporalibus, C. 1.

[26] Luchaire, Histoire de France publiée par E. Lavisse, T. III, p. 2.

[27] Rocquain, La cour de Rome et l'esprit de Réforme avant Luther. Tome I. La Théocratie, apogée du Pouvoir Pontifical (Paris, Thorin), 1893, p. 48.

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Guardian of the faith and morality of the time, the Pope was also absolute master of the discipline. The most autocratic form of the pontifical authority was reached by Innocent III. He intervened time and again in the government of the single dioceses. All kinds of cases could be brought before him; he had an answer for all and for everything.[28] Innumerable appeals were made for his decision. The moment came when Innocent III thought he could restore the schismatic church of the orient to his obedience. He could see upon the episcopal throne of Constantinople a patriarch who recognized his authority. The Serbs and the Bulgarians did him homage, and it seemed for a moment that the Russians would follow their example.

At this point, it is clear that the Pope not only affirmed his supernational rôle as head of the church, but also his rôle as arbitrator of European politics, and as the guardian of international morality. He did not limit himself to the defense and extension of the temporal patrimony, but proclaimed himself the sovereign of all Christendom, by invoking the principle "that the church has the supreme right over the countries upon which she has conferred the benefice of Christian civilization." "Christ," as Gregory VII wrote in 1075, "substituted his reign on earth for that of the Cæsars, and the pontifs of Rome have ruled more states than the emperors ever possessed."[29] By virtue of this doctrine, his successors recognize kings, or absolve their subjects from their duties of obedience; they confer feudal possessions; they make themselves the judges of the election of the German emperors; they receive the homage of the great of the earth; those smitten with excommunication tremble with fear.

This political supremacy was far from being pleasing to all the secular princes. History is filled with the record of their resistance; and everyone knows the reply which Philip August made to the legates of Innocent III: "The

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[28] *Ibid.*: 54, 412; Rocquain, La papauté au moyen âge, 1881, p. 162.

[29] Ep. II, 75. Cf. Roquain, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

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Pope has not the right to interfere in the affairs which take place between kings."[30] But even when rising against the Popes, Kings respected the Papacy.

We see this clearly when Innocent protested against the divorce by Philip August of his first queen, excommunicated the king, and obliged him to take back his lawful wife. This act of the Pope, who condemned the violation of the moral law by a great king, is one of the most noble instances of the exercise of his theocratic power. Likewise, when he intervened to prevent wars which he held to be unjust, and when he resorted to arbitration in order to put an end to dispute. Over the society of states, as well as that of individuals he exercises a supreme authority. "Each king has his kingdom," wrote Innocent III; "but Peter has the pre-eminence over all, inasmuch as he is the vicar of Him who governs the earth and all that are therein."[31]

V.

The Philosophical Basis of the Humana Universitas.

What are the presuppositions upon which this conception of a single human society rests?

First of all, it is to be noted that this association does not constitute a *society of nations* in the modern meaning of the term. For, a nation presupposes a strongly organized state, with an accumulation of traditions behind it, with institutions, liberties, and feelings, with victories and sufferings, and with a religious, moral, and artistic type of mind, as its elements, with the result that the bond which unites the nations in a state is first of all a psychical, intellectual and moral character.

Now, the European nations, thus defined, did not yet exist in the thirteenth century: *they were in process of formation.* The monarchical states, by reducing a number of feudal principalities to unity under a central power, were to become, in modern times, the nuclei of nations.

[30] Paul Janet, Histoire de la science politique dans les rapports avec la morale. Paris, 1887, T. I, p. 350.

[31] Rocquain, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

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Despite the centralizing tendencies of the king, the state in the thirteenth century did not attain a perfect consistency. Certain supreme powers, such as the judicial power, remained in a much more fragmentary condition, and the same is true in respect of the right of warfare, which was associated with the right of giving justice. War is not a contest between two nations, but a struggle between two members of a single family, or two kings, or two vassals, or between the vassal and the lord. It retains the character of a private war, and thus it is that in his philosophical doctrine of war, Thomas Aquinas insists that a war, to be just, must be declared by the legitimate authority.

By the very fact that the states of the thirteenth century were not formed into clearly defined nations, they had more traits in common than those of to-day. But the states of that period were on the point of becoming diversified. The thirteenth century was like a central plateau, and the streams which flowed from it, cut their beds in different directions. The republic of human kind, which the intellectuals of the thirteenth century had in view could not be other than a society of states, *such as then existed*, more or less unformed, embracing within themselves, as their elements, various races and divers languages.

Now, the accepted opinions held by the publicists with regard to the state,—with regard to any state,—as found in all the treatises *de regimine principum* would have to be applied to their doctrine of a society of nations. Their formula would be: "the principal factor in a political organization is not the collectivity, but the individuals which compose the collectivity." Apart from the individuals, the state is nothing at all and cannot commit any crime. Consequently the state itself has no proper *end* save the *ends* of the citizen. Thus "the individuals do not exist for the welfare of the state, but the state for the welfare of the individuals."[32] The state is organized to assure the pros-

[32] Ptolemée de Lucques, Comment. ad Polit. III, 3, regnum non est propter regem, sed rex propter regnum. Thomas Aquinas, de regimine principum. Oportet eundem finem esse multitudinis humanæ qui est hominis unius. L. I, 1.

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perity of each citizen and for the development of each personality. Now this prosperity and this development imply the right of the individual to own property, to exercise his intelligence and his will, to cultivate science, to marry and to bring up children, the right to practice religion and morality—in short, a whole series *of inalienable rights*, which belong to every human being, king or subject, lord or vassal, rich or poor, because they are the expression of human nature which is the same for all.

The state existing only for the individuals, a society of states is a grouping of individuals more than a group of governments, a *republica humana*, a society of individuals. The universal Monarch is the servant of all, *minister omnium*[33] as says Dante, precisely as the Pope is the servant of the servants of God, *servus servorum Dei*. He wills the welfare of each man; he is nearer to each than any single sovereign; inasmuch as he is quite free from any motive of gain, he is the object of the disinterested love of all human beings.[34]

Just because war prevents the state from watching over the welfare of individuals, it is forbidden. Just because wars of conquest lacerate not only the state, but the citizens who form the state, they are rigorously condemned. And just because the state is an association of individuals, there is no difference between the morality of the governors and that of the governed, and for the same reason fidelity to treaties and observation of the precepts of loyalty which are the supreme basis of the *jus gentium*, is required.

If one were to continue this inquiry into the bases of these doctrines, it would be clear that this theory of *inalienable rights*, as derived from human nature, rests in its turn, on the metaphysics and the psychology of the age. It would prove to be the development of S. Augustine with regard to the *rationes æternæ*, and of Thomas Aquinas with regard

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[33] *De monarchia*, I. Frederic the Great of Prussia said: der König ist der erste Diener des *Staates*."

[34] *De monarchia*, I.

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to the immutability of essences and of the value of human personality. It would harmonize completely with the stoic elements of the Roman law.

What remains of this marvelous structure of doctrines? Perhaps the only element which survives is the solemn affirmation of the *inalienable rights* of individuals. As for the unifying conceptions of the thirteenth century, they vanished after the middle of the fourteenth century, and with them all that was *specific* in mediæval civilization disappeared. The authority of Popes dwindled in the domain of politics; and soon afterwards the Reformation put an end to the accepted unity of beliefs and dogmas. The European states grew more and more stable, and their national spirit was ever more divergent. The sovereignty of a single temporal monarch became ridiculous, in proportion as the time advanced. It was unable to realize itself in the thirteenth century, when all conditions were favorable, and it can never hope for a better chance.

And similarly, the society of *human beings—universitas humana*—in its mediæval form, has been condemned; and if it be yet possible, it will only be on condition that it be transformed into a society of *Nations*, wherein autonomous and compactly organized states will be represented on a basis of equality.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

HUMAN NATURE AND ITS REMAKING. By William Ernest Hocking, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1918. Pp. xxvi, 434.

This is an instructive and stimulating book abounding in wide learning, genial wisdom, and shrewd insights, set forth in unusually clear, graceful and forceful English.

The title suggests a study in social psychology, and so it is. But this is auxiliary to the chief concern, which is with religion. The volume is the outcome of lectures delivered in 1916 before the School of Religion at Yale University.

The standpoint is frankly, that of the Neo-Hegelian absolutism of the general type of Bosanquet and Royce. But its method is much more effective than the procedure of most teachers of absolutism. It does not stake the case of the absolute on a mathematical or logical theorem. The concreteness of the "Concrete Universal" shall be exhibited. Our instincts shall declare it. There shall be no language where its voice is not heard. This is, of course, the thesis of all absolutism. But most attempts, from Hegel on, to exhibit its detail have ended in appeals to the principle of logical contradiction, even while professing to find the unique character of the absolute in Art, in "Sentience," or in Religion. This is not to say that Professor Hocking's method avoids all of the ancient difficulties of absolutism. On the contrary it means that it confronts them and grapples with them at points where they are most acute and where others have avoided them.

The "original" "primitive" human nature, which is to be remade is accepted "for the sake of the argument as a group of instincts." The most general form of the remaking agency is Conscience. And this agency, while it may appear now as *vox naturæ*, now as *vox familiæ*, or *vox populi*, is always at bottom *vox Dei*.

At the outset the argument encounters the old question, is this agency of remaking a part of "original" human nature or is it outside and independent of it? This antithesis appears early in the argument where Professor Hocking says (p. 99), "My own view is that conscience stands outside the instinctive life of man

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not as something separate, but as an awareness of the success or failure of that life in maintaining its status and its growth." On the other hand, one of the distinctive and most important features of the volume is the emphasis placed on the existence of a pervasive *central instinct*, best, but imperfectly, described as "the will to power." Here conscience appears (p. 115 and elsewhere) as the conflict of the specific peripheral instincts with this central instinct. Here the remaking agency is as instinctive as the material to be remade.

Human life is then the remaking and sublimation of specific instincts by the central instinct of "the will to power" which seeks its realization in nature, society, and art, but finds it completely in religion. Religion alone "is the satisfaction of the whole will, the will to power in its inclusive form." "In religion the will of man seeks direct union with the simple center of power which is beyond and within the world as the will of the world."

The account of the transformation of instinct through society, art, and Christianity betrays a rich acquaintance with material and a fertile power of interpretation. In reading this volume as in reading others written from the same standpoint, *e.g.*, Bosanquet's logic, so long as the exposition is occupied with specific, scientific or social problems the non-absolutist reader finds himself jotting the margin with approving and admiring comments. But when the attempt begins to connect up scientific procedure with the absolute, or to portray the sort of remaking of instincts required by the absolute, the character of the marginal notes changes. The notes are now full of such interrogations as the following: If religion provides a direct and adequate supernatural, super-social, super-artistic realization of "the will to power" why retain the indirect and inadequate forms? What is the relation of the direct and adequate to the indirect and inadequate forms of realization? What is the content of this direct and adequate realization? Or, must we here be frankly mystics? Again, if access to the direct and adequate source of power must be affected by that source itself, by "The Divine Aggression" (Chaps. 44–46), does the divine attack always succeed? If not, why not? If so, what is the evidence? May not "the will to power" after all mean just the capacity which we have for conceiving a better state of nature, art, or society than the present and of taking steps to bring it to pass? And may not the recognition and celebration of this capacity, and devotion to its oper-

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ation, be truly religious? And how (p. 415) does this conception "cut us off from the higher reaches of sympathy" or from the vision of "an endlessly progressive humanity"? Are not these the very essence of such a religion?

Professor Hocking is clearly aware of the fundamental social danger of the conception of absolutism, namely, that in the hands of any but the most sophisticated expert the finality and authority of the absolute is certain to be imputed to specific and finite social orders and programs with political and religious autocracy as the outcome. He recognizes that it puts a severe strain on human nature to ask it to refrain from justifying the detail of its procedure by its ideal. Nevertheless we must refrain; we must see (p. 315) that "the detail of the law like the detail of science has to be built with the aid of pragmatic considerations" of "social expediency. . . . Religion must content itself with giving to these pragmatic considerations their final meaning." Again our margin asks, what is the content of this "final" meaning? and what is its relation to the "pragmatic" meanings? Is it merely additive? Is there no organic relationship?

These questions may exhaust the patience of the author as they do our allotted space for this notice. He may refer us to the final chapter on "The Last Fact" which proclaims that the content of this final meaning cannot be rendered conceptually even by philosophy. In it meaning and fact are one and must be directly and uniquely experienced by the individual. Still the questions haunt us.

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The University of Chicago.

Some Suggestions in Ethics. By Bernard Bosanquet, D.C.L., L.L.D., Fellow of the British Academy. London: Macmillan and Company; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918. Pp. viii, 248. Price, 6s. net.

Idealistic philosophy has for some years been somewhat heavily in debt for a directly ethical treatment of the problem of good and evil. This is probably to be explained by its preoccupation with metaphysical problems on the one hand, social and political on the other. Meantime the lead which it may be said to have established by the publication of Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* has been taken out of its hands by more eclectic philosophies such as that represented by Dr. Rashdall's *Theory of Good and Evil* and by

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attempts to state its own principle in realistic terms such as we have in Professor Perry's suggestive essay on *The Moral Economy*.

Under the above modest title Mr. Bosanquet has done something to redeem this debt. Though he tells us in the Preface that the book is addressed to ordinarily thoughtful persons who are interested in reflecting upon morality, this merely means that he has taken more than usual trouble to make his central thought plain so that he who runs may read.

Sweeping aside all objections founded on the undefinableness of Good, as the result of "inattention," in the first part, under the titles, "Living for Others," "The Social Good," "Value and Goodness," "Unvisited Tombs," the writer criticises current fallacies as to the place of Altruism, the meaning of the Good Will, "Humanity" in definitions of the Good. The second part is concerned with the problem of evil and of the means in punishment and education of asserting and making the good prevail against it. If there is nothing under any of these heads that students of Mr. Bosanquet's other writings will find new they will be grateful for having these subjects brought together and rediscussed with what he himself calls somewhere in the book "the fire of youth and the faith of age."

One of the most interesting movements in recent ethics is the reaction against all forms of "personalism." It is agreed that the first moral duty is the achievement of something of value and, inasmuch as all values are universal, this means the sacrifice or "transcendence" of the merely individual self. But it means equally the transcendence of the point of view from which good is regarded as the welfare of other isolated selves. Goodness means self-suppression—unselfishness, but unselfishness has its value as the condition of devotion to impersonal ends not in its contribution to an existence and happiness in others which it is ready to sacrifice in Self. To be good implies "a ruthlessness of will" which, as in the case of the chemist, Palissy, may involve others in its own sacrifice. Morality is social not in the sense that it aims at the welfare of "others" but that it is only through the organised structure of society that the good reveals its nature. "Persons," says Mr. Bosanquet, "are to life like facts to truth, a medium in which something is revealed greater and deeper than the particulars concerned" (p. 12). The apparent opposite of egoism, "altruism" reproduces its fundamental assumption that good consists of a number of "separate welfares" and conceives

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of the ethical problem as that of the "cross-over" from mine to another's. As a matter of fact the cross-over has already been made in recognising anyone's welfare as "good." We cannot say "good" of anything and stand, ourselves, outside of it. In being "good" it is my good. This is to reverse the ordinary utilitarian, though not the common sense, point of view. Things are good not because they are social but they are social because they are good. If the utilitarian asks whence then the altogether praiseworthy devotion of good men to social well-being? If "others" are secondary, why not be content to treat them as instrumental to values, *e.g.*, knowledge and beauty which involve deprivation—albeit compulsory? The answer is that these impersonal values themselves depend on the development of the whole capacities not of this or that individual or group of individuals but of man. "If in any community there are undeveloped capacities so far the system of values is straitened and obstructed" (p. 44).

These may be felt by the reader to be hard sayings that nothing but a hard-grained idealism can bear. I do not think that in the end they can be disputed, but the author might (quite consistently with his principles) have made it clearer than he perhaps does wherein the precise moral worth of ordinary unselfishness and kindness consists as the guarantee of an attitude of mind which if ready to minister in temporal things much more, where end and means are clearly discerned, will be ready to minister to spiritual. In the end too the question rises how far we have the right of forcing upon others the sacrifices we are ourselves prepared to make in the establishment of ideal values. The Kingdom of Heaven doubtless suffereth violence but it is doubtful how far it is furthered by a love of union which is blind to the finer rights of personalities.

Coming to the question of Value: good it must be insisted is a quality in objects. It is something revealed. While not anything subjectively constituted or merely enjoyed by the human mind it is at the same time something that is especially revealed in the manifestations of objects within the mind and will. This means the "good will," but the formalism that the term is apt to suggest has to be counteracted by defining the conception to mean the incorporation of the will "in a whole where its quality and structure can deploy itself and be appreciated" (p. 60) in "a character complex in many sidedness," of which moral goodness in the narrow sense of the word is only one aspect that

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has to make room for others equally essential if not equally fundamental. What is here said has to be taken along with the vigorous assertions of the unity of intellectual, æsthetic, and moral activity in the last chapter of the book. *Meantime the conclusion is that only in a full experience can value be real and only in a complete personality can a full experience be present.*

Have we here an individualistic and aristocratic doctrine? The answer to this question is given in a happy chapter on Unvisited Tombs, the text of which is: "if not the pre-eminent yet the evident work of the world is nameless, general, indivisible;" and in which the writer seeks to do justice not only to the human spirit working in forms "unreflective if not subliminal" which are universal, but to the spirit that lives in all nature animate and inanimate alike but that touches us more closely in the trustfulness of friendly animals. "Everyone," writes Dr. Bosanquet, "who has had a friend among dogs or horses or birds, must have felt himself enlarged in sympathy and in faith and courage by having a representative, so to speak, at the court of Pan. Just because it lacks the intelligence directed to a whole beyond the individual, which forms the glory and the imperfection of man, the lower animal carries in itself a peculiar anticipation of the Absolute. The dog which runs beside one seems a middle term and an interpreter between one's worrying mind and the tranquil life of things. This quietness and simple trustfulness of an animal which is once your friend is surely the secret of its attractiveness. It is, I have fancied, as if the Absolute came to lap out of your hand" (p. 80).

It is in connexion with passages like this that the philosophical student will recur to the problems elsewhere discussed by the author of the personality of the Absolute and of personal survival here touched on with the suggestion of a negative reply. Is this reply he will be inclined to ask, consistent with the sorites italicised above? Granted the inconclusiveness of the argument for personal survival founded on the demand for opportunity to finish an individual work does not the previous argument mean that the highest type of experience cannot be conceived of as other than personal and that participation in it is achieved not in willingness to be reabsorbed in something lower but in the energetic assertion in a higher to which death itself is only an incident—perhaps an opportunity?

Idealism has so often been accused of reducing evil to illusion

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and of being thus in contradiction to healthy moral consciousness that the correction cannot be too often insisted on. "Evil is real." To this the common sense of mankind witnesses. "Evil is absolutely real." This is not common sense but a gloss upon it. It is theory and bad theory as we know by its fruits. For it means either that human life is an endless progress or that there is some end to evil in which there will be compensation. In the first case we have despair, in the second payment: in both cases the destruction of morality. The only way out of this *impasse* is to go back upon the theory of the absoluteness of evil. Opposition to the good we call evil is both possible and actual fact but it is an opposition within the good itself. In evil a good is asserted; what makes it evil just here is that a part is set in opposition to the whole in relation to which alone it can have reality as good. In the sense of this relativity of evil we have the ground of religion: the sense of sin and the sense of the annulment of sin in union of will with the good against which sin is the rebellion. If it is said that this is merely to confirm the suspicion that evil is illusory and to add to it that goodness itself is a sham (the author quotes from *Old Mortality* "the dry clatter o'morality" as a phrase appropriate to a Saint. I seem to have heard in a like connexion the phrase "they trashy duties") the answer again is that illusion and relativity are not the same thing. To recognise that sin is "done away" and that all our righteousness is as "filthy rags" does not mean that they are nothing at all. Sin becomes exceeding sinful and righteousness with all its imperfections is the bond of perfectness. The mistake is (it is the mistake of all moralism) to seek for perfection at the level of morality.

The "side lights" that such a doctrine throws on the meaning of the bad will and of progress are developed in ten pages of excellent analysis—to prove not that evil is good but that it is made of the same stuff as goodness: the stuff of life, its passions and values. The bad will is the will that makes up a self out of elements that can only be maintained as a unity by an *act* of rebellion against those that are excluded. It is eliminated, overcome or overruled by the removal of the narrowness of outlook that fixes it in an attitude of resistance to the claims of the good upon it. In overcoming this narrowness, as we may do by an act of faith, we become partakers here and now of the perfection of the universe. Similarly progress has value not as identifiable with good but as a clue to the relativity of evil.

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The corollary that the writer draws as to the rightness and wrongness of war is perhaps the best extant criticism of ordinary pacifism and may be commended to pacifists who still possess the open mind which is the best part of their creed. Of the nature of corollaries also of chapters III and V are the remaining chapters on "What to do," "Something worth Knowing," "Punishment," and "Stupidity." Whether they are also verifications of the main doctrine must depend on their harmony with ethical experience. The reader may be left to test this for himself. I believe myself that on the whole they are. They raise, however, one or two questions by way of criticism—whether of the author or myself I am not quite sure.

The first is in connexion with the treatment of evil. I accept the writer's view as to the reality of evil. Whatever we may say as to pain as the sign of defective adjustment, moral evil is no mere defect. It is the assertion, as I understand him to say, of a partial good beyond the point at which it impinges against the whole of good. But the question does not end there. Evil has not only reality in the content of the act. It has a formal reality in the spirit of the act. It is 'positive': there is real rebellion and there is real hindrance to the good because of it. This to ordinary reflection is the real difficulty. Is the spirit of rebellion and the resultant hindrance of the essence of good as a whole or is it merely accidental? If the first in what sense does evil remain real? If the second what remains of the guarantee of the subordination and ultimate relativity of evil? May not what our optimism treats as accidental be the substance and what it treats as substance be the accident? Idealism will probably reply by an appeal to the unreality of time. But if time is unreal even in the relative sense of "appearance" we escape the difficulty of the appearing of evil only by involving good in the same condemnation. This is admitted in Mr. Bradley's doctrine of an Absolute which is beyond Good and Evil and eludes ethical treatment. It is not clear how far Mr. Bosanquet will accept this. The relativity of the 'moral' good in the narrower sense, discussed earlier in the book, does not necessarily carry with it the relativity of good in the wider sense he gives to it. In one further respect I am ungrateful enough to ask for more. No better definition of education could be given than that it is "the special and principal engine for awakening interests and proportioning them to values so that the area of life may have some tolerable chance of being

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duly represented in any value field," and again "the bringing home humanity to the human being." These definitions make us wish he had added a chapter on humane education. It is the question of the time and if Idealism has not the clue to the answer I do not know where we are to look for it. Unless it builds the house the builders will build in vain. Perhaps should the writer's eye happen to fall on these lines they may suggest to him a remedy for his omission.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

University, Birmingham, England.

THE REAL BUSINESS OF LIVING. By James H. Tufts. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1918. Pp. 476. Price, $1.50.

The great majority of the leaders of the next generation in every department of American life will have been pupils in high schools or kindred institutions. If therefore we wish our future leaders to possess vision and the will to make realities out of ideals it becomes our duty to acquaint these boys and girls with the nature and needs, the excellences and defects of the society of which they are members. Various attempts have been made to perform this service. Mr. Dunn's *The Community and the Citizen* certainly marked an epoch in this field. And now we have at our disposal a book adapted primarily to the last two years of the high school which attacks this problem in a broader and more complete way than has ever before been attempted.

Professor Tufts' *The Real Business of Living* presents a general survey of the growth of modern society from the primitive clan through the military monarchy to the complicated social organism of to-day. The whole of this story could not be told, even in outline, in a single book without confusing the student. Accordingly the author confines himself, for the most part, to two fields, the political (including the legal), and the economic. After a description of the clan, the common matrix of all the civilized forms of life, he gives an account of the establishment of the absolute monarchy through successful war, then of some of the essential features of the long struggle for political and civil liberty that followed in England and later in the United States. One of the great forces in this struggle was the mediæval city, and a special description is given of this important institution. This is the political and legal side of the picture. The industrial side is presented by means of a brief account of hand industries, followed by

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a sketch of the Industrial Revolution and some of the most striking of its multiform effects in the economic life of to-day.

This descriptive work, however, is not the building, but only the foundation. On the basis of the facts thus presented Professor Tufts keeps asking, What is the value of these institutions, What needs do they supply, Do they perform their function with economy, Do they carry with themselves compensating evils or potential or actual dangers? These questions are asked, for example, concerning the institution of capitalism, and again concerning the contemporary city. This leads to the question, how to construct more perfect forms of social machinery. Some of the problems considered are, How can we produce a form of government that is democratic in reality as well as in name, How can we conserve and enlarge the good in farm life and eliminate as far as the nature of things permits, its limitations and evils, How bridge the chasm between the industrial classes as they exist to-day, and break down the barriers that separate racial groups in the United States, How obtain real equality for rich and poor in our courts of law?

Most writers on social subjects would, I fancy, stop at this point. But it is one of the most characteristic and valuable features of Professor Tufts' book that its author carries the discussion one step farther, beyond the problem of machinery, or of means, to the problems of ends, the problems of ethics. Ethics has to do with the principles on which the claims of conflicting values, or goods, are to be adjusted. For questions of rights and duties are questions of values, and the question, Which value shall I, or shall society choose, never arises in practice except where the attainment of one end excludes, or is believed to exclude, another. In this department of his subject Professor Tufts discusses alike problems which come before the individual as such, and those which come before him in his capacity as citizen, or those which, in our mythical way of speaking, we say must be solved by "society." Examples of the latter class are: the ethical basis of private property, the grounds on which a social group is justified in demanding independence as a nation, and the individual is justified in demanding participation in the government which controls him. As an example of the former may be noted the extended discussion of fair business competition.

With regard to the manner in which this complicated piece of work has been done, it is, broadly speaking, beyond praise. Pro-

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fessor Tufts has shown a remarkable gift of seizing upon live issues, of going to the heart of the matter, of marshalling facts and presenting principles with clearness, of illuminating general statements with illustrations apposite, concrete, interesting, and sound. There are in this book, it seems to me, no issues and no facts presented which will not interest the upper three-fourths or nine-tenths of a junior or senior high school class. There are no facts of which these young people can afford to be ignorant, no principles upon which they ought not to have reflected. Of course the book, like all things human, has its own limitations. The most serious one, it seems to me, is found in the treatment of the strictly ethical problems. Here too much use is made of the appeal to authority, in particular the appeal to the law of the land. This appeal is not illegitimate, and is indeed very useful as a subsidiary agency. But in the last resort it means an appeal to dogma,—thus it is written. Dogma means an end to thinking, but in a course like this the aim must be to stimulate thinking. The difficulties involved in guiding young people's minds in this to them somewhat unaccustomed form of activity can be fully realized only by those persons who have given the subject a great deal of thought. That the treatment of these portions of the field is less satisfactory than that of other parts is accordingly no ground for surprise. However, if this problem had been more adequately solved the book would have not merely been more effective, it would also have possessed more unity. For in the treatment of all other subjects, the appeal is always to the experience of the individual or the race, including under experience, of course, ideals as well as "facts."

A course of the kind presented in this book should be introduced into every high school in the United States and made compulsory for members of one of the upper classes. Until this is accomplished something of the sort should be made a part of the required work for freshmen in every college and university, as has been done with notable success for several years by Amherst College.

What, specifically, may we expect from the adoption of such an educational policy? We dwell in a society shot through with inadequacies and imperfections. But under ordinary circumstances the average citizen scarcely notices them. He thinks them inevitable, or a part of the "Providential order of things"; or he thinks,—Let the galled jade wince, *our* withers are unwrung; or in many cases he does not think anything at all. He needs a

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Hume to "awaken him from his dogmatic slumbers." He needs to become aware of himself as a member of a society with enormous capacities for progress, he needs to be set thinking about both the goal and the road, he needs to see that as a member of an organism nothing human can be foreign to him, and he needs to gain a realizing sense of what social sores mean to their victims whether his own back is likely to be galled or not.

He needs furthermore to be awakened to the excellences and attainments of our civilizations. We take these things as we take good health—as a matter of course. We need to have our gaze turned backward to the days when there was no trial by jury, no *habeas corpus*, no guaranty that one's property would not be looted by his king through the artifice of a demand for taxes. With these things before our mind's eye we shall be in a position to look with gratitude and emulation upon the Hamptons and Washingtons that have given us, the heirs of all the ages, the priceless possessions which we now enjoy; we shall develop a spirit of hopefulness as we face the problems which bear down upon us and threaten to destroy us, both as individuals and citizens; we shall feel increasing respect and admiration—and with it an increased willingness to serve—for the members of a race which, with all its aberrations, has been able to accomplish these great things. With this should come a deep and genuine affection for the society of which we are members, an affection that, just as in the case of our parents, is no less genuine because of our recognition of its defects. In the famous funeral oration Pericles declared: "I would have you day by day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens until you have been filled with the love of her. And when you are impressed with the spectacle of her glory reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it." We too are inhabitants of a great city—a city coextensive with civilization; and those who have been granted the vision of what it is and what it may become will be moved to serve it.

The aims of education are too manifold and too diverse to be covered by a single formula. Several of them are of the utmost importance. But of them all I am unable to conceive of any more imperative in claim than that study of society to which Professor Tufts has pointed the way in his *Real Business of Living*.

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

The University of Wisconsin.

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READINGS IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY. By L. C. Marshall. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918. Pp. xxiv, 1082. Price, $3.50.

READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF WAR. By J. M. Clark, W. H. Hamilton, H. G. Moulton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918. Pp. xxxi, 676. Price, $3.00.

Marshall's "Readings in Industrial Society" is a comprehensive synopsis of the whole structure of modern industrial society. In an introductory section, over two hundred pages long, the author has endeavored to whet the reader's power of observation of the industrial circumstances of his own time first by contrasting modern society with various obsolete and hypothetical societies and then by sketching with some detail the development of the machine economy out of the manorial household economy of the mediæval period. The description of industrial society is organized around a dozen "outstanding features" of the economic order. Thus the book does not follow the conventional division of economics into production, distribution, value, money and banking, public finance, etc.,—but this is only to say that it is exactly what it purports to be.

Although many of the selections are adapted from books and articles which would puzzle a beginner, the book is intended for the elementary student and the general reader. Mr. Marshall himself uses it as the text of a large elementary course open to freshmen. Its power to hold the interest and strain the attention of the matured reader, however, argues that there is very much more in it than can be exhausted by a freshman in one reading. Apparently the author believes that it is better to expose the novice to the unmitigated truth even at the risk of baffling him with its complexity, than to nurse him along with saccharine simplifications.

The war from which we are just emerging has absorbed so completely the economic resources of the belligerent nations as to produce a new type of social organization—the war economy. "Readings in the Economics of War" is a systematic attempt to describe this modern phenomenon. Beginning with the economic background of the causes of war, its authors proceed to the economic character of modern warfare, the economic bases of military strength and efficiency, the social problems involved in the financing of war and in the regulation of prices and labor, and finally to the economic lessons of war and reconstruction. The

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book concludes, very properly, with President Wilson's now famous fourteen points.

The appearance of two such books as these ought to provoke the philosopher to great searchings of heart; for they give evidence of a progressive movement in economics upon which no one can look with unconcern. The study of economics has meant pretty universally, in the past, the study of the literature of economics. Text-books have been simplifications of treatises. Yet here we have two books, intended for the elementary student, which attempt to introduce him not to other books, but to the world of here and now as it is described by those who live in it. The unavoidable inference is that the leaders of the movement away from the text-book believe that by the time a set of issues has been discussed in occasional contemporary literature, digested in a treatise, and then reduced to a text, they are dead issues.

The study of philosophy is practically everywhere the study of the literature of philosophy, at the present time. Is it accordingly the study of dead issues? Are the problems with which the students of philosophy occupy themselves problems which the world seriously needs to solve? Men of the world answer this question unanimously, and lately the most worldly of modern schools of philosophy has been concurring in their judgment. If someone should set to work to compile a book organized about the philosophical problems of to-day by collecting a series of short extracts from the non-professional literature of philosophy, to what extent would that book turn out to be a departure from academic convention? One hesitates to say.

At all events this rash adventurer would find a wealth of material in these two books. No student of ethics can help recognizing his own unfinished task in nearly every chapter of "Industrial Society," and "The Economics of War." Nor can he be ignorant of the fact that most of the material contained in these volumes is the raw material of his profession.

C. E. Ayres.

University of Chicago.

Mysticism and Logic, and Other Essays. By Bertrand Russell. London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918. Pp. viii, 234. Price 7s. 6d. net.

These reprints of ten of Mr. Russell's papers, to which are added a few notes written in 1917, are, in part, welcome. Those

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of some ethical interest are the essay "Mysticism and Logic" which appeared in 1914 in the *Hibbert Journal* and which develops views very much the same as some of those advocated in his book "Our Knowledge of the External World" (Chicago and London, 1914); the almost too well-known essay "A Free Man's Worship," which is here reprinted for the third time and which is supplemented by some remarks in the preface (p. v); two essays on education in science; and the lecture of 1914 "On Scientific Method in Philosophy." It is Mr. Russell's belief (pp. 97–98) "that the ethical and religious motives, in spite of the splendidly imaginative systems to which they have given rise, have been on the whole a hindrance to the progress of philosophy, and ought now to be consciously thrust aside by those who wish to discover philosophical truth." Again (p. 124), "the adoption of scientific method in philosophy . . . compels us to abandon the hope of solving many of the more ambitious and humanly interesting problems of traditional philosophy. . . ." Most of what this book contains consists of those doctrines expressed by Mr. Russell ably, long ago, and in books which everyone has. Surely, then, from a philosophical point of view, it was unnecessary to repeat them. In another reprint under a different title of a well-known, interesting and amusing essay on mathematics written in 1901, which seems to have given rise to more laborious misunderstanding than any other of Mr. Russell's writings, there was added in 1917 a rather depressing note of ethical and perhaps personal interest (p. 96): "The greatest age of Greece was brought to an end by the Peloponnesian War." Mr. Russell probably means this remark to be applied, by analogy, to the present, but it may be remarked that it would only be so applicable if we can conclude as to the "past-future" from a single instance in the "past-past," whereas we are told (p. 192) that, even in more favorable cases, the truth of the "inductive principle" may be "reasonably questioned."

J.

SHORTER NOTICES.

EDUCATION FOR LIBERTY. By Kenneth Richmond. London: W. Collins, Sons & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. 253. Price, 6s. net.

In this very interesting presentment of a modern ideal of education Mr. Richmond explains his "synthetic method" of education, or the teaching of the unity of knowledge. He approaches chiefly those who are

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unfamiliar with the main principles of educational advance, and shows by a wealth of illustration how his method can be woven together in school practice. Liberty is chosen as the theme and the title of the book, because liberty, "the ordered relation of parts in a purposive whole" is the real aim of education. "Our sense of right," he writes, "upon which liberty depends, is a social sense; education for liberty means education in fellowship. But for real fellowship of minds we need community of thoughts; and by community I do not mean uniformity, but interrelation. We need a unity of spirit in a diversity of minds. And we can only achieve this by teaching, and teaching effectually, that all knowledge is one." A final and very arresting section on 'The Unexplored Mind,' is full of practical wisdom. He believes there is an unexplored region in educational method corresponding with the unexplored gap in the human mind; and that it is possible, by right method to train the child to run his superconsciousness and his consciousness in double harness, instead of as at present systematically neglecting the superconscious. The idea is that a greater number, not only geniuses, may be able to use their superconscious intuitions.

E. F.

LABOUR AND CAPITAL AFTER THE WAR. By various writers. Edited by S. J. Chapman, with an introduction by the Right Hon. J .H. Whitley, M.P. London: John Murray, 1918. Pp. x, 280. Price, 6s. net.

This book of essays deals with the questions arising out of the relations of capital and labour, which have been forced into almost too rapid growth by the progress of the war, for after the upheaval caused by the war, as the editor suggests, we shall probably find the changes of an age packed into a few years.

The contributors who attack vital questions such as the capacity of British industries, and the means of avoiding disorder, dislocation and the possibility of industrial warfare, range in authority from the lowest to the highest, from the Bishop of Birmingham (who offers us generalities as to 'immoral unrest,' and the 'sense of discipline') to experts such as Mr. F. S. Button, Mr. Tawney, and Professor S. J. Chapman. Mr. Button details his practical suggestions as to the institution of Workshop Committees, Central Works Councils, Local District Boards, and National or Industrial Councils; while Mr. Tawney's valuable article is also concerned with the opportunity for self-organisation in industry. "Economic freedom," the latter writes, "must develop through the application of representative institutions to industry"; and Professor Chapman also emphasises the value of joint industrial councils and workshop committees. There are papers on the position of women in industry and the first report of the Whitley Committee is printed as an appendix.

M. J.

INDUSTRIAL PEACE. Vol. I. London: The St. Catherine Press, 1918. Pp. 212. Price, 6s. net.

This is a bound volume containing six numbers of the periodical called *Industrial Peace* from September, 1917, to February, 1918. The professed object of the writers is the establishment of co-operation between Labour and Capital by means of an attack on Syndicalism. The writing may be classed as "propaganda": and the positive programme supported is not very obvious. But on its negative side there is no doubt of the attitude of those who edit and publish the attacks on every unpopular

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name or group. It is known that the periodical is supported by employers who hate working-class organisation and edited by persons who have been employed in "investigation" not to say "secret service." Most of the information given is valueless.

C. D. B.

THE BULWARKS OF PEACE. By Heber Hart, K.C., L.L.D. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. xiv, 221. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

This small book is a calm scientific study of the obstacles to the preservation of peace, and differs from other recent studies both in matter and manner. In matter, the author takes us further down the stream of time than most political theorists; while as to manner, the author concludes each chapter with a distinct proposition (which is repeated in the Table of Contents) which forms a skeleton of his line of thought, and gives a curious Euclidean finality to his conclusions. It is an unusual system, but one to be encouraged, as it leads to clear thinking and lucid statement.

The author first takes into consideration the relation of war to the evolution of humanity, and the 'great ascent' from anarchy to good will, and from war to peace. Next he considers the various predisposing conditions leading to war, and the impractibility at present of preserving peace by the creation of a common and plenary sovereignty over the great Powers, the question of Right and Might, and the League of Peace, or as it is generally termed the League of Nations, and the nature and practical value of International Law.

The concluding chapters of the book are given over to the study of the conception of a League of Peace and of its later form, the League of Nations. He is careful not to lose sight of the realities which dominate the situation and concerns himself with the practical problem of how far the eight great powers can be prevented from fighting each other or all of the rest. His solution is that each of the allied states must not without the authority of the Council of the League engage in hostilities against any other state except for the purpose of preserving the *status quo*.

The Council must undertake in the last resort the function of settling disputed claims. Lastly the Briton and American "twin brothers" are to be the main pillars of the League and *custodes pacis*, taking the princeful part in the measures required for the prevention of wars.

M. J.

THE DELPHIC ORACLE: ITS EARLY HISTORY, INFLUENCE AND FALL. By the Rev. T. Dempsey, M.A., B.D., with a prefatory note by R. S. Conway, Litt.D. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1918. Pp. xxiv, 200. Price 6s. net.

A sound and well-arranged monograph upon the history of the Delphic oracle and the phenomena of its inspiration, dealing especially with the oracle's influence, both political and religious. The monograph, which is a revision of Mr. Dempsey's *thesis* on the same subject, is useful, as no other treatise covers quite the same ground and presents facts in so lucid and convenient a form. The only unsatisfactory portion of the book is that dealing with the explanation of the Delphic inspiration as superhuman. It is impossible, at this day, to apply the methods of the psychical society to the Pythia, and Mr. Dempsey is aware of the possibility that many of the responses which are attributed to the oracle may not be authentic, or were *posteventum* prophecies. He draws special attention to "at least

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one famous oracle, the authenticity of which seems certain enough,—the famous test oracle of Crœsus," yet after suggesting telepathy in this case, he seems doubtful whether this would be a sufficient explanation of all the facts associated with Delphic inspiration. "Perhaps, after all, there is something in the explanation given by Plutarch—that the Pythia's inspiration was due to the influence of spirits. . . . Certainly the hypothesis that the Delphic inspiration was due to demon or spirit influence *would seem amply to account for the phenomena*" (p. 73). This is a dangerous path. Telepathy need not be the only cause, as Mr. Dempsey admits (p. 102) that the Delphic priests commanded a range of information such as no other body in antiquity enjoyed ("Delphi might be regarded in modern phraseology as a great intelligence bureau") and gives full weight to the influence of the priesthood in the matter of colonization.

There is an interesting chapter on the influence of the oracle on morality.

M. J.

London, England.

THE PAN-ANGLES: A CONSIDERATION OF THE FEDERATION OF THE SEVEN ENGLISH-SPEAKING NATIONS. By Sinclair Kennedy. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914. Pp. xii, 244. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

This book is a family appeal, or plea for Federation, in terms familiar to the family here called the Pan-Angles, *i.e.*, the whole people living in New Zealand, Australia, Newfoundland, Canada, the British Isles and South Africa and the United States. The grounds for such a federation are, as stated, that separate political existences of seven Pan-Angle nations do not make for peace, while together the seven nations would ensure the peace of the world.

The preface is dated January, 1914, and references in the text to periodical literature are apparently not later than 1913. Yet in 1913 there is a hint of the coming storm. "It is not merely the appearance of Germany on the North Sea or the South Pacific. . . . These are but signs. They forbode coming dangers whose extent we cannot foresee. Out of the future loom menacing forms, hardly more tangible and comprehensible to us than were the Teutonic hordes to the Romans." Mr. Kennedy was a true prophet.

E. F.

London, England.

LIBERAL JUDAISM AND HELLENISM, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By C. G. Montefiore. London: Macmillan & Co., 1918. Pp. xii, 328. Price 6s. net.

This volume contains a series of lectures on Liberal Judaism, asking with persuasive eloquence what are the chances of the survival of Liberal Judaism amid the competition of religions. Is Liberal Judaism a well-meaning but hopeless attempt to fit out for modern life a religion whose roots—reaching for away into the past—can no longer give sap and sustenance to its leaves and branches? The early chapters are concerned with what is left when the solvent of higher criticism has done its work on Judaism. Liberal Judaism, the author claims, must accept the assured conclusions of historical and critical investigation. "It must be precisely as open-minded and as independent on any question which falls within the province of criticism and history as the Greek or Roman student would be open-minded and independent on any question concerning Homer or

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Romulus." And, accepting the verdict of higher criticism, Liberal Judaism has sought so to adjust itself that, in its relations with the past, it may be practically independent of historical and critical research. What is still left? Mr. Montefiore submits that the residue is not mere "unsubstantial theism" or unitarianism. "Mere Theism!" people say. But what an adjective for what a noun! But . . . the unity of God is *not* the end-all and be-all of Jewish theology. You are not a Jew merely by saying that you believe in the Divine Unity. What *sort* of God is this deity whom you declare to be one?" It is in Liberal Judaism, not in Unitarianism, that the author, while sternly repudiating the ideal of Jewish nationality (p. 306), sees the universal church, "Israel was once a Nation; it is now a Church."

Upon the ethical side (p. 84 et seq.) he points out that the Liberal Jew may perhaps see certain features of religious advance in the New Testament as compared with the Old, but on the other hand he may also find in it certain features of retrogression from the highest point of religious development attained in the Old Testament. Such, for instance, is the belief in demons and devils, a dualism and pessimism towards the world of each, and a declension (naturally) from the purest monotheism of the Old Testament.

M. J.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MARRIAGE. By Walter Gallichan. London: Werner Laurie, 1918. Pp. xiv, 194. Price, 5s. net.

This sympathetic and dignified study of the subject of deepest emotional interest and importance for future generations keeps strictly within the (somewhat arbitrary) delimitations of the "normal," but is not equally successful in grappling with the difficult question of terminology, inclining sometimes too much to the scientific, sometimes to the non-committal vague. I would also suggest to Mr. Gallichan that in future editions a systematic bibliography would be very useful as he is obviously well abreast of modern research, quoting Robie and Vecki as well as Freud, Ellis and Bloch. There is a good vindication of birth-control and a welcome plea for the "Association of the Artistic and Poetical with the spirit of enquiry and the passion for truth," and also for "a psychological appreciation of the enormous importance and variability of the love-impulse, and a higher emotional æsthetic sensibility in our attitude towards the sexual energy." It is an encouraging sign of the times that the book can be issued at a popular price, and it deserves to be widely and carefully read.

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

RACE REGENERATION. By E. J. Smith, Member of the National Birth-rate Commission, and Chairman of the Health Committee of Bradford Corporation. Illustrated. London: P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 223. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

It is really no use for the "National Birth-rate Commission," "The National Council of Public Morals," and so forth, to attempt to scold or bribe people into returning to the recklessly wasteful birth-rate of early Victorian times, even by promises of municipal *crèches*, Housing Reform and an adequate Public Health Service. As a record of the work for Maternity and Child-Protection accomplished at Bradford, the book has value. But outlook and style are hopelessly confused and entangled in masses of psychological *débris* and the worst type of journalistic mixed metaphors.

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

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HINDU ACHIEVEMENTS IN EXACT SCIENCE. By Benoy Kumar Sarkar. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918. Pp. xiii, 82.

In pointing out the achievements of the Hindus in science Mr. Sarkar is employed upon an excellent enterprise. It is an inexcusable tendency on the part of the Occident to overlook the fact that in other places men have worked in the fields of science and have attained certain definite results. Mr. Sarkar compares the achievements of the Hindus from time to time with the work of the scientists of other nations and the study is not to the disadvantage of the Hindus. The importance of the information in this well-made book is both scientific and moral. It is a scientific obligation to be well informed upon the history of scientific information, while such knowledge makes for an understanding and appreciation of the merits of other peoples. The comparative method as used in this volume is not without its dangers, since one is tempted to find too many and too important anticipations. Mr. Sarkar has not entirely avoided these dangers.

J. R. K.

WHAT IS NATIONAL HONOR? By Leo Perla. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918. Pp. xxix, 211.

This book represents the attempt to give a rational treatment to the conception of "national honor," which as an ethical ideal has previously been an empty phrase, standing for "a great, irresistible war-slogan." The chaotic condition of the true significance of national honor the author strikingly points out in the very valuable chapter called "A Symposium." It is shown that in all matters, which potentially might be said to involve the honor of nations, men have taken little interest, until war was imminent. Thus when the question of national honor does arise, it is found in a purely emotional setting; the rational element enters only as an "ex-post-facto justification." The popular patriotic attitude, "My country right or wrong," naturally predisposes of any scientific inquiry into the definition of national honor, or the validity of the ideal pursued. Consequently the serious need exists for a complete rationalization of honor. Such a moralization of national honor would involve the process of universalization, acceptance of external criticism and internal discussion, and above all a recognition that honor is an ethical complex implying the honor of two parties. This process of reaching the conception of "International honor" is, of course, essentially a rational procedure; the author, however, falls back on the tradional belief that the mob must remain in the bondage of the force of emotion, purely. Thus the problem arises of fusing this vital human impulse of the man of the streets with the cold abstraction of international honor as formulated by the more intelligent and rational statesman. The author's suggestion for this solution resembles a sleight-of-hand performance. In the place of emotionalized national honor, which stood for the frenzy of war, Perla plans in some miraculous way to substitute the more rational sentiment, international honor, which signifies the unfaltering guarantee for the peace of the future. The shift in the objective of honor is to be made effective in the same melodramatic manner as of old; in other words, "the slogan which opens up an arena of passionate conflict, with its spectacular display of æsthetic emotions in mass setting must be preserved." This note hardly comports with the opening intellectualizing intention. The question arises as to how much worthier and more effective a conception of "international honor" can be than the old "national honor," if the mass of people adhere

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to the former through the same blind emotional appeals as in the past. After all it is the way individuals view things that is significant in this situation, rather than what they view.

H. R. K.

THE GOOD MAN AND THE GOOD. By Mary Whiton Calkins. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1918. Pp. xx, 215. Price, $1.30.

Professor Calkins states in the preface that the underlying purpose of this book is "to treat ethics as the study of live men"; this is to say, it is the study of character. The earlier chapters, which resume the familiar ethical theories, reveal a voluntaristic bias which doubtless bears a close relation to the author's conception of the subject. She puts forward the consciousness of obligation (with qualifications), the good will, conscious loyalty to community; discounting the pursuit of happiness—or of anything else but "the good." The later chapters seek to construct the character of the virtuous man through the citation of his chief excellences. Individually he is thrifty, abstinent, courageous, and prudent; socially he is truthful, just, generous, and obedient to society—though militantly non-conformist when occasion demands. In the concluding chapter the author's voluntarism comes to a climax in the distinction between moral, æsthetic, and religious values on the ground that the former alone are objects of the will—matters of character.

This conception and treatment of ethics has a peculiar value and a peculiar weakness. Its chief value lies in its moral influence. It throws the full weight of moral responsibility upon the individual will; there can be no dodging. And the average college underclassman sorely needs just such moral discipline as Professor Calkins' book provides him (and her!) in unmistakable form.

There is always a great danger, however, that a gain in disciplinary force may be achieved through the sacrifice of reality. That is the weakness of this conception of ethics. It is all very well to teach children that people are either good or bad (Chap. I), with the implication that it is up to them to be good—by an act of will; but every sophisticated person knows that it is not quite so easy as all that either to be "good" oneself or to distinguish accurately between the virtuous and the vicious. It is all very well to cultivate the student's sense of moral responsibility; but sooner or later we have got to open his eyes to the institutional order as the matrix of human character and the storm center of all really significant moral problems.

C. E. A.

THE VITAL ISSUES OF THE WAR. By Richard Wilson Boynton. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1918. Pp. viii, 134. Price, $1.00.

This little book contains eight sermons delivered in the spring of 1918 and dedicated to President Wilson, whose ideals in war and peace they expound and commend. The spirit of the book is refreshingly optimistic. The author looks confidently to the future for great things—the overthrow of militarism in Germany and the accomplishment of a peace that will win the German people to democracy and internationalism through the league of nations. The author even had the courage to hope for good from the Russian social revolution and to endorse the President's (then) policy of laissez faire.

C. E. A.

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SOCIAL PROCESS. By Charles Horton Cooley, Professor of Sociology in the University of Michigan. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918. Pp. vi, 430. $2.00 net.

This book, by the author of Human Nature and the Social Order, and Social Organization, shows the same thoughtful and well-balanced study, the same penetrating psychology and the same charm of style which characterized the earlier books. The author insists particularly upon an "organic view" of the social process as contrasted with views which seek in some one motive whether economic or other the cause for everything. The whole book is delightful reading and avoids the hackneyed and the scholastic. "I believe in democracy, but not in the philosophy by which it has often been justified. It appeals to me as on the whole the best means of enfranchising the human spirit and giving sway to those tendencies and persons which, being truly strong in a higher sense, are fit to prevail."

THE END OF THE WAR. By Walter E. Weyl. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918. Pp. 323.

Written before the close of hostilities the aim of the book is to urge a permanent basis for peace as versus a militaristic basis. Internationalism affords the only permanent basis. Absolute and uncontrolled national sovereignty must give place to a new internationalism. Backward countries ought to be ruled, not in the interest of this or that single nation, but in the common interests of all. No lasting security lies in the process of debilitating the enemy. One of the best books for study in connection with the coming Peace Conference.

THE STRUCTURE OF LASTING PEACE. By H. M. Kallen, Ph.D. Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1918. Pp. xv, 187. $1.25.

The main thesis of the author is this: "The propitious future of mankind is in the hands of the armies of the democracies and the radical and labor organizations of the world." Nationality, economic life, equality of nations, federalization, are analyzed with acuteness of insight and distinction of style. Admitting all the obstacles to internationalism the answer of the pragmatist is: "Society is more and more what we choose to make it. In the forms of human organization belief *is* fact."

THE WORLD PEACE AND AFTER By Carl H. Grabo. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1918. Pp. 154. $1.00.

Although written shortly after the entrance of the United States into the World War, this essay is very much in place just now. Dealing less with detailed problems than the preceding titles it argues persuasively for the larger principles at the basis of international good will and democratic life. The four reforms which the author believes most important are: (1) Minority representation; (2) Abolition of the two-party system so as to give labor a voice in legislation; (3) Political union of agricultural and industrial labor; (4) Alliance of professional and intellectual workers with manual workers.

THE WAR AND THE COMING PEACE. By Morris Jastrow, Jr., Ph.D., LL.D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1918. Pp. 144.

Continuing the theme of "The War and the Bagdad Railway" the author in this essay treats: (1) The war as a moral issue; (2) The problem

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of peace. The moral issue is the question whether the brute force of militarism shall be the dominant power in civilization. The problem of peace is likewise not so much a technical problem as it is a moral problem issue. The spirit of domination and of autocracy are the real enemies to be conquered.

THE ETHICS OF CO-OPERATION. By James H. Tufts. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918. Pp. 73. $1.00.

One of the series of Barbara Weinstock Lectures on the Morals of Trade, delivered at the University of California in the Spring of 1918. Dominance, competition, and co-operation as three organizing principles of society are shown to give rise to different types of ethics. Special attention is given to the principle of co-operation and its implications for the ethics of business life and of international relations.

A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS. By Raleigh C. Minor. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1918. Pp. xxxix, 316. $2.50.

An attempt to outline a constitution for a republic of nations following rather closely the constitution of the United States, although in the case of the executive the European plan of an executive responsible to the legislative body is favored. The book serves the purpose of offering something definite for discussion.

DEMOCRACY MADE SAFE. By Paul Harris Drake. Boston: LeRoy Phillips, 1918. Pp. xi, 110. $1.00.

To make the world safe for democracy the author believes that the total abolition of all forms of money and capitalistic enterprise is demanded. The wastes of the present order are pointed out and the picture of a better is so persuasively painted that one wonders why anyone should cling to the old. But the logic of human nature is still very largely a logic of habit and of one step at a time, whereas the author's ideal seems to demand a total change to make it workable.

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The July number contains an important statistical article on War and the Balance of the Sexes; the October number, two articles on the Eugenic and Social Influence of the War, and The Need for Widespread Eugenic Reform in Social Reconstruction. The January number will contain an article from M. March of La Statistique générale de la France on Race Hygiene in France During the War, and one on the Sex Ratio at Birth.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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APRIL, 1919

DE ECCLESIA.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

SOCIAL philosophers and sociologists give little consideration to churches. The theory of the state since the Renaissance has dominated social philosophy. The contemporary forms of association with economic purposes attract attention and some reference is made to academic or artistic societies; but there is no theory "de Ecclesia" and the conception of a church hardly affects our understanding of social life as a whole. The earlier forms of religion have been analysed by sociologists; but contemporary churches and religious associations are not seriously described or discussed.[1] And yet their social importance, even as regards our political life, is immense. No state would be what it now is but for the action of religious associations among its citizens. Again, trade unionism has been studied, but not the effect upon trade unions of the forms of religious association in different countries. It may be, however, that the multitude of English trade

[1] Mr. Figgis in his *Churches and the Modern State* has made a valuable contribution to a theory "de Ecclesia." Professor Royce, especially in *The Problem of Christianity* has given an idealist interpretation of the purposes of some members of Churches, but has not analysed the phenomena of contemporary religious association. Mr. R. Roberts in *The Church and the Commonwealth* has given the basis for a philosophy. But it indicates the place given to a "de Ecclesia" in social theory that Mr. Maciver's book on *Community* should give only two pages (248, 249) to the Church and that he should treat religion in society as exemplified in ancient Greece and among the Hebrews.

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unions is due in part to the number of sects in England and the habits of mind formed in them. The printers still call one group in their union a "Chapel," whose officials are a "Father" and a "clerk." And it may be that the characteristics of German, French, and American trade unionism are in part to be explained by the characteristic forms of religious association in those countries.

Churches and religious associations affect academic and artistic societies; and their connection with certain forms of "business," through the personal attachments of men like Rockefeller or the investments of the clergy, is not unimportant. It may, therefore, be presumed that even if religion is destined to disappear, as Sir J. G. Frazer indicates, its present social connections and influences are immense. But there is no modern theory of the church; and, in default of this, mediæval ideas take precedence of the hints and implications in the claims made by religious men who are philosophically incompetent. Those who do not belong to any religious group are not sufficiently aware of the social importance of such groups; and those who do belong accept obsolete conceptions of their association. The immediate consequence is the lack of any popular or generally accepted conception of the church as an association and its relation to other kinds of association. And being without any clear conception of the place in social life to be given to religious association, we are confronted unexpectedly by such problems as those of the conscientious objector, the Quaker community and the military violences of the Episcopate both in Germany and in England. It would be well, therefore, to attempt to make some consistent theory of the relation of religious associations to society as a whole or to the state in particular. For, in addition to our unpreparedness in the face of immediate problems, the neglect to provide a philosophy "de Ecclesia" has other important consequences.

First, the emphasis on economic issues in social philosophy is uncorrected. Unless attention is given to other purposes of association than the economic our social theory

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is too much affected by the history and structure of trade unions, capitalist companies and the groupings of men which result from the action of supply and demand. Democracy and other social ideals are interpreted too exclusively in economic terms; and the interpreters, guides or prophets of social progress are taken too exclusively from those who calculate in money values. A *furor economicus* at present rages in social theory. But what can we expect, if those who associate for religious purposes have no conception of their place as a group in social life or give us only confused reminiscences of mediævalism? The attention given by social theorists to economic issues is equivalent in our day to the ecclesiasticism of such theorists in the Middle Ages; for this is an economic age. A greater amount of attention has to be devoted to the supply of material necessities in an age of great cities and wage-earning populations. But it still remains useful to consider the social organisations formed for the supply of religious needs; whether or not we ourselves feel such needs and whether or not we approve of such organisations.

Secondly, without a theory "de Ecclesia" there is a weakening of the social quality of religion. This has been one of the evil effects of Protestantism. Its theorists have accepted and promulgated a most inadequate idea of the individual, as though he were a separable unit within society. Private judgment has been ridden to death and now, like a broken-winded horse put out to rest, it nibbles the grass in the deserted fields of texts and sermons. But no religion has any force if it is not shared; and if only one man adopts a certain religious attitude he carries in fact within him the results of his opposition to others and the historic effects of old schisms. Those, however, who wish to see religious enthusiasm weakened may rejoice in the isolations of Protestant individualism; since the result is to give the more prestige to such obviously social experience as that of state life; and yet even the "anti-clerical" should see that the weakening of the social quality in religions does not destroy religion but makes

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it a disintegrating force. Religion has a much more evil effect on social life when it is individualistic than when it unites many in one sentiment. From many points of view, therefore, a modern theory "de Ecclesia" would be useful.

Again, the absence of any theory derived from the observation of contemporary social life leaves us at the mercy of false old theories. And if the absence of any theory results in the Anglicanism of the ordinary Englishman, the acceptance of a false theory results chiefly in Erastianism in England and in anti-clericalism or obsolete mediævalism in Europe. It has been said of metaphysics that the attempt to avoid it only succeeds in leaving the anti-metaphysician enslaved to an obsolete or a false metaphysics. So the neglect of a theory "de Ecclesia" has left us enslaved to dead theory. What is needed, therefore, is an analysis of contemporary life, which will show the place actually occupied by religious associations and their relation to the state, the trade union, the artistic society, the scientific or educational associations, and also to social life as a whole. But since the subject is vast, we shall confine our attention here chiefly to the Western forms of religion and to their relations with political life. This will provide the basis for at least a partial theory "de Ecclesia."

The theory must be philosophical: it must not be merely a psychological analysis of the experience of religious men, such as James attempted. It must, indeed, be based upon an analysis of facts; and the relevant facts are to be found in the practices of worship, the results of meeting at churches and chapels, and the revivalism of Wales as well as the more formal attitude of the older religious groups. Further, as religious associations we must class the various forms of Buddhism, Islam and the Chinese cults, as well as the Christian churches; for a similar place in society is filled by all these and the relations of all these to the state are similar. But in view of such facts a theory "de Ecclesia" should indicate some moral assessment of the present situation and some ideal. This is what is attempted in

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Thomas Aquinas' *de Regimine Principary;* it is partly achieved in Dante's *de Monarchia* and in William of Ockham's *Dialogus*. A theory is to be found in Calvin's *Institutes*, in Hobb's *Leviathan* and in Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*, but the historic tradition is almost useless for the analysis of contemporary life.

We shall suppose, therefore, that the psychological analysis of religious experience has been made and the historical or contemporary facts in the life of religious associations are sufficiently well known. In view of these we seek to determine the position of the Church in society. The "general will," if we must use such a misleading phrase, has a special embodiment in the Church; and in the whole complex of experience, which we call life, certain actions, emotions and ideas can be subsumed under the category of religious association, at least for the majority of men, women and children. But the theme is a large one, and therefore we must here attempt only a cursory view of the most striking characteristics in the social life of contemporary religious associations.

In the first place almost every religious association, church or chapel, is regarded by its members as essentially the only such association which should exist. Members of the Church of Rome may acknowledge that there are in fact many churches; but they tend to explain this as Thomas Aquinas explains the existence of many states or *regna*. The multiplicity is said to be due to sin or to human depravity.[1] There ought ideally to be only one church, with all men as its members.[2] This theory can be recognised in the Roman church as an interesting survival from the Middle Ages; but it should be also recognised that the same theory is implicit in the attitude of the members of the newest and most narrow "little Bethel." The

[1] *Summa Theol.*

[2] *Contra Gentiles*, ch. LXXVI, "Quamvis populi distinguantur per diversas dioceses et civitates, tamen sicut est una ecclesia ita oportet esse unum populum Christianum."

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"poor misguided creatures" who do not sit under Mr. Jones are regarded as somewhat outside the pale of higher life. Even the newest "new" thought inherits this ancient conception, and the anti-clerical is often as certain as the Romanist that anyone who disagrees with him on religious issues is outside the pale of reasoning humanity. As Vauvenargues said—"Not all who scoff at auguries are wiser than those who believe in them." We are all in religion "imperialists." And this is clearly a universal phenomenon in the more primitive stages of all social organisation—that the members of that organisation should regard their "frontiers" as the limits of civilised humanity. Outside their membership the "animal rationale" of the scholastics can hardly be regarded as a man; or, at most, he is "barbarian." *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus;* and so outside our own sovereign state there are only foreigners. The outer world is not known as integrated to our own or in its different parts.

In actual fact, however, every religious association affects every other. This was not always so. In earlier times the Roman church was isolated. Confucianism and Buddhism were almost unconnected with other forms of religion. But now every religious group is, to a greater or less degree, being affected by every other. The Church of England takes on the features of non-conformity and of Romanism; the Church of Rome in England is anglicised. The non-conformist bodies begin to build Gothic churches. And all this affects the politician, with the same result as similar experience had on the officials of the Roman Empire. He thinks of all churches as equally useful or equally a nuisance. The interconnection of churches, however, provides for the social philosopher a new fact of importance. The general features of religious life are becoming more obvious; and it is becoming easier for men to endure the sight and sound of other religions than their own. They wear their religion more lightly but they do not therefore value it less; and we are probably witnessing a stage in social development in which the institution is

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being mastered by the life which it arose to maintain and often in fact contrived to stifle.

Ritual is to religion what manners are to morals, not unimportant but subsidiary and yet essential. When the frontiers of a religion are sharply defined, ritual is exact and elaborate, as in an aristocracy manners are a fixed form. In a democracy manners are fluid and sometimes hardly apparent except to the keenest eye: in contemporary religions the forms of ritual are of smaller importance and sometimes hardly perceivable. So in the contact of all social groups of the same order, the general features are most obvious and differences become more delicately graded.

In the second place, the religious association is voluntary. The very contact of different churches makes the adherence to any church appear to be a free choice; and this is why though men may wear religion more lightly they value it more as their own. This was not always the case and traditionalists in every such association still regard those who leave their association as apostates. There is still a vague idea that a man is born into a particular form of religion; and, within due limits, this idea corresponds to fact even to-day. But clearly the situation, when in Europe every man was by hypothesis a member of "the" church, was very different from what it is now when a man's parents may belong to any one of a hundred churches. In the later Reformation the idea of a voluntary choice of religion was established; and now in fact it is perfectly possible for a man to choose to belong to any of the churches or religious associations. There is still a prejudice, not altogether irrational, against his choosing to be a Mohammedan or a Confucian, if he is born of European parents. But the further, still more important principle of voluntaryism, is established,—that a man may choose to belong to no church or religious association whatever. The idea of a church thus approximates to that of an artistic or scientific society; and the voluntaryism established for religion also affects political allegiance, for it is granted that

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a man may choose his state by "naturalisation." This political voluntaryism is shaken by the national atavisms revived during the war; but it will be difficult as society develops to prevent citizenship from being regarded as a free choice. The results of a free choice of one's state would be naturally a change of local habitation; and this is not a necessary result of a free choice of a church. The state is territorial in one of its connections, the church is not. But even in respect to a church, race and locality have influence. On the other hand, the state can never be voluntary in the sense that a man may choose to belong to *no* state. Here it differs from all other forms of social organisation.

In the third place, there is a continual interaction between the religious associations and all forms of political association, from the district council to the sovereign state. We omit for the present the effect of religious associations upon local government. On state life as a whole the effects are as follows. The forms of government are partly determined by religious tradition. As de Tocqueville showed[1] the Puritan associations affected the government of the early North American colonies and even the influence of Catholicism assisted democracy. Economic life as well as political organisation is affected by the particular view of the Sunday adopted by the most important religious associations in any community. Public holidays are often ecclesiastical in origin. And in general almost all civilised states have grown up in societies already saturated with a religious tradition. But that is ancient history. At present, the Roman church in Spain helps the resistance to reform among the military and oligarchic classes: it gives sacredness to those who for the moment hold power. In Denmark the simpler forms of religion assist the simplification of political government. In all Western countries even the moderate Christianity expressed by the churches

[1] *Dèmocratie en Amérique*, III, ch. 2. De la réligion considérée comme institution politique, et comment elle sert puissament au maintien de la République democratique chez les Américains.

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has the effect of inhibiting the grosser forms of *real-politik*. Such are the typical effects of religious association on political life.

Of all the means by which religion affects political life none is more powerful than education. Spain is an instance in point. In France the Republic was believed to be endangered by the influence of religious schools and this was one of the reasons for the law against associations. In England also the influence of that peculiar form of religion which survives in the public schools and universities has much affected administration because the superior administrators have been educated at these institutions. There is the strange tradition that a schoolmaster is almost, or ought to be quite, a clergyman. This confuses the minds of members of Parliament and the higher civil service as to the distinction between education and religion—a confusion with immense political consequences. But the more immediate effect on politics of the public school form of religion is that it makes the governing class regard religious enthusiasm as unintelligible lunacy and induces among them a horror of thought. Public school religion at its best is a graceful gentlemanliness and a smiling acquiescence in intellectual torpor: at its worst, it is formalism and intense hatred of whatever disturbs the even tenor of the life of the country gentry. But other forms of religion have affected political life through education. The Jesuit tradition, a variety within the Roman church, has had, and in some countries still has, the most extraordinary political consequences.

The other political effects of religious association are not very important at present among the highly civilised peoples. In most cases, as we shall see, political life dominates the religious associations. But there are vague indications of influence in the hesitation which sometimes inhibits for a short period some new method of diplomacy or warfare[1]

[1] Thus Troeltsch recently made a dignified protest against the idea that the interest of the state was the ultimate criterion of morality; but this may be individual and not representative of any body of Christians.

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But the effect of the Churches on political administration is of extreme importance among primitive peoples. Missions have existed in parts of Africa before European administration; and since that administration has too often been used for commercial exploitation the contrast to the native mind between the church and state is not to the advantage of the latter.[1] Perhaps the native thinks the missionary a fool: he inclines to suspect the official of being a knave or the agent of knaves. And where the Christian churches have affected the natives at the same time and to the same degree as the political administration, the preaching of "human brotherhood" has often made the domination of the white traders very difficult for the officials to maintain. Hence comes the hostility to missions among those "who know the natives."

The effect of political administration and political conceptions upon the religious associations is even greater. The days are long since gone when the church could dictate to or direct or be a model and guide to the state. Perhaps in those days the effect of the position of the church was evil both for church and state. That is an ancient controversy. In modern times the grouping of men for religious purposes has been in the main apologetic or consciously subordinated to political associations. The effects have been various and by no means admirable, although many rejoice at the weakening of religious associations in face of organisation for political and economic purposes.

Where the effects of politics are most extreme, the pulpit returns an echo to the political platform. Not even party politics are excluded. The bishops used to be called the "ecclesia docens": now they have joined in every European country the "ecclesia discens," and they are

[1] Darwin in the *Voyage of the Beagle* says that in Chile an old lady fled to the mountains with her property when she heard that Englishmen were coming, because Englishman meant buccaneer; in New Zealand the natives came to welcome the visitors when they heard that Englishmen were coming, because Englishman meant missionary. What is an Englishman? A cross between the two?

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taught by their party leaders. The various non-conformist bodies in England have been so thoroughly affected by political and economic ideas that their preachers and congregations are not even aware when they are thinking politically or in economic terms under cover of theological "uplift." The inevitable consequences of the Cromwellian age are to be heard in the violences of the chapels in Great Britain and New England. The pulpits of Prussia are inspired by the "All Highest." The Roman church in France becomes an instrument for monarchist reaction. Islam in India maintains the British Raj; and in the Balkans and the Austrian Empire almost every political programme has a subsidiary religion. The Roman church, which claims to be international, has discordant voices crying across the frontiers of different states. The bishops in France condemn the shelling of a Paris church on Good Friday, while those in Austria complain of the irreligion of the French.[1] In Köln the church asks for a respite from air-raids on the feast of Corpus Christi, and it is granted, but no German bishop seconded Cardinal Mercier. Islam, again an international religion, is a force for anti-European propaganda in Africa. But the position of the forms of Christianity is obviously not equivalent to that of the forms of Islam in face of political organisation. Islam contains in it a political theory and even a suggestion of a particular form of government. Christianity is not generally now supposed to be in favor of any particular political forms.[2] The "obiter dictum" of the New Testament that established authorities should be reverenced has had, however, the most unfortunate consequences. Rousseau found the phrase an obstacle to reform and semi-educated lawyers have made a political theory out of it in

[1] I have seen a letter from a Bavarian abbot, headed with the Benedictine motto "Pax," the theme of which was that true peace could only be attained when England was overcome and her world domination destroyed.

[2] Thomas Aquinas and M. Barrès would probably deny this; but see, on the contrary, Loisy's *Mors et vita*. Calvin (*Institutes*, IV., ch. 20) prefers aristocracy.

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our own day.[1] The military nationalism of parts of the Old Testament has also had effect in enslaving the religious association to political controversy. It is easily reconcilable with the theory of the state in Hegelian idealism. And the church is generally in practice what Hobbes said it was, either the state itself or a department of the state or a subordinate mechanism for supporting political opinions. At certain moments even the "patriotic" are able to perceive that religion is no more national than is mathematics; but during moments of excitement we hear even of "British" science as we hear of "Catholic" truth or "Protestant" truthfulness. Everywhere a few men and women stand out against the prevailing Erastianism. But the voices of these few are not representative of the minds of the churches to which they belong. They receive, it is true, a grudging approval from those who, from other than religious reasons, are inclined to criticise the existing administration; but no consistent and intelligent attitude results in the various religious associations. And this is not due to the depravity of men, but to the evanescence of religious enthusiasm.

Two great efforts have been made in practical life recently to give the idea of the Church independence of political groupings. The Pope has attempted an internationalism, but it appears to have failed to affect even those of his own church; and the Quakers have claimed the right to limit their allegiance as citizens, but they are few and they speak only within two states, Great Britain and the United States of America.

When churches take their colour from political administration or economic classes, the result is evil not only for

[1] Three men in Los Angeles were recently fined $1,200 each and imprisoned for six months for holding a religious meeting in which it was stated that Christ would not have used a bayonet. The judge in passing sentence said,—"Duty to country is a duty to conscience, a duty to God. For country exists by natural divine right. It receives from God the authority needful for it life and work; its authority to command is divine. The Apostle of Christ to the Gentiles writes, 'There is no power but from God and those that are ordained of God.' Therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God."

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religion but also for politics and economics. In economics the result is a confusion which is embodied in the doctrine, —equally false economically and morally, that virtue "pays." In politics the state absorbs all the finer emotions and claims the unlimited allegiance of men. The political theory which develops out of Erastianism is the Hegelian. As Kantian ethics are the result of Pietism and as "German philosophy is the granddaughter of Protestant theology," so Hegelian political theory is the result of the enslavement of the German reformation to the German princes. And so in England Mr. Bosanquet speaks of the state exactly as the mediæval monk spoke "de Ecclesia"; since the German reformation transferred to the Prince the prestige and the power of the Pope. We do not, however, propose to reverse the process. A proverb says that we should give every devil his due; and the controversy in the theoretical sphere does not concern us here.

In political practice the evil result of Erastianism is that the state has no adequate critic. Indeed, the fantastic idea becomes popular that one may abuse the government, but the state itself is above criticism. But to criticise a government is the task of a political party: there must be some standpoint outside the political sphere from which alone the whole of political institutions can be criticised. This is not possible for an individual: the isolated judgment, even if it could be correct, is ineffective; and "society as a whole" or "the general will" is hopelessly vague as a basis for practical criticism. Some, therefore, have made their trade union experience a basis for their judgment of the state; but, whether this is justified or not, obviously a more effective criticism can be derived by most men from their membership in an association, the purpose of which is the greatest elevation of life. We can imagine what mediæval despotism would have been if it had not occasionally been opposed by the mediæval church. What will economic nationalism become if it is not held in check by some strong social group representing an admittedly higher interest?

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What of the immediate future? We may describe first what would be desirable and secondly what is likely to occur. Nothing is more needed than a clear conception of the purpose and place in society of religious associations or churches. The life of man in society is a complex of different associations formed for different purposes or in different spirits. Where no conscious common purpose binds the members, we may suppose that they are emotionally united. One kind of association is a church; and within this one kind there are many varieties. All, however, are alike in grouping men because of their common interest in a particular moral enthusiasm or emotional attitude towards life and the universe.

Another kind of association is a state, another is a trade union, another a joint-stock company, another an artistic society, another a club. These associations differ in importance in the lives of different men. One may find more "life" in a trade union that in a church; another may be absorbed in the life of the state. And in addition to this "subjective" importance, there is what may be called an objective degree of importance in so far as it is not dependent upon the experience of a single person. Thus at one stage of social development a church, at another a state may be most important to the progress of character and life in any group. There is no absolute standard of importance.

A treatise "de Ecclesia" based upon contemporary experience would show first the relation of one church to another. The conception of religious sovereignty as belonging to any one church would be rejected: all churches would be recognised as equally "sovereign" in the sphere of religion for their own members only. The members could not reasonably say more of non-members than that their religious experience or need was different. One church might be less excellent than another for this or that man: there might be religious associations which were primitive or limited; but there would be no absolute standard of comparison, good for all times and all persons.

Again, the churches would not be regarded as separate

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units. Since each existed for the same kind of purpose, the attainment of that purpose would probably be better achieved by co-operation between them: so that ideally there would be an articulated and organised world of religious associations.

Again, any man at any stage of his life might join or depart from any church without any more ill-feeling than is involved in a man's leaving an academic society. The membership in a religious association would be entirely and absolutely voluntary and consciously accepted for a specific purpose. This implies, further, that some men may find no use in any religious association or have no social meaning in the word "religion." The established churches and religious associations would be recognised as claiming allegiance from their members, which allegiance is not subordinate to their allegiance as citizens but co-ordinate with it. The Church would not be superior to the State on questions of law and order of administration and taxation; but it would be superior to the state on questions of morality, of life and death, of human affections and the finest human life. There might be, at certain crises, conflicts of allegiance as to which it might be difficult for the individual to decide; but normally there would be little difficulty in defining the proper spheres of religious and political organisation.

A world so orderly is not likely to exist in the near future. It is in a sense ideal. But that does not mean that it could not exist or will never exist. If it seems to us too clearly defined and yet too complex, we should remember that to the mind of the Middle Ages the complicated order of administrations in a modern city would have seemed impossible. We may find a complex organisation better. In a world in which the churches were given a recognised place and due allegiance of their members, the pull of economic forces would not be so supreme as it is to-day. The state might even be rescued from the hands of business men. For we must be aware that what most excites political interest now is the raising and expenditure of money, the

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assistance to commerce and industry. There was, indeed, a time during which the science of politics itself seemed to be absorbed in a hybrid "political economy." But the interest of the statesman should be men and not material, life and not production; and it may be that churches with a conscious social place will be able to make men feel the nobility of man and the divinity in human life.

We turn to what is likely. Prophecy is not our part; but we can perceive present tendencies. First, every church will be affected by what has been called "modernism." There is no religious association which will be able to resist the new knowledge of science and history and the new attitude to human life and the universe which such knowledge involves. But the effect of this modernism may be to weaken the churches rather than to strengthen them.

Secondly, there will be a general weakening of the sense of allegiance to institutions. Even the state will begin to suffer from the growing perception of the fact that institutions should be subordinate to life and not life to the maintenance of any institutions. The church will be seen to be a means and not an end; and this may dissolve the powers of the clergy and of all officials.

Thirdly, in the social crisis which will follow the war the churches will be on trial. It is impossible to say whether in that crisis the churches new or old will rise to the height of their possible ideal. They too will suffer from the general suspicion of institutions. Priest and preacher may possibly be laughed out of existence. A crisis not unlike that which will probably follow this war was endured in England after the Napoleonic wars. From 1815 to 1830 the populace were being driven from the countryside and were being enslaved in the factories. The churches spoke. They preached complacence to the rich and submission to the poor; and they should bear some of the blame for the social evils of industrial England which we have inherited. It is wonderful, indeed, that any of the churches should survive the incompetence and beggarliness of their vision throughout the early industrial period in every European

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country. But if they show any such meanness of spirit in the period we shall have to face, we may candidly hope to destroy them all. Any association for the finer enthusiasms of life which lends its aid to support inherited abuses as the "will of God" must make room for new forms of social life.

The period following the end of the war will probably lead to new social experience and new theories interpreting or controlling that experience. Among the many established social forms, churches and religious associations will play their part. Although their character and possibilities are still hardly understood, clearly there is a very great part which they may be able to play. But as the evidence now shows they may make a second and more disastrous failure than was made after the Napoleonic wars; and if they do, men will perhaps find some new form of social enthusiasm with which to illuminate and invigorate their lives.

C. Delisle Burns.

London, England.

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WHEN GODS ARE BORN.

ALFRED H. LLOYD.

THE cartoonists of recent times have been picturing civilization in every imaginable situation of horror and cruelty. She has been affronted in every conceivable way. Her life has been all but taken from her. Some great brute, perhaps, has thrown her down and holds his heavily booted foot across her neck or an armed warrior wipes the sword that he has just run through her body. Of course the meaning is that civilization has all but failed, that she may fail altogether, nature proving too much for her. At least she has been fearfully injured in her great struggle and cannot hope for recovery in many, many years. Sometimes, it is true, thanks to somebody's more optimistic mood, she has been represented as still strong and ascendant, able to overcome her enemies and destined in good time to do so completely, and recent events have been making this more hopeful view quite plausible. But, whatever of good may be coming, the idea has been widespread that the progress of civilization has been undone and that mankind must begin again where they began even thousands of years ago. In short either a great reversion has taken place and, as some would put it, nature rather than man, instinct and passion and force rather than reason and worth, have been in control, or, in a view sometimes asserted, men have simply been throwing off their disguise of civilization and, instead of reverting to primitive conditions, have been showing themselves without shame the natural creatures they really have been always and always will be. Those holding this latter view may even point, at least with a semblance of justice, to the fact that the most openly avowed and honest friends of civilization, albeit in self-defense and with apologies, have themselves had to revert, resorting to force, cultivating anger and hate and taking delight in destruction of life and property.

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But this thing men call reversion, be it real or apparent,—what does it mean? What is it in fact? "Real" or "unreal," it must be something and so mean something. Perhaps men see reversion, having a false idea of progress. Perhaps reversion is necessary at critical moments to force great issues. Perhaps human nature does at times waive the nicer manners of civilization, civilization being only so much Pharisaism, and in word and deed confess to its always natural and primary, as well as primitive, self. Whatever the explanation, however, certainly appalling forces have recently been let loose, forces that had long seemed under control or at least no longer considerable. Violence and destruction have broken loose and possess the world and have seemed to many to spell only disaster. What can the real explanation be? In particular: Are instinct, passion, force, now so much in evidence, exclusively savage and brutish?

History ought to throw some light, for history has shown other "reversions." Not for the first time in her long struggle upwards is civilization in such a crisis. There was, to give the very familiar and very positive example, the downfall of the ancient Mediterranean civilizations with all the wars and all the violence and destruction incident thereto and later there was the passing—should we also call it appalling?—of the mediæval régime. In the first instance the "return to nature" was attended with abundant evidence of all that is brutish. Lawlessness, sensuality, brutality were everywhere. Might made right. The institutional integrity and stability, social and political, of the old civilizations were undone from causes internal and external, the two seeming in cordial co-operation, and nature had her way, her passions running riot, injuring or wholly destroying what men had achieved and long warmly cherished. In the second instance, too, thanks to the waning authority of the ruling institution, the Roman church, to the asserted naturalism and humanism, to the rise of the enthusiasm for things secular and temporal, a cloistered human life moved out into the world and openly

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spirit turned flesh. Nature long suppressed seemed again to come to her own and man found more interest in earth than in heaven. The material and sensuous, often expressed in sensuality and brutality, were once more released and, as in the first, so in the fifteenth century came a startling reversion from civilization. There was the sensuous Renaissance, reviving antiquity and paganism, and soon followed the Reformation, which openly sought to liberate the spiritual from the secular but which certainly at least as truly did liberate the secular from the spiritual.

So, truly, not now for the first time in its long struggle is civilization suffering from reversion. But, as should at once be pointed out, those two instances of reversion, bringing such sensuality and brutality, show more than merely materialism. Something besides a release of natural forces and primitive passions characterizes them. In the most materialistic and individualistic age of Mediterranean life— "Unto Cæsar that which is Cæsar's"— there came to the world a great spiritual vision. There came, indeed, not merely the vision, but also great and positive spiritual achievement. Material Rome and spiritual Rome arose together and in our thought and appraisal to-day should be inseparable as in their own life so long ago they were inseparable. Individualism was no more the way of worldly ambition and great offensive selfishness than the way of great noble personal achievement. Christ and Cæsar were contemporaries; St. Paul and Nero. Not only in theology and philosophy, but in fact, when the physical and the sensuous were so obtrusive, man found a soul as well as a body. Nay, more! The primitive forces and passions raged; might made right; and out of the great upheavals of nature God was born or—should I rather say?—was born again. I speak now, not for any particular orthodoxy, not for any formal creed, but for actual living experience of that time. The life of that time, then, was indeed very brutal, but it was also, certainly not less noticeably, not less obtrusively, very religious. Somehow, as it may be well to remember, deep religious experience has ever depended on a certain

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sensuous intensity, on a certain sensuous and almost materialistic realism. God and nature have ever been very near.

In the fifteenth century the spiritual was also as assertive as the material and sensuous. Not only did men sail west in order to go east; not only did they seek Eldorado in the name of Christ as well as of king; but also they turned human and natural in order to become more spiritual. The times produced Machiavelli but also Savanarola; and the Borgias, but also Luther. The storms of earth were violent and destructive, but the soul of man seemed to thrive as it was tried—could language be more significant? —by fire and tempest, and birth, or rebirth, came, once more, to the great things of the spirit.

Reversion, then, such is the evidence of history, is to something besides mere material violence and savagery. Something very different from primitive passion, as this is usually understood, is really involved; or, by some subtle alchemy, instinct and passion and force are themselves not exclusively brutish, being what souls may be made of or what may give birth to Gods. The term itself, reversion, may or may not be the best term, but in the actual movement, under whatever name, the ideal future is implicated quite as much as the unideal past or the primitive, to which the so-called reversion is made, must include the spiritual as well as the physical, God as well as nature, the nobly personal as well as the ignobly selfish. Violence, in short, may work reform as well as destruction and instinct be a basis of good as well as of evil. In time of reversion do men renew their worst passions? They renew also their best passions, reviving the vital sources of the culture and civilization they may seem to be betraying.

It is not at all strange, I think, that the primitive should have come to stand for the undeveloped and barbarous, since the primitive, not unlike the simple life on the old farm, is what has been left behind and outgrown. The primitive is natural and informal and lawless; it is nature unclothed and unrestrained; and its naturalness and simplicity are easily misjudged or seen only from one side.

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But, necessarily, nature and her so-called lawlessness, her lack of restraint, even because primitive, hold all that is good and worth while as well as all that is evil for human life. The past and outgrown may seem undesirable, degenerate, bad; but, strangely enough, its revival in this character has commonly awakened longings for the "good old times." So, I say again, reversion to the primitive is always more than disastrous retrogression. The primitive, holding the good as well as the evil, God as well as nature, can be, as men revert to it, only life's great and constant conflict once more openly renewed and, as is specially to be added, also greatly intensified with each renewal. It is greatly intensified, because the return or renewal is bound to have a deliberate and volitional character, a conscious determination and purpose, lacking to the actual, natural life of earlier time, and it is intensified, again, because to the renewed conflict men bring all the acquired and developed resources and instruments of their civilization. When civilized men break loose, renewing for good or for ill all that is primitive and engaging in searching vital conflict, then, in truth, there is a tug-of-war.

As commonly used, reversion and progress are quite opposite terms and, as might be expected, misconception has affected the latter as well as the former. If reversion has been return only to disastrous violence, to passion, instinct, force, progress has been escape from these, implying movement towards complete and final achievement, that is, towards life without passion, with complete control if not even total suppression of instinct, with gentleness and passivity of spirit, say even in heaven instead of on earth. Such a visionary, abstractly idealistic and, to add to my hard epithets, perfectionistic notion of progress, however, has no sanction in actual history nor can it ever appeal forcefully to normal human nature. Surely men commonly strive, not for mere final peace, but that, peace secured in certain relations and conditions, they may strive again on some new battlefield with still greater vigor and efficiency.

Here is hardly the place for discussion of the different

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fields, or levels, of human conflict. Suffice it to say simply that there are lower and higher levels and then that progress is concerned, not with peace without further fighting, but with peace that makes higher fighting possible. What do I mean by higher fighting? I mean fighting that is at once more efficient and more intense, that shows more self-control and so more dependence on rational methods and instruments and that has respect to the higher rather than the lower impulses and faculties of human nature. But, again, progress consists in elevation of the fighting spirit, not in its suppression, and accordingly it is a condition of progress that at any time of reversion, besides the renewal, deliberate and intense, of basal conflict, there will be also a conscious and determined struggle for security in the higher ways of fighting. In any game can be seen what this means. Some player turns lawless and his associates, in the interest of a tenser, more controlled and more skilful contest, will bid him "play the game" and will discredit him if he fail to comply. Progress consists in learning to play the game and in the game itself becoming ever a better game. In the large relations of life, social and political, the constant call for democracy is only the way men have of bidding each other play the game. It is a protest against some low way of fighting and an attending aristocracy in order that some higher way, bringing its own aristocracy, may be established. There is, therefore, no essential pacifism about democracy, as some have imagined. Quite the reverse. What democracy demands is a good and worthy game. Recent events afford very conclusive proof of this. Democracy in its real character and meaning is not a call from Utopia or some Golden Age, but a girding of the loins for more effective and productive effort, and progress is not a growing away from instinct, passion, force, but a growing in and through them, a growing *up* to them.

My reply to those who have held, rather cynically, that in time of reversion man is only throwing off his disguise of civilization and showing himself for what he has been and will be always, a sordid, selfish creature, resorting to force

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and fist, must now be evident. Disclosure of basal, primary human nature there certainly is, but in this are no necessary disgrace and no necessary decline. There may be honor and progress. At such a time depths of human goodness are exposed as well as depths of human wickedness and optimists, not merely cynics and pessimists, have good ground for satisfaction. The cynics too easily forget that, when civilized mankind revert to nature, there is that tug-of-war, which is indeed a tug-of-war, being—to express the natural feeling of its day and generation—always the "greatest war in history," and which also shows primitive instinct, passion, force arrayed on *both* sides.

Before direct application of what has been said is made to events of the present time, there is one more general fact about returns to nature that is certainly worth remarking, if it be not even of supreme importance. Thus, it is very significant that at any time of reversion there have appeared great commanding personalities. Not only are Gods born then, but also great men. Great wars, I suppose, whether so described or not, must always be religious wars, wars of the gods, but also great human personalities, springing out of the conditions of the time as leaders of men, are important to the fighting. Human greatness, too, in the history of any people, as it has appeared, now in these leaders, now in those, would seem to be proportional to the radical character of the changes which the leadership is serving. Greatest leadership has come at greatest crises. A truism, perhaps; yet pertinent here.

Can I possibly show how the greatest leaders arise? In a national course of events formal civilizations weaken or fall; life ceases to be under real control of its visible and once authoritative institutions—always influences for uniformity and checks on originality; the letter of the law, necessarily local and superficial, gives way; and there comes, as natural incident of the resulting broadening and deepening of life, a setting free of the spirit. "The spirit not the letter" is such an oft-heard cry and often it is given little heed; but the drama, the rise and the fall and, one

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may properly add, the final lesson or the real harvest of a whole civilization may be in it. The letter is so provincial; the spirit is cosmopolitan, universal; and with liberation of the spirit from the letter both things provincial come to be put to use of life at large and individuals are set free, becoming independent persons rather than mere uniformed citizens. A time of upheaval, then, and reversion is a time of free persons, a time of assertive individualism, the restraints of the traditional life of uniformity becoming little if anything more than so much convention or outer dress. The personal individual instead of the organized group or class becomes the vital unit and out of the general atmosphere, so constituted, great persons arise, great independent thinkers or seers and great practical leaders. Thus are the great born, not made; creatures of nature, not of formal civilization; and, being creatures of nature, themselves creators.

The great leader must be close to nature; superior to the formal and literal, loyal primarily to the free, generous spirit. Is not nature, in her essential vitality and passion, the proper executive agent of the spirit? Only she can do its will. Civilized man is agent only of the letter, of the formal and visible organization. So, once more, at times of reversion to nature, when Gods are born, are born also the greatest men, grand creatures of nature, agents of the free spirit. If, contemporaneously, taking part in the conflict, there appear also great brutal as well as great spiritual leaders of men, this is only what the conditions seem to demand, for in being a creature of nature there is always an essential ambiguity, as it were a fork in the road. As now so often indicated here, reversion to nature has in general its two conflicting opportunities, one being the violence of reform or progress, the other the violence of destruction and both, as they meet in primitive instinct and force, making the renewal of life's basal conflict.

But reversion characterizes the present day and what has been found true of similar times in history must help us to know what to expect now. Of course now, as in the past,

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human nature has been stirred by the "greatest war in history" to the depths of its best impulses as well as to those of its worst. *Our* reversion has been by no means one-sided. Basal conflict is going on now; an open war of the Gods, if ever there was such a war; and many have felt, it may be well to add, even in face of the appalling disasters, injuries, offenses, that the terrible upheaval has been, not just huge and grand and awesome, but spiritually worth while. There has been so much service; so much sacrifice; so much world-proportioned organization; so much common human feeling; so much new vision of great opportunities; so much emphatic demand for new life; so much really vigorous idealism; so much assertion of instinct and passion on the side of the right. The God of righteousness has not been either silent or idle and he seems sure, in the future, to take even more effective part. This, however, being recognized and appreciated, recognition and appreciation may not be so ready for the implication, pervading the present discussion from its beginning, that *our* reversion to nature is really as critical as that of either the first or the fifteenth century.

We are in a crisis, of course, but I may be told very emphatically that I have been greatly exaggerating its nature, that to find much and serious analogy between the present disturbance and those earlier disturbances is going quite too far, since no such revolution, as in those days, can possibly be preparing. Changes are coming, it is true, and we all wish changes; but, on the whole, except for some important reforms, such as a League of Nations might bring about, the order of things to which we are all accustomed and in which we all have our various vested interests must and will go on. Perhaps it will. The objector here may be right, as well as conservative and complacent. Yet, while one must not be either alarmist or visionary, the present is no time for complacency. One can ill afford to underestimate, as I think the objector is disposed to underestimate, the tendencies and the forces that the present reversion and its renewal of basal conflict has set loose

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or—this being the special way in which these things may be underestimated—to assume that the political changes bound to come will not involve all phases of life. Distinctly these are days of open instinct, passion, force. They are days in which all along the line life is being searched in an epoch-making degree and in one's thought and feeling to belittle or confine what the future has and ought to have in store would be to fall short of a great duty of the time. A great war never is and never can be only political or territorial in its original conditions or in its effects and, the present war being what it is, every human interest of whatever kind must not merely expect but seek vital changes. The great issues of morality and of economic and industrial life are at stake, calling for a new reckoning. In a war of the Gods nothing can go untouched. Everything must win something. When birth, new life, comes to the Gods themselves, man and things human can ill afford to lag behind. The present may be the greatest crisis in history.

Great, then, is the day's challenge. How it will be met can not be told in detail now. Great men will appear; have already appeared, in fact, although final estimate of individuals at this time would be premature. Every department of human interest and activity, however, is being searched and vitally aroused for great leaders, great agents of the spirit, and, in view of the feeling, prevalent, near and far, in the life of the day, who does not know that the response is to be certain and inspiring? Moreover, while one may not call the present or the coming leaders by name, one is able to indicate some of the qualities that the life, to which they belong, is bound to exhibit. Thus, the very things that already in notable measure have come to expression in the life of the present, courage and vigor and concreteness—or actuality—and large, world-proportioned enterprise and organization and enlightened purpose, will assuredly in increasing measure characterize the future. The present war, so soon in view of the armistice to be over as a military ordeal, is only the beginning of the real struggle, but the military ordeal, however regrettable, has

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constituted a preparation, that had to be, as the war had to be, for the struggle to follow. The military ordeal has developed the qualities that are, and still more are to be, in special demand.

In face of the certain and significant changes to come, men will be, first of all, courageous. The courage will be needed and the courage and the faith of it will be forthcoming. What has the war not done to make us all courageous! With the courage, further, there will be real vigor. The instinct, passion, force, now set loose, cannot be met by mere denial; they cannot be negatived or exorcised; they can be and must be, on the contrary, accepted and appropriated and rendered flesh and blood of the spirit, diverted from mere violence and destruction and put to constructive and progressive use. In time of reversion, when the Gods are at war, vigor, physical, natural vigor, is necessary to the spirit. The spirit needs the flesh. Might, not itself right, in these days must prove also right. When civilized man suffers reversion and is made naked, the spiritual and the physical, God and nature, may not be kept apart. Vigor, then, real, nature-supported vigor is a necessary character of the future, as well as one of the marks of the present.

Concreteness of life, actuality, is also to be counted on, being a natural condition of vigor. Actual conditions, positive facts, can no longer be covered over, or glossed, with sentimentalities and generalities, but must be met with direct candor and practical responsibility. Realism, in short, if the war be indeed a preparation for the future, will prevail, life being vigorous, direct, actual, vital. Realism, however, not the materialism that many may be now inferring. Realism, at least as the term is here used, is not materialism by any means; it is, on the contrary, idealism come to earth and getting to work; scientifically enlightened and morally inspired; the supreme idealism, then; and the conflict of it—there must be the conflict—is like that closest of all conflicts, the conflict of the spiritual and the physical in the nude. Clothing is protective, as also are the law and order of civilization. But the war in

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large measure has stripped life, in all departments, of its protective clothing, exposing what lies beneath the forms and arts of civilization, and this and the close hard conflict of it, the great battle of the nude, is what is here meant by realism. Plainly not a simple or naive realism, that and the innocent play of it belonging only to children and savages; but a realism tense with the best meanings and purposes to which mature civilization has grown—tense with these purposes and tense also with the conflicting temptations; in short, a deeply strenuous but an envisioned realism.

That only world-proportioned things can interest the future would go nowadays almost without saying. We have all learned to think and feel in the large. World politics, world trade, world industry, world morality, world interests of every sort are become commonplaces. Henceforth national isolation or racial isolation will be impossible.

But, to bring these reflections to a close, it very well sums up what has been the meaning here to say, as something very pertinent to the present time, that reversion to nature may have its compensations, if it do bring, as has been suggested, new life to God, great leaders to mankind and increased courage and enlarged purpose to general human endeavor. Certain ancient myths cannot have been altogether wrong when they associated the birth of the Gods with instinct, passion, force.

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THE INTERNATIONAL CONSCIENCE.

JOHN M. MECKLIN.

THE problem of international peace is not materially different from the problem of peace in the individual, the community or the nation. It is a question in part at least of a state of mind. "As a man thinketh in his heart so is he," is as true of nations as of individuals. War was in Germany's heart long before the crash came. Thanks to the disciplinary effect of national institutions shaped by Prussianism the thought of sixty-five millions of Germans had been moulded to fit a policy of *Wille-zur-Macht*. We can never be sure of world peace until we get an organisation of international sentiment that will make for peace.

The international conscience is therefore the ultimate guarantee of international peace. And by the international conscience we mean simply a body of sentiments and ideas shared by all peoples that will assure a peaceful solution of international differences. For without such a common body of sentiments international friction must inevitably lead to war just as the absence of a social conscience in any community leads to lawlessness. The law is but the rational formulation and interpretation of an organised body of moral sentiment. Hence, the problem of international peace is a moral problem. President Wilson suggests the solution in the following lucid language: "What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organised opinion of mankind."

The existence of great armies and navies and spectacular trials of strength in battle ever blind men to a fact which this war has brought out with striking force, namely, that conscience speaks the last word in the eternal argument of the nations. International law does not derive its power from armaments ready to enforce it. International law does not itself create morality and justice. It merely expresses in concrete institutional form organised opinion.

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The obligation to obey international law rests upon international sentiment and is just as binding therefore as the obligation to obey law based upon the sentiment of the community or the nation. "The assertion," says Ramsay Muir, "that there is no obligation of international morality because there is no international law enforcible by an interstate police, with its implication that law derives its validity from force, is seen to be essentially a denial of the very conception of law which is the vital principle of Western civilisation."

There is therefore nothing new in the problem of peace. It was first clearly formulated by Socrates and his immediate successors. Living in an age distraught by skepticism and political revolution, Socrates saw that peace could only come when men realise that law is not the arbitrary expression of the will of the strongest but embodies the mature moral sentiment of the community, that law draws its sanctions from an enlightened conscience, that obedience to the law is but the carrying out of the deeper mandates of the self and of society. Plato gave philosophical formulation to this idea in the book which more than any other has shaped the political thought of the Western world, the *Republic*.

The dominant idea of the *Republic* is that law is the correlative of a peaceful social order. Individuals enjoy a free and peaceful existence not by violating or transcending law but by exercising their functions, developing their capacities within the predetermined limits of the law. Likewise nations are free and assure to themselves and the world the reign of peace when they are willing to maintain and exercise their rights as nations under the guidance of a common body of international loyalties. A state that persists in ignoring and affronting these international loyalties will in time undermine and disrupt its own political integrity. The disintegration of the Prussian state on the battlefields of Europe is but the last logical result of its persistent and brutal violation of those great international loyalties which

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were the prerequisites of its own healthful existence as well as of that of the family of nations. A state that acknowledges no international bond except force is in these latter days a political and moral anachronism, a contradiction in terms.

The turbulent and short-lived Greek states lacked the sober moral traditions and the stable political and economic background necessary to the creation of an international conscience. It was left for the conservative and practical Roman to undertake this larger task. The choicest product of the Roman genius, the *pax romana*, was but the moral precipitate of the *jus gentium*, or the idea of a law of the nations, binding upon all alike because it reflected the organised opinion of mankind, the tested political experience of the *orbis terrarum*. The solidarity of thought and sentiment assured to the world during the formative period of the Middle Ages by the church was threatened by the rise of the individualistic state of the Renaissance with its doctrine of absolute sovereignty and its Machiavellian ethic of force and fraud. The larger unity of loyalties slowly ingrained into the thought of men through the discipline of ecclesiastical authority, in matters political, ethical and religious, seemed sacrificed to international anarchy. Western civilisation was broken up into sovereign and independent political entities, recognising no law but force. The story of the first three centuries after the Renaissance is one of almost continuous warfare. But even here the emergence of the modern state with its radical political particularism was really a step forward in the solution of the problem of an international conscience. It secured to diverse peoples freedom in the development of their own characteristic way of life. Within the larger whole of Western civilisation, various national cultures arose enriching modern life, stimulating progress and emancipating men from the dead hand of a stagnant mediæval society. It is only possible to erect a healthful and efficient internationalism on the basis of a vigorous and self-conscious nationalism.

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We may divide these sovereign modern states into two groups according to the disciplinary effect of their cultures upon the problem of the international conscience. For through the sheer logic of events national sentiments have been differently organised on international questions. In general we may say that where nations have attained unity and self-consciousness in the midst of conflict and friction with other nations they tend to become militant, egoistic, self-assertive and inimical to international peace. Germany and Austria-Hungary are typical illustrations of this narrow and militaristic nationalism. On the other hand, where nations have found scope for expansion and free untrammelled self-expression they are more sympathetic towards the international attitude. Great Britain and the United States have, for the most part, attained their national development in this unrestricted fashion and hence their responsiveness to the demands of the international conscience.

Starting with the more or less fixed elements in the problem, namely, geographical position, race, economic resources, language, religion and the like, the attitudes of the various nations towards peace may indeed be explained in almost deterministic fashion. It is an interesting question as to whether England's championship of the balance of power, the rights of the smaller nations, the freedom of the seas, and democracy is really due to the free creative genius of the English people and their natural love of liberty or whether these factors furthering peace are merely the by-products of her racial complex, her geographical isolation and the economic forces that gave rise to her maritime empire. On the other hand, it is a question as to whether Germany's absurd mediæval fiction as to the nature of the state, her glorification of war, her grotesque racial megalomania, her exploitation of Darwinism in the defense of national unscrupulousness, are really the spontaneous expressions of the German genius or whether they are but the bent given to her thought and life by the inescapable pressure of the forces of race, geographical position, constant friction

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with alien groups such as Russians, Poles, Danes and French, together with the economic and social forces created by her mastery of scientific method and the unparalleled expansion of her population. Certainly, if history teaches us anything, it is that nations no less than individuals are never the absolute architects of their own destinies.

Apart from this interesting problem of the philosophy of history, the fact of supreme importance for the present discussion is that international ideals, whether expressed in law or lying fluid in public sentiment, are the result of the slow habituation of the thought of the average man under the discipline of his own national institutions. The problem of international peace is, therefore, ultimately one of surrounding the average man with a cultural incidence that will effectively mould his sentiments into an attitude that condemns war and seeks peace. Men who love peace and pursue it are the products of social institutions that encourage peace. When through pulpit, press, platform, selfish economic nationalism or otherwise we surround the average man with a social discipline that encourages the jingoistic attitude we need not be surprised when international friction arises to see the nation plunge unthoughtedly, even enthusiastically into war. Here is the unanswerable argument against compulsory military training in a democracy, or the creation of a great military establishment.

There are two ways in which we may approach this problem of securing an international mind favorable to peace. One is the objective, the materialistic, the autocratic way; the other is the subjective, the psychological, the democratic way. The one looks on peace as something to be maintained through coercion, by means of leagues, armaments and international police. The other subordinates leagues and armaments as well as the entire disciplinary effect of domestic institutions and the national way of life to the organisation of a body of sentiments that will give to peace a substantial moral basis. The latter, or the democratic way, insists that instruments for the maintenance of peace

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can never outrun the state of feeling and intelligence necessary to make these instruments effective. International peace is a goal towards which we must work from the inner life of the nations themselves. No heaven storming idealistic scheme can ever coerce the world and force it to keep the peace, however just and pure the ideal may be. The social disciplines of the nations must seriously and soberly undertake the task of developing "men of good will." In this respect all states, including democracies, have erred egregiously. We pass laws for great navies and armies. We frown down upon our neighbors from the top of a high tariff wall. We are hypersensitive on all matters of prestige and national honour. There are few or no chosen instrumentalities through which states consciously strive to effect better understandings with sister states. Nations somehow manage to make friends with each other in spite of politicians and diplomats. Through the universal note struck in art, for example, men have overleaped national barriers and found their way to each other's hearts. Sophocles, Phidias, Dante, Raphael, Donatello, Mozart, Schubert, Goethe, Goujon, Watteau, Hugo, Rembrandt and Shakespeare have done more than all the diplomats and warriors rolled into one to make the whole world kin.

England, of all the great powers of the world, has more to teach us than any other as to the democratic way of developing an international conscience. For without doubt the English commonwealth of nations provides the world to-day with the most fruitful and inspiring suggestions as to the solution of the problem of international peace. Before we can have enduring peace in the family of nations there must arise something corresponding to the moral and spiritual solidarity of the British Empire that has exhibited such astonishing vitality and power under the challenge of the German gospel of force. The economy of the *pax britannica* points the way to a possible *pax orbis terrarum*.

Two forces or sets of forces in British life have provided the disciplinary setting for the organisation of the sentiments of Englishmen in favor of peace. The one is external

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and geographical, arising from the nature of England's island empire and world wide trade relations; the other is internal and social and is due to the early development of national consciousness among the British people and the disciplinary effect of struggles for freedom and democracy. To be sure here also we find the strange mixture of realism and idealism, jingoism and justice that characterises English life. In foreign affairs Britain has more than once pursued a selfish *Realpolitik*, as in China or South Africa. But often, at the very time when these selfish *coups d'etat* in foreign policies were being consummated, a noble struggle for freedom and justice would be going on at home. John Stuart Mill, the champion of liberty, was the contemporary of Disraeli, the dominating spirit of the Congress of Berlin. Other nations have seen only the realistic side of English life and have ignored the idealistic. Hence the epithet of "perfidious Albion" so frequently on the lips of the German and until very recently of the Frenchman.

A clear understanding of the permanent bases of international peace came to the English earlier than to other nations partly because of the peculiar geographical position of the British Isles. Impelled at first by material interests growing out of this position England was led to oppose, under the principle of balance of power, the undue dominance of any nation or group of nations on the continent. In the overthrow of the Spanish Armada in 1588, in the check of the ambitions of Louis XIV at Blenheim in 1704, in the destruction of Napoleon's power at Waterloo and finally at the Marne and the Somme Englishmen have shed their blood freely in defense of the principle of balance of power. Through the disciplinary effect of these centuries of struggle for national safety England has been schooled to cultivate the judicial attitude so far as peace is concerned. The sentiments of her people are perforce organised on international issues, not solely in terms of selfish national interests, but also in terms of a broad grasp of the interests of all concerned. In particular the conscience of the English people has been made sensitive to the

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rights of weaker nations, though even here idealism and realism are mingled. It was Napoleon who shrewdly remarked that Antwerp was a pistol pointed at the heart of England.

It is possible to trace, particularly in the England of the last century, the slow but sure leavening of foreign policies with the moral idealism born of domestic struggle for freedom and justice. Herein lies the greatness of such men as Gladstone and Earl Grey. Their pacifism was scorned by militaristic Germany as a sign of weakness because the German statesman lacked the social discipline which would make such a policy intelligible. But in reality the noble efforts of Earl Grey for peace during the eventful days of August, 1914, were based upon a deep sense of national responsibility and a very real insight into the nature of international right. The sequel of events has shown how fundamentally right was Earl Grey and how tragically wrong were the Kaiser and his advisers.

In the light of the deeper meaning of history English imperialism, therefore, loses much of the militant, arrogant and unlovely traits so often attributed to it by anglophobes. It is not a matter of painting the world red. There is to be detected here much that indicates a sacred and solemn dedication of a great people to the spread and maintenance of international peace and justice. To Englishmen of the type of Milner, Grey or Gladstone English rule means obligations rather than privileges, duties rather than rights. They realise that throughout an empire on which the sun never sets is being staged the last phase of the age-long struggle of men to reconcile liberty and law, freedom and authority. "Imperialism," writes Lord Milner, "is something wider than Anglo-Saxondom or even than Pan-Britannicism. The power of incorporating alien races, without trying to disintegrate them, or to rob them of their individuality, is characteristic of the British imperial system. It is not by what it takes away but by what it gives, not by depriving them of their own character, language, and traditions, but by ensuring to them the

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retention of these, and at the same time opening new vistas of culture and advancement, that it seeks to win them to itself."

It is, however, not so much in her dealings with alien races as in her treatment of the free English colonies, now known as Dominions, that England has foreshadowed the solution of world peace. These far-flung Dominions, united under the British flag, are in reality a Commonwealth of nations. More and more the tendency is to acknowledge loyalty not to England, but to the empire as a whole. There is evidence of the rise of a superstate, that lacks to be sure concrete embodiment, but finds its roots in a solidarity of sentiment, in a British conscience that secures unanimity of thought and action. It was the call of this British conscience that brought the men of Canada, Australia and South Africa to the support of England against German oppression. It was the invisible strength of this moral sentiment, making the British empire a fighting unit in spite of vast stretches of sea and diversity of economic interests, that was so completely misunderstood by Germany. This intangible and yet powerful superstate of spiritual loyalties has given to the world a most instructive object lesson. Do we not have in the British Commonwealth of nations an anticipation of a possible federation of free peoples that will one day assure world peace?

In this connection a word is in place perhaps in explanation of the feeble and impotent fashion in which America has shared in the international conscience as contrasted with England. The internationalism of England is based upon a very real experience of world problems. It has come as the result of the stern discipline of political responsibilities extending to the uttermost parts of the earth and including every variety of people and race. The international conscience of the Englishman is therefore red-blooded, practical and not divorced from the use of force. With Americans, doomed from the days of Monroe to the present to a rôle of international impotence, internationalism has been the plaything of peace societies and impossible idealists. The

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world has never taken us seriously on international affairs. In 1903 John Hay wrote of the breakdown of his policy in China owing to Russia's action in Manchuria, "the Chinese as well as the Russians, seem to know that the strength of our position is entirely moral, and if the Russians are convinced that we will not fight for Manchuria—as I suppose we will not—and the Chinese are convinced that they have nothing but good to expect from us and nothing but a beating from Russia, the open hand will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinks as the raised club."

The disciplinary effect of America's unreal and sentimental rôle in international affairs is registered in our national life. Because we have missed the splendid moral discipline the English have gained from shouldering the world's problems we suffer in these days of need from a pitiful mediocrity of statesmanship. Worse still, we have lacked in our national life great, absorbing, world issues that would have dwarfed the colossus of business with its fat and greasy god of profitism. We have been content to sit comfortably behind our high tariff wall and amass our millions while England won for herself moral emancipation by policing the world and protecting our trade. America, the young Hercules among the nations, stands at the parting of the ways. Has she the moral courage to work out her national salvation through the stern discipline of the great international rôle opened up to her by this war? Or will she return to the isolation and the selfish economic nationalism of other days where the sheer glut of her own prosperity will in time inevitably undermine her character? Crises arise in the lives of nations as well as of individuals when they need to realise the profound truth of the dictum, "whosoever shall seek to gain his life shall lose it: but whosoever shall lose his life shall save it."

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THE THEORY OF MORALS ON A CLASS BASIS.

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THE confusion which existed prior to the War in the Socialist movement with reference to the competing claims of nation and class can hardly be said to have been dissipated by four years of conflict and controversy. In the case of organisations (like the Independent Labour Party) which were accustomed to lay stress on ethical and humanitarian, as distinct from economic considerations, the mystery of their position has perhaps deepened. Accustomed formerly to defend the point of view of the State against that of the class, some of their number are now the most eminent exponents of the claims of the international working class against the nation. But until they abandon their present attitude of aloofness from the discussion of first principles, there is little purpose in trying to clear their minds.

The case of organisations, like the Socialist Labour Party and the Industrial Workers of the World is different. They, at least, have the merit of consistency. On the old opposition of war and class war their position has always been quite unambiguous. The class, they declared, was the unit, political, moral, and social, because it was economic. For their own rulers they had nothing but contempt and hatred, while they welcomed workers in other lands as brothers. The supporters of these views were a select, rather than a numerous or eminent body, but some rumour of the nature of their position percolated at times to the ordinary press. Until, however, the fall of Kerensky in Russia and particularly the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the world does not seem to have supposed that they had much influence. Of their importance we may suppose everyone is now convinced. Taken together, these views may be called Bolshevism and their main principle is the assertion of the supremacy of the "ideology" of the working class, particularly as it would be stated in

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opposition to the "bourgeois" or capitalist tradition. At their heart is the idea that morals rest inevitably on a class basis. The purpose of this paper is to explain the origin of these ideas in socialist theory, their main outlines and their later developments. To do this seems under existing circumstances more important than to criticise them directly. I shall try to show by what arguments they have been defended, what socialists supposed them to imply, in what respects the theory is admittedly imperfect, and what would require to be proved before it could be accepted as even *prima facie* reasonable. About the distinctive attitude to them of the Russian revolutionaries I propose to say very little: and about events in Russia nothing at all. There is no reason to suppose that even a fairly complete knowledge of what actually happened during the Revolution would throw much light on this particular problem.

Bolshevism, then, for our purposes, may be regarded as the theory which treats the economic class as the sole condition of moral ideas. Ordinary ethical theory, when it meets with a conflict of moral principles which seems to be correlated with the difference in economic class, is apt to treat it superciliously and assume that no ethical analysis has been made. Had this been done, it is argued, the unity underlying the difference would have been disclosed. To the Bolshevik, however, this suggestion is quite of a piece with the rest of the bourgeois mind. It may be sincere enough, but its sole result is to continue the dominance of upper-class morality. This idealism is suitable to the possessing class; truth (for them) is that which integrates; but in the eyes of the dispossessed the truth divides and destroys. There are class moralities, it is maintained, which cannot be reconciled, and to one or other of which you must adhere. Refusal will not help you; it will only leave you muddle-headed.

What then can be meant by a class morality? Though the term is in fairly constant use, as, for example, in the phrase "bourgeois morality," three possible uses of it may be met with and must be distinguished:

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1. Writers who are chiefly interested in the descriptive side of sociology may mean by "bourgeois morality" little more than the customs and habits of mind and psychological characteristics generally which the employing class in a capitalist society exhibit. The best example of this treatment is that of Werner Sombart, especially in his *Quintessence of Capitalism.* In spite of many admirable pieces of analysis and a definition of the social movement which attaches to the idea of class an almost exaggerated analytical significance, the same sort of thing may be discovered in his book, *The Proletariat.* By their ethical ideas, Sombart would understand their mental type, a product of their social status. When he considers who the proletarians are, what distinguishes them, and what goal they should set before them, he refers on the one hand to their rate of pay, their standard of life, their envyings of the rich, their dependent status and so on; and on the other (determining to some extent the end which the practical activity of the class is to seek), the tendency to communist organisation of life, and to aggregation, in which capitalism involves them, with the consequent intensity of life and restlessness, which is the consequence of it. From all this, together with some criticism and discussion of economic points a kind of socialism emerges.

This descriptive attitude, valuable though it is, does not give us much help in solving the ethical problem. In fact, it hardly states it. The contrast is very marked between the geniality of Sombart's attitude, and the bluntness of the revolutionary. The critical question of the basis of morality which must underlie any attempt to defend the division of moral standards on a class basis does not arise at all. Sombart's ethics, when they emerge, turn out to be remarkably familiar.

If, however, we abandon the descriptive and try to maintain a critical point of view, we can get rather farther. By a "morality," we may most satisfactorily mean a body of rules and precepts for the guidance of individual and social conduct—or more generally, a moral standard em-

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bodied in rules and customs and conventions. Is it intelligible to talk of a morality in this sense as belonging to a class? To do so may mean two things, and failure to distinguish them has introduced great confusion into the discussion of socialism.

2. By the morality of a class, we may mean that body of moral rules and standards, the observance of which by all the individuals and groups within a community would secure the dominance of that class[1] whose morality it is. Little difficulty need arise in understanding what middle class morality in a capitalist society means on this interpretation. Its primary condition is "the permanent hypothesis" of the wage system. Ordinary arguments on industrial reconstruction, on strikes, on rates of wages, and so on, assume the persistence of the fundamental conditions of industry as we know it. To deny this, to suggest for example, that the interests of Capital and Labour are irreconcilable in principle, is to declare oneself a revolutionary. We assume, of course, that capitalism means the economic domination of the owners of capital, the middle class. But the influence of these conditions, "the capitalist ideology," extends itself far beyond economic or individual matters, to politics and religion and tradition, and even science. It may plainly defend itself by referring to the good of the whole, and a complete system of ideas can be formulated, and is indeed actually operative, with these conditions as center. The prevalence, for example, of a certain idea among lower middle class people belongs to a society in which maximum production is the declared end of its economic system. They assume that the general structure of society is sound and naturally regard stability as its first condition. When constitutional means have been appointed for the adjustment of grievances, nothing remains except that the law should be obeyed. There is thus provided a moral standard which is common to a society in the

[1] I have, throughout, used the terms 'class' and 'dominance' in the economic sense which they invariably bear in orthodox Socialist theory. A class is not a function, but an interest.

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sense that all work towards the same end and observe the same rules, allowing for differences in station.

3. In socialist writings, however, this theory is cut across by another group of ideas inconsistent with it and hard to make quite intelligible, the influence of which, however, is at least very considerable, especially upon the minds of those of weaker capacity. A class morality in the sense in which we have discussed it, is really the morality of a whole community in which a particular class is dominant. But the term is also used with the suggestion that a class morality is really binding only on members of one class. It may mean, that is, a group of moral ideas imposed on the subordinate class by a ruling class in its own interests, or for its own ends, but which it itself either does not observe at all, or only pretends to observe. The term "working class morality" is thus used to mean the way in which the middle class would like the working class to behave: yielding obedience, being righteous, sober, and godly men, observing the rules of morality, and so on, while the bourgeoisie itself does as it likes.[1]

This idea is, of course, an old one, and it is congenial to the popular mind. If we may judge from the *Republic* and the *Gorgias*, fifth century Athens was extremely familiar with it. Indeed, it is a conclusion speedily formulated when critical reflection on traditional moral ideas has begun. A ruler, said Thrasymachus, rules in his own interests, not for the sake of those of his subjects. Laws do not promote the common good; they are only instruments of oppression. The moral code is something which the subject must obey, but he does not find his good in the activities to which it leads. Only that of the ruler is promoted thereby, and he takes care not to obey it himself.

That the second and third of these interpretations have a good deal in common no one would deny, and indeed, the ambiguity of the theory is sufficient evidence. They differ, however, if not in principle, at least in the basis on which

[1] From some discussions we should gather that the main feature of "bourgeois morality" is prostitution, *vide, e.g.*, Bebel, *Die Frau und der Socialismus.*

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each may be naturally defended. The third naturally accompanies social epochs where the division of classes is exceedingly acute, and where the opposition of their interests is admitted by all. But it gives rise to no difficult problem of ethical theory. It is in the attempt to explain views similar to the second of these interpretations that socialist theory has made some contribution to ethics.

We must now consider on what basis the position that differences in moral codes correspond to class divisions may be defended. The writings of Karl Marx himself, and of his colleagues and followers, give us considerable guidance, and to follow this road has the advantage of making us acquainted with a tradition; even if it be not the best, or the only possible defence, it is a familiar one. And it has profoundly influenced the history of Europe. It is peculiarly rich in controversy and divisions of opinion, which seem, in fact, still to be increasing. On the positive side of the special problem with which we are concerned, however, only two main lines of argument seem to be generally possible, and of these I propose to consider only the first. It is the orthodox Marx's view, and it is derived by a well-known set of arguments from Hegel. The other is Syndicalism, and for a philosophical defence of it, we must look mainly to Sorel. We have perhaps hardly enough information to tell with certainty by which line of thought the Bolsheviks were mainly influenced; but the probability seems to be that (like the Irish socialists) they had devised an easy modification of traditional Marxism in the line of direct economic action.

The view of Marx and Engels on morality[1] is a consequence of their attitude to history, and if it did nothing

[1] In the writings of Marx and Engels it is hardly possible to discover a systematic account of their ethics. As early as 1845 they had discussed the philosophical background of Socialism in relation to the prevailing Neo-Hegelianism and particularly, no doubt, to Grün and Hess, the "socialist" followers of Feuerbach. This work was never published; but references to it were made by Marx in the preface to his "Critique of Political Economy" (1859); while Engels published in 1888 his *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, which we may suppose contains so much of it as survived subsequent criticism. In any case it is the most important single text

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else, it would at least furnish us with some curious revaluations. Not the least part of the importance of the "materialist conception of history" is (in the eyes of its authors) its synthetic character. It is almost a coping stone of the sciences. The work begun by Hegel and continued by Darwin is completed by Marx, in spite of chronological difficulties. By the materialist conception of history is meant the doctrine that upon changes in the economic conditions of the life of a community ultimately depend all other changes—in its political history, its legal relations, its morals, its religion, and its thought. Changes in economic conditions mean primarily changes in technological methods. Climatic and other geographical conditions are not excluded; but seeing that over a considerable historical period they remain practically constant, their influence must be secondary. Along with these we must take the institution of private property, which emerges as an economic result at a certain stage of development. A method of production which involves private property in the means of production, implies a class division; and changes in such methods lead to alterations in the balance of classes. That is the very basis of history, for history in the Marxian view, is compact of class struggles, struggles for the possession of power as a means to all things desirable. The narrowness of this sense of the term "history" is of some importance. Before a division of classes arises in a society, there can be no history; nor in the future after all classes have been absorbed in the community.[1]

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on the philosophical basis of Socialism. Kautsky's *ex cathedra* utterance on *Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History* is useful though it is not acute. But a great deal has always to be inferred from writings on other subjects.

[1] This is a very familiar idea in Marxist theory. Engels wrote a pamphlet on the origin of the German *Mark* system; the orthodox regarded the publication of Morgan's *Ancient Society* as an event in the history of Socialism. James Connolly appeared to regard the theory that the Gaelic land system was communal and persisted in Ireland to the middle of the seventeenth century as vital to his propaganda. V. his *Labor in Irish History*. At the other end, we find Marx, writing in 1854, treating predications based on the existing state of affairs as liable to be disturbed by the irruption into history of Russia, a country still below the "historical" stage. V. *The Eastern Question*, passim.

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If, therefore, we wish to understand the complex play of parties which results in a historic document like the American Constitution; or the hidden meaning of the landing of the French at Killala in 1798; or the existence of the Lutheran Church in Germany, and the origin of Calvinism in Switzerland; the causes of the Secession and the American Civil War; the tendency of the Scot to Sabbath observance; or the decay of the English tradition of family life, we must consider out of what economic conditions they spring, and what class reactions they represent.

If all this is true, some unusual consequences follow. The generally received moral code in a society at a given time, represents the interests of the dominant class, and "public opinion" will hold that we ought to obey it. Alongside of it, however, there will also exist another set of moral ideas directly opposed, in at least some important respects, to the first. It will represent the interests of the class which though now oppressed, is, owing to changes in productive methods, about to come into its own. The obvious suggestion that one of these standards must be valid and the other invalid, hardly seems to occur to the Marxist; yet he does not fall back on the idea that they are equally true, and that one works better than the other. Substantially his position is that a particular moral rule is right from the point of view of one class, wrong from the point of view of another, and that this is all that "right" and "wrong" can mean.[1] Scientific investigation shows us, however, that one of these classes is in the ascendant. Therefore, in the next stage of history, its views will prevail. Nothing more than this is involved. His real objection is, as we shall see later, to the suggestion that it is possible to deduce moral rules from absolute ideas of good and bad. This would be mere Utopianism.

The materialist conception of history then enshrines the idea of class morality and provides the background for

[1] Cf. Engels, *Socialism Utopian and Scientific*, p. 27.

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it. On what arguments does this conception rest, in the minds of its adherents and exponents? There are in it at least three distinct elements: (1) It is dialectical. (2) It is materialistic. (3) It is social. Some consideration of each is essential to make the ethical theory clear.

1. The dialectical character of the whole system is the element which strikes the present-day reader of Marx's literature as most strange. Though it might have been expected to disappear with the alteration in the philosophical situation, from some developments of neo-Marxism it has not vanished, but has become more prominent.[1] Even into syndicalism it seems to enter in a peculiar fashion. A proper discussion of it would require the consideration of a rather little known period in nineteenth century history of philosophy, but its general principles are in any case pretty clear. The opposite of dialectical reasoning (which true scientific thought must employ) is metaphysics. The metaphysical method analyses and divides; it takes quantities apart from substances; it tends to give to mere abstractions an independent existence which they do not deserve. It deals in absolute independent entities and irreconcilable antitheses.[2] Dialectic, on the contrary, recognises that the two poles of an antithesis mutually pervade one another, that a knowledge of the part depends on a knowledge of the whole, that the world is an unending process, and so on.

The affinity of this with the familiar Hegelian antithesis of Reason and Understanding is obvious, and both Marx and Engels acknowledge their debt to him.[3] From his views, however, they diverge in certain respects. To their attitude to his idealism I shall refer later. They objected also to the absolutism which (as it seemed to them) Hegel

[1] Particularly in Dietzgen and Labriola.

[2] Cf. Engels, *op. cit.*, pp. 31 seq. This volume is part of a larger controversial work, *Anti-Dühring*, which illustrates these ideas with reference to the whole field of science.

[3] V. Marx, preface to the second edition of *Das Kapital*, Vol. I., and Engels, *Feuerbach*, p. 30.

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had introduced into his philosophy, and which became peculiarly vicious in his treatment of history. Consistently with his own sound principles the only absolute which the system can admit is the constant process; and the emphasis of this by the Radicals is the revolutionary basis of the theory. For even if we admit a certain "fitness and suitability" of a particular condition of knowledge and society to its time and condition, it soon becomes unreal, irrational, unnecessary. The idea of a perfect state eternal in the heavens has gone forever, and with it a belief in Utopias or spasmodic and moral revolutions.

In spite of much exaggeration and of a theory of knowledge which no one could make quite intelligible, the Marxists did learn from Hegel one profoundly important thing—that society develops in a regular way according to laws which we can comprehend if we take the trouble. Existing social conditions will pass away naturally, for there is about them nothing peculiarly sacred: not merely are moral ideas relative to social and economic conditions, but these conditions are themselves transitory.

As generally happened in modern ethics, particularly perhaps in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, from an argument of this sort, the idea of Nature is never far distant. With its uncritical use amongst his intellectual and revolutionary forerunners Marx would, no doubt, pretend to have nothing to do. But the *Communist Manifesto* breathes the very spirit of the Jacobin. The idea of Nature after all was a persistent setting for men's thoughts on social ethics; only the representation of it changed. It appeared in turn as universal law, as the source of rights indestructible and inalienable, or again, as a tendency of things which if not beneficent in the naïve sense furnished the only standard which we could very well grasp. As Professor L. T. Hobhouse[1] and others have pointed out, the fixed meaning which the idea of Nature had in political philosophy represented the antithesis to the

[1] *Morals in Evolution*, p. 587.

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deliberate action of government. Something of this sort is undoubtedly expressed by the element in Marxism which we are discussing. It would hardly be too much to say that the evolutionary doctrine of Hegel only gives form to a point of view which Marx holds in common with Adam Smith. Where exactly he got it has perhaps never been investigated. Some light might be thrown on it by considering the influence upon Marx of Saint-Simon, who received his ideas in turn from Condorcet.

2. The materialistic element in the materialist conception of history and in Marxism in general is somewhat puzzling. Marx and Engels have expressed their difference from Hegel in this respect in very similar words.[1] Two things may be said of it: (a) The opposition between idealism and materialism, which it implies, is an extremely narrow one, and the theory of knowledge on which it seems to rest is as uncritical as could be imagined. We know, of course, that Marx and Engels did not trouble about this side of the question. Primarily interested in social applications, they made shift with an inverted Hegelianism. By reference to Dietzgen some light might be thrown on it, but to do this would lead us much too far astray. The conclusion is in any case that a knowledge of the universe consists in an appreciation of the universal laws of motion which govern both the outer world and the mind of man. They express themselves in Nature unconsciously, and in Man with partial and growing consciousness. Thoughts and things are manifestations of one reality, and this is material. (b) As we shall see again a little later, when the Marxist talks about Materialism he means little more than many modern writers would mean by Naturalism. Primarily, it has a negative meaning. It involves the absolute rejection of anything "supernatural," incapable that is of explanation by ordinary scientific methods; and Hegelianism seemed to the young Hegelians to contain more than a trace of a special creationism of this sort. Along with this

[1] V. context of passages referred to in note one on page 299.

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went a determination to regard the world as systematically connected, with no gaps in it. Man, therefore, is continuous with the lower animals and with Nature. The laws of his being have a great deal in common with theirs. They are, in fact, in principle the same laws. Human life is only infinitely more complex.

The opposition to metaphysical reasoning, to which we referred above, has its counterpart in a rejection of metaphysical materialism, like that of La Mettrie and Holbach in the eighteenth century, which differed from historical materialism in two main respects. In the first place, it was purely mechanical. It had no appreciation of the difference between an organism and a machine; it does not realise that in biological Nature "the laws of mechanics are pushed into the background by other and higher laws."[1] Secondly, it could not represent the universe as a process. Being "anti-dialectical" its conception of Nature was quite unhistorical. Owing to the development of science in the nineteenth century, the idea of Evolution and of unceasing transformation has now penetrated into every existing science. Moreover, scientific investigation has become much more of a unity. No longer do you have natural sciences and a philosophy of nature. The former have taken the place of the latter, and observation and experiment have become the universal methods. The attempt to discover the general structure of Nature by short cuts (in which philosophy consists) is seen to be merely useless labour.

3. Hegel had provided the idea of development. Feuerbach had overcome the opposition of idealism and materialism: the development of biological science had begun to make the continuity of Man and Nature clear: What remained was to show that exactly the same sort of fundamental laws as governed all Nature, were to be found at work in social life. Neither there nor anywhere else could the descendants of the tribal gods find lodgment. This is what the materialist conception of history is primarily intended to do. Feuerbach in his ethics had fallen back

[1] Engels, *Feuerbach*, p. 66.

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upon the praise of religion and the most empty sentimentalism. "His moral theories turn out to be the same as those of all his predecessors—applicable to no time and place."[1] Moral conditions, like other things, must be relative to the historical circumstances from which they originate, and yet must show an orderly progressive development. Not even the "ideal" forces which appear in society can escape the reign of law.

To do this is little more than to show that the idea of a philosophy of society is quite as absurd as that of a philosophy of nature. The latter had contained many ingenious suggestions, and had anticipated many latent discoveries. But it could do this only by substituting ideal and maginary hypothesis for the unknown real connections; and this fallacy is the essence of metaphysics. Similarly, in the "philosophies" of law and history and religion, which substituted for the real interconnection of events, a knowledge of which could only be won by painful labour, a "law" purporting to be deduced from first principles, but owning in reality no more creditable ancestry than the mind of the philosopher. History is to be no realisation of an idea, least of all of an Absolute Idea; over its course, no mysterious fate presides. Its facts are to lie as open as the day.

Between the history of Society and that of Nature, there is, however, one difference, which is real, even if it is not vital, and some apprehension of it is the most obvious reason for the persistence of social idealism. In Nature nothing occurs as a desired conscious end. In History the actors at least are endowed with consciousness. It must be shown, therefore, that this is no obstacle to the sway of a universal law or to our discovery of it. This demonstration is the beginning of the ethical theory proper. One element in it is little more than the restatement of a favourite idea of Hegel. What a man brings about, or at least, what comes about through his acts of willing amongst other things, is very different from what he actually

[1] Engels, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–5.

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desires—very different perhaps from what he would have consented to desire had he known how it was going to turn out. Historical events seem to be controlled by chance, but as in the case of apparently accidental natural phenomena, when we look into them we see the law which controls and directs. The final causes of historical events are not, as Hegel saw, the actual motives of the men who figure in history. Where he went wrong, was in dragging in the Idea. If you do this, it is impossible to avoid giving to the whole process a teleological air. And teleology even the Hegelians admit to be false. Moreover, the descent from the exalted atmosphere of the Idea into the fog of the Bridgewater Treatises is inevitable. If on the other hand, you escape this error, nothing is explained. The philosophy of history must choose between patent falsehood and mere mystification. An advance beyond this point to an explanation of the driving forces behind history is the main achievement of the new doctrine.

Substantially, the history of ethics is regarded as a process in which supernaturalism is progressively got rid of, and a materialist, proletarian ethic takes its place. Eighteenth century ethics had left the origin of the moral sense and of the content of the moral idea an unexplained mystery, though it had done great service in explaining the workings of each. Towards this investigation of their causes within experience Kant contributed nothing; he represented the negative movement in the dialectic. Darwinism, however, really did advance the problem very considerably. Marxists can hardly avoid chronological difficulties at this point, because, of course, the main views of Marx and Engels were developed long before Darwin. The point hardly seems to be worth much attention for our purposes. The former were perfectly familiar with the idea of development and with naturalistic ideas generally. In any case, the way in which Darwin can be made to fit into the scheme is pretty obvious, even if we did not have the evidence of Marxists like Kautsky and Ferri and (for some points) Engels himself.

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The most important contribution made to ethics by Darwinism seems in the eyes of Marxists to be that of explaining conscience naturally. Their discussions of this, it must be granted, can seldom be called clear. Kautsky, for example (who is by no means the most confused), tends to identify conscience with the "social impulses." "The moral law is a universal instinct of equal force to the instincts of self-preservation and reproduction."[1] Its immediate approval of types of action of no utility to the individual had been the crux in all theory of conscience. But analysis of their origin shows them to be the ordinary bonds which hold society together. In Kautsky, there still remains the typical Hegelian view (which recurs in T. H. Green) of an animal as a creature moved entirely by impulse. Darwinism, he argues, betrays its incompleteness only when we try to explain by it moral *ideas*. "Of that there is not the least sign in the animal world."[2] To have made ridiculous the theological or supernatural idea of a moral law is a sufficient service, but it requires to be completed by a demonstration of the origin of the changing ideas which make up successive moral codes. And this brings us to the specific contribution to ethical theory of the materialist conception of history.

The supreme difference between animal and human societies is that the structure of the latter is continually changing, and the reason for the difference is that man is a social, intelligent, tool-inventing, animal. The slow unconscious indirect alteration of individuals through the struggle for existence gives place to a conscious transformation of organs in such a way as directly to promote life. Technical development is the basis of social evolution, and the most fundamental change that ever occurred is the emergence of class antagonisms, which in course of time supervene upon natural or functional groupings and divisions, such as those based upon sex. The critical period is when social labour begins to produce a surplus. Any class spe-

[1] Kautsky, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

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cially favoured by circumstances is able to monopolise the surplus and follow this up by gaining exclusive possession of the means of production. From the point at which this happens, the class struggle is the essential feature in the community. Alterations take place in the strength and direction of the social instincts, and history in the technical sense begins. On this basis some explanation can be given of the ideational side of morality. From social needs, moral ideas and precepts arise; and with each definite method of production there is connected not only (as is very generally admitted) a particular set of social relations, but a particular content of knowledge, a particular morality, and so on. Some familiar general moral ideas undergo a good deal of reinterpretation.

Take first, the treatment of the State. One would have imagined that in view of the admitted fact that non-economic conditions may break loose from their social basis and advance or retard social development, the State would be regarded as neutral in its own nature; that is, as the machinery of government naturally used by the dominant class in its own interests. The traditional Social Democratic policy of political action obviously supports this. But it is almost unanimously agreed amongst Marxists that the State, as we know it, is a device peculiar to Capitalism. Its function is to protect the dominant class against the oppressed, by "legal" and "constitutional" means, and with the help of the Army and of the Police to secure the stability of the existing order. It is "the Executive Committee of the propertied classes."[1] I pass over the question of the consistency with this of the advocacy of political action with the remark that there is a growing tendency to allot to such action a purely destructive function, where it is admitted at all. Religion again, according to the orthodox doctrine, has a place in capitalist society somewhat similar to that of the State, omitting the use of force; and in this condemnation are included all the "dem-

[1] The phrase is common. Cf. *e.g.*, Newbold, *Marx and Modern Capitalism*, p. 20.

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ocratic principles" which distinguish Liberalism. These, it is suggested, are purely middle class. And, as we shall see later, for the whole representative system it is proposed in some quarters to substitute government by delegates.

The idea of a moral tradition likewise suffers severely. The new moral standards are adequate to the situation in a sense in which the old are not. Economic development is proceeding apace, in spite of everything; and it is a fundamental principle of Marxist economics that a type of industrial organisation must collapse when production can be furthered in this way more than by its remaining in existence as it is. In fact, as new methods of production develop, the old usages about property, and the institutions which accompany them, become a mere hindrance. Therefore, the defenders of the morality of a ruling class are always, in the nature of the case, fighting a losing battle. They are supporting principles which can no longer be justified; hence the hypocrisy or cynicism of ruling classes in contrast with the vigorous moral enthusiasm of revolutionaries, full of a sense of their own strength.

The traditional notion of the moral ideal is that of a supernatural power which all men must always obey. This is a characteristic idea of a declining class which can look for salvation only to such a notion as this. Ethical idealism proper, however, is a product of the social conditions of an uprising class, of the strength of its social instincts, the indignation which it feels, and so on. This new moral ideal is generally vague. In principle it is negative, little more than opposition to existing hypocrisy, and it naturally tends to express itself in phrases like Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. The functions of the moral ideal, in short, are to offer some opposition to the existing social order, and to provide the motive power of the class struggle. But from it nothing can be learned as to the direction in which policy should be developed. That is a purely scientific question on which ethical considerations can throw no light.

This statement has taken us some distance beyond the definitive position of Marx and Engels, particularly in the

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rather detailed account we have given of the moral consciousness. These two writers were throughout chiefly interested in propaganda, and seldom developed their theories beyond the point at which they were serviceable for the campaign. To Marx's extraordinarily complicated economic theories, this statement does not, of course, apply without qualification, while Engels latterly devoted a good deal of attention to natural science. Their ideas on the nature of cognition, and on social psychology tended to remain at the rather uncritical stage which they had reached in 1845. It cannot be called a very complete point of view, and it is particularly obscure with reference to the function of "science" in relation to the moral ideal. The qualifications which Engels introduced into it when required to give an opinion on disputable points which emerged in practice or in controversy, seldom led to clearness, though they did give the doctrine a wider scope.

The orthodox followers of Marx have developed the position in various ways. Bebel and Kautsky are amongst the most generally known of these; but Labriola, whose discussions of the philosophical basis of the theory are classical in their way, and Mehring, the acute official historian of German social democracy, are perhaps more important. For our purpose, the chief problem left fairly indefinite concerns the functions in history of ideal forces. It is possible so to interpret the materialist conception of history as to deny to these any real influence. Perhaps, indeed, this is the popular notion of it, and some warrant for it could be found both in Marx and Engels. The really operative forces in sociological evolution are material in the literal sense. Human beings are mere flies on the wheel of the economic chariot, and all they think and do is a reflection of real changes which take place quite independently of themselves, whose creatures indeed they are. You have in fact a rigid system of economic fatalism.

Amongst American socialists this set of ideas has been fairly common, but the most distinguished exponent of it was Lafargue in a celebrated controversy with M. Jaurès.

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To argue the question would be irrelevant here. I am myself convinced that even Engels took the "minimising" view, or adopted a position which was deterministic without being fatalistic.[1] And the position of Kautsky in spite of some lapses is even clearer; while about those of Labriola and Mehring there can be no doubt at all. The outline of the theory is substantially as I have presented it. Its imperfection is mainly in two respects. It does not really succeed in making intelligible the psychological problem of the relation of the individual to his economic class, for it merely assumes that a class always pursues its own interests, and secondly, its view of the nature of knowledge remains quite incoherent. If it is derived from Hegel and still retains some of the dialectic method and a great deal of the terminology, it has abandoned Hegelian logic. Both Engels and Kautsky, indeed, occasionally talk in a fashion which tempts one to regard them as the forerunners of pragmatism in logic, and behaviourism in psychology. These two defects coincide when we consider the relation of the moral ideal to scientific knowledge. Kautsky, it seems, wishes both to leave something outside of the sphere of the necessary, and to include everything within it. The paradox of Marxism is that its contention that socialism is inevitable is constantly interfering with its passionate desire to malign the capitalist.

A solution of both these problems, it must be admitted, has been provided and has received the benediction of Engels and of Kautsky.[2] It is that of Joseph Dietzgen,[3] a working man philosopher, whose position is certainly consistent with that of Marx, though it has little direct reference to society and is mainly logical. A description of it as the substitution of a materialistic monism for historical materialism is at least not misleading. To dis-

[1] For a discussion of this point v. Seligmann, *The Economic Interpretation of History*, Ch. IV., and Simkhovitch, *Marxism versus Socialism*, Ch. III.

[2] Engels, *Feuerbach*, p. 96, and Kautsky, *op. cit.*, preface.

[3] Dietzgen's chief works are: *The Nature of Human Brain Work* (1869); *Excursions of a Socialist into the Domain of Epistemology* (1886); *The Positive Outcome of Philosophy* (1895).

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cuss it would be irrelevant here. I will only say that I do not see that it advances considerably the disputable problems of Marxism, while its peculiar dialectic method makes it hard to understand and impossible to accept.

Not much acquaintance with the body of modern socialist literature or with the opinions of the rank and file of the socialist movement is required to show that their conception of class morality depends on that interpretation of the materialist conception of history, which makes economic development the sole element it is ever necessary to consider. And this is not surprising. For the distinction between a fundamental and a sole condition is notoriously difficult to grasp, and still more to continue to observe. From even the most "minimising" interpretation of the materialist conception of history, it follows that economic power precedes political power. This means that a class has political power, or can direct legislation to the control of conditions, economic or other, only when it is economically predominant. And to attempt to use political power without first possessing economic power is foolish. From this, however, it does not follow that political power does not matter, or that it is not either an indispensable means or an indispensable end. Those socialists, for example, who do not trouble about the legal disappearance of the right to strike and defend their position by reference to this principle, fail to see that this political move involves a real transference of economic power.

The essential feature of the Bolshevik position appears to be precisely this; and behind it—necessary indeed for the beginning of its comprehension—is the long history of the idea of class morality and class ethics. To dissolve the Constituent Assembly, and to substitute for it the exclusive authority of the Soviets has no meaning (apart from the hypothesis of original sin in the Bolsheviks) unless two things are granted: in the first place, the representation of the nature of social development which we have discussed, from which follows the moral right of the Soviets (which represent the peasants, together with the industrial workers

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of the towns), to control the community and impose their principles on it; and in the second place, the idea that the "interests" of the proletariat (which is now theoretically coincident with the community, the previous possessors having by expropriation been reduced to the position always occupied by the working class) are expressed only and solely through economic institutions. The Constituent Assembly, no doubt, was suspected of being overwhelmingly middle class, on the ground that its constitution was obsolete; and the notion was certainly present and operative that in a really democratic state, no institutions, other than the economic, are required. For these must either reduplicate the economic or not. In the first case they are useless, and in the second misleading. In a capitalist society, as we have seen, Marxists agree that when Parliament is not a mere creature of the Government, it is a farce; and the State is the executive of the master-class. The Bolsheviks apparently believed that of these evils which orthodox Marxism has always admitted, these institutions could not be purged. The grounds for this view are easy to conjecture, and a most interesting confirmation of them is found in a striking declaration by Lenin which appeared in *The Call* practically alone of English papers.[1] Its purpose is to lay down the dogma that delegate government is the only democratic method; and this it is clear is little more than the definite expression of a series of ideas to which the Bolsheviks have always been committed.

This, then, is the conclusion drawn from that interpretation of the materialist conception of history which tends to suggest that the economic is not the fundamental but the only relevant condition of social life, and where, therefore, economic class interest tends to be regarded, if not as the sole motive, at least, as the sole moral consideration. That the theory when fully stated does not justify these conclusions, our exposition should have shown. But in the needs of controversy, qualifications are apt to be dismissed

[1] *The Call* is the organ of the British Socialist Party. The article referred to appeared on July 18, 1918, and was entitled "What are the Soviets?"

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as of purely academic importance, to give place to an extreme simplification. The economic interpretation of history is always specially liable to this abuse. "The rule of the Soviets meant the assertion of the Revolution and of the working and peasant classes, whereas the rule of the Constituent Assembly would have meant the re-establishment of the rule of those very classes and parties which had nearly ruined the Revolution, and which spelt the moral and political subjection of the popular masses."[1]

Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks have raised an issue of fundamental importance. They assert that government by delegates is the only really democratic method. Government by representatives they regard as a mere political device of Capitalism. The Social Revolutionary, and Social Democratic parties, on the other hand, have committed themselves to the statement that "Russia's only hope of salvation" lies in the summoning of a constituent assembly. Socialist theory of every type must come to terms with the political conditions of community, and in particular must consider what the State means, what it does, and what it might do. Is it true that an acceptance of the idea that, in some sense, economic conditions of life are fundamental, involves as a consequence that political institutions have no function of their own, and must either reduplicate or falsify the economic? To admit this is syndicalism,[2] and it may be said to have driven collectivism out of the socialist house. But it will not be permitted to occupy it in solitary state. Guild socialism, for example, shows signs of taking up permanent residence there.

On the theory in general only one remark need be made, which must also serve as criticism. Even in its most de-

[1] *The Bolshevik Revolution—What It is and What It Means*, by M. Litvinoff (Plenipotentiary of the Russian People's Government to Britain), p. 47.

[2] A curious point of theory emerges here. The Bolsheviks appear to deny that their position coincides with that of Syndicalism, on the ground that they have provided for the interests of consumers as well as of producers. *Vide* the article on "The Bolsheviks at work," by M. Meshtcheriakoff, in *The Herald* for August 31, 1918. The text of the decree establishing control of the industry by the workpeople is given.

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veloped form, Marxism is haunted by the necessity for maintaining the distinction of scientific from Utopian socialism. Marx and Engels were in deadly fear of being thought benevolent or sentimental, and they desired, therefore, to formulate a version of socialism which would be impervious to that charge at least. Hence, making socialism scientific, for them, comes very near indeed to arguing that socialism you must have whether you like it or not. But all that opposition to Utopianism really commits them to is (1) that there is in social matters a regular orderly development, and (2) that moralising about the wrongs of labour or the delights of a Utopia does not show what is immediately or finally practicable. This sort of thing haunts their ethical theory: as we have seen above, it induces Kautsky to regard conscience as an instinct, and the moral ideal as moral indignation. The intellect, he suggests, can do nothing except tell us what is going to happen. It cannot evaluate; for evaluation is apparently in his eyes a purely emotional reaction which though useful and exciting is slightly improper.

If, however, we dismiss these prejudices, the way is clear for the formulation of an ethics based on the idea of class, which is not open, at least in the first instance, to the charge of subjectivism. To call it an "ethics" is not too wide a term, for it would advance a claim to the allegiance of all good men. Naturally it would be based on the ordinary principles about value which are established by the theory of abstract ethics. In the application of these it would proceed by the help of certain general principles about the development of society and the place in it of economic conditions, of the nature of an economic order and the relation to it of a class. It would get rid of the abstract simplification from which orthodox Marxism so plainly suffers. Plainly it would differ from most ethical theories by its insistence on the fundamental importance of economic conditions and activities. It would deny, for example, that these could ever be "sublated." In the end a distant resemblance might be detected to the Marxist

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theory we have been discussing. But that, after all, does little more than provide us with material. As the old Scots cobbler is reported to have said of the boots: "They'll need new soles and new uppers, but the auld whangs'll dae."

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HOW ARE MORAL JUDGMENTS ON GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS POSSIBLE? A NEGLECTED CHAPTER IN ETHICS.[1]

WILBUR M. URBAN.

I.

MORAL passion and enthusiasm have always aroused the suspicion of the philosopher. On the other hand, the cool intellectualism of the thinker is the object of resentment on the part of the generous man with good red blood in his veins. In most men, however, including the philosopher himself, there is fortunately or unfortunately, usually something of both at the same time. This natural and normal incoherence—which often makes a man at once a believer in economic determinism and a passionate hater of both individuals and institutions, has reached an unusual pitch as the result of the events of the past four years.

The situation is admirably illustrated in Maeterlinck's "In the Wrack of the Storm." The philosopher starts with passionate denunciations of the German people; is then aware of certain compunctions of the logician and thinker; and finally, abandoning all logic, settles down to a passionate and mystical judgment upon the German people as a whole. As men, few of us hesitate to use such judgments as his. Who of us doubts his right to pass judgments upon peoples and states, to convict them of sin and to demand works meet for repentance? Yet underneath this moral certainty is an undertone of intellectual skepticism which demands to know how these judgments are possible. It was Burke, I believe, who said, I do not know how to indict a whole people. Yet few hesitate to try their hand at this difficult if soul-satisfying task.

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[1] A paper read before the American Philosophical Association at its Cambridge Meeting, December, 1918.

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II.

The problem thus suggested has indeed been intensified, but by no means created by recent events. It merely emphasizes an incoherence of common sense which goes to the very roots of ethics and reveals what has long been a neglected chapter in ethical analysis. Moral judgments upon organizations, social classes, etc., although among the most frequent and most significant in actual moral life, are scarcely recognized in ethics itself. Our ethics being individualistic, only individuals are considered objects of moral judgment. More and more, it is true, what is called social ethics is being incorporated into treatises on morality. Collective action and impersonal organizations require, we are told, a readjustment of our ethical conceptions to meet them. The old individualistic ethics is said to be inadequate. Yet a social ethics is scarcely possible without recognizing the genuineness of judgments of this type, and the genuineness of these judgments seems scarcely possible without the recognition of social conscience and collective wills in some real and not merely figurative sense. The possibility of a social ethics, to say nothing of a genuine ethics of states, requires the development of certain ethical conceptions of which as yet there is scarcely a trace.[1]

III.

When we ask how such judgments as these are possible, we do not, of course, mean psychologically possible. From this viewpoint, the question would rather be: how could we possibly judge otherwise? In the Jewish ritual the question was asked: who is guilty? For the tribal Jew it was

[1] Strictly speaking, it is, of course, not true that only judgments upon individuals are recognized in ethics. Collective action, as well as individual conduct, is included among the objects of moral judgment, as, for instance, by Hoeffding explicitly and by Dewey and Tufts by implication. But such judgments may for our purpose best be described as quasi-ethical, in the sense that the collective action is judged only as means to ends, and not as expressing a will through which the means are realized. Full moral judgments are defined as ultimately on character, and as presupposing obligation and freedom. As thus defined, they would apply only to individuals and the type of judgments we have been considering would not come within their range.

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entirely natural to answer, "all, all are guilty." It was just as natural and inevitable for him to judge his enemy's tribe as a whole and to exterminate it root and branch. It is not surprising that the concept of racial and original sin should have arisen and dominated the world for centuries.

Reflection upon such tribal remorse and resentment inclines us to feel with Professor J. Hervey Robinson, their atavistic character at the present time, and to agree with him that when we once recognize their psychological origin and nature, we are not so likely to yield to them again. Yet in the end we feel that these judgments must have a deeper basis and significance. We are not only ready, like Bergson, to "choose indignation rather than understanding," but even, perhaps, to change the ways of our understanding. We feel that these judgments are so significant morally that they must be possible logically. Our intelligence must at least "keep on speaking terms with the universe."

IV.

The weight of sheer intellect is probably against the validity of these judgments. And common sense, which is always equivocal, is in one of its moods of the same mind.

"In conversation," says a recent writer, "and in newspaper philosophy, we speak of nations *as though* they were individual people. The Germans are brutal, the English are hypocritical. We seriously argue such propositions and we attach to the collective name of millions of individuals having every kind and degree of human character among them, qualities and emotions which properly pertain only to a particular individual of a particular character. There are only three genuine meanings here," he insists. "When I say that a nation is brutal, I may mean to characterize the policy and popular utterances of its government, or I may mean that a greater number of its people are brutal than in other countries. Or I may mean that the people of that country are more brutal than the brutal people in other nations. Other meanings there are none."

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All of which seems common sense and well calculated to give pause to passionate judgments. Only it unfortunately ignores the most important element in the situation. These are the only genuine meanings? If so, they do not include what most of us *mean* when we make such judgments. For, strictly speaking, if this is all they mean they are not moral judgments at all, but merely descriptions, more or less true. Such judgments form no basis for imputation of responsibility and guilt, and common sense, in another of its moods, insists that this is precisely what it means.

V.

Moral judgment on groups, as though they were "real personalities" is one of the most genuine facts of practical morals, and the business of ethics is to understand them, not to explain them away. An analysis of responsibility makes this clear. For responsibility is as hard to divide as sovereignty.

"It would be wrong for you," says an English judge in charging the members of the jury, "to be influenced by sentimental considerations of the fact that a fellow creature's life is at stake. Strictly speaking that has nothing to do with you. Your responsibility ends with the verdict. If the verdict is 'guilty,' the responsibility of taking the prisoner's life will rest upon the law. Not on the jury, not on his honor who passed the sentence of death, not on the officials who carry out the execution. The jury will do well to keep in mind that their responsibility, impressive and important as it is, is strictly limited."

Now common sense recognizes the necessity of this principle of limited and divided responsibility. But what intelligible meaning can we give to the responsibility of the law on the individualistic basis? Is it on the persons individually who made the law? Surely that is nonsense. On the individuals who assent to the laws? Is that any the less nonsense? For then the individual on the jury must assent to the law and he cannot abdicate the responsibility. Reflection leads one, I think, to the view that the

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division and limitation of responsibility is either an anti-moral fiction, or else it presupposes subjects of responsibility other than individual persons.

This becomes clearer when we examine another difficulty of the moral sense in locating responsibility, what I may call the phenomenon of "receding" responsibility. We have seen it in the case of the law. But it is especially tantalizing in all those cases where, on the assumption that guilt is always personal, it leads us a merry dance after the man "higher up," or after all the individuals that may be involved in a corporate action.

So far as mere moral emotion and resentment are concerned, I am sure that there are cases where a group, e.g., a corporation, by the very singleness of its acts and their motives, calls out an intensity of moral reaction which no individual of the group alone could. This accords with more reflective moral judgment also. That individual guilt and responsibility are ethically most unsatisfactory, is shown by the fact that it is difficult to get juries to convict "responsible" heads of corporations, and that the idea of the responsibility of the individual stockholder, in any significant sense, makes little appeal.

These difficulties, it is often claimed, are due to defects of mechanism and not of principle, and differ in no respect from those encountered in registering the will of all. But this I think is a misapprehension. The defects of mechanism are doubtless real. The impossibility of "unscrambling the eggs" is as true ethically as economically. Yet the difficulty goes deeper. It arises from our refusal to sanction, or at least our lukewarmness in ethically sanctioning, the fictions which a purely individualistic conception of responsibility must employ. When men blame the "system" rather than the individual there is a genuine moral reason although it is frequently marked by intellectual confusion. It is significant that, as history shows, the finding of an individual scapegoat upon which the "sins" of the community or group may be laid brings satisfaction to the moral sense only while moral excitement lasts. So soon as

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the passion dies down, the fictions underlying the procedure make themselves felt and another attitude of "common sense" takes its place.

VI.

The preceding is but a bare suggestion of one line of thought which might lead to the conception of "real personalities" as applied to groups. There are, of course other arguments even more important. There can be no doubt of the meaning of common sense when it passes these judgments. It is scarcely less doubtful what must be presupposed if these judgments are to be possible. What shall we say of the genuineness of the judgments, and of the validity of their presuppositions? There are, it seems to me, three possible attitudes towards this question.

First of all, we may consider such judgments upon collective wills as simply illusions, and unfortunate ones at that. The great difficulty with this view is that whatever may be said in theory no one believes it in practice. There is also the further difficulty that denial of the moral *quale* to these judgments tends to throw into disrepute our judgments on individuals also. If the objects of these judgments, the collective wills, are pseudo-simples it is not difficult to show that the same destructive analysis can be applied to individuals. My own view is that these two types of moral judgment must, so to speak, hang together or hang separately. Spinoza's "humanas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere," may or may not be true, but if it is true of one class of actions, it is true of another.

A second view is that these judgments rest upon fictions, but that, like certain legal fictions—such as the responsibility of the law, the conception of a corporation as a person, the maxim that the King can do no wrong, they are necessary and useful. Now it is possible, as some have held, that there are ethical as well as juristic fictions. Some have held that even the personality and freedom of the individual are fictions of this type (Jellinek). But there

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is a serious difficulty in such a view. Legal fictions are in some respects like æsthetic. Up to a certain point we accept them readily enough—although we see through their unreality. But there comes a point at which they become intolerable, precisely at that point where they go contrary to moral sense. Thus in English law there is the principle that every husband is to be considered father of the child if he is in the country at the time of its conception. This is at first not a fiction but a natural presumption of common sense. It becomes a fiction—and an intolerable one—when in law he is treated as the father, although he is not and it is known that he is not. Although workable within certain limits, such fictions ultimately break down. Ethical judgment seems irreconcilable with fiction, for the very good reason that genuine value judgments presuppose the truth and reality of their objects.

Finally we may recognize these deliverances of common sense as fundamentally valid. The general will and collective minds which they presuppose are not fictions but realities. This seems, for instance, to be the position of Kant's "*Rechtsphilosophie.*" Apparently this great representative of sublimated common sense did not hesitate to ascribe to such concepts as the general will and collective mind the same "practical" reality as to the human personality and its freedom. And for essentially the same reasons. It is the central conception of the *Lose Blätter*, where it constitutes the basis of all juristic conceptions. Kant, it is true, was concerned primarily with the values of civil freedom and the harmony of individual rights. "In order that there may be civil freedom," he says, "the law must be so fashioned that it may be looked upon as the general will." "Harmony of the rights of all is possible only through the legislation of an original total will, not as a fact (*faktum*) but as an idea. This collective unity is merely thought, not empirically given." But similar conceptions are equally necessary as the presuppositions of all valid judgments upon the wills through whom these values of liberty and harmony of rights alone are possible.

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For my own part, I do not hesitate to accept this view, tentatively at least. The difficulties in these conceptions of collective wills and group personalities no one who has studied them will be inclined to minimize. But the difficulties of denying them seem to me greater. Acceptance of this view does not, however, exclude the possibility of there being a fictional element in the terms and images in which these over-individual objects are envisaged. They may easily be semi-fictions, and very probably are. But so are many of the analogies in terms of which the individual person has been conceived.

Nor does this Kantian kind of argument, with its evidence for validity, exclude the possibility of evidence of a more empirical kind, based upon what some call the new psychology of the group consciousness. But on that point I will not venture to pronounce judgment. For myself, I am quite sure that here, as elsewhere in psychology, the results have been greatly overestimated. At the same time there seems evidence enough that group minds, whether on the level of mob action or of more self-conscious purpose, have other characters and follow other laws than those of individual minds acting separately. But the important point here is the evidence of a more practical and moral kind, namely, that with the denial of these objects of judgment, the values expressed by a large part of our moral judgments lose their meaning.

VII.

The close relation of this problem to international morality or the ethics of states is obvious. It is ordinarily supposed that the intellectual difficulties in this conception are to be found in the absence of supra-national sanction. Every right and every duty presupposes a subject of right, a subject of duty and an over-individual will to enforce these rights and duties. This difficulty, though genuine, is not the chief one. It is rather the problem of the existence of a *genuine subject* of rights and duties.

Of the morality of states in some sense there is for most of

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us no question. If there were, one argument would seem to be sufficient. No definition of the state is possible except in terms of some relation to moral ends, such as the protection of the rights of its citizens or the establishment of an indispensable ethical minimum. It is inconceivable that the state could in the long run fulfil its immanental moral ends, so to speak, and at the same time violate similar ends of a larger humanity. The contradiction is naturally felt to be intolerable. It is then not a question of the ethics of states, but of what sort and how.

"The state is bound," says the Bishop of Peterborough, "by precisely the same morality as binds the individual; for morality is not a duty of positive but of natural obligation and is binding therefore upon all men under all circumstances." Few would be disposed to question the good bishop's major premises too closely, but, except by begging the whole question at issue, it does not follow that morality is binding upon the state. "An individual may not," the bishop continues, "lie and steal for his wards, so neither may the state." If a state *could* lie and steal, this would probably be true. But suppose, with Bosanquet and others, we hold that the state can not lie and steal, that, to quote his words:

> to steal, to murder and to lie can not be public acts, for the reason that the selfishness and sensuality which has so much to do with the immorality of private actions can hardly be present in such an act of will, and it is therefore mere confusion to apply to public acts names borrowed from analogous acts of individuals within communities.

If we feel the force of this objection to equating private and public morality, perhaps we may do it in a less objectionable way. In his account of the collective will, Davis (*Ethics*, p. 212), says:

> In this oneness of will the divided becomes an individual, a Briareus. What is subjectively plural becomes objectively singular. The new individual is complete in its solidarity and the combination is to be judged as an undivided whole, whether it be a family, a mercantile firm, a society, an army, a nation. . . . Thus an organism, when it consists of men as an individual personality, is subject in all functional activity, both internal and external, to the moral law.

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This sounds reasonable, and it certainly represents common sense in the main. But it really is not very intelligible. For the old question remains. The combination is to be judged as an undivided whole, but how judged? Are the judgments here merely quasi-moral in the sense that the combination or organism is or is not a good instrument for its ends, or is it completely moral in the sense of having the full presuppositions of moral judgments of praise and blame? Only in the latter case have we, I think, the basis for a genuine ethics of states. And the latter case is possible only, I think, by the further development of the conception of 'associations as real personalities," a view which is beginning to play a new and more significant rôle in political theory.

This is not the place to enter upon the technical problems which such conceptions involve. The chief objection of a purely theoretical sort, as is well known, is the absence of that unity of self-consciousness which characterizes the individual personality. That this is not by any means insuperable, however, appears clear to men differing as greatly as Mr. H. G. Wells and Professor Wundt. Both think that the immediate oneness of self-consciousness is too inessential a characteristic to counterbalance the fundamental agreement of the analogy at other points. Another objection much more germane to our discussion is a practical one, heard in many quarters and well expressed by MacIver in the following way. "Such a concept," he says, "regards humanity as something more than men, nationality something more than the members of a nation. Not only can we not give meaning and concreteness to such a value, but the postulation of it deprives of actuality the values we actually know. It makes illusion of the personal values."

With regard to the first point Mr. MacIver is certainly wrong. Far from its being impossible to give meaning and concreteness to such a value, it is, as we have seen, something that we are constantly doing—every time we pass moral judgments upon a group or a nation. Nor is it at all clear that it makes illusion of the personal values. We

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should first have to know just wherein personal values consist. It is just this fallacy, I fancy, which underlies the common notion which sees in the attribution of a separate individuality or personality to the state the cause of the worst excesses of nationalism. Yet a more serious misreading of the concept is scarcely possible. Nothing is clearer than that these excesses arise from the impersonalism of the state, from the development of that economic imperialism which is the very antithesis of a cultural and spiritual entity. The cure for nationalism is rather more nationalism —in the sense of the development of such a national self-consciousness as will make it a fit subject for rights and duties.

VIII.

The difficulties inherent in moral judgments upon over-individual wills are genuine. But so are they in the case of our judgments upon individual persons. I have referred to them several times in passing. So great are these difficulties that for some thinkers, e.g., Royce, the individual person itself is considered "an ideal rather than a datum." If this is a possible and perhaps necessary conception in the case of the individual, it is *a fortiori* even more applicable in the case of collective wills.

To our question: how are moral judgments upon collective wills possible? we might then, without too great absurdity perhaps, answer as follows: "Strictly speaking, they are not possible now, or at least only partially possible. But they may be made possible." Burke said, he did not know how to indict a whole people, but it is conceivable that we may learn how to do it. That is, we may develop such concepts of peoples and states as will make these judgments significant. I may make my meaning clearer by the following quotation from Mr. J. A. Hobson's "Work and Wealth."

"Until we attribute," he says, "to Society such a degree and form of personality as can evoke in us those interests and emotions which personality alone can win, this social will will not be able to perform great works.

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It is," he continues, "of the greatest importance to obtain the widest possible acceptance of this conception. So long as society is spoken and thought of as an abstraction, no social conduct is safe and sound." Similarly we may say that, until we attribute to associations and states a similar degree and form of personality, no genuine moral judgments upon them are possible and consequently no conduct, no collective action on the part of such associations and states, can be safe and sound.

Mr. Hobson bases his conclusion upon a masterly analysis of the insufficiency of individual motives for social ends. We would base our similar conclusion upon a corresponding insufficiency of individuals taken distributively for significant moral judgments upon collective wholes. The present moral judgments upon associations, governments and peoples, of which a Mill no less than a Bosanquet speaks, are really not moral judgments in the full sense. They are at most only quasi-moral, in the sense that their objects are judged in relation to moral ends; but not as wills for the realization or non-realization of which ends they may be judged. The full moral judgments are yet to be validated, and this can be done only by creating the realities which will validate them.

IX.

For all this "mystical nonsense" the hard headed realist and nominalist is accustomed to say there is no whit of evidence. And common sense will in one of its moods agree with him. Yet the most confirmed opponent of this view must at times talk and judge as though this same nonsense were true. If he does not, if he says he is talking in figure, that such judgments are merely like the judgments that the sun rises and sets, he will have to reckon with common sense in a much more fundamental and perhaps exasperated mood.

This is one bit of evidence at least, of a very practical kind. But I am far from believing that other evidence is lacking. When our critic fails to find evidence for overin-

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dividual wills it is not for their validity so much as for the truth of the fictional analogies in terms of which they are envisaged. It is all a matter of looking for evidence in the right place. Elsewhere[1] I have developed at length the view here suggested that all knowledge of other mind (individual persons) is essentially valuing and that such valuing includes and is the source of our certainty of other minds. The evidence for collective mind is *mutatis mutandis*, of the same sort. But this is another story. That there is, however, such a thing as evidence for value and validity not to be confused with evidence for physical and psychical existence is something that should be kept in mind, as well as the important truth that we may very well know *that a thing is* and still have very inadequate ideas of its nature. Lack of evidence for the fictional analogies, whether of a Wells or a James Ward,[2] should not be construed as lack of evidence for the reality of the object itself, when we are aware of the reality in almost every pulsation of our valuing life; nor should our inability to picture the object to our entire satisfaction, be interpreted as inability to give concrete meaning and value to objects the reality of which in one of its most fundamental moods "common sense" never questions. If this is "mystical nonsense," it at least lies so close to common sense that the veil between them is rent whenever, as at the present moment, moral enthusiasm and passion have their way.

Yet I should leave an entirely false impression of the purposes of this discussion, should it be supposed that I am primarily concerned either with the practical and moral problems raised by the striking events of the present or with the philosophical puzzles to which our consideration of them have led. The first have served merely to point my moral; the second to suggest how far-reaching the implications of that moral are. My main object has been rather to suggest the obligation which ethics has, either to ration-

[1] "The Knowledge of Other Minds and the Problem of Meaning and Value," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVI, No. 3.

[2] *The Realm of Ends*, Lecture III.

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alize a large body of irrational judgments which have found their way into the science without logical justification, or else to cast them out root and branch.

With such an object the practical man will, it is true, have little sympathy. He will always find reasons for his resentments and admirations, reasons for anything he wants to do; and a practical philosophy will always be ready with pragmatic sanctions for any desires of the social or legal will. But this way is not open to the responsible moral leader, still less to the ethical thinker who makes some pretence to scientific obligation. I admit my temerity in reviving an old and puzzling problem when I am able to contribute so little to its solution. My only justification lies in the fact that I feel the utter failure of ethics to deal adequately with a significant group of moral judgments—the need, in short, of calling attention to a much neglected chapter in that ancient science.

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THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIENCE.

RICHARD ROBERTS.

I.

WHEN Gladstone challenged English Catholics to say how they would act in the event of a collision between the commands of the Queen and the Pope, the greatest of modern English Catholics took up the gage and gave answer. "It is my *rule*," said Newman, "both to obey the one and to obey the other; but that there is no rule in this world without exceptions; and that if either the Pope or the Queen demanded of me an 'Absolute Obedience,' he or she would be transgressing the laws of human nature and human society. I give an absolute obedience to neither. Further, if ever this double allegiance pulled me in contrary ways, which in this age of the world I think it never will, then I should decide according to the particular case, which is beyond all rule and must be decided on its own merits. I should look to see what theologians could do for me, what the Bishops and clergy around me, what my confessor; what friends whom I revered; and if after all I could not take their view of the matter, then I must rule myself by my own judgment and my own conscience."[1] He then goes on to insist upon "the duty of obeying our conscience at all hazards," and supports his view by an appeal to weighty Roman authorities. "Certainly," he concludes, "if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts (which indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink —to the Pope, if you please,—still to Conscience first and to the Pope afterwards."[2]

Forty years before this English controversy, a great French Catholic found himself in just this dilemma. No man had more consistently maintained the duty of sub-

[1] *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, p. 69 (New York, 1875).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 86. For a luminous discussion of this episode see H. J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, pp. 121 ff.

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mission to the Pope than Lamennais. His hard fight for religious liberty in France was precisely for the right of the Catholic to render to the Pope a full and undivided allegiance in all matters relating to the content and practice of faith. But a time arrived when the Pope came to exact from Lamennais a submission he was unable to make. As he would not allow the state to have jurisdiction in the spiritual sphere, so he denied to the Pope jurisdiction in the civil. The Pope would not consent to this modification of his claim to authority, and demanded of Lamennais an unqualified submission. To which demand Lamennais replied, "Most Holy Father, a word from your Holiness is always enough for me, not only to obey it in all that religion ordains but to comply with it in everything that conscience allows."[1] "Outside the church," he wrote to the Countess de Senfft, "in the strictly temporal order, and more particularly in that which touches the affairs of my country, I do not recognise any authority which has the right to impose an opinion upon me or to dictate my conduct. I say it emphatically,—in that sphere which is not that of the spiritual power, I will never renounce my independence as a man; nor will I, for thought or action, ever take counsel but of my conscience and my reason."[2] In this course, Lamennais followed the judgment of Cardinal Jacobatus in what Newman calls his "authoritative work upon councils": "If it were doubtful whether a precept (of the Pope) be a sin or not, we must determine thus: that if he to whom the precept is addressed has a conscientious sense that it is a sin and injustice, first, it is his duty to put off that sense; but if he cannot, nor conform himself to the judgment of the Pope, in that case it is his duty to follow his own private conscience and patiently to bear it if the Pope punishes him."[3]

These two episodes are worth recalling at the present time in view of the danger of minimising the importance of

[1] Boutard, *Lamennais, sa vie et ses doctrines* II., p. 382.
[2] *Ibid.*, II., p. 370.
[3] Quoted in Newman, *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, p. 85.

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conscience which lurks in the current somewhat contemptuous criticism of the conscientious objector. Obviously the position taken by Newman and Lamennais is only sound so long as we agree with Newman that conscience is "the aboriginal vicar of Christ," that is to say, that it is the inner embodiment of an ultimate moral order against which there can be no appeal. It is indeed difficult to see how anyone who accepts a religious view of the world can avoid this estimate of conscience. Even Lord Morley who speaks of "the higher expediencies" where a religious believer might speak of an ultimate moral order reaches the judgment that this is a region in which no man ought to compromise. It is therefore singular that the most drastic criticism of the conscientious objector both in England and in America comes from ministers of religion; and it is the more singular, in view of the fact that in the Roman Catholic Church (where religion is especially an affair of authority), the supremacy of the individual conscience is conceded, that the non-authoritarian churches which were born out of the struggle for the rights of conscience, should have been so intolerant and suspicious of the conscientious objector.

At first sight there appears to be no real analogy between the case of the conscientious objector at the present time and that propounded by Newman. Newman postulates a conflict of loyalties to two societies, whose requirements are at a given point antagonistic, before invoking the arbitrament of conscience. The conscientious objector is, however, conceived as setting his own private judgment against the will of the only society to which he owes allegiance. That is, at least, how it looks on the surface. But in point of fact, the conscientious objector as a rule bases his action on the ground of loyalty to a certain view of human relationships, that is to say, to a social ideal; and in the case of a man like Stephen Hobhouse whose social idealism has been validated by a unique realism of self-renunciation and sacrifice, it would be idle to deny that the conflict of loyalties was very concrete and authentic. The socialist conscientious objector who sees in the International, if not the

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city of God, at least its threshold, and who does not conceive himself absolved from his loyalty to it even though the German socialists betrayed it, is moved by no personal eccentricity but by a real social emotion. In the British House of Commons it has been suggested that the conscientious objector may after all turn out to be the pioneer of that international society to which all temperate men are looking; and that we may yet be grateful for his witness when we recall how easily its truth might have been forgotten amid the urgencies of war.

II.

The conscientious objector—whatever the subject-matter of his dissent—has always been an exasperating figure to his orthodox contemporaries. This may be partly due to the inertia and the dislike of dissent which settle upon middle-aged communities; but at the present time it is probable that the impatience with the conscientious objector springs from other and more respectable sources. Yet by a curious paradox the two principal sources are logically antithetical.

The first is the circumstance that the mental habit of this generation has been profoundly affected by the supremacy of the machine. Its characteristic intellectual achievement is the pragmatist philosophy; and as much in religion and sociology as in the physical sciences its main preoccupation is with processes. It requires efficiency for immediate concrete objects rather more than faithfulness to what seem to be remote and imponderable abstractions. Conscientious objection is chiefly irritating because it appears so palpably futile, and indeed so vexatiously obstructive of the business in hand. Not only does it not work, it actually hinders the work in which the multitude is engaged. It puts the machine out of gear; in a supreme emergency when all hands should be at the pumps, the conscientious objector puts us to the trouble of putting him in irons. That is obviously—and naturally—how the case looks. The gulf between the conscientious objector and common opin-

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ion is, partly at least, made by a difference of emphasis upon principle and process. The conscientious objector—being perhaps a sort of reversion to a less sophisticated age—puts the process to the test of principle and finds them incompatible. Common opinion, in the exercise of a presumably more realistic judgment says,—"This is the only process available, let us make the best use of it we can, and take the risk of coming to terms with principles afterwards, if that be necessary." The one hitches his wagon to a star; the other hitches it to anything that is going its way. Upon the merits of this kind of controversy, contemporary judgments are notoriously unsafe; unfortunately none of us will be living at the time when it will be possible to say with assurance who was in this case the true realist after all. Meantime the conscientious objector, however despised, may help us to a healthier balance between ultimate principle and immediate process than any of us have had this many a day.

But along with (and somewhat incongruously) the mechanistic habit of thought, there is a survival of the Hegelian idealism which has been chiefly responsible for the modern apotheosis of the national state. It is not the Prussian only who has affirmed the sovereignty and omnicompetence of the state and its right to undivided obedience; but being more mechanically and remorselessly logical than his neighbours, he has carried the doctrine to a more definite point. But it seems to be generally assumed in all popular political thinking to-day that our loyalty to the state should be not only first but absolute over all the other loyalties of life. In our day, this view has received, particularly in democratic communities, a subtle and plausible reinforcement from the growing emphasis upon the fact of social solidarity with its implication that the consensus of the community fixes the norm of conduct. A man's conscience should (it is averred) reflect the collective conscience of the society. Moreover, the egalitarian postulates of republican democracy are construed to require a uniformity of conduct no less complete than that demanded by the

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political theory of autocracy; and the unpardonable sin is to break the ranks. "The true democratic principle," says Lord Acton, "that every man's freewill shall be as unfettered as possible, is taken to mean that the freewill of the collective people shall be fettered in nothing."[1] Democracy which has sloughed the archaism of autocracy has yet to outgrow the Austinian doctrine of sovereignty; and this it must also do, if it is not to be in danger of ceasing to be the home and becoming the tomb of liberty,—and with liberty, of much else beside. When it no longer tolerates the nonconformist and the moral pioneer, it is foredoomed to decay; for it is historically true that dissent of this type has always proved to be the growing point of society.

III.

This is not a plea for the conscientious objector, but for democracy. Newman said that if the Pope spoke against conscience, "he would commit a suicidal act. He would be cutting the ground from under his feet." The authority of the Pope is not shaken because he concedes to conscience the liberty of dissent; rather is it confirmed. Even more so do the stability and growth of democracy depend upon its recognition of the inviolability of the individual conscience; for democracy cannot live except its roots be deep struck in the moral nature of man. The ultimate battle-ground of democracy is in men's hearts; and its appeal must at last ever be to men's consciences. But the appeal to conscience has no meaning unless conscience be free; and when democracy constrains men's consciences it is writing off its own spiritual charter. Even in time of war, it is safer for democracy to let a hundred shirkers go scot-free rather than run the risk of penalising an honest conscience. For by its affirmation of the sovereignty of conscience, it reinforces the consciences of all its members and wins the deeper loyalty of those who are constrained to dissent from its policy on particular issues.

What the effect of the war will be upon general specula-

[1] Lord Acton, *The History of Liberty.*

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tive thought it is difficult to forecast; but it seems likely that it will strike a path which will be equally distant from Hegelian idealism and from pragmatism. We may be on the threshold of a reign of personal idealism in thought, in which case it is evident that conscience will attain to a new importance. And in any case it is likely that the political philosophy of the future will tend in a direction which will more than ever make the appeal to conscience a necessary postulate of social order. Already the recoil from the sovereign state is in full movement. The exigencies of modern life have created a number of associations of an economic and cultural kind each of which is in its own field an independent focus of authority. The Bank Clearing House, the Trade Union, the Medical Association, all these are *imperia in imperio* in a very real sense: and it is not inconceivable that occasions may arise when they may be found in conflict with the state, as indeed was the case in the opposition of the British Medical Association to the Health Insurance Act of 1912. A similar contingency is not unthinkable in the event of a renewed Church; indeed the Passive Resistance Movement in England after the passing of Mr. Balfour's Education Acts is a case in point of such conflict between Church and State. Moreover, many of these associations are becoming increasingly international in character,—and this circumstance adds great complexity to the problem of personal duty. And when the League of Nations arrives (as soon, please God, it will) we shall have still another possibility of a sharp conflict of loyalties. And amid this labyrinth of obligation, how shall we be guided if we may not fall back upon the instances of conscience? It is indeed only by a frank recognition of the moral autonomy of the individual that we can establish any kind of moral order in the world. There are, of course, other ways of securing a quiet world,—for a time; but in any case a quiet world is not necessarily a moral world.

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WILL THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS WORK?

DURANT DRAKE.

THE most important achievement which the successful termination of the war makes possible is undoubtedly the creation of the long needed League of Nations or supernational government. The overthrow of the political autocracies, which vigorously opposed the plan, the free hand given to the Allies, who have pretty thoroughly committed themselves to it, the discrediting of the policy of nationalistic selfishness and the marked success attending the policy of international co-operation, make it certain that a serious effort is about to be made to restrict permanently the rights of nations by some sort of higher authority. President Wilson, the unquestioned leader of mankind to-day, has pointed the way; publicists, statesmen, political parties, and a horde of popular writers are advertising this next step in human progress.

The federation of the world is coming. But how fast? How great a leap forward will statesmen dare now to take? And, whatever plan they try to put into operation, will it work? The answer to these questions depends upon the state of mind of the people of the nations that are to be thus federated. It is not exclusively a problem for statesmen and students of international law, though their expert services will be needed. It is in even greater degree a problem for the moralists, the educators, the editors and preachers, and all who can help mould the minds of men. For difficult as it will be to draw up a just and workable system of international law and administration, that difficulty is as nothing to that of persuading the people of the component nations to give that loyal allegiance to this new authority which alone can transform it from a paper plan into a working system.

For the crucial fact is this: the acceptance of any supernational authority will involve sacrifice; sometimes material sacrifice, sometimes sacrifice of prestige or supposed

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"honor," of national aspirations and expectations. Certainly the advantages gained will far outweigh the sacrifices. But that is the case with all morality, and yet morality by no means easily prevails over the selfishness and shortsightedness of men's hearts. Into the field of politics and economic rivalry morality has scarcely begun to penetrate,—its conquest of this great field will at best be pathetically slow. So the one outstanding and obvious duty of the hour is to prepare the way for the coming of the league, to make its paths straight. Every school and church and newspaper should be mobilized. The great organization of writers and speakers who have been giving their services to keep this nation in war temper should instantly be utilized to awaken and mould the temper which alone can sustain an organized, enforced, and lasting justice and peace.

The first aspect of this task—and that which will doubtless be most readily recognized—is to convince the peoples of the imperative necessity of the league; not merely that it may be created, but that it may be loyally upheld through the long period of readjustments and necessary concessions. We must not let the world lapse into a complacent self-congratulation on the collapse of Teutonic militarism and the exit of Kaisers and kings. Other nations may yet become powerful, arrogant, imperialistic; the lessons of history are quickly forgotten by the ambitious and the proud—and, indeed, there are examples of successful aggression as striking as those of defeated ambition. Sources of friction and bitterness will long persist, injustices will still rankle, thwarted ambitions still smoulder. The growing complexity of international relations will produce more occasions than ever for friction. Nothing is more likely than that this will *not* be the last war, unless we set to with utmost determination and create a mechanism which shall make the penalties for aggression so instant and certain that it will be universally recognized as suicidal.

The conclusion to be drawn from this candid forecast is not that drawn by the jingoes in each nation, who bid their

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countrymen continue to prepare to defend their territory and their honor, but rather that drawn by the prophets of the new era, who insist not only that the individual nation ought not to have to defend itself—any more than the individual citizen has to—but that it must not be *allowed* to make for itself the momentous decision of war. The right and the duty, to make war must be taken away from the nation, as the right to murder has been taken away from the citizen, and lodged in a higher tribunal. For the nations are too prejudiced, too hot-headed, too ambitious, too sensitive as to what they call their rights and their honor, to be entrusted with so dangerous a privilege. War in the future must be the prerogative of the supernational government alone; only so can the nations be rescued from the pall of insecurity and the cost of self-protection.

It is in the nick of time that this step is to be taken. An internationally decreed war, if it should ever be necessary, to down an unruly and defiant nation, would be short and certain and probably localized. Another anarchic war, like that from which we have just emerged, would probably mean the suicide of civilization. For inventiveness has by no means reached its limit with regard to destruction; and the horrors of war might well be far beyond anything the world has yet experienced. The submarine of the future, used by a nation with a long coast line, and ample resources, will be able to paralyze shipping and produce starvation on a scale not yet realized. The aircraft of the future, with their new explosives, will be able to destroy every city, every railway and waterway, every storehouse of grain. The poisoning of water-supply, the release of virulent disease-germs, and of deadly gases, might be done on such a scale as quickly to exterminate whole nations. Yes, war *must* end, or it will end human life on earth. And the surest way, probably the only way, to end it is to make militaristic enterprise obviously unprofitable, by the creation of a supernational executive body, backed by armed forces and existing for the avowed purpose (among other things) of *making* it unprofitable.

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We must combat, then, by might and main, that vague optimism that expects things to come out all right if they are let alone, that inertia that would let the peoples sink back into another era of unchecked nationalistic rivalry. It is to be hoped that the pacifists, *i.e.*, the passivists, who counted on the efficacy of non-resistance in touching the hearts of the predatory and the proud, who thought that words, and paper treaties, could shame them or win them to a brotherly spirit, have learned their lesson. Isolated instances to the contrary, human nature is, unhappily, such that its fiercer impulses cannot be tamed by charity and patience. Will must be met by will, force by readiness to use force. The ingenuity for evil and the blind passions of men, must be counteracted by a greater ingenuity in devising the good, and a greater and wiser passion in embodying it. *Effort*, effort of organization, of thinking, of training, of education, is the inexorable price of progress.

On the other hand, if overoptimism is dangerous, pessimism is treason. We *must* believe that this great task can be achieved, and to him who casts doubt we must cry "Shame"! We are naturally, and properly, afraid of faith, these latter days. Faith has so often meant the effort of believing what is irrational, unevidenced or obviously untrue. Because of faith, the spread of a sane and scientific world-view is still seriously blocked. But what we need is, after all, not less faith, but a better founded faith. There are some things which it is hard to believe psychologically, though it is not hard rationally—as when the child learning to swim is told that the water will buoy him up if he lies still, or moves his arms gently. That is the proper province for faith,—to keep us believing ardently, not in "what we know ain't true," but in what we know *can be made* true, if we will. As in William James' famous parable of the Alpine climber who needed faith to enable him to jump the chasm which confronted him, so the world now needs faith that the chasms between nations can be successfully bridged. We must learn the lessons taught by the historic faiths, and utilize this tremendous dynamic, not so much in

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enabling men to bear the ills of life with serenity, as in enabling them to dare and attempt and conquer those ills. Why, indeed, should not this great faith and loyalty form the core of our religion? And what would it be, after all, but loyalty to the Christian ideal of the Brotherhood of Man, and the Christian faith in the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth?

But—as the experience of the Christian Church only too well shows—a sense of the imperious need and worth of our ideal, and faith in it, are not the only psychological prerequisites to its realization. We must translate that ideal into concrete attitudes and sacrifices for everyday use. We must be willing, not only in the abstract, but with reference to each particular case, to see the general interest of mankind prevail over our own national desire. We must loyally abide by the majority decision of the supernational tribunal, even if we feel it to be unjust or mistaken. We must care more for the welfare of the world than for the welfare of America—just as we now care more (or ought to care more) for the welfare of America than for the welfare of New York or Illinois.

Reference to contemporary newspapers, congressional reports, and the conversation of the man on the street, shows what a long way we have yet to go in the matter of cultivating this attitude. For example, as an argument against the desirability of joining a League of Nations, Senator Cummins recently declared that the United States would not, in the concrete emergency, remain loyal to the dictates of such a league. "What would the United States do? My answer is that it would do whatever its people at that time believed it was for the interests of the country to do."[1]

Doubtless for this country not to take such an individualistic and selfish attitude will require a change of heart on the part of multitudes. But the alternative to such a wholesale conversion is the continuance of inter-

[1] As quoted in the *New York Times*, January 31, 1917.

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national anarchy. And he who harps upon the difficulties of the change is a slacker.

What shall we say, then, of those who openly *oppose* the change? "There is only one national morality which we Americans have a right to consider—the interest of America. . . . Any American in a position of power or influence who allows any consideration but the selfish interests of America to guide him is a traitor."[1]

This shockingly outspoken advocacy of collective selfishness is, it is to be feared, but a candid expression of the conscious or latent temper of great masses of our people. Is there not clear indication here that our schools and churches have been woefully at fault in failing to make the present generation realize that such collective selfishness, even when masquerading under the name of patriotism, is far wickeder and infinitely more disastrous than individual selfishness?

If this is "nationalism," one must sympathize with the idealists, such as Sir Rabindranath Tagore, Mr. L. P. Jacks, Mr. Henry Ford, who denounce nationalism as the great curse of the world. One must sympathize with Mr. Bouck White's symbolic burning of the American flag, and the refusal of the Baltimore schoolboys to salute it. We must spurn a mental attitude which has been responsible probably for more suffering than any other mental twist that has ever obsessed the human race. If this be patriotism, patriotism is indeed, in Johnson's famous words, "the last refuge of a scoundrel," the camouflage by which mob-selfishness masks its true nature.

But need patriotism be selfishness? Why can we not cultivate a loyal and proud love of our country that shall be above all things sensitive to keep it from the dishonor of self-seeking? Certainly, under our President's noble leadership, our nation sprang to arms in April, 1917, with little trace of selfish intent. By that great and chivalrous

[1] J. M. Patterson, in *Notebook of a Neutral*, New York, 1916. The whole book is in this vein.

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act it has perhaps wiped out the stains of certain earlier acts of aggression and self-seeking. Will that spirit of service, of national sacrifice for the good of mankind, persist during the less exciting months of the peace settlement? Shall we check all desire for revenge, all impulse to seize this opportunity to push our own trade at the expense of that of other nations, or to boycott the beaten nations and add, for our own profit, to the crushing burdens under which they must, at best, for many decades stagger?

Certainly, if we do any of these things, we must not call such selfishness patriotism. That splendid word is rightly applied to something quite different—to the spirit where men subordinate their individual wills to the common will, renounce, if necessary, their separate interests, or offer their lives for a larger good, and find their joy in so doing. Patriotism, in short, rightly spells not selfishness but sacrifice; and there is nothing better or nobler in human life. But patriotism, thus conceived, is a matter of concentric circles. Loyalty to one's family, or to one's club or college, does not imply disloyalty to the city or village in which one lives; nor does civic pride involve disloyalty to state or nation. Similarly, love and loyalty to our country does not rightly require disloyalty to the great brotherhood of man which not only Christianity but the most elementary common sense holds up to us as the supreme object of our sacrifice and service. Surely we must cultivate "the international mind"—it is our most pressing duty just now, because international sentiment has as yet been so little cultivated. But to suppose that the era of international co-operation and supernational loyalties is going to lessen our local prides and patriotism is a serious blunder. It is going to clarify and purge them, it is not going to make them less coercive or less beautiful.

Difficult questions, of course, will arise on every hand. Is it group-selfishness for us to continue to keep our flag over the Philippines? Is that an infringement of the now fully accepted principle of the right of the peoples of the earth to choose their own rulers, an infringement perpetu-

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ated because of our pride in seeing our dominions far flung across the seas, or because we covet control of their trade, or because we are impatient at their ways of doing things and take satisfaction in Americanizing their methods? Or, on the contrary, is the continuance of our rule in those islands due to a profound conviction on the part of those who know the conditions there, that that rule is for the present necessary to avert civil war or anarchy, and therefore our part of the "white man's burden"? Doubtless there are two sides to the argument. But in how many discussions is the welfare of the islanders made the one consideration? And even if it is the avowed consideration, can we be sure that our view of the evidence is not biased by the unacknowledged pull of the selfish motives?

How about the Monroe Doctrine, which even such an idealist as Mr. Bryan says we will not dream of surrendering? What right have we to arrogate to ourselves the office of protector of the nations in the continent to the south of us? Would it not be a wise humility for us to commit their safety into the hands of the world-federation? By so doing we should allay their present widespread suspicion of our intentions, ensure their independence even more firmly than we alone can guarantee it, and cease to irritate Europe by our "No trespassing" placard. And honestly, now that we have interfered in the affairs of Europe, so opportunely and effectively, how can we maintain our old theory of the dichotomy of interests between the hemispheres?

Import duties are another constant cause of national rivalries, jealousies, and irritation. Obviously, world-wide free-trade is the ultimate ideal toward which we must work. We have but to picture to ourselves how the development and prosperity of this country would have been hampered by the existence of tariff barriers between the states, to realize how the prosperity of the Great Community has been obstructed by such barriers between nations. But there will have to be a much more widely diffused education in economics before the peoples of many of the nations will

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vote for free trade. Mr. Hughes, the Australian premier, insisted just the other day on the right of the separate nations to impose tariffs at their own sweet will. It would be clearly unwise to attempt too much in the way of internationalization at once, and the league will doubtless have to consent to regard tariff-making as an internal national affair. If that is so, it is essential that we should refuse to let ourselves be exasperated by the tariffs of other nations, however irksome they may be to our industries. That virtue of live and let live should be far easier for us than for the British, who open their own doors to the products of all nations, and might reasonably expect the same privilege from them.

Greater relinquishments of sovereignty than that involved in the abolition of tariff barriers may, however, be necessary. Reduction of fleets and armies to the proportional standard required by the supernational council, acceptance of the boundary lines decided upon by the supernational court, compulsory passing of legislation to grant a proper freedom to racial minorities within a nation —such concessions may come hard to proud and powerful nations, but are essential if the league is to function. Hence it is dangerous individualism in Mr. Bryan, for example, to say, "I am not willing that this nation shall put its army and navy at the command of a council which we cannot control."[1] Or for Professor P. M. Brown to write, "Nations cannot jeopardize the freedom necessary for the achievement of their separate purposes and ideals by submitting to a common sovereign possessing coercive powers. An international executive thus becomes undesirable and repugnant, a menace to the legitimate aims and sensibilities of nations."[2]

We must face the truth that the sacrifices required will be greater for some nations than for others. If it falls to our lot to make a concession for the general good, we must

[1] In his speech at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1916.

[2] P. M. Brown, *International Realities*, p. 117.

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be ready to make it. Moreover, there are few precedents upon which to base decisions in international matters, there are few judges not unconsciously biased. Impartial, absolutely just and wise decisions we hope there will be; but there are bound to be many that seem, and are, one-sided, unfair to some nation, based upon an insufficient grasp of the facts, or colored by passion and prejudice. The essential thing is that we take these decisions, when they are made, as good sports; just as in baseball the game cannot go on unless both sides accept in good humor the umpire's decisions, however unjust and disastrous they may seem.

These difficulties can be overcome if we have the will to make the league work, if we care enough to make the necessary concessions. If not, they will wreck the undertaking. Our plain duty, then, is to forget our fears and suspicions of other nations' intentions, our bitterness and hatred and scorn of their wrongdoing, and to cultivate sympathy and understanding. For the former mental attitudes create trouble just as surely as the latter heal it. Our great danger now is not from Germany, or Japan, or any other nation, it is from ourselves. We are unchastened by years of suffering, we are rich, proud, unbeaten; we want *our* way in everything. All about us we hear the exultant or suspicious words of those who would have us punish more severely an already prostrate Germany, keep our clutch on her throat, treat her as her autocratic rulers would have treated us. In no such way can a lasting peace be established. Might does not make right simply because it is our might. The time has come to apply the Golden Rule in politics. What we should be thinking of is not Germany's past sins, but the future of the family of nations. It is not "surrendering to Germany" to return good for her evil, it is safeguarding the future welfare of men.

Patriotism, like charity, begins at home. But it does not end there. Only as we cultivate a sense of duty to all our sister-nations, a "put yourself in their place" attitude, and a firm loyalty to the common legislative, judicial and

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administrative machinery which is gradually to be created, can we seriously believe that the era of international wars is over and attainment by peaceful means of justice and prosperity for all the peoples of the earth on its way to realization.

DURANT DRAKE.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

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EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION.

ERNEST CARROLL MOORE.

I.

WHAT is the chief lesson of the war? It has tested many a theory and rejected many a conclusion. The activities of almost every department of human life have been forced to submit themselves to its criticism. Politics, ethics, religion, philosophy, science, economics, literature, and even art emerge from its crucible different, very different, from what they were before it laid its bloody hands upon them. So impartially has it brought human interests to trial by ordeal of battle, that each separate man of us is convinced that its chief lesson concerns his own, rather than his neighbor's calling. The world is in a highly progressive condition with such a wealth of newly proved insight to put to work.

Education is among the human interests which have been put to the trial. The war has, indeed, been the proving stage of two colossal educational experiments. The first of these began some fifty years ago, in Germany, at the time that her autocratic government began to form its plans for the subjugation of the world. Germany's educational experiment is in some respects the most remarkable demonstration of the power of teaching in the annals of the world. Mr. Benjamin Kidd, the author of that very remarkable book, "The Science of Power," regards the transforming influence of the German schools as a distinguishing mark of modern history. Their education was directed "almost exclusively to the ends of war and to the fastening on the world of ideals founded on war for their maintenance. Even so directed, it has produced an example in history of self-sacrifice, so colossal and so admirable," he says, "as to appear, to use the words of a recent American writer, 'almost superhuman,' albeit an example of almost superhuman power so misdirected as to

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constitute 'one of the most pathetic events in the history of mankind.' "

All wars, we are told, are wars about doctrine. Germany prepared this one by a process of indoctrination, so deliberate and so thoroughgoing as to be without a parallel in the records of men. National existence and national strength are due to folks agreeing, uniting, and sticking together to the end. The Germans desired the same things, hoped for the same things, and worked almost superhumanly to accomplish them. The time came when they began to see that their plan could not succeed. At that point they gave it up, at least for the time being, but they were apparently as united concerning the desirability of their plan at the end as they were at the beginning.

They . . . plotted, planned, and almost accomplished the enslaving of the race. They carried their purpose into execution with a brutality which has never been exceeded. How did they transform their own people into such willing implements of slaughter? How did they persuade flesh and blood folks to devote themselves to a cause so unrighteous? If we can find out, we may be able to use the process—or some parts of it—for better ends.

The means which Germany used were her schools. The war was schoolmaster made. She had twenty-one universities and eleven technical high schools of superior grade. Since the founding of the Empire, her population increased from forty millions to sixty-five millions, but the number of students in these institutions of higher learning increased from eighteen thousand to sixty thousand. There were some thirty-four hundred professors in the universities, and about seven hundred fifty in the technical schools, or a total professorate body of four thousand two hundred men. All were state officers. Formerly they made much of their freedom; but in recent years they have become "mere gramaphones" for the officials. There is evidence that their transformation has been going on a long while. Even as long ago as 1880 Hillebrand wrote that "the nation in which Madam de Staël did not find two minds

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thinking alike on any subject has become singularly gregarious, nay uniform; the great producer and consumer of original ideas is content nowadays to feed on some few watchwords mechanically repeated." "Money, titles and decorations play a considerably more important part at present than during the first half of the nineteenth century," said Paulsen when he wrote his *German Education—Past and Present.*

The German patriotism which produced the war was not naïve and natural, like that of older days; it was forced, intentional, manufactured, the result of that pounding-in process which Price Collier found so nauseating. The great professors and the little professors have for many years back been apostles of *Weltmacht.* In every one of the twenty-one universities and the eleven technical high schools there was never-ending talk about race psychology and the natural superiority of *Herrenvolk* to *Pöbelvolk*, the blessing of war and the lofty duty of all Germans. The Germans have a saying that a professor is a man who always has another reason. But those three hundred and fifty-two professors who on June 20, 1915, signed the petition to the Imperial Chancellor urging the government to utilize the military results, gained at such great sacrifice, "to the extreme attainable limit," did not have "another reason." They were engaged only in echoing official opinion—even as the famous ninety-three in their declaration had done at the beginning of hostilities.

It is difficult to understand how a crime so colossal and so deliberate came to be conceived. Its origin will have to be investigated more carefully than it has yet been, before we can be quite sure of the details of its beginning and the steps of its development. It is quite clear that the forty-two hundred professors in the universities and technical schools were active agents in promoting it. It may even in time be discovered that some of their number originated it and supplied it to the government. Von Treitschke seems at least to have aspired to that rôle. At any rate, when the officials had once taken it up,

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the professors became the most active propagandists which it had.

German higher education clearly had a Jekyll and Hyde character. It seemed to be concerned with the humanities, with ethics, literature and philosophy, but its real objective was something very different—something as far removed from these things as the East is from the West. The results of its cultivation of the humanities were quite indifferent, but what it really purposed it achieved.

An even more interesting question concerns the German people. If the universities indoctrinated the leaders, who indoctrinated the followers? That is a truly amazing story. There is a book which circulated freely in our country before we entered the war, which has something to say upon that subject. It is a propagandist volume called "Modern Germany, by various German Writers." Professor Troeltsch contributes an article on German Kultur in the course of which he explains that in Germany "the school organization parallels that of the army. The public school corresponds to the popular army. The latter, as well as the former, was called into being during the first great rise of the coming German state in opposition to Napoleon." The philosopher Fichte advised the Germans to adopt an educational program of three parts, schools for the people, middle schools, and the university. "This," says Professor Troeltsch, "has become the real formative factor of the German spirit."

The Germany which made the war was a land of castes. Her school system was not intended to open opportunity to everyone. They did not set up a ladder reaching from the kindergarten to the university. They made the *Volksschule* a thing apart to keep the toiling millions of the lower classes in their place, and teach them such unquestioning obedience as would make them pliant and devoted tools of the officials. The *Volksschule* was a free school; the others were not. The German child of working parents entered it at six years of age, and normally continued in its classes until he reached the age of fourteen.

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He studied no foreign language during this period. But the child of more fortunate parents who was to be trained for a career did not go to the *Volksschule*. He entered the *Gymnasium*, or the *Realschule*, or the *Real Gymnasium* at the age of nine and at once began the study of a foreign language, for a long training in foreign languages was necessary before he was qualified to enter a German university. The *Volksschule* did not lead through the middle school to the university; it led away from it. It was intended to do that. The Germans built a wall of foreign languages about their higher education which effectually kept it away from the mass of their people. Ninety per cent of them had to be satisfied with what was furnished them free in the *Volksschule*.

Professor Alexander's *The Prussian Elementary Schools* tells the story of the training which made the war possible. In all Germany eight hundred and ninety-two boys out of every thousand attended the *Volksschule*. It is a cheap school, the cost per year per pupil being $16, while in the middle and higher schools the cost per pupil is $34 and $70, respectively. The average number of pupils per teacher in the *Volksschule* was 55; in the middle school, 30; in the higher school, 18.6. There is much overcrowding, some classes having 90 pupils and others even more than that number. Four out of every five of the elementary school teachers of Germany are men. When the teacher enters the schoolroom, the children must rise and remain standing until they are told to sit. When the teacher is addressed, there is enforced curtsying and deep bowing. When the boy recites, he takes the military position. Fear presides in these schools, the teachers talk in a loud voice and not infrequently yell their instructions. Slapping is general and whipping common.

The method of instruction is significant. The teacher talks or lectures to the children, and at the close of his dissertation he calls them up, one by one, to repeat to him what he has said. Lessons are thus learned from teachers rather than from text-books. Some years ago, a leading American teacher became so enamored of their plan of con-

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ducting school work for children that he came back home and gave expression to his feeling of the superiority of their way of giving instruction in the saying: "The German teacher teaches, but the American teacher hears lessons." But if one is habituated from infancy to hear and believe the living voice of authority, will he not thereby be prepared to obey the commands of the drill sergeant, the lieutenant, and the captain? "It is part and parcel of the purpose of the whole elementary system of education in Germany, to destroy individuality and initiative among the lower classes. . . . I had visited over three hundred classes in the *Volksschulen* in Prussia before I heard a question from a pupil or a request for an explanation of a question which had occurred to him," writes Alexander. It was by pounding in the same lessons to her sixty million people that Germany produced the miracle of a nation that thought, moved, and acted as one man directed. What were the lessons which brought about that amazing and unnatural unity? The great subject of instruction in the *Volksschule* was religion. All the people were taught by incessant repetition, from the first day of school to the last, that God, King, and Fatherland were existences of the same order; that obedience to the King and the Fatherland was as necessary as obedience to God himself. The divine right of the Hohenzollern was no fiction to the German school child. German history was made to produce the conviction that the German people are the greatest, the best, and the only folks of much consequence on earth. The study of the German language and literature was undertaken to effect "a German attitude of mind." The German schoolmasters carried out the instructions of the Government. They did their work well, so well as to leave no doubt in any thinking mind henceforth that the schools of a nation can, indeed, if they will, mold its people to whatever end the national will may set before itself as its objective.

That our interpretation is not wrong is proved by the character of the changes in German education which the

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Socialist Minister of Instruction, Herr Hänisch, announced as soon as the revolution brought him to power in November last. Among them were: the separation of church and state; religion no longer to be an examination subject; no teacher may in future be compelled to give religious education; a plan for the introduction of unsectarian moral teaching is being prepared; supervision of schools by the clergy is abolished; all chauvinism is banished from the instruction, and especially from the instruction in history; mixed education of boys and girls has already been introduced in some schools; teachers and scholars are given powers of self-government; the uniform school (Einheitsschule) is secured, and the abolition of all class schools will be begun immediately; a system of national high schools is to be built on large lines, and to be placed in organic connection with existing schools and high schools; freedom of doctrine in the universities is to be rid of its last fetters.

So much for the German educational experiment. It supplied the cement which unified a people and kept it solidly devoted to its unholy purpose through four years of unparalleled sacrifice and self-denial, and in the end it yielded only to the inevitable disintegration of failure.

II.

Let us turn to the American experiment. When the war came we were not prepared. It took us two years and eight months to realize that our liberties were in danger. The Germans made no secret of their intentions, they disclosed their methods from the first outbreak of hostilities, they made war upon our citizens both at home and abroad, and in their complacency assured us that we were too cowardly to defend our rights. We failed to realize what they were doing. That is the supreme proof of the failure of our educational system, for a nation that cannot discern impending destruction in less than two years is not able to preserve itself. It must become more keenly sensitive to the conditions amid which it lives.

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And when we finally discovered that our very existence as a people was in jeopardy and had been all along, we promptly made certain other discoveries which were not at all reassuring. We discovered that a good many of us could not read or write, that some seven hundred thousand in the first registration could not read the government's instructions or fill out the blanks which they were called upon to fill out. And when the first national army found itself in camp ready for intensive training, not only were there thousands of men who could not read the manual of arms, but thousands who could not understand the simplest commands in English. In spite of all that could be done, men made their way into the Signal Corps who could not spell the simplest words with letters, let alone with signal flags or in the Morse code; and men made their way into the front trenches and took their turn at sentry duty who did not know enough English to give their fellow-soldiers the alarm when a gas attack began. The Provost Marshal General reported that the physical examination of the men called up for duty showed that twenty-nine per cent of them were physically unfit to defend the homeland. That seems to me to be the most pathetic disclosure of the war, for when armies are gathered and battles are fought we expect that wounds will be given and cripples be made and that starvation and sickness will come, but we do not expect to find that these conditions have been allowed to obtain unchecked and unremedied in peace time. The schools cannot control such conditions, but it is, nevertheless, true that a school system which allows such a proportion of its students to grow up physically unfit is to that extent a failure. When the men of the draft were called into camp, it was found that, though they had been taught music in school, they did not know and could not sing the songs of our nation and had to be trained to sing them. The country was divided into districts and a carefully selected corps of speakers went from camp to camp to give addresses on the causes and meaning of the war. I am told by one of these speakers, a well known professor of his-

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tory in a large American university, that they all found much the same condition in the different camps. The men were capable, alert fellows, eager to answer their country's call and to do whatever it demanded of them, but when they began to talk to them about the causes of the war, they met a dead wall of lack of understanding. I am told that it is a cherished belief of many of our army officers that soldiers do not need to know anything about the cause for which they are fighting, that all that is really necessary is a man with a bayonet who knows how to use it, and has visceral strength enough to let that knowledge function on occasion. It seems otherwise to that large body of students of human nature who hold that *morale* is at least three-fourths of the strength of every army and that every soldier is under-armed who does not know of his own knowledge that his quarrel is just.

There were other shortcomings which quickly made their presence known. We found that as a people we knew far too little about the production of food and about the selection and preparation of foods. We found that we knew wofully little about geography, wofully little about our own history, and less, far less even, about the history of our neighbors in Europe.

Then began our real experiment in education. Officers had to be trained, ammunition makers, infantrymen, artillerymen, motor transport men, flying men, men for a hundred forms of service. Instead of three years in which to train and prepare an army, we had but six months and did the job, but only by means of brief intensive courses for all arms which abandoned almost all the previously followed ritualism which the learning of the subject was supposed to involve, and having first of all determined the objective to be reached, thereupon analyzed the operations which were absolutely essential to the attaining of that objective and regarded everything else as of no importance. Miracles were performed here, too, as well as in Germany, but miracles of a wholly different order. We found it was possible to train pretty efficient mechanics to

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do a specific type of expert work in eight weeks; that it was possible to produce a trained officer, a trained artilleryman, a trained flying man in six months.

Whoever will collate and write the detailed history of this colossal educational experiment and will reinforce its lesson with an account of how England and France and Italy performed a similar miracle of quick training for war in all its branches, will perform a service of no slight dimensions to the race. It is quite clear that this contains the corrective for our hitherto almost aimless and desultory educational practices. There can be no question that before the war we put our trust in educational rites. We had no clearly conceived objectives. We did not analyze our operations. We thought of education as sitting in schoolrooms for a certain number of years and keeping almost any sort of company with the recognized and commonly accepted subjects of study. By that hit and miss process, taking a long time for it, we managed to accomplish something, but by no means as much as we now see that we should have accomplished in a much shorter time. We are now in the throes of educational reconstruction. We are trying to define our objectives and analyze our processes. A little book on "Individual Instruction in Rifle Practice" by Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. MacNab is on my table. It is typical of a procedure which must, I believe, be applied to all subjects of instruction. It outlines a system of training first developed by the Second Battalion, 14th U. S. Infantry. The officers of that battalion became convinced that there was no reason why every man could not learn to shoot. The manual contains only what every man should know in order to do that. The process is analyzed to its lowest terms. There are three essentials to good shooting: (1) Correct aiming, (2) correct positions, and (3) correct trigger-squeeze. In rapid fire three more are added. An instructor is necessary to explain the requirements, see that each man understands them, and then to stand beside the man to watch what he does and point out his errors to him. The schedule of instruction is

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for one week of intensive training. Each man's record in all the constituent processes is each day entered upon a carefully tabulated blank. The range practice is devoted almost exclusively to teaching him to squeeze the trigger as he should, but habits of position, breathing, and aiming are watched as well.

This is a rational proceeding as unlike the thing that used to pass for instruction in the use of the rifle as the ritualistic teaching of spelling, geography, history, civics, and the use of the English language is unlike what it would be if a similar analysis were applied to the teaching of each of these subjects. For example, why do we teach spelling? There are 400,000 words, more or less, in the English language. Makers of spelling books up to recent days have thought that it makes little difference which of them we try to learn to spell since we should, if possible, learn to spell them all. That is, their books were made on the principle that spelling is for its own sake, that we should learn to spell words because words are spelled. But why should anyone study spelling? The answer is, because he will have need to spell certain words when he writes. Then if we can find out what the words are which folks spell when they write and teach him those, that will greatly simplify our understanding and, perhaps, make it possible for everyone, or nearly everyone, to learn to spell. Dr. Leonard P. Ayres some years ago began an investigation to find out what those words are. Others have carried it on. Our aim in teaching spelling begins to take rather definite form, but our practice has yet to be made to conform to it. And an analysis of the process of learning even these words is yet to be supplied.

To apply the same method in every study which is taught will take a long time and call for pretty resolute work on the part of the whole body of educators. But that is the thing which the war has taught us we must do, and that is the reconstruction which is afoot in education to-day. But the war is teaching us much beside that. It is teaching us that the administrative machinery which

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we have trusted as sufficient to run the public schools is not sufficient.

We are a democracy—a government which exists by the consent of the governed. But Germany's autocracy existed by the consent of the governed. No government ever existed without the consent of the people it governed. Consent of the governed is a phrase of many meanings. It may be passive or it may be active. It may signify inactive minds and very active bodies, or it may stand for a high degree of mental, as well as physical, participation in the maintenance of the nation. That ours may be a government of the people, for the people, and by the people, the public must have an opinion and must at all times be fit and ready to take its part not only in shaping the policies of the nation but in carrying them out. That it cannot do while so many do not speak the language of the country and cannot be communicated with through the medium of print. Public education with us, as with Germany, is the one means which can make the nation one in attitude, desire, aspiration, and action; but public education which is our sole national reliance is, legally, an affair not of the nation but of the forty-eight states. It is, indeed, a coat of many colors. Schools are well provided in one state, the schoolhouse is good, the teachers well trained, the term is long, and the standards are high, but in the neighboring state the opposite may be true. The war has shown us that the nation must supplement the educational activities of the states if the results which we as a people require are to be attained. To that end the National Education Association has prepared what might be called a National Education Bill, for it is the American counterpart of the English Education Law. That bill provides for the creation of a Secretaryship of Education in the President's cabinet, and the annual appropriation of $100,000,000 from the national treasury to supplement the expenditures for public education on the part of the states. Of that sum it is proposed to devote $7,500,000 to co-operating with the states in the

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abolition of illiteracy, $7,500,000 to co-operating with the states in the Americanization of immigrants, $50,000,000 to co-operating with the states in the efforts to equalize educational opportunity, $20,000,000 to co-operating with the states in the promotion of physical and health education and recreation, $15,000,000 to co-operating with the states in preparing teachers for the schools, particularly for rural schools. The bill contains the provision that no state shall share in these several apportionments unless it devotes a sum equal to that which it would receive to the specific purpose for which the apportionment is asked. All provisions of Congress for co-operating with the states in the promotion of education are to be supervised by the proposed Department of Education. What is proposed is a nationalizing of education, but only in the sense that the strength and resources on the nation are to take their place behind the activities of the schools. Local responsibility for their welfare is not to be diminished, but rather increased, by this measure, and local control of them is to be complete save that if the people of a state want to share in the national allotments for education, they must bring their schools up to the standard which the nation may set. It will readily be seen that if this measure becomes a law, it will effect a wholesome strengthening of the school activities of the land.

But national reorganization is not the only kind that is needed. This is a time for reconstructing the administrative machinery in the states as well. That reconstructing is generally needed and nowhere more than in the administrative machinery for conducting the schools of the state. Massachusetts, for example, requires that the work of every school shall be supervised, but has, as yet, provided but very little help from the state for those towns which are too poor to support their schools. The wealth of the state is not taxed to educate the children of the state, the state exercises but slight control over it, and as a result education is a Joseph's coat in Massachusetts. In Connecticut, apathy and indifference are the rule. Great

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masses of foreign born workers fill the towns. The foreigners have the children and the Americans, the property. The part which the state as a state plays in education is by no means as strong as it should be. California has a better system. But her State Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected by the people, and her State Board of Education appointed by the Governor. As a consequence, she has a two-headed school administration. The State Board of Education appoints three Commissioners of Education who are supposed to serve as deputies and assistants to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. It will be seen that the parts of this administrative machine have not yet been put together. The rural schools of the state are organized and controlled by districts. The districts are too small and too poor to make their schools going concerns. There is little supervision, little standardizing, and rather indifferent results. Every state has conditions of this sort to repair. The war has brought about a transvaluation of former values. We see now that education is, indeed, as Plato said it was so long ago—the one thing needful for the preservation of states and the ordering of lives.

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THE VICTORIAN SPIRIT.

MARGARET JOURDAIN.

MR. LYTTON STRACHEY'S study of the Victorian spirit in *Eminent Victorians* has a two-fold appeal, according to the publishers' summary, historical and biographical. It has more. The interest of these concise and searching studies in the difficult art of biography and the vigourous coloured and arresting manner of the historian is indeed not negligible, but the real aim of the book is propagandist and destructive. He exposes and brings to light some aspects of that singular epoch with which he is least in sympathy, the puzzled Protestantism of an Arnold, the astute Catholicism of a Manning, the unbridled mysticism of a Gordon. Mr. Strachey's portraits are not haphazard visions, as he describes them in the following disingenuous passage in his preface; nor is his choice of subjects solely determined by the "simple" motives of art and convenience:

> I have attempted through the medium of biography to present some Victorian visions to the modern age. They are in one sense, haphazard visions—that is to say—my choice of subjects has been determined by no desire to construct a system or to prove a theory, but by simple motives of convenience and of art. It has been my purpose to illustrate rather than to explain. . . . In the lives of an ecclesiastic, an educational authority, a woman of action and a man of adventure, I have sought to examine and elucidate certain fragments of the truth which took my fancy and lay to my hand. That is what I have aimed at in this book—to lay bare the facts of some cases, as I understood them, dispassionately, impartially, and without ulterior intentions. To quote the words of a Master, *Je n'impose rien; Je ne propose rien; J'expose.*[1]

Mr. Strachey's book has attracted a considerable degree of notice, in spite of the fact that it has no novelty in matter, no reversal of the accepted facts of the four biographies. The biographies appended to each study are not exhaustive; and he has chosen to exercise his art upon

[1] *Eminent Victorians.* By Lytton Strachey. London: Chatto & Windus, 1918. This book is referred to as *E.V.* in future references.

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subjects—one would almost say patients—where in two cases recent and fully documented biographies exist.

It is an original work with no pretention to original research. Its author was not well-known, and had written no considerable book; it appeared in 1918 and its success was therefore the more remarkable, for in the closing year of the war, actors and spectators were alike strained to an unbearable pitch of attention. Mr. Asquith, who paid the book a generous compliment in his Romanes lecture, in saying that the prominent and potent personalities that form its subject were now in less danger of being forgotten, spoke of its style as subtle and suggestive. These are not fit words for the bold thrusts of Mr. Strachey, but the style is, in fact, its distinction. The book is in debt to Voltaire, and to Gibbon, on whom the French rationists of the eighteenth century and a long residence in French-speaking Switzerland had left an ineffaceable mark. Either of these two masters of irony might have written the description of the fanatic Tien Wang who, "surrounded by thirty wives and one hundred concubines, devoted himself to the spiritual side of his mission"[1] and the ambiguous thunderstorm, "a manifestation of divine opinion," that broke over St. Peter's on the last day of the General Council of 1870.[2] It was this method of Gibbon's that caused Archbishop Whately to go out of his way in a note to his *Logic*, to make a pass at an author whom it was politic to depreciate whenever occasion served. "His way of writing," he says, "reminds one of those persons who never dare look you full in the face." Mr. Strachey's attack is also a flanking one. But while the method is so similar, the manner in the younger writer is in some respects an advance upon Gibbon's. Mr. Strachey's narrative is concise, brisk,

[1] *E. V.*, p. 221.

[2] "On July 18, 1870, the Council met for the last time. As the first of the fathers stepped forward to declare his vote, a storm of thunder and lightning suddenly burst over St. Peter's. All through the morning the voting continued and every vote was accompanied by a flash and a roar from heaven. Both sides, with equal justice, claimed the patient as a manifestation of the Divine Opinion" (*ibid.*, p. 93).

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amusing and arresting; without Gibbon's blemish of unfailing grandiloquence. It is not possible to say of him, as Porson said of Gibbon, that "in endeavouring to avoid vulgar terms, he too frequently dignifies trifles, and clothes common thoughts in a splendid dress that would be rich enough for the noblest ideas. In short, we are too often reminded of that great man, Mr. Prig, the auctioneer, whose manner was so inimitably fine that he had as much to say on a ribbon as on a Raphael."

The Victorian age was in point of time a very long epoch, even if the outer fringes—the years before 1840 and after 1898[1]— are set aside. Diverse in activities, busy and multiform, the singular period escapes and baffles the historian; it has lost lustre and become unfashionable rather than been dismissed and condemned. Mr. Asquith in his Romanes lecture speaks of the almost paradoxical incongruity between what may be termed its outward and its inward life,[2] and observes that the note of revolt was not the age's characteristic. The apparent outward peace was, it is true, disturbed by Chartism, the growth of the trades unions, the extension of the franchise, the strike as a weapon in the hands of labour; but there was revolution rather than peace on its inward life.

Its scientific achievement, its economic expansion,[3] its potent and prolix literature are not weighed by Mr. Strachey; he does not mention the man who incarnated most completely the Victorian spirit, Macaulay. He has directed his attention to one characteristic, its preoccupation with religion. In 1840 Macaulay, who was anxious to launch a scheme of Whig Reform, was unable to get to business because of the obstacle of a religious tension or religious preoccupations. "Everything in heaven and earth was turned into a theological treatise and all the

[1] Queen Victoria, 1837–1901.

[2] The Right Hon. H. H. Asquith. *Some aspects of the Victorian Age.* Oxford: The Clarendon Press; London: Milford, 1918.

[3] During the reign, the population of Great Britain doubled in number, but the accumulated wealth of the country increased at least three-fold, its trade six-fold.

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people cared about was the nature of the Sacraments, the operation of Holy Orders, the visibility of the Church and baptismal regeneration." He goes down to Edinburgh to talk to his constituents about Corn Laws and Sugar Duties and the Eastern question and is met by such objections as "Yes, Mr. Macaulay, that is all very well for a statesman, but what becomes of the headship of your Lord Jesus Christ?"

Mr. Strachey shows the same preoccupations in the minds of his subjects; and for the purpose of studying the age he has chosen the personal and biographic rather than the historic method. He has chosen four persons for his gallery of life size portraits.[1] Each of these four was a religious person; and in no one case does he find that their religion is their strength. If these four persons (for one of whom at any rate, he shows some partiality), were candidates for beatification, this *advocatus diaboli* brings forward a hint here, and a suggestion there, that religion was their delusion, their worst feature, their undoing. The choice as subject, or victim, of Dr. Thomas Arnold, a man, as Martineau wrote, "respectable in scholarship, insensible to art, undistinguished in philosophy," seems to have been suggested by the absurdity of some of his opinions which Mr. Strachey has found useful as detail, to complete the picture of the age.

It is his part, to suggest, that this religious preoccupation induces or at any rate co-exists with a blindness to ethical and other real values. A Keble can observe that it would be a gain to this country were it vastly more superstitious, more bigoted, more fierce in its religion, than at present it shows itself to be;[2] an Arnold can tell a friend that: "Rather than have physical science the principal thing in my son's mind, I would gladly have him think that the sun went round the earth, and that the stars were so many spangles set in the bright blue firmament. Surely the only thing

[1] He includes smaller sketches of Gladstone, Sidney Herbert, Lord Hartington, Lord Cromer, Keble, Clough, Newman, Cardinal Wiseman and others.

[2] *E. V.*, p. 18.

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needful for a Christian and an Englishman to study is Christian or moral and political philosophy."[1] It is as characteristic of such a spirit that toleration goes to the wall. Arnold believed in toleration, within limits, that is to say, the toleration of those with whom he agreed. "I would give James Mill as much opportunity for advocating his opinion," he said, "as is consistent with a voyage to Botany Bay."[2]

Besides these expressions of limited sympathy, the point pressed home again and again by Mr. Strachey is the credulity, the literalism, the lack of historical spirit, the distrust of thought,[3] the vain preoccupations of his four Victorians. Of these defects he gives most telling illustrations in Newman's attitude towards the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius and to the Santa Casa at Loreto, in Arnold's difficulties with regard to the parentage of Abijah's mother,[4] and in Manning's astonishing lecture on the *Present Crisis of the Holy See tested by Prophecy*.

"When we were there,"[5] wrote Newman in a letter to a friend after his conversion, describing a visit to Naples and the miraculous circumstances connected with the liquefaction of St. Januarius's blood, "the feast of St. Gennaro was

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[1] *E. V.*, p. 194.

[2] *E. V.*, p. 197.

[3] At Oxford, Thomas Arnold had "doubts"; he doubted the proof and the interpretation of textual authority. "In his perturbation Arnold consulted Keble. What was to be done? Keble's advice was peremptory. Arnold was 'bid to pause in his enquiries, to pray earnestly for help and light from above and turn himself more strongly than ever to the practical duties of a holy life.' He did so and the result was all that could be wished. He soon found himself blessed with perfect peace of mind and a settled conviction." *E. V.*, p. 184.

[4] "In his view the scriptures were as fit a subject as any other book for free enquiry and the exercise of the individual judgment, and it was in this spirit that he set about the interpretation of them. He was not afraid of facing apparent difficulties, of admitting inconsistences, or even errors in the sacred texts. Thus he observed that in Chronicles XI, 20 and XIII, 2, there is a decided difference in the parentage of Abijah's mother—which he added, is curious on any supposition." *E. V.*, p. 200.

[5] *E. V.*, p. 28 and *seq.*

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coming on, and the Jesuits were eager for us to stop, they have the utmost confidence in the miracle and were the more eager because many Catholics till they have seen it, doubt it. One father director here tells us that before he went to Naples he did not believe it, that is, they have vague ideas of natural means, exaggeration, etc., not of course imputing fraud. They say conversions often take place in consequence. It is exposed for the octave, and the miracle continues—it is not simple liquefaction, but sometimes it swells, sometimes boils, sometimes melts; no one can tell what is going to take place. They say it is quite overcoming and people cannot help crying to see it. I understand that Sir H. Davy attended every day and it was this extreme variety of the phenomenon, which convinced him that nothing physical would account for it, yet there is this remarkable fact that liquefactions of blood are common at Naples, and unless it is irreverent to the great Author of Miracles to be obstinate in the enquiry, the question certainly rises whether there is something in the air (mind, I don't believe there is—and speaking humbly and without having seen it, think it a true miracle—but I am arguing). . . . We saw the blood of St. Patrizia, half liquid, *i.e.* liquefying, on her feast day. But the most strange phenomenon is what happens at Ravello, a village or town above Amalfi. There is the blood of St. Pantaloon. It is in a vessel amid the stonework of the Altar. It is not touched, but on his feast in June it liquefies. And, more, there is an excommunication against those who bring portions of the True Cross into the Church. Why? Because the blood liquefies wherever it is brought. A person I know, not knowing the prohibition, brought in a portion, and the Priest suddenly said, who showed the blood, 'Who has got the Holy Cross about him?' I tell you what was told me by a grave and religious man."

After leaving Naples, Newman visited Loreto, and inspected the house of the Holy Family, which, as is known to the faithful was transported thither in three hops from Palestine. "I went to Loreto," he wrote, "with a simple

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faith, believing what I still more believed when I saw it. I have no doubt now. If you ask me why I believe, it is because every one believes it at Rome, cautious as they are and skeptical above some other things, I have no antecedent difficulty in the matter. He who floated the Ark on the surges of a world-wide sea, and enclosed in it all living things, who has hidden the terrestrial paradise, who said that faith might move mountains, who sustained thousands for forty years in a sterile wilderness, who transported Elias and keeps him hidden till the end, could do this wonder also".[1]

Arnold again, when told that the gift of tongues had descended on the Ivingites at Glasgow, was not surprised: "I should take it," he said, "merely as a sign of the coming of the day of the Lord."[2] The Coming of Antichrist is a subject congenial to the mind of Manning, and Mr. Strachey gives full weight to his detailed speculations upon this subject.

There is no passage in scripture, Manning pointed out relating to the coming of Christ more explicit and express than those foretelling Antichrist; it therefore behoved the faithful to consider the matter more fully than they are wont to do.[3] In the first place, Antichrist is a person. "To deny the personality of Antichrist is to deny the plain testimony of Holy Scripture." And we must remember that "it is a law of Holy Scripture that when persons are prophesied of persons appear." Again, there was every reason to believe that Antichrist when he did appear, would turn out to be a Jew. "Such was the opinion of St. Irenaeus, St. Jerome, and of the author of the work *De consummatione Mundi* ascribed to St. Hippolytus, and of a writer of a commentary on the Epistle to the Thessalonians ascribed to St. Ambrose, of many others, who add that he will be of the tribe of Dan; as for instance St. Gregory the Great, Theodoret, Aretas of Caesarea and many more.

[1] *E. V.*, p. 35.
[2] *E. V.*, p. 198.
[3] *E. V.*, p. 101.

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Such also is the opinion of Bellarmere who calls it certain. . . . Lessius affirms that the Fathers with unanimous consent teach as undoubted that Antichrist will be a Jew. Ribera repeats the same opinion and adds that Aretas, St. Bede, Haymo, St. Amselm and Rupert affirm that for this reason the tribe of Dan is not numbered among those who are sealed in the Apocalypse. Our Lord has said of these latter times. 'There shall arise false Christs and false prophets, insomuch as to deceive even the elect'; that is, they shall not be deceived, but those who have not faith in the Incarnation such as humanitarians, rationalists and pantheists, may well be deceived by any person of great political power and success who should restore the Jews to their own land and people Jerusalem once more with the sons of the Patriarchs." Then Manning threw out a bold suggestion: a successful medium, he said, might well pass himself off by his preternatural endowments as the promised Messias."

Manning went on to discuss the course of events which would lead to the final catastrophe. But this subject he confessed "deals with agencies so transcendent and mysterious, that all I shall venture to do will be to sketch in outline what the broad and luminous prophecies, especially of the Book of Daniel and the Apocalypse set forth; without attempting to enter into minute details which can only be interpreted by the event." While applauding his modesty one need follow Manning no further in his commentary upon those broad and luminous works, except to observe that "the apostacy of the City of Rome from the Vicar of Christ," and its destruction by Antichrist was, in his opinion, certain. Nor was he without authority for this belief. For it was held by Malvenda, who writes expressly on the subject and who further states as the "opinion of Ribera, Gaspar, Melus, Viegas, Suarez, Bellarmine, and Bosius that Rome shall apostasise from the faith."

The exposure to ridicule of the literalism carried into every day life, is not neglected by Mr. Strachey. He tells us, apparently innocently, that Cardinal Manning decided

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to make his night prayers forty minutes instead of thirty minutes.[1] A resolution recorded in all seriousness by the Cardinal, together with his determination to use during Lent "no pleasant bread (except on Sundays and feasts) such as cake or sweetmeat," but adding the proviso "I do not include plain biscuits."[2] W. G. Ward's vow to abstain from music during Lent and his relapse[3] are not omitted and the searchings of heart of Hurrell Froude are rescued from the dust of his diary.

"He was obsessed by the ideals of saintliness," writes Mr. Strachey of the latter, and convinced of the supreme importance of not eating too much. He kept a diary in which he recorded his delinquences and they were many. "I cannot say much for myself to-day," he writes on September 29, 1826; "Looked with greediness to see if there was a goose on the table for dinner and though what I ate was of the plainest sort and I took no variety, yet even this was partly the effect of accident and I certainly rather exceeded in quantity as I was muzzy and sleepy after dinner." And again, "as to my meals, I can say that I was always careful to see that no one else would take a thing before I served myself, and I believed as to the kind of food, a bit of cold endings, of a dab at breakfast, and a scrap of mackerel at dinner are the only things that diverged from the strict rule of simplicity." Such were the preoccupations of this young man.[4]

The Church is moving towards other problems and the various religious ideals and conceptions that Mr. Strachey illustrates so adroitly are more remote from the Churchman of to-day than Victorian scientific speculations from the scientist of to-day.

It is obvious that religious enthusiasm[5] is little or noth-

[1] *E. V.*, p. 93.
[2] *E. V.*, p. 93.
[3] *Ibid*, p. 32.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[5] "When a child Newman 'wished that he could believe the Arabian Nights were true.' When he became a man his wish seems to have been fulfilled." *E. V.*, p. 31.

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ing to Mr. Strachey, and that Gordon's mystical theory of the relation between God and man, the Mahdi's Divine mission, the wild visions of the Taiping leader, the asceticism of Hurrell Froude, the doubts of Arnold, the speculations of Newman, are all equally valuable to the wise man. They may have, however, the human and dramatic interest of those mysterious impulses that may, interacting in queer complication,—hurry at last—so it almost seems—"the creatures of a puppet-show to a predestined catastrophe," or at any rate if they move men to no dramatic action, are peculiarly fitted for Mr. Strachey's diverting analysis.

MARGARET JOURDAIN.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE NEW STATE: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government. By M. P. Follett. New York, London, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918. Pp. 373. Price, $3.00 net.

"The New State" essays a critical analysis of our political situation and a constructive principle for its improvement. It is singularly fresh in its treatment, and frequently brilliant in its style. Its distinguishing merit is its employment of social psychology, first for a more fundamental analysis of the situation than the more familiar categories of "corruption," "machine rule" and the like afford, and second for a way out. The word "new," in the title is used not as a time word, but as signifying "vital." The problem is, how to have a really vital state?

For there is no question that just now the state, once the idealists' idol and the socialists' hope, has of late been discredited from many sides. From without, the trade unionist, syndicalist, high churchman, internationalist, and even the socialist is jealous or distrustful. From within, its candid citizen must confess that its actual working is often grotesquely unlike its professed aims, and tragically inept for the great tasks which it should perform. Representative government, once hailed as the great political discovery, is now charged with failure and direct government is proposed. The pathetic ineffectiveness of individual action is matched by the machine character of party rule. Self government, measurably simple for the small homogeneous community, is an unsolved problem under present conditions.

The root of these futilities, according to the author of "The New State" is disclosed by social psychology. We have vibrated between two untenable positions: false individualism and crowd or herd collectivism. An individual alone is futile. He can accomplish nothing. He cannot even think or plan except as his powers are brought out by contact and interaction with others. To multiply such individuals by sending more of them to ballot boxes, or by sending them more often to the ballot box accomplishes nothing valuable; it merely counts one individual after another. Nor does party rule improve things. It submerges the individual and substitutes crowd action which is less

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intelligent than the action of individual members would be. Democracy in any true sense is not just "liberty and equality," nor is it the majority, nor the crowd. What is needed for vital organization is a type of association which shall not merely take the individual as he is and count him, but shall bring him out—make him wiser by contact and discussion, stronger by co-operation. It must be large enough to give power, but small enough to enable and indeed to compel each member to contribute to the joint output. Its method must be discussion rather than imitation. Group organization, not ballot-box democracy or crowd action, is democracy's method. "The most salient political fact to-day is the increasing amount and power of group life—trade unions, professional societies, citizens leagues, neighborhood associations, etc. The most pressing political problem is the relation of all these groups to one another and to the state."

The type of groups which seem to the author most promising as the basis of a "new," that is a "vital" state, is the neighborhood group. The neighborhood now occasionally meets for a specific purpose; what is needed is the more continuous and responsible organization found in germ in community centres, school centres, and the like. "With the inclusion of all men and women (practically accomplished) in the suffrage, with the rapidly increasing acceptance of direct government, the *extensive* work of the democratic impulse has ended. Now the intensive work of democracy must begin." "We hear discussed from time to time how far public opinion governs the world, but at present there is no public opinion." Government is supposed to express the will of the people. "But there is no will of the people. We talk glibly about it but the truth is that it is such a very modern thing that it does not yet exist." A chaos of ideas, an urge of the crowd, the voice of an interest or a party—yes, but is this public opinion? A real public opinion,—an opinion better and larger than the opinion of any one of us,—must be created, built up by joint effort. A social will must be brought into being; it does not exist ready made. Political life began in the small group. In expanding to the rational state our political life has not kept pace with our political machinery. We must turn back to the local unit again for the vitalizing springs.

But this assumes that a unifying state is desirable. Is this true? Syndicalists, and various political pluralists deny this. The labor unionist of to-day is as jealous of state control as is the

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High Churchman, and is not occupational representation a more rational plan than local representation? Miss Follett finds a half truth in all these challenges. She admits also that some of these very groups which aspire to practical sovereignty, *e.g.*, trade unions, are indeed suffering internally from the same outworn representative system or centralized government as is our political state.

But she holds that it is as fallacious to talk of "the group vs. the state" as to talk of "the man vs. the state." The problem is one of federalization. There is no inherent reason why the new state—the service state—shall not use all these various professional, employing, and labor groups instead of ignoring or fighting them.

Finally the moral state and the world state are likewise not gifts but activities. Sovereignty is an outworn category with which to face tasks of constructive statesmanship.

As to the first half of the book which shows the defects in our present political situation, I think little exception can be taken. Public opinion, which we assume controls our decisions, is a matter which is at present as little under intelligent control almost as the lightning was before the day of Franklin. We have no assurance that our newspaper organs are giving us the basis for judgment; still less can we hand over our own judgment to the editorial group knowing as we do the influences which work upon it. And on such momentous questions as entrance upon war or formation of a league of nations our policies seem often capable of determination by some single great personality, a Lincoln or a Wilson. Such a great personality may be wise, as these were, but he may not be; in any case the basis of democratic opinion does not seem to be broad and firm.

As regards the constructive suggestions of the book, the most serious question is likely to be the adequacy or workability of the neighborhood group, for the task put upon it. One difficulty felt by the city dweller—to borrow Miss Follett's mode of expression—is that there is no neighborhood,—at least in certain regions. Where people are nearly all renters, and shift from year to year or even from month to month, it is almost impossible to get any group consciousness. And when industrial conditions or land values classify people and fix their residences, neighbors are too much of a kind to give the most fruitful group contacts. Our churches are many of them paralyzed by this condition.

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They tend to become class organizations—and perhaps through no fault of their own. Our city schools are not "common" in a very inclusive sense. I should hold, therefore, that before we can get very far with any political regeneration along the lines of neighborhood groups we should find it necessary to face the economic forces which at present make neighborhood consciousness almost impossible. This is not to minimize the importance of social psychology's contribution; it is simply to point out its limitations.

The author should have thought well enough of her book to provide an index.

JAMES H. TUFTS.

PROBLEMS OF THE SELF. By John Laird, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the Queen's University of Belfast. London: Macmillan & Co., 1917. Pp. xiii, 375. Price, 12s. net.

The Shaw Lectures in Edinburgh University have been the occasion of some notable volumes; and it may be said at once that Professor Laird's work is eminently worthy to stand in the series. It has the great merit of admirable clearness both in plan and execution. It takes an important and difficult subject, defines the limits within which the question will be discussed, within those limits surveys the ground in a carefully detailed but systematic fashion, and arrives at definitely formulated results. Probably the only complaint which anyone is likely to make about the method of exposition would concern the inclusion of a good deal of historical matter, which at some points does not appear seriously to advance the thesis. But in an argument which depends so much on the precise use of terms which have long been tokens in philosophical currency, some such discussion is almost inevitable. In any case, one should be prepared to work through all that is given for the sake of one or two more or less casual exegeses which Professor Laird offers. The comments on Kant's ethical theory, *e.g.*, with which Chapter VII begins, seem to me very happy and illuminating.

The subject of the book may be very simply stated. Psychology until it became very critical of itself in Hume, conceived itself to be the science of the soul or the self. Professor Laird asks precisely in what sense psychology is entitled to use the terms "soul" or "self": or in other words, in what kind of soul,

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on the evidence available, have we a right to believe? Mr. Laird in the course of his discussion, finds himself compelled to advance or to deal with arguments of a highly metaphysical character. But for his positive results he relies mainly on certain psychological methods for the employment of which he offers a careful philosophical justification.

What we are obviously aware of, when we introspect at all, is experiences of one sort or another. The question at issue is whether when we have precisely defined these experiences and the unity which subsists between them, we shall find *that* a sufficient account of the self. Mr. Laird thinks that we shall, and that there is no need to assume the presence of some more remote element as a necessary condition of any unity of experience at all. The plan of the book therefore is to discuss these experiences and what they imply.

The first three chapters are devoted to the elucidation of the data, including the question whether the body can be considered part of the self. On this point Mr. Laird holds that though the body may be essential to the self, it is not part of it. Organic sensations, he thinks, are really mental acts which cognise certain bodily states; and it is the acts not the states or objects which belong to the self. In general Mr. Laird holds that all our experiences are modes of reference to an object. And this affords a *fundamentum divisionis* for the classification of our experiences. The characteristic of the act of Cognition is that it seeks to know its object, not to change it: it is therefore, in Mr. Laird's phrase, a dynamic. On the other hand, Conation (the action of the subject towards the object) and Feeling (the way in which the subject is affected by the object) are dynamic. Armed with this account of the nature of these experiences, he discusses in detail the various attempts to find in any one of them *the* clue to the nature of the self. He finds that no one is reducible to another; and therefore that no one is, in any important sense, prior to the rest.

But the most obviously striking feature of our experiences is not so much their difference in kind, as their interpenetration with one another. Their unity and continuity is essential to their being experiences of a self. Hence two important chapters are devoted to a discussion of this topic and of the conditions which make this unity possible. Retentiveness is the chief condition. Mr. Laird rejects the view that retentiveness is only a

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function of the brain and thinks its explanation involves the admission of psychical dispositions and subconsciousness. This suggests a further series of questions with regard to multiple personality; and Mr. Laird holds that in any ordinary sense of personal identity, there is evidence for the dissociation of selves into separate selves, and probably for the coexistence of a plurality of selves in the same body.

This whole argument leads up to the fundamental question whether the self or soul can be regarded as a substance, not merely in the logical sense of subject, but in the ontological sense of particular existent. There are marginal cases where it is difficult to say in what precise sense anything may be called "one"; but in general we "have the right" to give the name "one substance" to any distinct particular complex which requires us usually to treat it as one thing, and which cannot be explained in terms of anything else. In this sense the self is unmistakably one substance. "Any given experience may be considered as one, although it is continuous with other experiences, but the self seems to be an indefeasible unity, and that is why it is a substance in so fundamental a sense. That unity of experiences is the soul. Its substantiality is the ultimate fact that any given experience must form part of a distinctive unity of experience. It is therefore a substance in the same sense as other things are substances, though it is a distinctive kind of substance whose parts are experiences."

I have spent more than my allotted space in giving this rough outline of Mr. Laird's argument and his main conclusion. The book is full of close and detailed argument, in which, no doubt, there is plenty of room for disagreement. But the work as a whole seems to me to deserve something more than simply criticism of this kind. Plainly there are important corollaries following on Mr. Laird's view. On one of them—the problem of immortality—Mr. Laird has said something at the close of the book; but there are others at least as important. Perhaps I can best express my appreciation of Mr. Laird's admirable achievement, and my suspicion of the limitations of his argument by saying that I look forward hopefully to a second volume in which Mr. Laird will develop the implications of the view which he has sustained here.

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H. J. W. HETHERINGTON.

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ESSAYS IN SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS. By Eugenio Rignano. Translated by W. J. Greenstreet. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1918. Pp. 254. Price 7s. 6d. net.

The author of this book, which is translated from the French and consists of articles which have appeared in various periodicals, is the editor of *Scientia* and appears to combine in his own person the very varied learning of that journal. In fact the argument which he develops in this book is a sort of apologia for the variety of *Scientia*. It is a defence of the theorist who is not himself a specialist in any department but works out the problems which are common to and interconnect physiology and biology and psychology and sociology. The great and growing complexity of all these sciences, M. Rignano contends, makes the work of the theorist not only useful but absolutely indispensable. He cannot, it is true, claim the mastery of detail in a particular field which the specialist possesses, nor the technique, nor the intimate familiarity with a field which years of research in it give; and therefore he must not presume overmuch. But he has advantages. A specialist is becoming increasingly confined to a relatively narrow range by the growing complexity of knowledge. For example, some of the most fundamental of all questions in the interpretation of the general nature of evolution can only be solved or properly faced when account is taken of phenomena from very different sciences. M. Rignano instances particularly vitalism, which involves a consideration of the relations between physiology and morphology; the phenomena of adaptation and of the mechanism of transmission which lead in turn to the basal problems of psycho-biology and to the study of the property of "mneme." Similarly the parallel study of assimilation leads to physical questions. No one man can possibly be a specialist in all these fields. Only the theorist can succeed in embracing so extensive an area of research. His method may proceed according to M. Rignano on one or both of two main principles; (1) A kind of synthesis of the one-sided views naturally developed by specialists. The theorist is at a higher point of view from which he can combine them in a truth. That there is something in this need not be denied, but M. Rignano does not always escape the danger which lies ever in wait for this sort of thing—that of dividing the opposing views

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with great sharpness so as to obtain material for the synthesis and over-simplifying them in the process. (2) The application to a new field of a method or idea or principle proved to be successful in another; in fact, generally the use of analogy. The danger here is more obvious but probably less real. Both plainly gain whatever value they possess from the comprehensiveness of the theorist's standpoint. M. Rignano attempts to explain his view by reference to the relation of the mathematician to the physicist, but this seems hardly helpful.

A series of chapters exhibiting these methods makes up the volume. They deal with very various subjects from biological evolution through physiology and psychology to sociology and socialism.

Two chapters on Historical Materialism and socialism are the most interesting for readers of this JOURNAL. M. Rignano's methods are perhaps unusually successful in the case of the first because though scientific socialism has formulated historical materialism as a basis for itself it has been desperately dogmatic, and its opponents whether through anger or fear generally stupid. M. Rignano points out very properly that the exact meaning of the theory will depend on the view taken of the supreme factor underlying economic changes on which it is argued that the others depend. Marxism has in fact varied in this way without noticing it or at least without admitting it. The chief criticism which M. Rignano brings against historical materialism is that it involves a striking contradiction. Its adherents held that economic changes take place independently while all others follow them as their reflex without causal efficacy of their own. At the same time they argued that history is the record of the struggle of class against class. The second way of putting it is according to M. Rignano in direct contradiction with the first; for it suggests that the class struggle is carried out by direct economic action and indirect political action (*e.g.*, by suitable modifications in the law of property.) Nothing, however, according to the first formulation, can possibly affect the inevitable independent course of economic change. The action of classes cannot do so. But since by hypothesis this is the object of the class struggle in the give and take of which history consists there can be no history. The defect of this criticism is that it does not pay sufficient attention to the Hegelian origin of the materialist conception of history, in the

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light of which we must try to understand that blessed word 'reflex.' Marx had an affection for higher syntheses quite similar to that of any of the epigoni. The fact is that the class struggle is itself one of the results of economic change. The world-process manifests itself in the souls of men, and the changes in their ideas or policies depend on preceding or immanent economic transformations. The real difficulty in Marxism is that no attempt is made to show how this mechanism works. We are so often merely invited to have a materialism like that of Büchner and adopt it, or be condemned forever as incurably middle-class. How in a dialectic process can a single set of conditions—the economic—be regarded as more fundamental than the others, admitting that they are all actually necessary?

I do not wish to suggest that M. Rignano's discussion of the class struggle is not true and valuable. He tries to formulate as a sociological principle the idea of class struggle, paying particular attention to the "weights" of the different classes, their interplay, and the modes in which their influence may show itself. Direct economic action, he argues, is only resorted to, or should only be resorted to, when political or legal action is not possible; though he admits that it is necessary to possess great economic power before any effect is possible on political power.

The discussion of socialism in the last chapter brings together some varied types of theory. When M. Rignano distinguishes the two elements of inevitability and advisability in socialist theory, we may agree with him, without subscribing to his assumption that Marx's theory of value is primarily a doctrine of "equity." Marx, I think, was concerned only with inevitability, whatever indirect effects his idea of surplus value may have had. And I am not convinced by M. Rignano's interesting attempt to support his view by referring to the doctrine of price of production in the third volume of *Capital*. I agree that this points to a definite limitation in Marxism; but certainly it does not suggest that it is even partly an ethical doctrine. I regret that I cannot here discuss either the grounds for this judgment, or the distinction which M. Rignano draws between 'legal' and 'reformist' socialism. He is on the right lines in his endeavor to find an alternative to collectivism while recognising the social priority of property.

M. W. Robieson.

Belfast, Ireland.

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THE NEW RATIONALISM: The Development of a Constructive Realism Upon the Basis of Modern Logic and Science, and Through the Criticism of Opposed Philosophical Systems. By Edward Gleason Spaulding, Professor of Philosophy in Princeton University. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1918. Pp. xviii, 532. Price, $3.50 net.

This book is the most comprehensive statement of the point of view of the new Realism which has yet appeared and is welcome to all who wish to get a systematic presentation of this method and of its doctrines. Little attention is given to historical material; the effort is rather to discover "what those postulates are from which each philosophical system is logically derivable, and also, whether there is, finally, one body of principles that is common to all systems, and logically presupposed by them."

From the ethical point of view the chief aspects of this Rationalism are that it rejects naturalism as a complete account of reality and holds to "a Neo-realism of *ideals* that are discovered by reason, as well as of those *reals* that are disclosed to the senses and that form what we call nature." This applies in particular to the doctrine of values in which the doctrine of Plato, that ideals are real, is reaffirmed. "Justice, truth, goodness and beauty are eternal verities." It is when we ask, however, what kind of verities these are that Realism gives its peculiar answer; it holds that there are at least certain values which "are objective in the sense that they are numerically distinct from and independent of both a perceiving consciousness and a receptive organism. The principles on which the author relies chiefly in defending the distinct character of ethical and other values as not included in biological or other natural science fields are first "creative synthesis": parts form wholes which manifest or *are* one or more qualities that are different from those of the parts; secondly, freedom: new qualities are a law unto themselves; they act in accordance with their own nature and are free to do this in that they are specifically different from the qualities of the parts; third, that one and the same entity can stand in several relations and that these relations are not constructive of one another. Of course the student of philosophy will recognize that the first of these principles is as old as Aristotle and that none of the three is peculiar to Realism. But they are good principles in any case, and the student of ethics may well wish

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that this part of the book had been much more fully developed. In its insistence upon the eternal values and their numerical distinctness from the values which are experienced in our finite life the issue with certain types of pragmatism is joined and it is not made clear just how far Realism can make its peace with the doctrine of evolution. To say that some existents evolve and no subsistents evolve is at least only to put a new problem.

JAMES H. TUFTS.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. N. S. Vol. XVII: *Papers read during the Thirty-Ninth Session, 1917–18.* London: Williams and Norgate, 1918. Pp. iv, 655. Price 20s. net.

The new volume contains a thoroughly representative set of papers, reaching the high level of excellence we have come to associate with this Society, whose *Proceedings* are now quite indispensable to anyone wishing to keep abreast of philosophical thought in England. Furthermore—what would have been a surprising phenomenon even in times of peace—quality is maintained side by side with a uniform increase in quantity.

The papers of special interest to the student of ethics may be divided into two main groups: (1) The first is a series of papers possessing what the author of one of them calls "an unwonted theistic flavour." Those of direct ethical interest are centered about the moral arguments for theism. In *The Theory of a Limited Deity* Dr. D'Arcy, the Bishop of Down, takes off from Mr. H. G. Wells' *God the Invisible King* and shows how the hypothesis of a limited deity arises out of the problem of evil. But he asserts that "this problem is absolutely insoluble for finite souls" (p. 166). Naturally enough, therefore, the Bishop in seventeen more pages fails to solve it. In *Omnipotence* Dr. Schiller criticises this paper, and urges that the alternative theory of an infinite or omnipotent God is not acceptable on either logical or scientific or religious grounds. "If" writes Dr. Schiller, developing his ethical argument "the world is to contain a real moral issue, it must be *denied* that the victory of right has been assured from all eternity—if for no other reason than that, if it has been, there cannot be anything wrong with the appearances which exhibit right so often overborne by might. If these appearances are unreal and do not matter, they need not be changed; and so there can be no reason why the right should ever *appear* to triumph. On the other hand, if there is a real moral issue, the

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power of God cannot be 'omnipotent'; it can, and therefore may, need our co-operation and support" (p. 269). And he asks in conclusion if we might not "be encouraged a little by our spiritual guides to think that our world . . . may even achieve a good, without being absolutely guaranteed by a vain 'omnipotence'"? The Rev. W. R. Matthews boldly sets aside the problem of evil and undertakes to show, in his *Moral Argument for Theism* that the very facts of morality furnish us with data affording a cumulative argument by means of which we may establish God's existence with a high degree of probability. He makes use of the concept of development to demonstrate that a *Deus ex machina* is required to explain the emergence of moral ideals; the developing moral consciousness being, in fact, a revelation of "the purpose of the world as a whole." But Mr. Matthews is not content to regard this as the mere hypothesis his method alone entitles him to reach, as is shown by his assertion that "the claim of the moral aspect of our experience to be considered in forming our general view of the nature of the world must be put much higher than that of mere equality with others" (p. 386). And amongst others is included, I suppose, the cognitive aspect of experience and therefore the concept of development itself. It would seem simpler to rely on revelation in its older sense.

(2) The second series of papers of direct ethical interest forms a continuation of a discussion on the philosophical foundations of politics which has been in progress in these *Proceedings* since 1914. It is well to be reminded in these days of undue reliance upon the bare forms of "political" democracy that, both before and during the war, the more intelligent of political thinkers have concerned themselves with the defects of this system as represented in the Anglo-Saxon world. For political democracy is of little value to society as a whole so long as political power is largely determined by economic power. It has been one of the merits of the Aristotelian Society discussion to bring this issue into the light of day. In *The Conception of a Unitary Social Order* Prof. H. J. W. Hetherington claims that the modern attack on the classical idealist theory of the state involves the "elimination of the whole conception of 'obligation' which is the clue to any rational explanation of social organization" (p. 289). The more convincing portion of the paper is the criticism of the anti-intellectualist attack on the state as the product of a mechanically organized interference with individuality. When Professor

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Hetherington passes on to a defence of the sovereign state he carries less conviction. He holds, as against Mr. Cole, that the "sovereign is prior; and if we must keep the terms, the functional institutions are 'creatures' of it, rather than it of them" (p. 311). This thesis is supported by (a) an appeal to an "universal," the good of society as a whole; followed by (b) the identification of this genuine general will with the sovereign state which is its "appropriate expression." Once this piece of traditional idealist conjuring has been accomplished Professor Hetherington is able to avoid the real issue, which is whether the sovereign state *is* in any real sense the "appropriate expression" of the complex of institutions making up the web of the social world. Mr. J. W. Scott puts forward the claim, in his paper on *Realism and Politics*, that the two lines of attack on the sovereign state—namely, anti-intellectualism and the pluralism which regards the state as one among other functional institutions—have much in common. As examples Mr. Scott chooses on the one side M. Bergson's doctrine of the *élan vital* as used by syndicalists to discredit all political organization; and on the other Mr. Russell's suggestions toward social reconstruction. He believes he can show that what is common to these two modes of thought is their realism. For realism loves the given. So M. Bergson goes directly to the uncontaminated real by means of intuition; whilst Mr. Russell takes the unsophisticated reality of "vital impulse" as the basis for social reconstruction (p. 243). Whatever plausibility this view has rests on a preconceived idea of the sort of monster a realist theory of the state must be. Realism, so far as it has been applied to political theory, has concerned itself with the exact scientific description of such constructions as the sovereign state. Mr. Scott, therefore, speaks true when he calls it "a picker up of inconsidered trifles" (p. 228). But the trifles are factual trifles—a matter of some importance to a philosophy which seeks to build a state-theory for the world as it is and not for imaginary commonwealths. If then we consider Mr. Russell as an adherent of such a view, it is a mistake to group him with M. Bergson. For, speaking roughly, Mr. Russell regards intellectual constructions as retrospective descriptions of what is or what may be; and creative impulse as the basis for action. Whereas M. Bergson regards the intellect as a tool for practical activity; and intuitional impulse as the means of reaching what is. One view is thus an inversion of the other, and their supposed common basis is

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clearly illusory. The remaining paper on ethics is on *Practical Dualism* by Miss E. E. C. Jones. By this is meant the doctrine that there are two supreme principles of human action: Rational Self-Love and Rational Benevolence. And it is urged that the latter implies or includes the former.

In the above, and following, notes no attempt has been made to give an adequate summary of the contents of this volume, but rather to indicate shortly the immense range of subjects treated—with occasional critical comments on points of interest to the reviewer. The remaining papers may be divided roughly into three groups.

(a) There is a series on subjects of more or less psychological interest. Prof. H. W. Carr, in the third presidential address he has given in succession, deals with *The Interaction of Mind and Body*. In *Behaviour as a Psychological Concept* Prof. A. Robinson gives an admirably clear and critical account of Behaviourism. Mr. F. C. Bartlett's interesting study, *The Development of Criticism*, arose out of an experimental investigation on problems of perceiving in which Mr. Bartlett found a tendency in his subjects to preface their descriptions of the material supplied by unsought criticisms. He contends that "the whole line of development from simple appreciation to rational and intuitional criticism, is an important exemplification of the influence of the fundamental 'effort after meaning'" (p. 100). Prof. J. A. Smith answers the question *Is There a Mathematics of Intensity?* with a negative, on the grounds that attempts at such "have plausibility only so long as analogy is mistaken for identity" (p. 134). I find it difficult to follow the course of the argument, but it seems to be claimed that because what Meinong has called "substitutive measurement" is applied to intensities it is therefore more inexact than the measurement of divisible quantities in which "units" are possible.[1] But this is false; for *all* measurement, intensive no less than extensive, depends ultimately on analogies between natural phenomena and the operations of some calculus. An effective reply to Professor Smith's denial is in fact supplied in this very volume in Miss D. Wrinch's short but excellent sketch of the possibility of a calculus of pleasures (*On the Summation of Pleasures*, p. 589).

[1] Cf. Prof. Dawes Hicks, *British Journ. of Psychology*, Vol. VI, p. 169: "Because, however, there are not . . . units of sensation, it does not by any means follow that sensations are not measureable."

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(b) There are a number of papers dealing with historical questions. Prof. G. Dawes Hicks gives an able and learned comparison between *The "Modes" of Spinoza and the "Monads" of Leibniz;* and Prof. A. E. Taylor's paper on *The Philosophy of Proclus* is an extremely interesting and encyclopœdic account of the Neo-Platonists as "neither magicians nor emotional *schöne Seelen*," but as systematic, rational philosophers. Dr. F. W. Thomas writes on *Indian Ideas of Action and their Interest for Modern Thinking;* and Mr. A. A. Cock on *The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God.*

(c) The third group of papers deals with problems raised by New Realist thought. Dr. G. E. Moore, in his subtle and important paper on *The Conception of Reality*, criticises the distinction which Mr. Bradley seems, in his *Appearance and Reality*, to make between "being real" and "existing," "being a fact," and "being." Miss L. S. Stebbing's paper on *The Philosophical Importance of the Verb "To Be"* is a heroic attempt to introduce order into the whole complicated question of "being." *Space-Time* by Prof. S. Alexander is of interest in view of modern physical notions; for it is claimed that "neither Space nor Time is a reality without the other, and that instead of the two empirical realities Space and Time there is but one reality, which is Space-Time" (p. 410). Prof. J. B. Baillie's *Anthropomorphism and Truth* is a persuasive argument against "the recent revival of mediaeval realism." Though "things are quite indifferent themselves to our intellectual operations" yet, once conceptions are obtained, it is wrong "to ascribe to objects themselves the conceptions which the intellect has devised to enable man to handle the world of objects" (p. 200). But concepts are not, as is claimed, rendered objective by reference to "objects"; nor are hypotheses (even when successful) supposed to give the "nature of things." Professor Baillie seems to make no allowance for the distinction modern realists make between the world of subsistents and that of existents. Mrs. Karin Stephen's clever exposition of what Bergson means by intuition (*Thought and Intuition*, p. 38) has a bearing on the problem here raised. It is a closely reasoned attack on "knowledge about" which, whilst of use for practical purposes, is said to devitalise the act of focussed attention by which alone we obtain the raw material for organised "knowledge about." It does not seem to be sufficiently realised that whole new fields of acquaintance are often opened up by organized thought; thus,

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radioactive materials presumably existed before 1900, and yet it required organized "knowledge about" to direct the focus of attention to its phenomena.

Finally, about one third of the volume is occupied with the papers read at symposia on the following questions: (1) *Are Physical, Biological, and Psychological Categories Irreducible?* by Dr. J. S. Haldane, Prof. D'Arcy W. Thompson, Dr. P. Chalmers Mitchell, and Prof. L. T. Hobhouse; and on (2) *Do Finite Individuals Possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being?* by Prof. B. Bosanquet, Prof. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, Prof. G. F. Stout, and Lord Haldane.

A. E. HEATH.

ETHICS IN THE PERIODICALS.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, Mai-Juin, 1918. M. de Wulf gives an interesting account of *Civilisation et Philosophie aux XII^e^ et XIII^e^ Siècles*, founded on the belief that the philosophy, art, politics, and social conditions of the Middle Ages can only be properly understood if we give up the habit of interpreting it in terms of contemporary standards, and realise that they are interdependent factors in a civilisation other than our own. *L'Art et la Philosophie* is the third of the posthumous lectures of V. Delbos. He contended that philosophy, because it has intimate and indissoluble relations with human needs, offers to art imperishable material; and further, that it is itself, in a certain way, a work of art. *La Métaphysique de Josiah Royce*, by G. Marcel, is the first part of a critical study of Royce written with great care and with sympathetic insight. In *Réflexions sur la Force du Droit*, R. H. disclaims the over simple opposition between right and might and attempts a fair statement of the will to power. But to the claims that the organised militarist state is a higher development worthy, by its increase in efficiency, of a greater place in the world, it is replied that organisation—replacing individualism—is only justified if it builds on the individual as a basis. The state does not precede the nation and create it; it is only a superior will in proportion as it gains the consent of those subject to it. And on these lines, individualistic even to the extent of denying universal moral judgments, a defence of right is built up.

MIND, N. S. 108, Oct., 1918. In *The Rights and Wrongs of a Person*, W. M. Thorburn concludes his strongly worded but stimulating series of articles. (See also Nos. 103 and 107.) Man is not the apex of creation; the world was not made for him, but he for the world. Man the Image of God, forsooth! That is only a piece of Man's vainglorious impudence; a complete contradiction of all the relevant facts. There is still the same mystery about the birth of a bull-pup and the birth of a baby. And it really would be shameful; not to take a safe shot at any pothunter or trophy-hunter, black or white, in order to save one of the fast-vanishing family of giraffes. The most effective servants of Satan are the impious imbeciles, who make a dirty little deity out of every lump of animated rubbish that can be classified under the Genus *Homo* of the Family *Anthropini*. *L'Anthropolatrie: voila l'ennemi!* must be the watchword of every God-fearing student of Science and Justice. Furthermore, since "Man is

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a bridge and not a goal," the subservience of other men is essential to the development of wisdom. The presence of well-instructed men who have not to labour for their daily bread is important to a degree which cannot be overestimated. "Poverty produces masterpieces, and wealth smothers," is only exceptionally true of mere literature; and is quite untrue of history, philosophy, and every kind of science. The author supports these fulminations against our maudlin age of levelling and overcrowding with a wealth of illustration from a vast array of subjects. His fierce opposition to democracy may be unpalatable to many of us; but it is free enough from cant to render it more acceptable than much that passes for support.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, Vol. XVII, 1, Oct., 1918. *In What Sense is Survival Desirable?* is an analysis by C. D. Broad of the notion of survival, made in order to see how far we should be justified in taking a more cheerful view of the world if it were true, and to examine the bearings of the notion on the question of optimism and pessimism. A refreshingly sane and clear discussion of a subject too often fuddled by avowed or unconscious emotional bias. L. P. Jacks in *Arms and Men: A Study in Habit* urges that arms, like clothes, are a normal part of human equipment; and therefore, like clothes, they have played a notable part in moulding history, changing human character, and creating habits of thought. To strip mankind of his arms suddenly would thus be the most complete return to the simple life imaginable. For a nation, or a league of nations, which had no armament would be, in a very real sense, naked. In other words our whole treatment of the question of disarmament must take into account the psychology of arms. A break with age-long national habits cannot be accomplished by a *coup d'état*. Dr. Jacks then outlines his plan for seizing on the danger, which the end of the war will bring to our industrial civilisation, as the necessary "shock" required to break up the crust of national use and wont; and for utilising that danger to create an impulse towards mutual insurance in international affairs.

SCIENTIA, Vol. XXIV, 8, 1918. J. A. Lindsay, *Les dangers moraux de l'euthanasie*. It is urged that, without invoking the sanctions of religion, and considering only the higher interests of the race, there are the gravest moral objections to euthanasia—and *a fortiori* to suicide and to all forms of infanticide. A. Hopkinson discusses, from the point of view of international law, *The Blockade* as applied by Great Britain. Incidentally he makes a worthy protest against the clamour of a portion of the press in which vigour of language and violence of invective is equalled by its ignorance of the real facts and of the legal limitations which the country has repeatedly pledged itself to observe. Vol. XXIV, 10, 1918. A. Graziani in *La politica economica e sociale per il dopo guerra*, discusses the financial, political, and social readjustments which the change from war to peace will involve. Vol. XXIV, 11, 1918. *La guerre et la différenciation de l'Europe*, by F. Carli puts forward the thesis that a material as opposed to a formal explanation of the war is to be found in the fact that European history exhibits a process of differentiation—and not, as most sociologists believe, one of successive integration. The universalism of the Roman Empire has only slowly been split up by linguistic and psychological differentiation; but the change is none the less real, even in phenomena which appear at first sight to be a return to universalism—such as the socialist movement. According to this author, then, the German effort at a world hegemony was the final dying spurt of the flame of that form of universalism which is based on a denial of national heterogeneity.

A. E. H.

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SHORTER NOTICES.

THE HUMAN NEEDS OF LABOUR. By B. Seebohm Rowntree. London, Edinburgh & New York: T. Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 168. Price, 3*s*. 6*d*. net.

Mr. Rowntree asks what are the human needs of labour and at what cost they can be supplied, with a view to fixing a minimum wage for unskilled labour. He suggests, after basing his enquiries upon conditions existing in the town of York in 1914, that a minimum wage, sufficient to secure physical efficiency for, say, three dependent children, should be fixed and that the state should make a grant to families with more than three dependent children. The cost of living in 1914 is very carefully gone into; and it would be difficult to dispute Mr. Rowntree's figures. On the top of these figures is to be added a percentage based on the increased cost of living over the 1914 standard. The question as to whether industry can bear this burden is not dealt with in any detail, as to deal with it adequately would occupy many chapters.

It is possible that this question of the minimum wage may be taken up, not by the state, but by the trade unions which cater for the unskilled and semi-skilled workers, which have gained immensely in power and prestige of late years.

M. J.

TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES. By Robert Franklin Hoxie, Ph.D. With an Introduction by E. H. Downey. New York and London: D. Appleton & Company, 1917. Pp. xxxi, 409. Price, $2.50, net.

This book, prepared from notes and lectures of the late Professor Hoxie, is distinctly a book for the student who wishes to understand trade unionism. While there is a certain amount of descriptive matter aiming to give information, the chief purpose is to analyze unionism, to discover the reasons for its structure, the reasons for its varying types of organization, and the varying methods which it employs. It may well be called, in a broad sense of the term, a study in the philosophy of trade unionism. The purpose is not propaganda but comprehension. The reader is compelled to think the problem through. For any one who believes the subject to be really important and is willing to take the trouble to think, the book is indispensable.

J. H. T.

INDUSTRY AND HUMANITY: A Study in the Principles Underlying Industrial Reconstruction. By Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918. Pp. xx, 567. Price, $3.00.

As indicated in its sub-title, this book concerns itself with industrial reconstruction. It might be called, broadly speaking, an effort to do missionary work among employers and other classes who are not fully aware of what has been going on in the industrial world. It is an effort to get the human aspect of industry into the foreground of the industrial situation. It contains little that is not well known to social workers, but it is likely to be read by many of the employing class who would not read material more severely scientific in method or more radical in point of view. In one sense it is depressing that such a book should be needed. Yet the opposition of employers to organized labor during the war and the obvious fact that the human aspect of industry is still an unknown field to many

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employers and to much of the general public, is a sufficient reason for a book which, without presenting radical views, aims to acquaint the public with what is actually going on in the better firms to-day.

J. H. T.

INSTINCTS IN INDUSTRY: A Study of Working-Class Psychology. By Ordway Tead. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918. Pp. xvii, 222. Price, $1.40, net.

In studying the psychology of industry one might attempt an analysis of the actual life of a worker in factory, in his home, and in other relations, and thus work back to the motives and values which are present. The author of this book has gone at the matter from the other end. He takes from the texts on psychology a number of basic instincts and points out the operation of these in the worker's life. The result is to bring out the fact that working men and women are "people" with the same instincts which others have. This is doubtless an important task. Many of the things which working people do seem queer to other people because they do not take the trouble to find out the motives or instincts from which such acts spring. On the other hand, the method of treatment gives a certain divided-up view of human nature and does not give adequate place to the relation between instinct and other aspects of mental activity. The book, like that of King, is designed for the general reader rather than for the scholar.

J. H. T.

SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL REFORM. By Sir Charles Macara, Bart. Manchester. Sheratt & Hughes, 1918. Pp. 207. Price, 5*s*. net.

Sir Charles Macara's book is one of a large number that have been issued since the war began, emphasising the need of humanising the relations between employers and employed. Many of these are general recommendations of a better spirit; Sir Charles' recommendations, however, gain a particular value from the experience of his long public career and his intimate knowledge of the cotton industry. He advocates the retention, in peace time, of that wise war expedient, the Cotton Control Board, as an advisory body which shall be able to speak for the whole industry, to which any dispute between the organisation directly concerned with one class of operatives or one branch of the industry may appeal as to an independent tribunal for an award on any question which may threaten trouble.

M. J.

NEW METHODS OF ADJUSTING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND THE FUTURE. By Sir Thomas Barclay. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1917. Pp. xiv, 1206. Price, 6*s*. 6*d*. net.

Sir Thomas Barclay's object is to show how arbitration and other pacific methods of adjusting international disputes are part of the existing diplomatic machinery; and how far they are capable of development. He is able to show that "without exaggerated expectations," arbitration and similar methods which have been co-ordinated by the Hague Conferences serve many purposes which narrow the area of international dissension. In so far as these methods are fully and carefully considered, the book is a useful reference work, full of interesting detail concerning the force of public opinion in international disputes, and the business of "good offices" and mediation; and the meaning of "national honour." Here and there, however, the author is betrayed into somewhat hasty

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obiter dicta, as when he informs us (p. xi) that "History does not always distinguish between right and wrong, and in general assumes an indulgent, if not admiring attitude towards successful international brigandage." There are three appendices giving the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, the proposed convention, relating to the establishment of a Court of Arbitral Justice, and the Convention relative to the establishment of an International Prize Court.

A. F.

INDUSTRIAL LOYALTY: ITS VALUE, ITS CREATION, ITS PRESERVATION. By Boyd Fisher. London: G. Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 79. Price, 2*s*. 6*d*. net.

This small book, which is a wise and practical contribution to the problem of the relations between employers and employed, was the first short concise statement of a complete programme for stabilising industrial employment, and was issued in America in 1916 under the title of *How to Reduce Labor Turnover*. It is now slightly altered for English readers. Mr. Fisher emphasises the fact that after the war organised labour, united with organised society, is going to "render it impossible for any but the social-minded employer to remain at the head of industry."

M. J.

A SELF-SUPPORTING EMPIRE. By Edward Saunders. With an introduction by Sir Edward Carson, K. C., M. P. London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. x, 203. Price, 3*s*. 6*d*. net.

Mr. Saunders wishes for a millennium of co-ordination and co-operation instead of our present *laissez-faire* methods, and in this he is at one with an influential body of thinkers. The policy of a self-supporting British Empire implies a synthesis of the mother country, the dominions, the colonies and the dependencies for the fullest development of each in co-operation with the others; and he has no difficulty in showing that the empire can be self-supporting in all vital matters. But government action is necessary for the proper co-ordination of activities, and for the attainment of long views and really constructive policies; and he has little sympathy for the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom and the Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association who wax enthusiastic on the value of non-interference with trade. There are four chapters on the peculiar problems of South Africa; and the organisation of industries, especially the basic industry of agriculture, is dealt with. On the question of the organisation of industries the author is in favour of Joint Industrial Councils; and places to the credit of the British government during the war its vigorous encouragement of associations of manufacturers and producers. The rapid advance in productivity is to a great extent due to the efficiency of united industries.

M. J.

PRUSSIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: ITS PRINCIPLES AND IMPLICATIONS. By W. W. Willoughby. New York and London: D. Appleton & Company, 1918. Pp. xi, 202. Price, $1.50 net.

Although this book was written before the war came to a close, it has permanent value as giving a clear and dispassionate account of the Prussian political theory. Its title naturally suggests comparison with Professor Dewey's book on German Philosophy and Politics. As might be expected from the author's field of study, this book gives a much fuller account of the actual incorporation of the Prussian political theory in Prus-

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sian institutions. In the opening chapter on American Political Ideals the principles "consent of the governed" and "control of dependencies" are more smoothly and easily reconciled than some at least would be willing to admit. The book makes an admirable companion volume to the book of Professor Dewey as a brief and very readable account of a system which, it is hard to realize, has now collapsed—it seemed so impregnable!

J. H. T.

INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW OR THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. By W. N. Hibbert. London: University of London Press, 1918. Pp. 225. Price, 7*s.* 6*d.*

This book brings up to date the legal position under British Law of such problems as those of domicile, nationality and the jurisdiction of courts. It is concise and practical, with a full reference to cases and full indices. There are very interesting and clearly stated details given of the position, for example, with regard to liability for income tax within the United Kingdom. The registration of a company in one place does not fix the place of residence for income tax purposes, but only the position of the head office. The second part of the book deals with the Law of Things. The general rules are given in an elaborate series of references to case law; and the book as a whole will be found most useful for its collection and classification of such cases. In the appendices, the texts are given of the Proclamation of 1914 in regard to Trading with the Enemy, the various acts which followed and other war legislation affecting private international law.

C. D. B.

NATIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT: ITS GROWTH AND PRINCIPLES. By Ramsay Muir. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. xii, 312. Price, 8*s.* 6*d.* net.

This book is in two parts, an historical survey—in moderate compass—of the development of parliamentary institutions in the modern world (chapters II to VII inclusive) and the remaining chapters in which the historical survey is used as a text for an elucidation of the difficulties of self-government. On the historical summary side it is not exhaustive, leaving on one side, as it does, the development of many European countries, but this is not a defect, as the book is as the author claims "historical politics, or a blend of narrative and analysis," with analysis its main concern. The book is in some sense a companion to the author's *Nationalism and Internationalism*, and together they form an adequate and valuable history of the political development of the modern world.

In *National Self-Government* Professor Muir shows how it has come about that the institutions of self-government have been adopted within a very short space of time in every land of western civilisation, more or less after the English model. The nineteenth century was essentially the era of constitutional government, and the history of European states during that century is largely the history of the introduction of some kind of parliamentary institutions. Germany, however, the leading power in Europe after 1870, opposed the forces making for national self-government, and if Germany had won in the present struggle, self-government would appear to have been proved a failure, or at all events a premature experiment. And Germany is not only opposed, as Professor Muir points out, to the spirit of national self-government; she is also opposed to two other principles, that of nationality, "which asserts that the unity of sentiment which we call the national spirit constitutes the only sound basis for the

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organisation of the state"; and the international principle, which asserts that the interests of the whole civilised world are essentially one and endeavours to protect the rights of all by international co-operation and by the maintenance of an international system of law.

Professor Muir gives as essential to success in self-government two conditions; first, that the mass of active citizens should be in some degree educated "not merely in the formal sense, but still more in the sense of having been trained in the practice of co-operation in common affairs," and secondly, a real unity of sentiment in the community, a national spirit. The book is a notable record of the history of self-government—by no means a hardy plant—and also a diagnosis of the (at any rate temporary) failure of representative institutions in certain environments, and a valuable expression of President Wilson's famous phrase that the world must be "made safe for democracy."

M. J.

ST. PAUL'S ETHICAL TEACHING. By the Rev. William Martin, B.D. London: A. L. Humphreys, 1918. Pp. xii, 222. Price 4s. 6d. net.

A small well-arranged book dealing with the sources and broad principles of Christian Ethics as they appear in St. Paul's works, and attempting to bring his teaching into touch with present problems. There are chapters on the influence of Pauline ethics in the post-apostolic church; pagan morality, asceticism, true and false, and the ethics of social life.

N. C.

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BOYER, PAUL, and others. La Vie Universitaire a Paris. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1918. Pp. 231.

ELLIS, HAVELOCK. The Erotic Rights of Women, and the Objects of Marriage. London: The British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology, 1918. Pp. 23. Price, 1s. net.

FISHER, BOYD. Industrial Loyalty: Its Value, Its Creation, Its Preservation. London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 79. Price, 2s. 6d. net.

FLIPPIN, PERCY SCOTT. The Royal Government in Virginia. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law. Vol. LXXXIV, No. 1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1919. Pp. 393. Price, $3.00.

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

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The July number contains an important statistical article on War and the Balance of the Sexes; the October number, two articles on the Eugenic and Social Influence of the War, and The Need for Widespread Eugenic Reform in Social Reconstruction. The January number will contain an article from M. March of La Statistique générale de la France on Race Hygiene in France During the War, and one on the Sex Ratio at Birth.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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JULY, 1919

JUSTICE HOLMES ON NATURAL LAW AND THE MORAL IDEAL.

BOYD H. BODE.

IN a recent brilliant article,[1] Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes maintains a position which is of fundamental and indeed crucial importance for ethical theory. It is a philosophy of revolution based on the biological law of Natural Selection. In these times of revolution it is not surprising that institutions and beliefs which have endured for centuries are now being challenged and required to show their credentials. Old standards are going into the discard, and with the passing of their authority there is growing up a disposition to question the moral basis of all authority. The repudiation of absolute standards is taken to mean that our impulses and preferences, as they stand, are final, in the sense that there can be no rational test of fitness save the ability to survive, and no standard of evaluation except the principle that might makes right.

This is apparently the position of Mr. Justice Holmes in the article in question. As he intimates, the belief in "natural law" as an absolute standard for conduct has its origin in the fact that jurists are prone to regard "what has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere." No account is taken of the fact that "beliefs

[1] Natural Law. *Harvard Law Review*, November 1918.

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and wishes have a transcendental basis in the sense that their foundation is arbitrary. You cannot help entertaining and feeling them, and there is an end of it." We are disposed, it is true, to hallow our individual preferences by deriving them from certain *a priori* rights and duties, but this is unconscious subterfuge. It obviates the necessity of recognizing the fact that the case of our opponent is perhaps on all-fours with our own. "Deepseated preferences are not to be argued about—you cannot argue a man into liking a glass of beer—and, therefore, when differences are sufficiently far-reaching, we try to kill the other man rather than let him have his way. But that is perfectly consistent with admitting that, so far as appears, his grounds are just as good as ours."

If we start with the proposition that men have certain impulses or desires which are not to be argued about, it clearly follows that problems of conduct are limited to the selection of the means for the satisfaction of these desires. We can then speak of an "ought" only in the sense that a certain course of conduct is necessary or "ought" to be adopted, if a given result is to be realized. But for the evaluation of ends no standard is provided. "Men to a great extent believe what they want to—although I see in that no basis for a philosophy that tells us what we should want to want."

This conclusion does, however, give us a hint as to the proper place of philosophy in the scheme of things. It is clearly not the business of philosophy to discover eternal truth or to formulate a system of eternal values, of preexistent rights and duties, for the guidance of man in the affairs of life. On the contrary, its mission is precisely to deliver us from the bondage of such prepossessions. Beliefs and wishes being essentially arbitrary, philosophy can help us to a clear recognition of the fact, and by so doing it can give encouragement to proceed towards our goal with singleness of purpose and with all our resources of hand and brain. When we once give up the notion that our beliefs and wishes must conform to an antecedent "nature

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of things," our motives are no longer subject to cosmic condemnation, but can stand forth naked and unashamed. "Philosophy does not furnish motives, but it shows men that they are not fools for doing what they already want to do. It opens to the forlorn hopes on which we throw ourselves away the vista of the farthest stretch of human thought, the chords of a harmony that breathes from the unknown."

According to Justice Holmes, then, the function of philosophy is to draw up a Magna Charta, in order to safeguard the right of our human impulses to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. To some a proposal of this kind will doubtless mean moral anarchy; to others it will perhaps mean merely a formal recognition of actual practice, since our conventional rights and duties serve chiefly to give an odor of sanctity to what we are bound to do anyhow. It is not my intention just now to discuss these interpretations. My purpose is rather to consider this claim of finality which is made on behalf of our desires. Does it follow that if we abolish "natural law," as embodying the principle of an absolute and external standard, our impulses and desires are confronted with no further problem or obligation than that of securing the means to their realization?

Back of this question, however, lies still another question, which has a prior claim to our consideration. What is meant by the contention that "deepseated preferences are not to be argued about?" It cannot mean that desires are fixed and immutable. As Justice Holmes himself points out, "What we most love and revere generally is determined by early associations." Despite a certain fundamental identity of human nature, the desires and aversions of the civilized man are very different from those of the savage; and among civilized people there are similar variations of likes and dislikes. The ragtime and the dime novel which delight the untutored mind are an abomination to the man of culture. The facts are obvious and unquestioned. Under the pressure of the environ-

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ment desires are anything but fixed; they are rather plastic material that may be moulded into a great variety of shapes. What is meant, so far as I can make out, is not that the environment cannot modify desire, but that the individual is unable to to do so in his own case. If he becomes exposed to certain influences, his likes and dislikes will undergo change. But he must not undertake to supervise the process. Intelligence must, to all appearances, confine itself to the recognition of our actual wants and to the execution of their behests; it must not presume to tell us "what we should want to want."

On the surface this may seem to be a plausible limitation. If our desires are already moulded by the environment, the attempt to place intelligence in a position of authority over them does not look very promising. But there is ground for the suspicion that the part assigned to the environment is an instance of what our late, lamented ex-President was wont to call nature-faking. It is overlooked that the environment, apart from intelligence, plays no rôle at all. Its importance consists in the fact that it provides the opportunity for the expression of impulse under the guidance of foresight. The eagerness of the child to share in whatever is going on and its ready sympathy with the aims and purposes of the adults with whom it is associated is evidence, both that our impulses and tendencies are relatively formless and unorganized at the start, and that an outlet for these activities can be secured only through an understanding of the environment. What form our activities will take depends doubtless upon the opportunities that are available and the inducements that are offered. Hence the love of excitement may lead some persons to exploration, automobile racing or aeroplaning, while others will perhaps seek satisfaction in gambling or in circumventing the police. Our opportunities may be limited, but such limitation does not exclude the need of foresight in discovering the alternative possibilities that are actually open to us and in estimating their relative value. Foresight remains an indispensable condi-

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tion for the expression and development of desires. It seems evident, moreover, that if different impulses can be made to reinforce one another in a unified course of conduct, the aim or goal of such conduct will take on a unique value. The achievements of an explorer, for example, are normally attended by certain incidental advantages and satisfactions that are not to be expected as the fruits of an equally successful career in burglary. But this must be made apparent through inquiry and reflection, which is to say that it is the function of intelligence to create new values and ideals through anticipations of results.

Perhaps a parallel will serve to emphasize the point. If we observe man's dealings with his material environment, the outstanding fact is his refusal to take things as he finds them. Guided by foresight of ends he drains swamps, produces new kinds of animals and plants, applies the latent energy of coal to the machinery of his factories, and travels about in heavier-than-air machines. The laws and facts of the material universe are not accepted as standards to which human conduct must be made to conform, but as the raw material, so to speak, for the attainment of human ends. All this is so much a matter of course that we have forgotten how it has come about. Yet the right of intelligence to dominate nature and to pass from each achievement to the creation of new ends was won only as the result of an agelong struggle with tradition. Even today the disposition to regard epidemics and other calamities as interpositions from a transcendental world has not wholly disappeared, nor was it difficult, a few years ago, to find support for the view that vaccination and rainmaking were impious interferences with the will of Providence. Certain ills of life were to be accepted in a humble and contrite spirit; they were a challenge, not to man's ingenuity, but to his submissiveness. And in moral matters this point of view still seems to prevail. That human values and standards are fixed once for all is assumed on all hands, whether the appeal be to supernatural authority, or to natural law, or to human history,

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or to our native endowment of impulses and tendencies. The dominant tendency is to regard certain facts as the ultimate standard or court of appeal, and not merely as the embodiment of conditions that must be taken into account. But unless we grant to intelligence the same position in morality as elsewhere, we invite disaster. It is because of the failure to recognize this fact that the growth of knowledge, instead of revealing new spiritual possibilities, has served so often only to strengthen the conviction of moral defeat.

One further consideration remains to be mentioned. The fact that our native impulses are dependent for their expression upon the foresight of results implies as its corollary that conduct is intelligent in proportion as we are able to evaluate the ends that are within our reach. The business man, for example, may be confronted with alternative possibilities, one of which promises great financial reward, while the other offers a smaller reward, but affords an opportunity to promote the welfare of his employees and the community at large. The latter opportunity is perhaps clearly foreseen, but its value or desirability may not be immediately evident. It may need to be translated into terms of direct appreciation, if there is to be an adequate sense of the possibilities inherent in the situation. Such appreciation, however, requires the ability to realize beforehand, through the imagination, the outcome of our acts in their bearing upon the fortune of others. That is, it requires the ability to see things as others see them, to put oneself in the place of those whose interests are involved. The disposition to give due consideration to all the interests that are at stake constitutes the moral attitude, which makes it possible to speak of fairness and justice as something other than the ability to trample upon a competitor. In so far as such a disposition supervenes, the struggle with an opponent becomes transformed, through sympathetic intelligence, from a clash of blind passion into an attempt to secure a readjustment in which, as far as possible, the interests of

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both parties shall be conserved. It becomes an attempt to bring about a new order of things in which new values are realized. The view that our desires must not be argued about because "we cannot help entertaining them and there is an end of it" is an endorsement of the policy of keeping one's eyes closed to potential values. The refusal to reflect on potential values, for the sake of determining "what we should want to want," is a refusal to be intelligent.

In the end this refusal to provide for potential values is a charge that may be laid at the door of every doctrine which involves a fixed standard of conduct. My complaint, accordingly, is not that Justice Holmes's position is too revolutionary, but that it is not revolutionary enough. What it offers is, in the last analysis, but a continuation of the old tradition that right conduct consists in conformity to a pre-existent standard. Although purporting to be a philosophic Bill of Rights, it merely provides for a change of masters. External standards are repudiated for no other purpose than to set up in their place certain arbitrary and accidental preferences, to rule over us by divine right. And even this change is perhaps less significant than may appear at first glance. At any rate, the example of Germany suggests that all these anointed rulers are likely to do business in much the same way. It will be recalled that the attitude of Germany was explained by publicists, in part by reference to the Kantian tradition of duty and obligation, and in part by reference to the evolutionary doctrine of struggle and survival, which seems to enjoy the approval of Justice Holmes. In spite of their wide divergence these two standpoints found it possible to co-operate to a common end, because both set up conformity as their ideal of conduct. It is true that Kant preached conformity to the mandates of an unseen world, whereas the evolutionist finds his standard in the laws and facts of our everyday world of space and time. But since a military clique had been permitted to draw up the specifications as to the concrete duties of the German

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citizen, the effect of the two doctrines, so far as national policy was concerned, was largely the same. Moreover, the events connected with the Peace Conference show only too clearly that the very same type of national policy is apt to emerge if we look for a standard, not to Kant or to evolution, but to the history of the past. There is something incurably Bourbon about the whole precious lot of fixed standards, which, at the present juncture, completely overshadows, in practical importance, their individual differences. Intelligence is permitted to have no share in the construction of new ends, but is supposed to confine itself to the selection of means to the realization of ends that are already fixed. This is not an emancipation of the moral life, but a perpetuation of its servitude.

When it is once recognized that the moral quality of conduct is to be measured, not by reference to a fixed, antecedent standard, but by the determination to adjust difficulties on the basis of sympathetic insight, we may expect men to face the future with a new sense of responsibility for human destiny. They can then neither evade the challenge to their resourcefulness in creating new ends nor refuse to examine their motives and aims in the light of the larger good. By accepting this obligation intelligence becomes free and responsible, and so makes possible the vision of a world in which men may dwell together in the freedom and equality of common devotion to ideal ends.

BOYD H. BODE.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

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SOCIALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM IN EVOLUTION

VICTOR S. YARROS.

IN the rise, decline and fall, or radical modification, of systems of thought we no longer find anything astonishing. In a world of change thought naturally evolves along with everything else. But, while general statements of this sort command universal concurrence, few are in truth prepared for certain concrete exemplifications of the doctrine expressed in them. The average person cannot readily believe, for instance, that the Socialism of today is a very different thing from the Socialism of 1890, or 1900, or even 1910. He is apt to assume that Socialism is a fixed, stereotyped body of ideas and propositions, and that it cannot undergo any material change without ceasing to be Socialism. Similarly, the average person thinks Individualism is what it was in the days of Bright, Cobden, Manchesterism, or, at any rate, of Herbert Spencer and the British Liberty and Property Defence League. Assure him that Socialism and Individualism have both "marched," evolved, taken on protective coloring and adapted themselves to the requirements of the new era, and he will either venture to doubt the affirmation or else conclude inwardly that the alleged changes are apparent rather than real, shadowy and negligible rather than substantial.

Even the serious reader and student occasionally pauses to wonder at the nature and quality of the differences that he finds between the Socialism or the Individualism of today and the same schools or bodies of doctrine as he knew them a quarter of a century ago.

The Socialism of Edward Bellamy, of Laurence Gronlund, of Hyndman, of Bebel and other followers of Marx and Engels was distinctly rigid, mechanical, artificial. When a William Morris insisted on a certain elasticity in the arrangements of the Socialistic order, he was dubbed a dreamer and Utopian. The radical who could not swallow

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the orthodox Socialist creed was usually driven to become an Anarchist-Communist of the Bakounin or Kropotkin type.

On the other hand, the Individualist of that period never thought of compromising with Socialism. He condemned the whole Socialist movement as reactionary, non-evolutional, unscientific and dangerous.

What is the situation today as between Socialism and Individualism? And what is the situation in each of these camps?

Let us consider a few symptomatic developments.

A few weeks ago there appeared in an English translation a little book entitled "Socialism versus the State." It was written before the world war, but the activities of the "state"—of the governments—during the war only served to confirm the author's conclusions. Yet he is a leading European Socialist, Mr. Emile Vandervelde, a Belgian writer of note and now a minister of state.

The thesis of the book is, in substance, that Socialism should not be confused with Statism; that the extension of the power and sphere of the State, as exemplified by the nationalization of railroads and other utilities, or by the creation of government monopolies, is detrimental, not beneficial, reactionary, not progressive, unless it is accompanied by corresponding changes in the political organization of the State and in the social organization of the industries taken over and "statitized."

Mr. Vandervelde maintains that Socialism is the opposite of Statism. The latter, he says, is founded on authority, on the government of men by men, on force and tyranny. Statism is inseparable from autocracy and bureaucracy, and never can be democratic. There is no such thing as a free State. The State's authority must be restricted, not enlarged, and in the future the State will disappear entirely. Socialism will gradually undermine the State and make it unnecessary and undesirable. Socialism is "founded on the management, the administration of things," and is essentially "the organization of social labor by the workers, grouped in public associations."

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Now, all these phrases have a Syndicalist, rather than a Socialistic, sound, but, whatever the Socialist casuists may say, the fact is that contemporary Socialism has been profoundly influenced by Syndicalist criticism and thought and has been compelled to borrow rather generously from the stock of Syndicalist ideas. But let us pass over this particular phenomenon, interesting and piquant as it is. Let us ask how Vandervelde proposes to safeguard what he calls Socialism and keep it democratic, free, vital.

It cannot be said that his answer is clear, candid or satisfactory. He repeatedly draws a distinction between the democratic State and the Socialist régime or system. He tells us that there are various ways and means of separating the State as the organ of authority, the embodiment of force, from the State as the organ of management or administration. The democratic State can give a certain degree of autonomy to a department or bureau that operates a public utility. Or it is possible to create a public corporation "not for profit," appoint trustees to manage it in the interest of the whole community, and give them sufficient power to manage the corporation on sound business principles, rather than as an adjunct of the central governmental machine. Such a corporation would have no "police power" and its trustees would be likely to retain the methods of private industry.

This is true and important—to a democratic State or municipality that wishes to get rid of an anti-social monopoly without exposing itself to the evils of an anti-social bureaucracy. But what has it to do with Socialism? Would a Socialistic régime create such quasi-independent corporations and permit them to borrow their methods from private industry? If not, then we are entitled to know from the reformed Socialist school what methods they propose and what manner and form of industrial organization they favor.

Mr. Vandervelde, "further answering," points out, however, that today the State is the instrument of the ruling classes; that the conquest of political power by the pro-

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letariat is to be followed by "the transformation of society into a great economic co-operative by the socialization of the means of production," and, hence, that the fusion of now hostile classes into one class will make disinterested public service possible for the first time in the history of civilization.

So far so good. A militant, enlightened proletariat will first conquer political power, socialize capital and industry, pension off or otherwise dispose of the private capitalists and proprietors, and abolish all class distinctions. The land, factories, warehouses, shops, transportation systems, etc., will be declared the common property of the community. Then—what? How will this railroad, this factory, this bank, that great store, be managed and operated? By bureaucrats? By men appointed by some minister or president? No, explains Vandervelde. The French *Parti Ouvrier*, he tells us with satisfaction, has adopted this article:

Operation of state factories to be entrusted to the laborers who work in them.

"Can anything be more democratic and less statist?" asks M. Vandervelde. No elections by outsiders; no appointments by bureaucrats; the workers of each factory will form a council, elect directors and managers, adopt rules and regulations, and then go to work under these rules and regulations. Perhaps the regulations will be unwise at first, but the opportunity to change and correct them will always be present. At any rate, the workers will know that they themselves are the court of ultimate appeal, and that the managers are their agents and representatives, not their masters.

It must be admitted at once that this picture of a democratized factory is strikingly different from the picture usually painted by the critics of Socialism. The alleged vicious element of Statism, of bureaucracy, is certainly eliminated.

Unfortunately, neither Vandervelde nor any other of the neo-Socialists—if one may call them by that name—has

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yet cared to put and answer the following question (which cannot have wholly escaped them):

"What is to be the relation of the autonomous group of workers in the democratized factory to the rest of the community—to other workers, engaged in producing other goods, and to farmers, to merchants and to the professional elements? Are the various groups of workers to be free to follow their own judgment, to fix prices, hours of labor, and so on, as they may see fit, or are they to be controlled in a measure by some other body—perhaps a legislature elected by the whole community, or a central Soviet?"

Mr. Bertrand Russell, a social radical who leans toward what he, with others, calls Guild Socialism, or a modified Syndicalism, but who has vigorously and straightforwardly criticised all orthodox forms of Socialism, stresses this important point in his recent writings. He is right, of course, in asserting that complete autonomy or independence of groups of workers spells Anarchism, or Syndicalism, not Socialism in any familiar sense. The Socialist must emphasize and provide for the interests and needs of the society as a whole, as well as for the rights and liberties of the various social groups. It is highly probable that the neo-Socialists, when they face the difficulty candidly, will adopt the solution of the Guild Socialists, which is thus roughly indicated by Mr. Russell in his stimulating and timely, though not in the least original, little book on "Proposed Roads to Freedom":

> Every industry will be self-governing as regards all its internal affairs, and even separate factories will decide for themselves all questions that only concern those who work in them. . . . Relations between different groups of producers will be settled by the Guild Congress, matters concerning the community as the inhabitants of a certain area will continue to be decided by parliament, while all disputes between parliament and the Guild congress will be decided by a body composed of representatives of both in equal numbers.

Add to this machinery—as American, Swiss, Australian and Canadian Socialists undoubtedly would add—some provisions for the referendum and the initiative, and we have a fairly democratic and flexible scheme of adminis-

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tration. We have a scheme that an orthodox Marxian Socialist would hardly recognize as the object of his contemplation and planning. We are far indeed from the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, from Economic Materialism, from the characteristic sneers at "bourgeois" solicitude for minority and individual rights! We are almost equally far from Fabian glorification of Efficiency, of the government of experts, of the scientifically organized State. The individual has come into his own once more. The principle of personal liberty, of spontaneity or voluntarism, so long derided and scorned, is again acknowledged as paramount. Few Socialists, one fancies, would today take exception to the following dicta of Bertrand Russell:

> The glorification of the State, and the doctrine that it is the duty of every one to serve the State, are radically against progress and against liberty. The State, though at present a source of much evil, is also a means to certain good things, and will be needed so long as violent and destructive impulses remain common. But it is merely a means, and a means which needs to be very carefully and sparingly used if it is not to do more harm than good. It is not the State, but the community, the world-wide community, of all human beings present and future, that we ought to serve. And a good community does not spring from the glory of the State, but the unfettered development of individuals. . . . It is the individual in whom all that is good must be realized, and the growth of the individual must be the supreme end of a political system which is to re-fashion the world.

The same idea is expressed by G. D. H. Cole, an able and progressive English writer on labor and social topics, when he says in his "Self-Government in Industry":

> What . . . is the fundamental evil in our modern society which we should set out to abolish?
>
> There are two possible answers to that question, and I am sure that very many well-meaning people would make the wrong one. They would answer, Poverty, when they ought to answer, Slavery. . . .
>
> Poverty is the symptom; slavery the disease. The extreme of riches and destitution follow inevitably upon the extremes of license and bondage. The many are not enslaved because they are poor; they are poor because they are enslaved.

Now, it is unquestionably true that at no time in human history were these truths or principles *wholly* obscured and

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forgotten. The significant fact to bear in mind is that the schools of thought and reform that have been disposed to emphasize material and economic considerations are today desirous and even anxious to disavow indifference to the demand for the unfettered development of individuals and for such appropriate social machinery and forms of organization, political and industrial, as shall—to use Mr. Russell's words—"reduce to the lowest possible point the interference of one man with the life of another."

It is sometimes said, half facetiously or half-paradoxically, that "we are all Socialists now." Certainly the rigid, dogmatic opposition to what is called restrictive and regulative social legislation that was characteristic of Individualist and Philosophical Anarchists two decades ago is hardly ever met with in reform circles and reform periodicals. But it is almost equally true that "we are all Individualists now," in the sense that few of the Socialists and Communists rail at Individualism or profess much confidence in or affection for the Socialist State.

The change that has taken place in radical thought is primarily ethical and secondarily political. Certain systems of philosophy have suffered shipwreck. Ideas and formulas that were unpopular for a long time have regained their former hold and appeal. We no longer worship the State or the Majority. We are good practical democrats, but we treat democratic forms of organization as wise compromises. The most valuable thing, we realize once more, is personality, and personality abhors bureaucratic routine, straight-jackets, artificial and mechanical arrangements. We cannot dispense with machinery, but we must not make a fetich of machinery. The essential object in all our contrivances is to free, elevate and ennoble the individual. We are advocating co-operation in a hundred directions, but we want the co-operation to be voluntary, at least as far as possible. We are transforming our industrial system—slowly, perhaps, but steadily and surely—not so much because it produces a "submerged tenth," not because it does not afford a living wage to all, but because it has

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killed joy in work, has deprived even the well-paid mechanic of a stake and voice in the industry that monopolizes his energy and time, and because it has destroyed the freedom, dignity and independence of the working masses. We are democratizing our industries in various ways, but the aim is the same—the emancipation of the laborer. Democracy in industry means that the employe is his own employer or master—that he works for himself and obeys rules which he has himself helped to frame and adopt, after the manner of the members of a social or scientific club that makes rules without enslaving the membership.

We are transforming our political organization because the individual has become too insignificant and because so-called representative government has largely broken down. The referendum, the initiative, the recall, proportional representation, Industrial Councils—"British style" —to advise and guide Parliament, or the political council—all these things are designed to increase the importance and the power of the individual under modern conditions. The individual will insist on justice and freedom, for without these he cannot have self-respect and manliness. He will have economic justice, not because he has any "materialist interpretation of history," but because a sense of wrong, injustice, undeserved inequality, subjection and exploitation is intolerable to a free man. He will have political justice for the same reason. Under a just and fair system the individual will be eager to work with other individuals for the common good. Under a just system he will even surrender a certain amount of freedom of action, because give-and-take, compromise, provided it is open, honest, based on antecedent general consent, is indispensable in any civilized society. But the basic condition of voluntary co-operation and mutual concessions is justice.

May we not, then, be witnessing a remarkable rapprochement between Socialists and Individualists? Is not a common ground being prepared by the latest formulators of social creeds? The Socialists have in the past emphasized co-operation, the Individualists—freedom. The

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Socialists were betrayed into dogmatism, into worship of the State, into blind trust in mere machinery, organization, external changes. The Individualists were betrayed into a narrow sectarian, holier-than-thou attitude toward the State, into professed abhorrence of all "compulsion," into blind worship of competition, of personal liberty. Today the scales have fallen, or are falling, from the eyes of Socialists and Individualists alike. Both schools have learned something in the last decade, and especially in the last quinquennium. No one who thinks wishes to sacrifice the individual, the human spirit, to the Moloch of efficiency, or to the State, or to organization. On the other hand, the necessity and utility of co-operation is universally recognized. There is at last, after a century of polemics and conflicts, an opportunity for a radical *entente*. The march of thought leads to differentiation, but it also leads to unity, to synthesis. Are we approaching unity in social thought and reformatory activity?

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THE IMPLICATION OF GOOD.

M. LIGHTFOOT EASTWOOD.

THE idea of Good lies at the root of all ethical construction, and progressive attempts to unfold its significance are therefore justifiable.

I.

At the outset of this effort it is important to note that, in recent years, a school of thinkers has arisen which asserts that Good and Bad, together with other fundamental notions and experiences, are indefinable in any sense. This school may be described as a new form of Intuitionism; for, although it rejects the older view of the indefinability and self-evidence of judgments concerning right and wrong, yet it affirms these characteristics of Good and Bad and also of certain other so-called "simple" notions. This view, generally, is based upon the conception of analysis. We are said to know things by analysing them into their constituent parts. We can define them as a result of this analysis, for a definition states what parts invariably constitute a given whole. Now the result of this analysis is to lead us to certain ultimates which are incapable of being subjected to further analysis. Such ultimates are simple, they cannot be defined because they have no parts, they are themselves the final elements out of which definitions are constructed. These elements, of which we think, or are otherwise aware can never be made known to anyone who cannot experience them directly. Propositions concerning them must all be synthetic. Among such ultimates certain writers include various data presented to the senses such as yellow and sweet, the self, certain axioms, and also good and bad. Such a view would seem inevitably to lead to that attitude of empiricism which Professor James described as the habit of explaining wholes by parts, which parts may be considered in isolation from the whole

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without losing any aspect of their significance. In this view the world consists, as it appears to common sense, of an indefinite number of independent beings each of which is unique, irreducible and finite. Each aspect of our experience presents such beings of which red, shrill, hard, good, beauty, happiness, and each individual self are probably examples. Between these real and independent beings relations exist which bind them into wholes of greater or less complexity. But these relations imply neither any complexity nor any intrinsic property, in the nature of the elements they combine, and in virtue of which the relations exist. Relations, in this view, are purely external, the constituent of a complex is entirely identical, as a constituent, with what it is considered by itself in isolation from any relation. For, although, when a particular thing forms part of a whole, it possesses a predicate which it would not otherwise possess, this predicate in no way alters the nature of the thing nor does it enter into its definition. The relation of the part to the whole is, then, not to be regarded as analogous to that of the whole to the part, for the whole implies the part analytically, but the part in no way implies the whole. The universe is, according to this view, to be explained by reference to parts, but it is not to be regarded as a whole; for the absolute sum-total of things may never be so related as to form a whole. "Reality may only ever be a distributed and imperfectly unified collection, wherein each individual person, each separate fact, each aspect of experience, and even God Himself, is a unique, irreducible, simple and finite individual."

It is worth noting, however, that all advocates of this new intuitionism do not follow their empirical atomism to its logically complete conclusion. Mr. G. E. Moore, for example, modifies it in an interesting way. He asserts that although wholes are not to be regarded as organic unities from the point of view of *existence* they may very well be so regarded from the point of view of *value*. In other words, he says, the whole is not organic in the sense that the part implies the whole and reflects its nature, yet

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it is organic in the sense that the value of the whole is greater than the sum of the values of the parts. Only from the point of view of existence, not from that of value, can the whole be accounted for by a mere analysis of its parts. It is not necessary to examine this contention in detail for it has little direct bearing upon the subject of this chapter. The point with which we are here concerned is, that if we accept this view that good and bad are simple indefinable notions—then the science of ethics would just rest upon this ultimate distinction in thought and would proceed to give an account of "the Good" or the things of which good can be predicated from a moral point of view.

Such a view is, however, based upon a general metaphysical theory which may be described as a logical atomism, and which we are, by no means, obliged to accept. If our general metaphysical position is of an organic type, such as was put forward by Aristotle in ancient, and Hegel in modern times, then we shall neither seek to define by means of analysis, nor attempt to explain the universe in terms of its parts. These last have only a relative independence—the parts imply the whole just as the whole implies the parts. In order to get the full truth about anything we must regard it in relation to the whole of everything. "Isolate a thing from its relations," said Dr. Edward Caird, "and try to assert it by itself, you find it has negated itself as well as its relations." The thing in itself is nothing. The effort to define on this view, then, is not an effort to resolve a thing into separate parts, each of which are relatively simple, but an attempt to see the thing in all its intrinsic relations to the whole of which it forms a part. A final definition in this sense would, of course, involve perfect knowledge; actual definitions must, accordingly, be progressive efforts whereby we more and more fully unfold the significance of the members of one organic experience. Such ultimate conceptions as good and bad are, then, to be defined by means of an examination of the various ways in which they are involved in the system of our experience, and if we can arrive at some

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measure of understanding of this, we ought to feel that we have in that measure attained the only true form of definition.

II.

It is evident at the outset of this examination that the significance of good and bad, when used as predicates, is very various. In some cases there is a moral implication but more frequently there is not. We may, for instance, speak of various material objects such as coal as good; in other senses we speak of a work of art, a scientific theory, generosity, the cardinal virtues, and love as respectively good; and it is clear that in each of these connections we mean something different. On a cursory examination it seems that we mean successively:—good for a certain purpose, beautiful, useful for colligating or describing facts, conditionally good, partial manifestations or particular differentiations of the good, and absolutely or ultimately good.

In order to arrive at the kind of definition which we are seeking it would be necessary to find out precisely what is meant in each of these cases and to discover what, if any, is the common element of meaning, on the ground of the presence of which, a single predicate is applicable.

Mr. Herbert Spencer adopted the view that where good is predicated it is always possible to define it in terms of means and end, or more particularly, in terms of adaptation to an end. The predication of good thus implies the promotion of adaptation, the predication of bad, the hindrance of it. On such a view goodness and badness are not characteristics of any object *per se*, but are relations which exist between the object and something else which is regarded as an end. But this definition is far from being ultimate for when we ask what these conceptions of adaptation and maladaptation imply, we find that they only have significance with reference to some being who has aims or ends which he seeks. Two things can only be said to be maladapted if they are in a relation in which they ought not to

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be if a certain end is to be realised. Thus, in the case of a ship, if there are human beings for whose purposes it is essential that it shall float in a certain position, it can be said to be maladapted only when the centres of gravity and buoyancy are respectively so situated that equilibrium in that position is impossible. Apart from this desire on the part of human beings, the ship that turns over as soon as it is launched is neither less good nor less adapted than the one that retains the upright position. The concept of unattained ends, therefore, is necessary before adaptation or maladaptation can have any meaning. To assert, that the predication of good is the affirmation of adaptation to some end that is itself regarded as good, is a *circulus in definiendo*. To avoid this it would be necessary to find out what things there are which can be regarded as ultimately good, in which case good could be defined in terms of each of these. But in doing this, we should, of course, be completely giving up the conception that good consists in adaptation. When we speak of love as good we certainly do not merely mean that it is adapted to the attainment of some further good. Again, when Plato spoke of courage, wisdom, temperance and justice as good he does not seem to have regarded them as means to the attainment of "the Good" but rather as partial manifestations of it which in some measure shadowed its complete perfection. With reference to Mr. Spencer's interpretation of the predicate good, our conclusion, therefore, is that where it is applicable it is a definition in a circle, and that where good is really predicated of an object *per se*, then the conception of adaptation is not really applicable at all.

Confining ourselves now to cases where good is predicated of an object in an ultimate sense, that is to say, where good is not reducible to some other conception such as useful, beautiful, true and so on, in which case the term is only used at all through an illegitimate transfer of meaning, we find that there are a number of objects which at different times have been regarded as ultimately good. Socrates believed knowledge to be so; Aristotle, self-realisation; the

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Ascetics, self-sacrifice; Christ, love; Kant, the good will; Mr. Spencer, fulness of life; the Pragmatists, utility; and so on.

It would be neither possible nor relevant here to examine the claims of these various objects to be so regarded as good. To do so would involve a careful consideration of "the good" or the ethical end. What concerns us at present is the question, whether in each case that we predicate good, in an ultimate sense, there is not some common aspect of meaning, and if we can discern this we shall, in some measure, have unfolded the significance of good.

III.

In the first place it does seem to be true that the predication of good is universally related to the wills of persons. It rests upon the fact of will and preference. Good, generally, is that which satisfies desire; moreover, to say that we prefer one thing to another is to say that we regard one thing as better than another, or the one as relatively good and the other as relatively bad. Apart from this experience of preference one could not possibly say that any one thing was better than another, the most that could be affirmed would be that it was different. If one could imagine oneself to be completely indifferent to all possible objects of experience, to neither desire any of them nor to have any inclination to choose some rather than others, then the objects of experience would simply *be*, they could not possibly be regarded as either good or bad. To predicate good of a thing means, accordingly, that it is in some measure willed, and this implies further that this object is regarded as capable of satisfying a conscious want or unfulfilled desire and also that it is chosen in preference to other objects. On the other hand, to predicate bad of a thing means that it is in some measure an object of aversion, that it is regarded as inconsistent with the satisfaction of some conscious want or unfulfilled desire and also that other objects are chosen in preference to it.

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This then is, at any rate, part of the significance of good and bad and is, accordingly, a tentative definition. It brings us in fact very near to the position of Aristotle when he defined the good as that at which all things aim.

IV.

Concerning the actual existence of the thing of which good can be predicated, that is to say, of the object of choice or desire we say that it "ought to be" of such a particular nature. We say, for example, that a pulley should have no weight, a work of art should be sincere, a scientific theory ought to colligate a wide range of facts, a man ought to tell the truth and so on. When we make such statements as these we have an ideal in thought or object of desire on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a demand that existence in fact shall correspond with this ideal. It is accordingly to be observed that all judgments of either obligation or value imply two existences, mind or ideas on the one hand and objects or things on the other. Both of these existences are real and the conception of value arises through the relation which the one bears to the other.

In considering the general meaning of good, we have not, up to this point, considered the term specially in its moral signification. Here the term does, in truth, seem to possess additional connotation but it is not easy to state precisely what this is. Mr. Bradley[1] maintains that, whereas for goodness generally an idea must be present and existence be found to be in accordance with the idea, in the case of moral goodness, existence must not only be *found* to be in accordance with the idea but the idea itself must necessarily have produced or realised itself in the fact. It is not only that an idea has an answering content in fact, but in addition also it has made or brought about that correspondence. The idea has translated itself into

[1] *Appearance and Reality*, chapter XXV.

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reality, the content on both sides is the same, and existence has become what it is through the action of the idea. This distinction seems to embody the truth that was urged by Aristotle when he said that virtue is an activity or an ἐνέργεια. Although this does seem to be true of the morally good it does not, however, appear to be peculiar to it, and so it cannot really be regarded as its differentia. Indeed the same thing would seem to apply to most mechanical constructions and inventions. Here also there is usually present, in the first instance, an idea of a desired object which must possess various characteristics and an existence is made or invented in accordance with the idea. The idea has thus brought about the existence of a corresponding object in fact. It does not seem possible, therefore, to follow Mr. Bradley in his view that the predication of goodness, in this sense, is confined to the sphere of morality.

It is not easy to say with certainty what precisely is the differentia of good in this sphere, in other words, to determine what makes the signification of "ought" so different when we say that a man ought to love his neighbour, from that when we say that a pulley ought to have no weight. It seems, at any rate, that there is a difference of complexity in the two cases. In the general predication of good there is a human will with its ideal or purpose, on the one hand, and this is in a certain relation to some existence or external fact on the other. Two realities here seem to be involved. In the case of the morally good there is again the individual will with its ideal or purpose existing in a certain relation to some external object but there is also the standardised will, or system of purposes that represents the moral order and will of society in relation to the same external object. Three realities, accordingly, seem to be involved here. Beyond this difference of complexity in the two cases there are of course further differences. The criterion of value is not the same, nor, indeed, is the object to which the quality of value is attached. In the case of good generally, the criterion of value is the purpose or ideal of the will concerned

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and *objects* are called good or bad according as they harmonise or conflict with this; whereas, in the case of the morally good, the criterion of value is the relation of the standard will to its object and *individual wills* are called good or bad according as their relations to the same object correspond to or conflict with this. Good, therefore, in the general sense, is regarded as a value attaching to things and, in the moral sense, as a value attaching to wills, but in reality neither account is quite correct. Goodness and badness do not attach to objects or things in isolation from the wills of persons; nor, on the other hand, do they, as Kant maintained, attach to the mind of will out of relation to things. They attach only to objects regarded in relation to ideals or wills, and to wills regarded in relation to their objects.[1]

V.

It follows from all that has been said of good generally that we must recognise degrees in the perfection of goodness. Although the objects of choice, or objects which are regarded as satisfying the demands of the will concerned, are to be regarded on that account as good, it is obvious that they are not all to be regarded as equally good. In other words, when a man chooses or wills an object of a particular kind he regards it as good from the point of view that he occupies at that time. From another point of view the same object would be regarded as bad for it would completely fail to satisfy the will which issued from this

[1] I am very well aware that this account of the distinction between the two modes of predication is neither exhaustive nor convincing. It probably involves far more than has been indicated above. It may be the case that, only in the moral sense, can good be properly predicated at all. In every other sphere its signification may be reducible to some other conception such as the useful, the consistent, the beautiful. If this is so, the "ought" involved would be conditional, not categorical, wherever the predicate which has to be substituted is not one of those things which must be regarded as ultimately good. Thus, a pulley ought to have no weight only *if* the principles of mechanics are to be applicable to it; but, a man ought to love his neighbour unconditionally because the standard mind recognises this relation to be ultimately good.

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different universe. Much that society regards as bad to-day is a survival of what was once regarded as praiseworthy conduct and we may suppose that much that we approve to-day will be regarded with disapproval by posterity. There are, indeed, all degrees in the perfection of goodness and in relation to the higher good the lower becomes sheer bad. The fact that good and bad in experience are relative distinctions depends upon the fact that no object in experience ever completely satisfies us, every actual good points beyond itself and is relative to "The Good." Accordingly, the distinction between good and bad is not analogous, as Mr. Moore suggests, to that between colours. Professor J. S. Mackenzie compares it rather with that between more and less and his comparison is very convincing. Just as you cannot appreciate the significance of more, without appreciating the significance of less; so, you cannot appreciate the significance of good without appreciating the significance of bad. Again, just as more becomes less when viewed from the point of view of the greater more; so, good becomes bad when viewed from the point of view of the more perfect good. Finally, just as you cannot conceive of a consciousness in which the distinction between more and less was not operative; so, you cannot conceive of one that did not involve preference—in other words—one in which the distinction between good and bad was not perpetually exercised.

VI.

This conception of degrees in the perfection of goodness leads one to ask what is the criterion whereby we are enabled to distinguish the more from the less perfect good—the more perfect good being that which is more nearly identical with this standard than the less perfect good. Accordingly, it is that which would require less addition or modification in order to become congruent with the perfect good than the less perfect good. Every judgment of value inevitably implies the existence of some standardised or organised point of view by comparison with which particular exist-

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ences are evaluated. This has been apparent throughout the preceding pages where reference has repeatedly been made to the standardised mind or will. What then is this criterion? Various accounts of it in the moral sphere have been given at different times. Thus, it is described by Adam Smith in terms of the "Impartial Spectator," by Clifford in terms of the "tribal self," by the man in the street in terms of common sense, and by others in terms of the "normal man," the "ethos" of a people. All of these conceptions depend upon the view that our judgments of moral value imply a reference to some point of view that is more universal and authoritative than that of the individual who acts.

In our own time Dr. S. Alexander propounds an interesting evolutionary conception of the standard mind. He maintains that all judgments of moral value arise in connection with social institutions. These embody the good and are the result of the adaptation of human beings to each other in society. Moral laws are said to be the principles of conciliation which maintain these institutions, they are accordingly the foundation upon which the adapted condition of society rests. The relation of an individual will to its object is thus said to be good if it is coherent with the relation of the agents whose wills maintain these institutions to the same object.[1]

This account, while embodying a good deal of truth, hardly seems to be capable, without exaggeration, of accounting for all our moral judgments of good. It is true that acts which we call good do, on the whole, tend to maintain social institutions, and that these moreover, do seem to be embodiments of the morality, "ethos," or "Sitten," of the people. Also, since adaptation is progressive this explains why social institutions, and judgments of good based thereon, exhibit a progressive evolution. But, on the other hand, the attempt to interpret the standard mind in this way is open to all the traditional objections that have

[1] *Moral Order and Progress*, p. 253 et seq., and the *Gifford Lectures*, Course II, Sec. VIII.

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from time to time been urged against the moral code as a criterion of morality. For, no system of laws that could arise in connection with the maintenance of social institutions can be so exhaustive as to include within its scope every attitude of will or choice which we must regard as either good or bad. According to Dr. Alexander, honesty is a virtue of commercial exchange, chastity the virtue of abstaining from unlawful relations,[1] but it is obvious that such an interpretation could not, without exaggeration, be strained to include all the various forms of honesty and chastity that we recognise as good. True, honesty is not confined to commercial exchange, it is something that involves the whole man and enters into every relation of life. It includes absolute sincerity of mind, hatred of falsehood in any form, ever readiness to learn the true lessons of experience undistorted by prejudice or blindness of soul. Similarly, against the doctrine that chastity consists in abstention, it is to be urged that it consists rather in the spirit in which we contemplate things in the world around us. "Unto the pure all things are pure." There is of course an intimate relation between a clean life and a clean heart but a person may refrain from entering into any unlawful relations and yet be unchaste and inherently vile. Hence, though the criterion of many of the attitudes of will that we can call good or bad may be the legalised response of man's nature to the various social institutions, this is not an adequate criterion for all of them.

A further objection to this view is, that the judgments of value based upon it will be conflicting and incongruous. In the social life we have many masters, often in following the one we must desert the other and we are perforce led to ask—Which is the higher institution? To this question Dr. Alexander's criterion affords no answer. Finally, the moral spirit of the best men teaches them that, while loyalty to social institutions is good, yet it alone is not good enough. These institutions and their laws have their

[1] *Moral Order and Progress*, p. 253.

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shortcomings; they represent in fact, the evolutionary stage of the majority, and though it is right, in a measure, to respect majorities it is wrong to bow before them as infallible; for the wills of majorities are not stationary things, they and the corresponding social institutions, develop from lower to higher; but they do so, not mainly through a non-voluntary process of natural selection, but because the best men at each stage set themselves to establish a higher atmosphere and criterion of good than is embodied in the institutions around them. The criterion of good for them, therefore, rests not upon what existing institutions are, but rather upon what they have in them to be.

VII.

The consideration of Dr. Alexander's view is very fruitful in suggestion as to the true nature of the standardised point of view by comparison with which particular attitudes of will are evaluated. It certainly seems to be the case, as Dr. Alexander maintains, that men's ordinary judgments of moral value have reference to a point of view that is intimately associated with the existing state of society. The point of view or standard, which seems to be most generally employed, has been aptly described by Professor Mackenzie as the "ethos" of a people or the morality of our world. It is not open to the first objection that we urged against the view of Dr. Alexander, for the ethos of a people does supply a criterion whereby to evaluate every attitude of will which men must regard as good or bad. On the other hand, it does not meet the other two difficulties that were raised against social institutions as the source of a criterion. Like these, the ethos of a people, while affording a criterion for the mass of men, is not good enough for the best men. They, in truth, speed on the progress of the ethos, because they continually strive to employ a standard that is rooted in the ethos, but yet has corrected its defects. These defects are essentially those of lack of unity and consistency, and the responses evoked by

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the ethos are accordingly fragmentary and incongruous. The ethos of a people lacks ethical unity, and, with this as a criterion, the character developed in man could not form a harmonious and consistent whole. Nevertheless there are two reasons why this ethos is the criterion generally employed and accepted as satisfactory. The first is, that the mass of men habitually occupy a limited point of view, and within this range of vision the defects are not apparent. The second is, that the ethos, or morality of our world, is actually far higher in the scale of perfection than that to which men generally have attained. Only for the best men of the age does it fail as the criterion, for they have already so far attained, and in process of that attainment a more coherent and unified criterion has emerged. From this higher level, conduct in accordance with the ethos could no longer be described as good, it could neither satisfy nor be the object of choice since it would be seen to violate that demand for unity and coherency which belongs essentially to every rational soul.

This seems to point to the conclusion that the organised point of view, with reference to which particular acts of will ultimately derive their value, must be a complete, harmonious or rational one. Good, in an ultimate sense, therefore, is that which a being possessing a perfectly rational soul, would inevitably choose and with which he would be satisfied. A particular attitude of will to its object is, accordingly, only completely good if it is congruous with the attitude of a perfectly rational soul to the same object. In comparison with this criterion we find all degrees in the perfection of goodness. This is illustrated by further reference to the analogous distinction between more and less. This involves an implicit reference to the limiting conceptions zero and infinity which are the ideal termini of the scale of quantity. All the quantities which experience presents fall somewhere between these two. Likewise the attitudes of will towards objects, which can be called either good or bad fall somewhere within a scale of value whose ideal limits are completely irrational and

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completely rational choice. The attitudes of will of a man, whose life is habitually determined by a very limited point of view, have a place low down in the scale. He chooses irrationally and must continually frustrate himself by his selection of incongruous objects. He is divided against himself and forever enslaved. The objects that he chooses must indeed be called good in that he regards them as capable of satisfying his wants but from any standardised point of view they must be condemned as bad. With the ethos as the criterion they would be so condemned, for lacking in unity and complete rationality as the ethos undoubtably is, it yet possesses these characters in a far higher degree than is embodied in the attitude towards life of the vast majority of men. There are, indeed, relatively few men in any age whose points of view are more rational than that which is embodied in the morality of their world. Any individual should therefore be chary of setting up his private conceptions of moral value in opposition to those which represent the accumulated rationality of his world.

VIII.

The foregoing account in some measure unfolds the significance of good when it is predicated in an ultimate sense, but it seems rather to indicate the form than the content of the rational point of view. This is a limitation that characterises all ideals as such—they indicate the truth but not in all its richness and concreteness. It would not on that account be right to conclude that they are therefore barren as a source of guidance. The abstract ideal of rationality enables us to form judgments of value in the qualitative sphere just as our inadequate conception of infinity enables us to form certain judgments in the quantitative one. Our conception of the content of a rational point of view is necessarily inadequate as long as the ideal is unrealised. Could we fully conceive of perfect rationality both in form and content we should already have attained it. All notions that we form of it are rela-

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tive to our finite and imperfectly rational point of view. At the same time it is never difficult to discern the content of a more rational view than that which we have formulated at present. Here, as everywhere throughout the scale of evolution, the next step higher is practically anticipated before it is theoretically known. Our actual practice is pregnant with a higher rationality than that of which we are theoretically aware. Only by trying to act rationally do we learn what rationality means. This was the truth urged by Kant when he insisted upon the primacy of the practical reason. In like manner, if you try to act loyally with regard to existing social institutions you will become aware of the rational ends or purposes that these institutions serve; then and then only will you be in a position to see where these ends lack unity and coherency and so be capable of passing to a higher level of rationality. You must live as rationally as your world before you can formulate to yourself a higher stage of being. Every act we do enriches or impoverishes the content of the ideal of rationality that is gradually shaping itself within us. The dim and abstract anticipation of this ideal, which is a sufficient guide to make us feel that one attitude of will is good and another bad, will if we act upon it, become more concrete and significant, and so afford a more certain guide in the complex issues of life. The ideal is not something foreign to our practice, but is already imperfectly embodied in it, for the recognition of the unfulfilled possibilities of this practice, which comes to us in our best moments, indicates the direction in which further rationality is to be attained. No man is so ignorant of the content of rationality as to persistently fail to realise what he might yet make of his life if only he could consistently act upon a less distorted, incoherent and one sided view of things.

One can hardly close a consideration of the meaning of good without reference to the question whether, with perfect rationality, choice and with it the distinction between good and bad, would not inevitably disappear. It would seem that this must be the case, for the rational soul in

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seeking to grasp the full content of the world could not choose or be satisfied with anything other than the whole harmonious system of experience. Such a soul would be beyond all those preferences and exclusions which our finite minds set up. Amid all the variety, complexity and immeasurability of its world no thing would be negated but each would have its place and contribute its quota to the infinite meaning of the whole system.

M. LIGHTFOOT EASTWOOD.

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"IN THE HOPE OF THE NEW ZION."[1]

H. M. KALLEN.

IV.

THE first families of Europe and their stewards, usually called prime ministers and secretaries of state, who sought to reapportion this continental domain of theirs according to their vested rights as those had been understood prior to the French Revolution, counted without the Revolution. The Congress of Vienna lasted, with interruptions, some five years. Its final act was not signed until May, 1820, and by that time every position and attitude it had taken in the adjustments of the family squabbles and dower disputes of kings had been challenged by the rising discontent of peoples. This turned all royal benevolence into defensive tyranny, as in the instance of the notorious Holy Alliance, and royalty has remained on the defensive ever since. The Revolutionary gospel of equality, liberty and fraternity had awakened peoples—at least to liberty. Even in the Napoleonic tyranny there had been an element of overturn and equalization. Napoleon himself was a symbol of what opportunity freedom might create for a man, and his Empire a dominion of careers open to and won by talents. A real reversion to the old feudal caste system of Europe was impossible. The mind and mood of Europe had turned from it. But equally impossible was the attainment of that abstract equality and fraternity of the "natural man," the "human being" that had been the inspiring vision of the Revolution. Both the Revolution itself and the urgent need of dynasts, appealing at last to their subjects to save their thrones, gave it an immediate concrete and specific application in that neighborliness of common speech, common customs, traditions and memories which are the very heart of nationality.

[1] See the January number of the JOURNAL.

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These supplied to the abstractions of the Revolution both body and force. These are the explosive elements in democracy, and it is these primarily that throughout the nineteenth century made of the democratic aspiration an efficacious dynamic in the lives of men. The nineteenth century has been called the century of nationality and, indeed, it is; but it is no less so the century of democracy, and the two cannot be separated. One after another the European and Christian subjects of the Turk, the Magyar and the Slavonic and the Italian subjects of the German, the Polish subjects of the Russians, the Irish subjects of the English, rose against their masters, some to failure only and some to freedom. One after another peoples arose against governments in France, in Germany, in Austria, in England, in Spain, in Portugal. In all these uprisings, they won, in spite of setbacks, to constantly freer positions, sometimes by force, as in France, sometimes by somewhat more legislative action as in England, but they won. The winning marks the rising wave of nationality in Europe, its first phase culminating in 1830 with the revolutions in France and Poland, the liberation of Greece, the integration of Switzerland; its second phase in 1848, with uprisings all over Europe, and its third phase in 1878 with the council of Vienna. Its fourth phase has culminated in the just suspended war, which marks the end of the era of nationality as a program and an ideal. The war will convert it from a motive into a condition, will establish it as an acknowledged fact, and thus permit the emergence into the foreground of history of the second great social motive which has been a spring of action in the nineteenth century, the motive of economic justice. That has already sprung clear in Russia and in Hungary and has defined itself sharply in England and Germany and France. It will challenge all government anew, as nationality challenged government after 1815. The future belongs to it.

The past, however, has been governed by the aspirations of nationality. The utterance and philosophy of these reached their height in the third quarter of the nineteenth

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century and its noblest and truest voice was Giuseppe Mazzini. His outlook is simple, a complement rather than a contradiction of the outlook of the eighteenth century thinkers whose ideas gave birth to the French Revolution. He criticises them, Voltaire and Montesquieu and Rousseau particularly, for their political and historical formalism. "It is not by the force of *conventions* or of *aught else*," he writes,[1] "but by a necessity of our nature that Societies are founded and grow." Hence nationality and the aspirations of nationality. Hence its implication in democracy and democracy's implication in it. Hence the need for collective action. "Nations are initiated into the worship of liberty by the sufferings of servitude." Individuals cannot by themselves win liberty. They can only die for it: "individual faith makes martyrs; social faith gains victories. . . . The charter of each Nation's liberty is a clause in the charter of humanity." These excerpts are from *Faith and the Future*, written in French at Bienne in 1835, as a reply to Louis Phillipe's treachery against democracy. The essay states the whole Mazzinian philosophy of democratic nationalism. All his other writings are either anticipatious or echoes of it. Its conception of society is independent of its metaphysical or theological doctrines. The former might go with any of the latter and in point of fact, did. The unity of mankind is for Mazzini, organic; nations are organs of humanity.

"We believe," he declares, speaking for Republicanism, "in the *Holy Alliance of the Peoples* as the broadest formula of association possible in our age—in the *liberty* and *equality* of the peoples without which association has no true life—in *Nationality*, which is the conscience of the peoples, which assigns to them their share of work in association, their office in *Humanity*, and hence constitutes their mission on earth, their *individuality;* for without Nationality neither liberty nor equality is possible—and we believe in the holy *Fatherland*, that is, the cradle of nationality, the altar and patrimony of the individuals that compose each people."

This creed has remained, though crossed by newer and later visions and aspirations, the creed of the *peoples* of

[1] Thoughts on the French Revolution of 1789.

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Europe. It is the living spirit in the poetry of Swinburne and the political philosophy of Hegel. It is the centre from which departs the new economic internationalism of the Socialists and the cultural and financial imperialism of the pan-German and pan-Slavists and other panic movements that have precipitated the war. Its application to the Jews, whose creed and aspiration it has been from the beginning of their history, of the outlook of whose prophets it is a restatement, is obvious enough. And, indeed, the application was made in Mazzini's day as a matter of course. Not merely in the remote speculations of the aged Mordecai Noah in the America of the '40s. It was given the nearness of political practicality and religious action in both England and France, and among Gentiles more largely and generously than among Jews. To Hollingsworth, writing in 1852 in England[1] the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was not only an act of humanity and justice, but a political necessity, present in the British mind to this very day, in the safeguarding of the highway across Asia Minor to India.[2] To Laurence Oliphant, who himself settled with a colony near Haifa, the restoration to the Promised Land was, as it still is to so many pious and devout Christians, the indispensable preliminary to the return of the Saviour. The idea energized the mind of Abraham Pétavel, a protestant minister and professor in Neuchatel. His pamphlet,[3] published in 1864 in Geneva, utters much the same piety and humanism that is apparent in Laurence Oliphant, with somewhat greater regard for the political "realities" of the time. National justice to the Jewish people was one of the ruling passions of Henri Dunant, founder of the Red Cross and author of Geneva Conventions. He urged the French *Alliance Israélite Universelle* to settle the Jews in Palestine; appealed to the

[1] Remarks upon the Present Condition of the Jews in Palestine.

[2] Its immediate stimulus was the agitation about the Suez Canal. This great project had stirred Frenchmen to the same ideas. *cf. Denbie's New Oriental Problem*, and "*The New Eastern Question*" by *E. Laharame.*

[3] Devoir des nations de rendre au peuple juif sa nationalité.

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Jews of Berlin, to the Anglo-Jewish Association. Failing of sympathetic response from them, he organized the International Palestine Society and the Syrian and Palestine Colonization Society. But the Jews of Western Europe were still too preoccupied with piecemeal and individualistic emancipation, with the dominant abstractions of the eighteenth century, and the Gentiles were too absorbed in their own problems to concern themselves with the Jewish problem in a purely objective, sociological and historical as well as sentimental way. The sentiment was to be noticed all over Europe. It gave tone to much of the literary avocation of Beaconsfield; it was a note in a play of Dumas fils;[1] it became a great preoccupation of George Eliot. The restoration of the Jewish people to the Promised Land is a theme she returns to again and again—in *Theophrastus Such*, in *The Modern Hep, Hep*, in *Daniel Deronda*. The latter, indeed, may be said to make this restoration its subject-matter. And to the present day there is, to my mind, no more eloquent statement of the case of Zionism than she puts in the mouth of *Mordecai*.

When it is rational to say, "I know not my father or my mother; let my children be aliens unto me, that no prayer of mine may touch them," then will it be rational for the Jew to say, "I will seek to know no difference between me and the Gentile; I will not cherish the prophetic consciousness of our nationality." Let the Hebrew cease to be, and let all his memorials be antiquarian trifles, dead as the wall-paintings of a conjectured race. Yet let his children learn by rote the speech of the Greek, where he adjures his fellow-citizens by the bravery of those who fought foremost at Marathon; let him learn to say, That was noble in Greek, that is the spirit of an immortal nation! But the Jew has no memories that bind him to action; let him laugh that his nation is degraded from a nation; let him hold the monuments of his law which carried within its frame the breath of social justice, of charity, and of household sanctities; let him hold the energy of the prophets, the patient care of the masters, the fortitude of martyred generations, as mere stuff for a professorship. . . .

In the multitude of the ignorant on three continents who observe our rites and make the confession of Divine Unity, the soul of Judaism is not dead. Revive the organic centre: let the unity of Israel which has made the growth and form of its religion be an outward reality.

[1] La femme de Claude.

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Looking forward to a land and a polity, our dispersed people in all the ends of the earth may share the dignity of a national life which has a voice among the peoples of the East and of the West—which will plant the wisdom and skill of our race so that it may be, as of old, a medium of transmission and understanding. Let that come to pass, and the living warmth will spread to the weak extremities of Israel, and superstition will vanish, not in the lawlessness of the renegade, but in the illumination of great facts which widen feeling, and make all knowledge alive as the young offspring of beloved memories. . . .

There is a store of wisdom among us to found a new Jewish polity, grand, simple, just, like the old—a republic where there is equality of protection. . . . Then our race shall have an organic centre, a heart and a brain to watch and guide and execute; the outraged Jew shall have a defense in the court of the nations, as the outraged Englishman or American. And the world will gain as Israel gains. For there will be a community in the van of the East which carries the culture and the sympathies of every great nation in its bosom; and there will be a land for a halting-place of enmities, a neutral ground for the East as Belgium is for the West. Difficulties? I know there are difficulties. But let the spirit of sublime achievement move in the great among our people and the work will begin. . . .

Let the torch of visible community be lit! Let the reason of Israel disclose itself in a great outward deed, let there be another great migration, another choosing of Israel to be a nationality, whose members may still stretch to the ends of the earth, even as the sons of England and Germany, whom enterprise carries afar, but who still have a national hearth and a tribunal of national opinion. . . . Let the central fire be kindled again, and the light will reach afar. The degraded and scorned of our race will learn to think of their sacred land, not as a place for sacred beggary, to await death in loathsome idleness, but as a republic where the Jewish spirit manifests itself in a new order founded on the old, purified, enriched by experience our greatest sons have gathered from the life of the ages. . . . The sons of Judah have to choose, that God may again choose them. The Messianic time is the time when Israel shall will the planting of the national ensign. . . . Let us help to will our own better future and the better future of the world—not renounce our higher gift, and say, "Let us be as if we were not among the populations," but choose our full heritage, claim the brotherhood of our nation, and carry it into a new brotherhood with the nations of the Gentiles. The vision is there: it will be fulfilled.

Nor were the Jews of Western Europe themselves altogether untouched by this resurgent nationalism. By

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and large their first reaction to the emancipatory call of the French Revolution had been, as we have seen, one of surrender and self-effacement. Suffering for a thousand years from the assertion of their difference from the rest of mankind, they accepted eagerly the escape from suffering which the eighteenth century assertion of sameness of all men opened to them. They launched themselves upon a piteous obliteration of their corporate entity, upon the comminution of their nationality into its individuals and the dilution of their social personality into the undistinguished and neutral association of the reformed congregations. They threw themselves with passion into the republican emancipatory movements of their fellow-subjects of other stocks. They declared themselves Frenchmen or Germans or Englishmen of the Mosaic persuasion, and as such they labored with not untraditional fervor in the enfranchisement of their fellow-subjects. Members of the race are particularly conspicuous in the Polish and Hungarian rebellions, in the republican uprising in Germany of '48. Even more conspicuous were they in the new internationalism, an internationalism running across and in many respects denying the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century and the ideas of the French Revolution.

This internationalism is a conclusion from the philosophy of Socialism. Its strongest authoritative voice was that of the Jew, Karl Marx; its most heroic practical defender the Jew, Ferdinand Lasalle; its underlying thought the economic doctrine of the Jew, David Ricardo.

The whole of this internationalism is an inflation of a new social condition into law, the identification of a changing social fact with an unchanging social principle. The new social condition was the use of machinery in industry. The changing social fact was the realignment of the classes of men in accordance with the operation of the machine, the adaptation of society to machinery. Machinery was both "labor-saving" and "over-productive." Machinery both multiplied the division of labor and created the unemployment and the competition of labor. It changed the laborer

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from a semi-independent, self-supporting householder to a factory accessory, from a man into a "hand," to be bought in the open market as other things are bought, according to the "law" of supply and demand. Society seemed destined merely to produce commodities for foreign markets, and the miseries of men, declared the pundits of the "dismal science," as political economy was at once called, were the indispensable condition of the progress of society. The creation and encouragement of capital came to be considered the exclusive aim of the state and men and women and children simply the tools and servants of capital, whether as laborers sacrificed, or employing high-priests sacrificing.

Thus the eighteenth century idea of the "natural man" was confronted by the nineteenth century idea of the "economic man." The sameness of men according to nature was opposed by the sameness of men according to machinery, and in the minds of the more reflective men of the age the latter sameness became the obsessing one. Men were classified from the Ricardian standpoint with respect to their relation to the great god Capital, their natures and realities were held to be determined by whether they owned it, or whether they created it. Between owners and creators, capitalists and laborers, an eternal conflict had necessarily to be waged, under the "iron law of wages," by which the rich were constantly growing richer and the poor poorer. If only the poor, the workers, would become conscious of this conflict, if they would recognize their community of interest and cease competing with each other, they could then wage successful warfare against their enemies, where enmity was predetermined by the nature of things. "Workingmen of all the world, unite!"

Such is the burden of the gospel according to Karl Marx, the gospel which has become the established religion of the Russian nation and, in ever growing proportions, of the whole population of Europe. Its progress was, as is natural, slow and piecemeal. Its exemplification in the Trades Unions has been more real and effective than its exempli-

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fication in the political party. Like all gospels, it is a compensatory correction of a condition, not the description of a fact. But it set a pace for Europe. It had the courage of its conclusions, and its protagonists made of them a program they have tried with all their might and constantly-increasing success to carry out. They created the famous "Internationale." They set themselves against the traditional processes and institutions of civilization. They repudiated kings and priests and war as well as capital. They failed, of course, but it is not their fault that the habits and passions and interests of men cannot keep pace with their intellects. Their real fault is that, being gospellers, they ignored or denied the realities of human nature which did not fit into their system of salvation, so retarding their own progress in realization and converting into opponents forces that might have been aids. Economic internationalism, in short, could no more discount nationality than political cosmopolitanism. And this impossibility is conspicuous with no people so much, perhaps, as with the Jews.

For the greater men of the race, those who, in John Adams' quaint terms, contributed to "the amelioration of the philosophy of the age," either shut their eyes to the Jewish question or, facing it squarely, adopted the nationalist attitude. Marx and Lasalle shut their eyes; Beaconsfield was a nationalist with immense racial pride. So was the French patriot, Joseph Salvador, son of a Jewish father and a Catholic mother; physician, protagonist of the "higher criticism" of the Bible; close student of the constitutional development of the ancient Jewish state; hated of the clerical party, one of the foremost influences in bringing about the revolution of 1830. He, *circa* 1837, called for the assembling of a European congress for the purpose of restoring the Jewish people to their promised land. So was Lazar Lévy-Bing, prosperous banker of Nancy, large participator in the affairs of the French commonwealth. His Zionism had a religious color, derived from Pétavel, whose work had opened his eyes to the Jew-

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ish problem. He saw in the restoration he so passionately advocated a religious as well as a political event, and in the restored Jerusalem the fulfillment of a prophecy that the law should go forth from Zion and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. Even Jews of purely philanthropic intention, to whom piecemeal emancipation was the sole way out of the difficulties of the Jewish position could not elude the spirit and outlook of the age, or avoid the impregnation of the Mazzinian philosophy. Thus the *Alliance Israelite Universelle* is the creation of the philanthropic impulse of emancipated Jews. It is a charitable organization, evoked in 1860 by a great need, rendered vivid in the misery and persecution for religious reasons suffered by the Jews of Damascus in 1840, and again and more terribly, in 1860. Among its founders is the Adolphe Cremieux, ten years later a minister of justice in the French Cabinet, and in all essentials an "assimilated" and "emancipated" man. Yet the statement which explained the organization he helped to found is near to the practical essence of the nationalist political philosophy of the time. "All other important faiths," it declared, "are represented in the world by nations; that is to say they are incarnated in governments especially interested in them and officially authorized to represent them and speak for them only. Our faith alone is without this important advantage; it is represented neither by a state nor by a society, nor does it occupy a clearly defined territory." And that the hope and desire to create this "important advantage" was in the minds of the founders of the *Alliance* may be gathered from the report of Charles Netter, among them the passionate devotee in the creation of this society, on the Agricultural School which it had established near Jaffa. It tells the central committee which it addresses of the refuge from persecution it is preparing. It speaks of the "peaceful winning of this Holy Land." It assures the committee that the land can and will be thus won. Since Netter's day the *Alliance* has had many a change of mood, swayed by every fashion of feeling and opinion that infected France and threatened

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the position of the timorous Frenchmen (like Salomon Reinach, a contemporary director) "of the Mosaic persuasion." Yet the whole influence of the work of the *Alliance*, in spite of the wishes of the directors, is witness to the correctness of Netter's prediction. . . .

However, the distinguished example of the incapacity of abstract cosmopolitanism and internationalism to withstand the realities of human association on the continent of Europe, is Moses Hess. Born in Germany, 1812, his childhood and youth were passed in the turmoil of conflicting systems, ideas and organizations of which Germany was the theatre between that year and the fateful '48. Son of a profoundly orthodox father, his education stripped his orthodoxy from him like an outworn garment and alienated him from his family. A brief conciliation was followed by a marriage with a Gentile girl of questionable reputation and rendered the alienation permanent. He was early impregnated with the dominant Hegelianism of the period. But it was the Hegelianism of the left, and it led him first of all to a sharp and lasting opposition to the Hegelianism of the right, that Hegelianism which accepted the Prussian state as the goal and ultimacy of social life, and its dominion as the rule of spirit. This opposition endured until his death. For his participation in the revolution of '48 Prussia proscribed and pursued him until he found refuge in France. When, in 1870, France expelled him as an alien enemy, he replied with his book, *The Defeated Nation*. This book was a call to all Europe to arm against a Germany dominated by Prussia.

The affirmations of his Hegelianism were primarily and basically socialistic. By temperament and aptitude a libertarian and activist, he was naturally the antithesis of Marx, and the opposition more than once found literary expression. Nevertheless, the two men collaborated in the enterprise of proletarian organization. Hess gave himself from 1845 on to the propaganda of the Communist program, so much so that Arnold Ruge satirized him as the "Communist Rabbi Moses." He contributed to Marx's

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Jahrbücher. He risked his life by returning to Germany to organize workmen with Lasalle. In the intervals he studied biology and ethnology. The effect of his studies was the concretion of the abstraction *Humanity* to whose service he had dedicated himself, of the abstraction *Labour* for whose liberation he was risking his life, into societies of men and women with character, customs, habits, speech and culture, history and traditions attached to places, times and circumstances. He discovered, in a word, nationality. His conceptions became very similar to those of Mazzini, with the difference in philosophical background and assumptions that the training and practical preoccupations of the two men made. The amplification and vitalization of view which Hess's discovery of nationality effected, he registered, 1862, in *Rome and Jerusalem, the Latest National Question*. The book is a series of twelve letters, addressed to a doubting friend. It utters his whole theory of life, with special emphasis on its bearing upon the fate of the Jewish people. Life and the world are, in his view, an organic and living whole of which the continuous, infinite multitudes of change and mutation in Nature and in history are manifestations and expressions. They are, in the words of Bergson, to whom Hess bears a somewhat striking resemblance, a single undivided *élan vital*, differentiating itself as life and the universe. It is particularly lucid in human life, and history is its clearest self-utterance. In the development of this history each race has its own function or mission equally with all others. That of the Jews is the realization of the laws of social justice in organized society. Properly to discharge this function the Jewish people must be restored to free community, to national independence in Palestine. Nothing else can restore them, economically, socially, spiritually, to normal. Throughout the western world, they are an uprooted and disinherited people, in its economic life middlemen or traders rather than producers; in its social and civil life, outcasts and pariahs, in the life of the spirit chameleons, imitators because repudiators of their own living tradition, unhappily fossilizing in

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the eastern world. The return to the Promised Land would give them roots, enable them to become once more the producers and creators they should be, assure the discharge of their proper functions in the family of nations. The technique of restoration he regards as very simple—a Jewish Colonization Association devoting itself with French protection to the resettling of Jews in Palestine, under the sanction of a Jewish Congress supported by the powers.

Hess's metaphysics has its alternatives—what metaphysic has not?—but his sociological acumen and his historical judgment are open to little question. Both the Epilogue to *Rome and Jerusalem*, and the storm he raised in German Jewry are witness. The storm was only a passing storm. It led the historian Graetz to remark upon it—upon the anger of the anti-semites, the fears of the Jewish cosmopolitans, the hopes of the orthodox, but Graetz drew no conclusions. He was too timid. The great bulk of the Jews of Western Europe, particularly those of Germany, were too timid. Hess called them to self-assertion and self-help. Their reply was—self-concealment and impotence. They were afraid collectively to conquer freedom as a people's victory; they were not afraid to have emancipation ungraciously thrown to them as a master's generosity.

V

That Eastern Jewry should, all things considered, provide its fair counterpart of Western Jewry was, of course, natural. It did reproduce, line for line, the disturbances and perturbations which shook the Jews of Western Europe. It reproduced them, but with a difference. In this difference lies, however, the secret of the vitality of Zionism and the continuity and vigor of its vision and aspiration in the hearts of the great bulk of the Jewish nationality, whose home is in Central and Eastern Europe. Its history, from the failure of the Sabbataian adventure on, leaves nothing to be desired for tragic irony. The government of Poland itself was disintegrating. Kings, power-

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less before the unspeakable *Shlakhta*, whose arrogance, sloth and selfishness ruined Poland, perforce turned the kingship into an engine of intrigue. The royal protection of the Jewish charter became a scrap of paper. The Jews themselves were compelled to become the victims and the instruments of the irresponsibilities of the landed magnates, whose absolutism on their lands was exceeded only by their misrule. In addition to the exploitation and abuse of these magnates, the Jews had to suffer the aggression of the urban German burgher class, always pressing to eliminate the Jewish rival, and the persecution of the Churchman, whose religious zeal received powerful re-enforcement from economic greed. The conflicting impositions, demands and restrictions of these three classes broke up the integrity of the Jewish community. Their pressure squeezed the vitality out of the *Congressus Judaicus*, destroyed its authority and denuded it of its representative character. It converted the *Kahal* from a town meeting into a tyrannical corporation of oligarchs. It cut off the contact of the Jews both as individuals and as nationality from the rest of the world. At just the time when the bans and taboos of mediævalism were broken in Europe and the spirit of man could adventure free through thoughts and things, persecution and disaster imposed them upon Jewry. The thought and feeling of the great Jewish community turned inward and fed upon itself. The spirit so nourished is a queer and twisted thing of dialectic, passion and devoutness, as irrelevant to the realities of the business of living as anything mediæval Christianity so devised. It converted changing social customs into everlasting rituals, accidents of fashion in garments and hairdressing into religious vestment, accidents of diet into sacraments. It imagined a gross, material Otherworld which echoed to the last nuance the literalness of mediæval Christianism which it had until then been free of. It found in the wonder-working rabbi of the Chassidic sect the precise analogue of the Christian saint, the hermit, the lay brother who did miracles for a price, and it clung to him with a passion of faith and devo-

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tion which is a secure measure of the degradation and horror into which the community had fallen. Not an ill nor an evil in this life but had its precise and material compensation in the world to come! That world assumed all the definiteness of the Christian eschatological system—a region of the habitation of dead saints and unborn saviours, of delectable food and drink and clothing, of magical efficiency and of vengeance upon the persecutor. The lineaments of the real Zion were absorbed into it. The true Messiah became in effect a supernatural being, his appearance contingent upon supernatural events and the restoration of Palestine a heavenly thing, unconnected with things of earth. Life throughout this period, which lasted some two hundred years, and traces of which still survive, was for the Jews a somnambulism wherein the community and individual escaped from the harsh oppression of the poignant facts. The barren dialectic of Rabbinism and the hopeless inarticulation of mysticism were the whole of it. For once in their history the Jews were at last truly and completely a "religious," that is, a demoralized, people.

The political event which broke into this somnambulism was the partition of Poland. The partition divided Jewry no less than the Poles, between three new and active forces, whose impact brought not only different and new oppression, but also different and new social and intellectual contacts. Prussian and Austrian and Russian monarchs, much under the seductive infection of the liberal ideas of the eighteenth century, could not endure that their Jews should be different from their other subjects. They brought to bear upon them all the malicious pressure of bureaucratic machinery to "modernize" and "assimilate" them. That this should be met with stiffening resistance was inevitable. Neither Joseph I of Austria, nor the first Russian Alexander, nor Nicholas, succeeded in developing among Jews any actual living *movement* toward modernization. The Jews went as far as they were compelled to, and no farther. And wherever the pressure was relaxed, they reverted to the initial form. Nevertheless, they did get

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modernized, and with unparalleled swiftness. The power which achieved this was not, however, political but intellectual and social, and it operated not by force, but by infection.

The process of its operation is usually called the "Haskalah" or Enlightenment. It is an inward change in the complexus of the Jewish nationality in Eastern Europe, responding to the contacts of the new peoples, new forces and new ideas which the partition of Poland brought about. It began in Germany, spread thence to Austria and to Russia. Its great protagonist was Moses Mendelsohn. A Polish Jew, come to place and power in Berlin, Mendelsohn felt, and felt truly, that the renewal of Jewry must come first through the force of liberal ideas, such ideas as were the currency of the fashionable and humane cosmopolitanism of his day. The movement he began was a movement to "Germanize"—in the matter of dress and manners (in the course of time to dress or to be otherwise "deitch," became a matter for excommunication) but the medium for the transmission of these "German" ideas was inevitably Hebrew, always the *lingua franca* of the multilingual Jewish people. Hebrew, the holy tongue, was to be used for profane and secular purposes. There is the true animus of the Haskalah. It was an enterprise in secularization and the resistance to it took the same form as some centuries earlier the resistance to the renaissance in the wider world. Religion was set over against wisdom, superstition against knowledge, authority against freedom. The protagonists of the Haskalah made alliances with the government, to effect their secularizing ends. The more the Rabbinists insisted on the dominion of their power the farther the *Maskilim* went in the loosening of a community which was merely, and so, superstitiously, religious. In the end, the confrontation ceased to be one of religious Rabbinism or scholasticism with secular Hebraism. It became a confrontation of orthodoxy with "assimilation."

Of this assimilation, of this perennial detachment of Jew after Jew from his community and his absorption in the

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community of the non-Jewish majority, the protagonists of the Haskalah had conceived high hopes. The impulsive and uncertain benevolences of Alexander II, the "Czar liberator," which opened to Jews the schools of the land and promised improvement of their economic ills, drew thousands of them into a new world, to their ardor and inexperience, a freer and more joyous world. It seemed to them as if the liberalism of the nineteenth century were about to succeed in Russia in accomplishing what it had failed to do in Western Europe. The liberation and absorption of the Jews was to take place by an administrative ukase and the force of circumstances: no Jew had need to do anything but prepare himself intellectually and wait. The young hopefuls were disillusioned. Alexander II himself repented of his wisdom just before his assassination, and his successor, with the assistance of the devout Pobiedonostzeff, arranged that the holy mediæval tradition in the treatment of the Jews should in no way be desecrated. The young Jewish hopefuls discovered, as so many of other races and times did, that the solution of a problem of community by self-attrition was not a working solution for the community. They found themselves, therefore, loose, uprooted, tramps in mind and body, with more energy than efficiency. This energy they threw into the vernacular and Hebrew press, which they used as the device to get the benefits of their experiences to the Jewish masses hoping, and succeeding, so to recover a basis of existence. No people in the world is as completely sensitive to the printed word as the Jew, and the Haskalah became, almost over night, a mass-movement. It laughed supernaturalism, magic and myth out of court. It popularized science and radical economics. It created a Yiddish and neo-Hebrew belles lettres. The realities of this renaissance ensue over a period of hardly two generations of the nineteenth century. Its achievement seems a miracle—until it is remembered that the Jews were without any other institutions either for expressing, conveying or stabilizing opinion. They were literally the people of the book—and the newspaper.

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The interpenetration of science, higher criticism, "Jewish science," political and economic theory, religious speculation and belletristic fabrication with a realizing sense of the great Jewish tradition which was the stable mind of the Jewish masses led to a recovery of the normal outlook upon the Jewish position and destiny. Haskalah imperceptibly took on the features of Jewish nationalism. Passive emancipation at the hands of the non-Jewish majority, which was the hope of secularists, gave way to plans and programs of active emancipation of the Jewish people by the Jewish people themselves. The earliest significant voice—which Hess heard and to which he had responded—was that of Hirsch Kalischer, a rabbi of the orthodox church in Thon, Prussia. His whole work is witness of the interpenetration of modernism and tradition which the great conflict of the Haskalah resulted in. The Jewish people, Kalischer wrote,[1] needed to reinterpret their life and destiny. They had been taught to wait for the realization of the Messianic hope through a miracle, but the true basis of realization must be self-help. By means of a colonization society working in a modern way under modern conditions[2] the restoration of the Jewish people to the Promised Land and to freedom might be achieved. At the outset, Kalischer had more influence in the west than in the east. The creation of the Alliance Israélite Universelle was due to his inspiration and Hess's own practical proposals echo his. But in the east the heady taste of secular freedom kept the young men assimilative and the old men reactionary a generation longer. It was the anti-Semitic reaction of the '80s which there brought them to realization of the social realities of the Jewish position. Its mark is Leon Pinsker's "Autoemancipation." This book, by a man as cosmopolitan as Hess himself, makes an accurate and still valid analysis of the Jewish position. The world, it points out, has been dealing with Jews distributively, not collectively.

[1] Emmuah Jesharah, 1860.
[2] Derishat Zion, 1862.

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Emancipation has been piecemeal, where it has occurred at all. The Jews have themselves been content with this condition. They have themselves denied their national reality, though it stared them in the face. In consequence, they have been treated as living individual members of a dead nation, whose entity involved them like a ghost, insubstantial, yet present enough for fear and dislike. As individuals they are twice homeless—of uncertain and ambiguous status in the land of their sojourn and without any homeland to which they can refer or with regard to which they can change their status. Thus they are everywhere in the modern world legally and formally free and socially outcast. The only way to resolve this ambiguity is to create a homeland, a centre of corporate reference—anywhere. This can be done by the union of various Jewish alliances, the creation of a single directorate and of a fiscal agency that could raise money through the sale of lands and the necessary subscriptions.

How near to the actual feeling of the vital generation of Jewry Pinsker's analysis came may be gathered from its results. For the first time since Sabbattai, a concrete proposal bore practical fruits. A society was organized in Odessa, with Pinsker at the head. Branches sprang up wherever in a Jewish community thoughtful men congregated. By 1890 the Hovevei Zion had chapters in Austria, Germany, England, Rumania, France, the United States. It had undertaken the adventure. Bodies of ignorant, untried and tenderly-nurtured young idealists had gone to Palestine to found colonies in swamps, to suffer decimation, to persist, and in the end to conquer: sufferers from Rumanian pogroms had gone; the victims of Russians; and those who were moved only by the love of Zion. To all the Odessa committee held out a helping hand, sometimes mistakenly and ignorantly, but always with certainty as to the ultimate purpose. Its work in Palestine was met and supplemented with the work of the Alliance Israélite, and of the great benevolent Leopold Rothschild. Its mistakes were met and supplemented also. But under-

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neath the intrigue, the error, the comedy and the irony which the work in Palestine developed there was a living thing taking root in the soil and sending shoots in the air and growing free. Observers of the social process could say truly that the Jewish people was finding itself at last.

VI.

How completely and basically the Jewish people was finding itself may be gathered from the history of what is technically and formally Zionism itself. In the mind of Theodor Herzl, the initiator of the organized international movement, it took shape first of all, as a reply to anti-Semitism, which from the '80s to the end of the nineteenth century infected Europe like a disease. Anti-Semitism, Herzl argued in his *Judenstaat*, is an ineradicable and growing social phenomenon. The world rejects Jews who come to it as Jews purely, who have not rejected their nationality and committed national suicide. Such a suicide, even if it were desirable, is a terrible and tragic process of suffering, and impossible to accomplish. The alternative is the liberation of the Jewish nationality as such, and this liberation must take the form of restoring the Jewish national home. The agency would be a world-wide society of Jews which should make preliminary political and economic investigations and create a Jewish company, with a capital of 50,000,000 pounds and headquarters in London, to carry out the enterprise of colonization by obtaining a charter from the Turk and operating under the same privileges as, say, the British East India Company. Practical initiative did not, however, come from the author of the *Judenstaat;* it came from the Kadimah of Vienna, an organization of students in theory and practice imbued with the spirit of insurgent nationalism as that dominated Central Europe. This organization pledged its support to Herzl in every effort to bring together his society of Jews. From various communities in the heart of Jewry came memorials and appeals. Herzl

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went to England, where Zangwill introduced him to the Jewish community of the United Kingdom.

At last the great enterprise was launched and the first call for the Zionist Congress was sent out. Over it the Jewry of the world divided sharply—the prosperous minority of the west, represented chiefly by rabbis of the reformed synagogue, resented and denounced it. The great unprosperous majority of both the east and the west welcomed and acclaimed it as the first step in their salvation. The old controversy between assimilation and freedom flamed up. The old arguments were repeated and the old rancors renewed with, however, an unprecedented intensity deriving from the efficiency and vitality of the Zionist enterprise. The first Congress, held at Basle in 1897, was an irrefutable demonstration of Jewish national solidarity: demonstration of the organic interdependence, of the diversity in unity which is nationality, of all extremes of Jewish life and thought. The platform it adopted: "The aim of Zionism is to create in Palestine for the Jewish people a publicly recognized homeland under legal guarantees," became a foundation and a centre absorbing and co-ordinating all factions of Jewry to the common purpose it expressed. It brought together orthodox and freethinkers, capitalists and socialists, the east and the west; it gave their unconscious and blind solidarity a conscious and envisioning ground. It rationalized the Jewish being.

This rationalization is perhaps the most interesting aspect of an enterprise as rich in handicaps as in practical endeavor and achievement. It took the form of a conflict and reconciliation of what might be called the colonial temper of the western Zionists and nationalist temper of the eastern ones. The first congress was naturally dominated by the great Jews of the west—in effect citizens of the world,—by Herzl, Nordau, Zangwill and their kind. To them Zionism was the solution of a question primarily economic and political. Its achievement was to be remedial rather than creative, and its value one of relief rather than of contribution. But to the children of the Haskalah whose voice was

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the voice of the living Jewish nationality in Eastern Europe, Zionism had of necessity to be far more than a relief and a remedy. In their reflection and aspiration it was to be the enfranchisement of the creative energies of the Jewish people, the conservation and reconsecration of the Hebraic spirit to the service of mankind in the Hebrew land. For them Zionism was primarily the condition of a spiritual and cultural recovery; economic and political changes were tools, not ends in themselves. The most powerful but also the most obscurantist (because he insisted that the effect must also be used as its own cause—he urged the priority of a merely cultural centre), voice of this conviction was Asher Ginsberg. No Jew of modern times has had so profound an influence upon the Jewish people because no Jew has so adequately effected in his own thinking and outlook that fusion of contemporaneity with tradition which is the constant ideal of the Jewish nationalist. In many ways an autodidact, Ginsberg, whose pen name is Ahad Ha'am, had like most young Jews of his class and generation, studied a little in Germany, a little in Switzerland. He had absorbed both from the writings of Smolenskin and the intellectual temper of the world of his youth, the spirit and the method of the Hegelians of the left and his use of these has served satisfactorily to reconcile the antagonisms of the factions of the nation. Each nationality, Ginsberg holds, is characterized by a spirit, an essence, a central spontaneity which expresses itself in all the diverse forms of the national life, economic, social, political, religious, literary and so on. The opposites of this expression are invariably fused in a common resultant, a synthesis, which alone is the adequate expression of the spirit. Thus the otherworldliness of the Essenes and the worldliness of the Sadducees are reconciled in the moralism of the Pharisees, who are therefore the true representatives of the Jewish spirit of their time. And so through every phase of the history of the Jewish people, the present phase excepted. The contemporary Jew of the Ghetto is too restricted and rigid in his life and vision to be

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truly expressive of the Jewish spirit; the "emancipated" Jew is too uprooted and errant. The combination of stability and freedom which allows for true emancipation is possible only by the recovery of a fixed centre of national life where the Jew may be a Jew by inclusion and absorption rather than as in the Ghetto by exclusion and rejection. This centre is necessarily Palestine. Tradition, hope and work make it so, and the settlement of Palestine, the establishment there of concrete embodiment of the Hebraic spirit in cultural institution, is the only true method of saving a living Hebraism for the service of mankind. This teaching made of Ahad Ha'am a protagonist and leader in the movement of Hovevei Zion. Herzlian Zionism took him by surprise and his relation to it has been that of resentment and correction. The bulk of the Russian Zionists, that is, the bulk of the Zionists, were his following. They opposed "practical" and "cultural" enterprises to "political" and diplomatic ones, the winning of the spirit to the saving of the body. Their victory was complete, for they conquered the temper and spirit of Herzl also—partly by combat, partly by infection. By combat through the steady and relentless party opposition, culminating in the scene at the Congress of 1903, where, in spite of the bitter need of relief from the terrible persecutions of the period, they overwhelmingly rejected the British offer of Uganda. By infection through the slow modification of Herzl's purposes from remedialism to construction, because of contact with the spirit and aspiration of the Jewish people as it lived and labored. This is to be observed in all his publications from 1896 on, but particularly in *Altneuland*. In that book the writer's preoccupation is not to escape from persecution. The writer's preoccupation is the structure and organization of a just state.

Such a state was Herzl's foremost concern when he died. His death set in the background whatever surviving purely "political," *i.e.*, diplomatic, tendencies remained in the international Zionist organization. The administrations which succeeded his devoted themselves under great

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handicaps to the peaceful penetration of Palestine and the construction of a Jewish life there. They sought to underpin diplomacy with an accomplished fact. They put their strength behind the weakness of the already existing settlements in Palestine. There in the course of a generation the Jews have under Zionist inspiration and leadership laid the foundation for the excellences they hope to attain. In a land, desolate through neglect, they built, against the resistance of nature and man, with great devotion and hardship, forty prosperous, self-governing agricultural colonies; for the slums of the cities they had begun to substitute modern sanitary dwellings; for disease, hygiene and hospital service; for a mediæval and restricted educational system, a radically modern one, from kindergarten to university, and to be directed by the society of teachers, not trustees or aldermen. Their chief instruments—the Jewish National Fund, the Jewish Colonial Trust, the Anglo-Palestine Company—are constituted upon the principle of democratic control of the fiscal and industrial machinery of the nation, and their use aimed always to eliminate as nearly as might be the avoidable injustices which are the social problems of modern states. The war had endangered this whole achievement. It brought death and starvation to Palestine also, and had there undermined the credit upon which the work is done. Yet so completely did the fiscal instrument of Zionism have the confidence of the non-Jewish as well as the Jewish population of Palestine that its paper was preferred above all others, even that of the government. It and the other institutions are under English charter. They have been shaken, but by tremendous effort the Zionists have kept them from shattering, and now on these conserved foundations they have begun rebuilding.

But their hopes and purposes go much further than this. The righting of the thousand-year wrong which was begun by the Balfour declaration[1] and is to be consummated—with

[1] His Majesty's government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavors

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the good will of all the free *peoples* as well as the governments of the world—by the peace conference, supplies for them an opportunity for social construction which they regard as their duty. When it became clear that the restoration of the Jewish people to Palestine was assured, the Zionist Organization of America unanimously adopted at its last convention the subjoined program of construction which was assented to by all the Zionists of the world.

The recent declarations of Great Britain, France, Italy, and others of the allied democratic states have established the recognition of the Jewish National home as an international fact.

Therefore, we desire to affirm anew the principles which have guided the Zionist movement since its inception and which were the Foundations laid down by our lawgivers and prophets for the ancient Jewish state and were the inspiration of the living Jewish law embodied in the traditions of two thousand years of exile.

First: Political and civil equality irrespective of race, sex, or faith of all the inhabitants of the land.

Second: To insure in the Jewish national home in Palestine equality of opportunity we favor a policy which, with due regard to existing rights, shall tend to establish the ownership and control of the land and of all natural resources and of all public utilities by the whole people.

Third: All land owned or controlled by the whole people should be leased on such conditions as will insure the fullest opportunity for development and continuity of possession.

Fourth: The co-operative principle should be applied so far as possible in the organization of all agricultural, industrial, commercial and financial undertakings.

Fifth: The fiscal policy should be framed so as to protect the people from the evils of land speculation and from every other form of financial oppression.

Sixth: The system of free public instruction shall be Hebrew, the national language of the Jewish people.

The program envisages, in contemporary times, the intent and effort of the prophets. It recognizes in harmony with the Jews' "great tradition" the organic character of "spirit" and it sees in the free development of this spirit,

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to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

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in the growth and ripening of the excellences appropriate to its nature, the best that the Jewish people can as a people continue to give to civilization. This is their rôle —the flowering and fruitage of the Hebraic spirit, which, rooted in Jewish history, planted on historic soil, shall realize in modern form, through social organization, through religion, through the arts and the sciences a national achievement, which, by its inward excellence, shall truly make Israel a valuable servant of mankind.

This, in sum, is the hope of the New Zion. It is a vision and aspiration of nationality in international terms. Historically, it aims at two results. The first is remedial. Zionism seeks, in response to the pressure of anti-Semitism, in observation of the terrible and guiltless social maladjustment of Jewish individuals and groups, to relieve the pressure, to minimize the maladjustment, and to eliminate its cruelty and injustice, so far as possible, by a Jewish settlement in Palestine.

The second is constructive. Civilization is, in the Zionist and democratic reading of its nature and bases, a concert of nationalities whose reciprocally interacting cultures make up the symphony of history. And there is no question what part the Jewish people have played in that; the Hebraic note, which has been the utterance of their corporate life, has given to the history of Europe an unquestionable coloring, for the possession of which authority acknowledges that history to be spiritually the richer. Zionism aims to establish conditions under which this note may gain in strength and purity; conditions under which the national individuality of the Jews, like that of any of the peoples of Europe, may again be free to express itself characteristically in organized social life, in esthetic and intellectual activities. Zionism aims to establish conditions in which the Jewish people may do their share of the world's work as a nation, dedicated to the cause of international democracy and international peace.

H. M. KALLEN.

BOSTON.

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A LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

E. S. P. HAYNES.

UP to 1919 most observations on this subject lacked just the element of actuality that wins human assent. Men read President Wilson's speeches in much the same mood as they read Plato's Republic or any other Utopia, or as they used to read of flying experiments before the aeroplane materialized. Their attitude remained passive even when quite an admirable groundwork for a league was presented to them by a consummate lawyer like Lord Parker in the House of Lords on the 19th March, 1918, although the date and occasion of his speech were unexpectedly inauspicious. But the end of the war cleared the air of ancient assumptions. The alleged uses of war as a social purge, its alleged necessity as an outlet of human passions, its alleged permanence (on the analogy of prostitution and disease) became no longer plausible. The devastating misery of war now challenges human ingenuity to mend or end it just as human ingenuity is always wrestling, not altogether vainly, with the problems of prostitution and disease. Moreover, human ingenuity has admittedly succeeded in establishing a reasonable measure of free discussion which would have been considered entirely utopian in the sixteenth century.

It is realized, for instance, that social purgation can be achieved by revolutions which are all the more bloodless because they can only be justified by the complete success of an overwhelming force behind them. We see that men can learn to abstain from duelling, that they have at best but little to gain from war, and that pugnacious and adventurous instincts can be and are canalized into modern exploration and finance. We see that patriotism is by no means necessarily a product of militarism; but that militarism is rather a by-product of patriotism. A flag stirs emotion; so do the colours of an Oxford or Cambridge col-

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lege. Yet it does not occur to the bitterest critic of Balliol to suggest that the members of that college would ever wish to vindicate its prestige by exerting armed force against the University of Oxford or any of the other colleges. Moreover in the mediaeval, possibly also in the modern, world many citizens of different European countries habitually regarded Europe much as a Balliol man regards his University.

We may bear in mind that the judicial committee of the Privy Council settles in London the disputes of an Empire which comprises far more divergent and seemingly incompatible types of humanity than are to be found in the continent of Europe; and the British Empire has survived every intrigue that the Germans could engineer in its most remote quarters. There is undoubtedly some power apart from brute force that welds the whole mass together by a process apparently unfamiliar to German statecraft and philosophy. What is it?

Before we answer this question we are faced with the difficulty of explaining how the existence of any empire can ever be incompatible with a League of Nations. The *pax Romana*, may be said to have subjugated Europe, and the *pax Britannica* to have subjugated much of the world outside Europe; but what free play was left for small states under either yoke or how can any such empire combine with smaller states? The answer is that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The Roman Empire gained for Europe at least three centuries of human happiness. When the empire ceased to function it died; but the causes of its decline were accidental, and not necessarily inherent in its nature. Similarly, the British Empire, founded on sea power, has achieved incalculable good and honourably settled far more disputes by peaceful means in the last century than any other Power.

Under British, as under Roman, hegemony the citizens of small States all over the world, have enjoyed the privileges and happiness of real self-determination. If this is not so, why has Indian loyalty never failed Great Britain

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in almost the worst crisis of her history during the last four years? Outside Europe, and outside the empire itself, the resources of Great Britain have always been united with those of the United States and of Japan in order to promote the peace and order of the world. In the famous lines of Virgil which begin, "Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento," the reader too often slurs over the words of the second line, "Hae tibi erunt artes; *pacisque imponere morem.*" For it is not war, but the prevention of war, that has justified the existence of Empires. It is today the potentialities of the British Empire for peace, external and internal, that principally justify its existence. It was the violation of the world's peace that united almost the whole world against the Central Empires.

We are now perhaps a little further on the way to finding the answer to our question: "What power holds together the British Empire or any other empire or any League of Nations?" We need not rely on arguments that can be called utopian; we need not assert that peace and goodwill are normal to human beings. We need expect no more of human nature than Hobbes did or the modern Prussian does. We need only presume that all human combinations to promote peace and order are founded on an universal fear of war and anarchy.

It is true that before 1914 this fear expressed itself in piling up armaments, but that was clearly because there was no other solution open to the European Powers. Germany was avowedly preparing for a war of conquest and there was no precedent in international law or custom for any other power or combination of powers uniting to treat this preparation as a *casus belli.* Nothing could be done according to existing rules but to await the cataclysm and hope that it might in some way be averted. Here again the motive of fear was paramount.

Inside Germany there was a strong peace party eloquently described by M. Cambon in 1913. The country was prospering commercially beyond all expectation. Trade and markets were being peacefully captured without

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resistance all over the world. Why could the Germans not keep the peace? The answer is still the same. Their rulers perpetually frightened them with different bogeys; of which Russia was the most conspicuous. It suited the governing group, for various reasons, to make war and they had exploited the motive of fear from 1890 onwards to this end. Nothing but overpowering fear secured the toleration of secret diplomacy and autocratic intrigues that made the war possible. There was no doubt a looting instinct both in the governors and the governed; but it had not a fraction of the compelling force that the terror of imminent destruction could evoke.

Nearly four years have elapsed since then and the horizon is entirely changed. Europe is ravaged with war and anarchy. Its bogeys are the Prussian and the Bolshevik. Let us imagine, if we can, some sort of peace and order restored to Europe, even a peace and order in which Germany and her allies do not actively participate. What will men then fear? Surely they will fear nothing so vividly as the return of war. War will be to them something like the pneumonic plague, which when it spread westward to the famished populations of Central Europe might conceivably have ended the war. Can the rulers of Germany now threaten any process of destruction to their subjects which will have more terrors than those associated with war? Will not men of every country insist on governments which will relax no energy in establishing whatever security can be obtained against war? Surely it is clear that the general sense of mankind will overwhelmingly support any measures that can be adopted to preserve the human race from the menace of inevitable suicide.

We are told that the League of Nations is a "*chimera bombinans in vacuo.*" But surely it has existed before our eyes since 1914. The principal powers of the civilized world are straining every nerve to end a process of universal destruction which was but feebly outlined by writers like Norman Angell. If men did not in 1914 recognise that war "did not pay," seventy-five per cent of the civil-

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ized world must now be aware that the toleration of irresponsible dynasts and governors involves the destruction of all that makes life worth living.

It is just this question of responsibility in government that is crucial. Is it really possible, in the huge amorphous character of the modern state, to make either governing groups or individuals responsible for negligence or criminality? The old English remedy of impeachment is difficult to work as society becomes more and more complex. How far, for example, could it be proved that the Kaiser was morally responsible for the crimes of 1914 in the sense of being the driving personality, and not merely a reluctant figure head? On the other hand his legal responsibility is clear enough; and it may be safely predicted that modern peoples will be less tolerant than they ever were of any governing group that gambles on war in order to promote its own interests; or, as in the case of the Prussian junker, to crush the progress of political opponents. It is incredible that the abominable intrigues of despotism and secret diplomacy, described in such books as Bismarck's "Reminiscences" or Dr. Dillon's "Eclipse of Russia," will be allowed to endanger the happiness, and even the existence of, the human race.

The responsibility of the world's rulers can, however, be enforced from the outside if once a League of Nations is established. No nation will welcome the minor penalties of a blockade or commercial boycott more than the English welcomed the interdict in the reign of King John. If the league can substitute temporal for spiritual weapons in dealing with lawless violence no despot can ignore the league, however callous he may be to the welfare of his own subjects.

Without such a league the world has to face not only self destruction on a colossal scale but also complete anarchy. Men will not work for, and women will not bear children into, a world which is at the mercy of irresponsible tyrants. Almost a majority of human beings now alive have personally suffered from the war either in mutilation

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or bereavement, or the destruction of their homes or in privation of some kind. There is no more glamour about war as an art in itself. The Germans may have won considerable prestige as fighters; but they are today regarded by civilized men more as noxious ruffians than as human beings.

The whole *morale* of the Allies today reposes on their collective resolution to stamp out murder and violence. Most of their soldiers would have revolted long ago but for their belief in the possibility of a new order of peace and justice. This point of view has been reiterated in our own war propaganda and it is far more emphatically expressed today than in any previous wars.

To some minds history may suggest the constant supremacy of war-loving races such as the Prussians or the inhabitants of the Balkans. The decline of the Roman Empire is an obvious example. The answer is that modern conditions are quite different. War has become too complicated in its machinery and resources to be controlled by a horde of scientific barbarians. As Mr. Wells has pointed out, modern warfare is the monopoly of the modern industrial state; and the control of raw materials by the power of a blockade may often be more important than any skill in the art of wholesale massacre by land, air, or sea.

There is, therefore, no question of the old order being restored. Something must be done; and the most practical solution of the problems raised by President Wilson is the scheme of Lord Parker above referred to and fully set out in the appendix. Lord Parker laid great stress on the importance of a sound substructure. He emphasized the fact that all our system of municipal tribunals and police was a "creation of historical growth rooted in the far past, and that it was supported in reality not so much by organized force as by that sense of mutual obligation and respect for others which forms the foundation of those settled rules of conduct among individuals which alone make law and order possible."

Municipal law arose from customary rules which in general were voluntarily observed and only broken in

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exceptional cases. "For such cases there was at first the remedy of self-help; but this left the weak at the mercy of the strong, and hence there arose a tendency for the weak to attach themselves to the strong, to become their retainers, surrendering a portion of their own independence for the sake of the protection the strong could afford, and increasing their lords' strength and resources. Thus it was important for the retainers to get 'good lordship,' and, ultimately when one lord became overlord or king, the peace maintained by each powerful lord merged into the king's peace, which survives in the formula by which wrongs are still charged as "contrary to the peace of our Lord the King."

There are in international relations precisely the same tendencies at work. "Such communal life as exists between nations is based, and must be based, upon customary rules of conduct. These customary rules are dignified by the name of international law, but there is no remedy for their breach otherwise than by war. During a war those nations not immediately concerned remain neutral. But war is an uncertain remedy; it inflicts as often as it redresses a wrong. Victory is generally on the side of the big battalions; hence you get international competition in armaments, though they may be used for aggression as well as for defence. Hence, too, arises the growing conviction among smaller nations that the weak nations cannot stand alone. They must get "good lordship"; they must attach themselves to the stronger, must surrender to them a portion of their independence for the sake of the protection which the stronger nation can afford them. This, however, only perpetuates war, and international law will be no check on a nation which definitely seeks overlordship, such as, according to German war philosophy Germany seeks; and the result, if she is successful, might be a peace, but it would be a *pax Germanica.*"

Lord Parker, however, suggested that the real solution of the problem is to abolish neutrality and to band together the nations to resist an aggressor.

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"The last three years have shewn us that war is a danger which may well be fatal to our common civilisation. Neutrality has become increasingly difficult. Those nations which at first desired to remain neutral have been one after the other dragged into the fray. The neutrality of others is secured only by fear. If we can once make it clear that in future there will be no neutrality the danger of war will be minimised, because its risk is increased. Lord Parker suggested that hitherto the efforts of those to whom war is hateful have been directed, on the one hand, to laying down rules for the conduct of belligerents in order to make war less dreadful and more humane, and, on the other hand, to laying down rules for the benefit and advantage of neutrals. But under the stress of war all those rules have vanished and the development of the future should be, not in consulting the selfish interests of neutrals, but in abolishing neutrality. Murders would increase if the murderer could count on the neutrality of bystanders, and it is the same with war. The neutral, in fact, shirks his share of the burden of humanity."

Charity begins at home. It is the admitted duty of the Allies to get up a League of Peace themselves and not to admit any other powers without solid proofs of good faith (e. g., in regard to annexed provinces or protectorates). Lord Parker's scheme was based on the presumption that all the members of any given society never want to commit the seven deadly sins at the same moment. The scheme omits all discussion of any international troops or police force or disarmament or the freedom of the seas. These are dangerous questions which cannot be settled offhand; but the scheme (if accepted) would certainly make war almost impracticable, and it also allows for the peculiar conditions of the different powers. It gives time for the settlement of disputes and scope for interference with preparations for war, which would have to be on a huge scale if (say) any two powers wanted to defy the league. This provision, would, for instance, secure the world against any abuse of sea power.

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The scheme does not touch two other questions, namely, that of colonies and dependencies or that of interference by the league with the internal affairs of its members. Touching the first point, we may be reassured by remembering the peaceful partition of Africa among European nations in 1885; and it may be presumed that if disputes can be peacefully settled between nations there ought to be no obstacles to such settlements as between colonies and a mother-country. Touching the second point, the league is not likely to interfere with the internal affairs of any constituent member so long as the conflict is localized. It could scarcely intervene except to assert some political principle, as, for instance, the Holy Alliance might have done; and on any such point the members of the league would differ among themselves.

The important point at present is to act. Let the Allies limit their League of Nations on Lord Parker's lines; and we may be sure that apparent difficulties will be solved.[1] They are not really so formidable as the inherent difficulties of combining to make a world-war; and in the case of the Allies this war represents a combination to make a world-peace. The populations of the Central Empires will only appreciate the benefits of such a league when they see it before their eyes; and it will then be open to them to take such steps as to make their adherence practicable. The dangers of a top-heavy superstructure increase every day. A really sound substructure will survive all vicissitudes and the rest of the building can be set up under these conditions without any risk of hustling. A medieval cathedral used to be built up more than once, as it generally fell down at the first or second. We cannot afford to establish a League of Nations in this haphazard manner.

E. S. P. HAYNES.

LONDON.

[1] The scheme would not, for instance, radically alter the existing treaties between Great Britain and France and the United States; it would scarcely do more than extend them to the other allies.

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PRINCIPLES OF MORAL LEGISLATION.

A. K. ROGERS.

IN what sense, or to what degree, is it the proper business of the state to, as we say, promote morality? It is notoriously difficult to answer this in a principled way, and the temptation has, therefore, been to leave it unanswered, and to deal with questions of repressive moral legislation piecemeal, each on its own merits. This, however, has practical as well as theoretical disadvantages, and we should clearly be better off if we could lay down limiting conditions as a suggestive guide for legislative programs. I shall, therefore, in the present article, be concerned, not with the merits of this or that reform in particular, but with the general logic of a certain theory of state action. I shall assume as my hypothesis that the business of the state is, neither to compel its citizens to live the life it thinks to their, or its, advantage, nor to encourage a general competitive scramble in the interests of an abstract "liberty," but to provide the positive conditions under which a good and satisfying life is open to all alike, leaving, however, the individual man to take advantage of these in the degree to which his own inclinations may prompt him. And what I wish to do is to inquire whether one can deduce from such a standpoint anything to throw light upon the question as to just *how far* it is desirable for the state to go in its interference with the "moral" habits of the citizen.

It is evident that the principle of "freedom of opportunity" creates a certain presumption to begin with in favor of leaving men to work out their own salvation; it puts the burden of proof on a proposal for active interference. I am not unaware that there is a plausible turn to be given to the conception of freedom which would reverse this declaration. Is a man really at liberty to use his powers to the utmost when he weakens them by personal habits that are harmful—drink or debauchery,—or throws away in gambling the money that might have been used to

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extend his business? If not—and clearly the answer must be in the negative,—then the more by state action we remove from him the temptation to such indulgences, the more we enlarge rather than contract his freedom. Now the point that is questionable here is on the surface. Doubtless it is so, morally speaking, that no man has the perfect use of himself who is not strong enough to keep from under the control of vicious habits. But it does not follow forthwith that, therefore, the state ought to perform the task for him. This might follow if we had sound reason to believe that the state *could* do it successfully. But nothing is more certain than that the endeavor of the state directly to make men moral is of doubtful issue. It may induce, through lack of opportunity to go astray, habits of living that outwardly are more correct. Even this is not an inevitable result; it *may* lead rather to an underhanded and consequently more vicious gratification of the tendencies that are forbidden. But even where apparently it works, there are most commonly coincident ill effects, in the encouragement of a passive moral temper which is out of line with any social ideal other than that of mere regularity and decorum.

Now in view of the psychological limitations of the practice of public moralization, and in view also of that ever-present disposition to enforce personal standards, and compress human growth within the boundaries of our own possibly very short-sighted and puritanical notions of what is right or wrong, it seems inadvisable to leave moral legislation to a mere spontaneous sense of fitness, with no principled guidance. On the other hand, I do not think that our natural predilections here are to be ignored. Undoubtedly, even with no well-considered theory to oppose to it, men have very widely hesitated to accept the laissez-faire attitude toward moral legislation, simply because their moral interests did not seem to be sufficiently placated by its apparent indifference to the value of the ethical life. Consistently with theory or not, they have felt impelled to try to do something here just because the

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matter was so important. And the tendency has been encouraged by one obviously weak point in the negative theory,—the impossibility of fencing off certain vices as private, as if they had no consequences in the way of public injury. A habit which affects only oneself hardly exists for a man unless he lives quite isolated from his fellows. Nevertheless the very universality of this statement indicates again the need for caution, and for some principle of distinction which does not leave *any* injury to others a proper ground for legislation; for as injury of some sort always can be found if we look for it, we might then find ourselves on the road to a universal social meddling. And as determining, at least, the general location of emphasis, the principle of opportunity would, therefore, again, seem to lay it down that, in proportion as a habit would popularly be classed as private, we should start from the idea of freedom and non-interference. It still, of course, remains to find the right qualifications to this; but at least we are able to guard now, as we otherwise could not have guarded, against the danger of passing over inadvertently to a dubious paternalism.

Now for the formative period of life, in the first place, it is an obvious corollary to any scheme of education which works in practice, that there should be protection in some considerable measure from influences detrimental to character. Sensible laws which aim, therefore, to prevent undue temptation of the young offer little cause for serious demur. To forbid the sale of intoxicants or tobacco to boys may readily be justified, whatever one thinks about it in the case of those who have supposedly reached years of discretion. It is true that even on the basis of age the line that has to be drawn between minors and responsible adults is in a measure arbitrary. But at least there is a general principle of separation here about which there is no real dispute; and although within narrow limits there may be a doubt about the proper dividing line, the application can at any rate be carried out by rule, whereas in any attempt to draw a moral line between adults, it would have

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to be left to that very questionable source of decision—the judgment of one man on the inner character and capacities of another, undistinguished by well-defined objective marks. And the connecting of the habit of mind which this encourages with power to carry its judgment into effect, is too great a menace to the general freedom to be lightly entertained, even if the moral benefit to the person under discipline were much more certain than it is. And it is true, furthermore, that the principle might readily be pressed too far, so as to break down the distinction it was intended to help establish. The needs of the "young person" can be used to set a standard which is then imposed upon all, on the plea that otherwise we cannot be sure of guarding completely such as need protection; and the danger of this should lead us to scrutinize very carefully any proposal in particular. When the evil is in a form so pervasive as to force itself on the passer-by, then, indeed, there may be reasonable ground for endeavoring to suppress it entirely. But this does not apply with anything like necessity except to cases where the evils are in the realm of thought or imagination, and only indirectly of outward act. Public appeals to sensuality through the eye or ear represent the most obvious instance of this class; and they may quite properly be eliminated on the ground of their danger to the young, if there are no other reasons. But there is no great force to such an argument in the case of most things that are popularly condemned as vices. Here the hurt comes rather in the event of actual use, which commonly involves a definite act of purchase; and a law that shall prevent such purchase by minors is entirely feasible. Of course it stands a chance of becoming a dead letter, and will only be saved from this by the force of public opinion. But if public opinion is not strong enough to enforce it, it certainly will not be strong enough to enforce a still more drastic attempt to make the prohibition universal.

This conclusion may be applied to two cases in particular—books, and the theatre. The two are alike in that

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they both bring up the difficult problem of a moral censorship; for here it is not a question at all of the product as such, but only of distinguishing in the product between the good and the bad. The difficulties in the way of the successful attainment of this end are so obvious in practice, that even apart from the theoretical question of the right of society to regulate the moral tastes of its citizens, there would be sufficient reason to examine any proposal looking toward it very carefully indeed. It appears from experience that the almost inevitable tendency of the civic censor is not only to act fitfully and unsystematically, but also to exhibit much greater alarm at a serious discussion in terms of ideas, than at frank salaciousness. One reason for this, especially in connection with the theatre, is the financial one, as was rather naively admitted by the English censor not long ago; a musical comedy represents a much larger expenditure usually than a problem play,—the property rights of the author being of course to the official mind a negligible matter. Furthermore, if this irresponsibility of the censor could be remedied by public opinion, it is altogether likely in practice that things would go to an extreme, and that an attempt to catch every offender would result in interfering with the virility of literature and the drama. It is quite true that if, as the logic of the libertarian theory might suggest, the theatre were left practically to itself to supply what it can find patrons to enjoy, and if it is frankly admitted that when a full grown man wants to fill his mind with nastiness he shall be permitted to do so, so long as this is not intruded on others who have different tastes, then in case we also make the reasonable requirement that it shall close its doors to all save adults as its price for immunity, this also would require an intelligent censorship. But the practical task of the censor would be greatly lightened. There would be no particular objection here to the policy which in its more general application would be so obnoxious—the presumption that a play must be beyond suspicion if its audience is not to be restricted to responsible adults. And there is no particular reason to think, either,

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that such a law would call forth any general antagonism to hinder the censor in the performance of his duties. The complaint in behalf of the freedom of letters would lose its point; indeed the policy would be of service to such freedom, by removing the paramount influence of the "young persons"; while the ordinary man who wishes to enjoy himself in this particular way, would commonly be ready to admit that it is very likely not a good way for the young. And indirectly such a policy might conceivably diminish the nastiness of the stage, for a manager would think twice before cutting himself off from so considerable a proportion of his audience as is supplied by adolescents.

In the case of written literature the situation is not quite the same, owing to the fact that a boy cannot so readily be prevented from buying a book as from securing a seat in a playhouse. But at the same time the possible danger of emasculating the intellectual life is very much greater, apart from an intelligence and insight in the censor which there seems only a small chance of securing. Meanwhile we are apt to forget that there is another factor—the responsibility of the parent. There will be left sources of contamination, no doubt, in plenty; but any ideal of a completely innocuous atmosphere for the young is on the surface rather Utopian.

One would perhaps feel more comfortable theoretically if he could stop here, and, having protected youth, leave men to their own devices. But while evidently we cannot treat men as children, it does not seem altogether satisfactory to say that even in their case the state has no concern whatever with morality. The common sense of mankind has always inclined to reject such an outright denial. Assuming that the moral life is only another expression for the really good and desirable sort of life, then the state, if it is concerned with making this concretely possible, must provide the conditions which give it a real chance to be attained. Now morality requires ordinarily a certain kind of environment, or it will not come to growth. A slum dweller may, exceptionally, turn out a decent man; but

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we have no right to expect it, and the chances are the other way. If the state is concerned with the reality of liberty, and not the name merely, it must see to it that the environment is favorable, or at least not too unfavorable. It must leave a man free to make a fool of himself if he chooses; but it is not necessary that special facilities be provided. It is interested, therefore, in having the citizen surrounded with agencies that have a tendency to develop the good that is in him; and—what in the present connection is most pertinent—it must take care that he is not subjected to too strong and persistent temptations. Notice this does not say that the state is to tell a man that he shall not form a so-called bad habit, and that he will be punished if he does. It does not look directly to the individual, but to the circumstances of his environment; and it says that these shall not be allowed to take a form which make it inherently improbable that men generally will have the strength and motive to resist incitements to evil. Accordingly it concerns in the first instance the organized and commercial purveyance of vices, rather than the personal indulgence in them.

Now the public interest in this is probably too clear to need much argument. The gambling house, the saloon, the brothel, are almost inevitably encouragers of violence and fraud as well; and under such conditions the right, not to private indulgence, but to make money by encouraging vices in others, is no necessary corollary of the theory of freedom. Interference of some sort is demanded; and if it is found that, to be successful, this has to go the length of total prohibition, there seems no serious theoretical objection. To be sure, incidentally this curtails to some extent personal liberty; but it does this only to an extent. It does not say that a man shall not, for example, bet, or play for stakes, but only that he shall not do this under specified surroundings which have proved to be prejudicial to public order in ways obvious and already in principle forbidden by the law. Of the three cases mentioned, the brothel perhaps shows the strongest case for prohibition.

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The professional side of sexual vice is sure to develop features difficult to handle in the way of mere regulation. In the nature of the case it cannot advertise itself without interfering with certain fair claims on the part of decent citizens, in which the rights of the young again play an evident part. So the location of prostitutes in respectable neighborhoods is a thing clearly prejudicial to the interests of self respecting residents, while the alternative of segregating vice presents also drawbacks of an obvious character. And a further element is the danger to public health. Gambling houses also are hard to regulate. It is difficult, without a degree of interference that almost makes the state a partner, to secure immunity from fraud; while the emotional excess which games of chance foster is so stimulated in public gambling, and the consequent temptation to pecuniary dishonesty is so great, that the prevalent tendency to forbid it as a business enterprise seems not difficult to defend theoretically.

The case against the saloon is weaker. It is true that there is one public evil attendent on the business side of vice which in connection with the saloon is particularly acute. This is the fact that, as things go, provision for the indulgence of so-called vices are intimately mixed up with political evils that call for regulation. This makes of the saloon or public drinking place a problem quite over and above the problem of the evils of drinking; and it is this perhaps as much as anything that has led recently to a vigorous recrudescence of the policy of prohibition as the most effective weapon against lawless forces. The ground here is, again, not the viciousness of drunkenness, but the evils of corrupt political combinations based on the coarser passions; and it might at least be said in favor of the necessity, that in the nature of the case such a business has a leaning toward underhand and undesirable methods, from which it is the less likely to be restrained the more the sense of public disapprobation tends to confine it to men with no very nice moral scruples. But on the other hand it is to be remarked that nuisances here, on the public side,

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it is by no means inconceivable that we should be able to minimize by regulation. Furthermore, it is a real difficulty that the elimination of the saloon, without the total prohibition of the liquor traffic in every form, involves an element of discrimination, since the rich still have their clubs which it is extremely hard for the law to reach; and anything which in practice is forbidden to the poor while it is permitted the well-to-do, is certain to make trouble.

Before, however, taking up briefly the theoretical case for the more drastic policy of complete prohibition, it will be convenient to say a few words about that aspect of the general situation which brings us back to the individual person. The previous considerations bear immediately, as I have said, on the business, and not on the more personal side of vice, except as in a somewhat indefinite way they stand for the need of making the environment such as will not foredoom the average citizen to exposure to temptation in a form too strong and omnipresent to justify the probability that he will not succumb. And as such, they present a stronger case than do proposals which have the individual directly in mind—the proposal to forbid betting between private persons, or the buying and drinking of a bottle of beer. It remains to consider whether there is any way to justify the state in extending its authority in this direction also. And the one undisputed point is this, that vices may legitimately be punished when they infringe the rights of others. But here, of course, it is not really the vice which is attacked, but the resulting injuries, although a systematic campaign in this direction would undoubtedly have an effect in checking the vice as well. The debatable question is, however, what we are to consider an injury which violates a right, since there are many injuries which are clearly not of this sort. And it seems to me that in order to be on the safe side we shall clearly have to rule out all those impalpable injuries to the feelings and the moral prejudices of others, and the vague diffused injuries to the public which cannot be definitely located, and to confine the operation of the

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principle to the things that work harm in obvious and recognized ways to individuals. These are, first, actual interference with the physical welfare of others, such as at present comes within the reach of the law. In the form of violence, this applies chiefly to drunkenness. Of course the penalty here, as elsewhere, must await the commission of the deed; but when this occurs, it might well be punished severely, and drunkenness not taken as, rather, an excuse. And it would seem defensible to go beyond this, and when once a man has been guilty of such an act to make him a special subject for restrictive legislation, in order to avoid the second time what has been shown to be a reasonable chance. But there is also a more general ground for legislation. Drunkenness is to most people a serious nuisance, interfering sensibly with their comfort and feeling of security. The forbidding of nuisances is a recognized public policy, and can easily be applied to intoxication in public places. To have a drunken man patting one on the shoulder and indulging in maudlin conversation is unpleasant for a self respecting man; and the situation often is intolerable for women. Here also the saloon which turns out an intoxicated man on the street might well be asked to share the penalty.

The second ground of state action is where the injury is a definite violation of some obligation voluntarily undertaken. One can scarcely punish a man for spending his money foolishly even to his own hurt; but when this entails harm in the way of inability to meet recognized demands, to his creditors or his family, there would seem no inconsistency in bringing social pressure to bear. A man who is failing in the support of his children can with more obvious justice be constrained to mend his ways, than a bachelor whose delinquencies will only in an indirect and diffused manner bring harm to his fellows.

The same principle of injury inflicted supplies the only suggestion I have to make as to the manner of dealing with the sexual relation on its individual and personal side. A basis on which society is justified in penalizing irregular

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relations between the sexes is not altogether easy to come at. It may forbid forms which constitute a public nuisance; but this hardly touches the essence of the problem. So also the principle of duties assumed in marriage, and, more particularly, the clear right of children to be protected, will necessitate some safeguard to the institution of marriage and the family, in the way at least of insuring that reasonable financial obligations are met. But at this point is certain to come in a disposition to go further, and to enlarge the scope of state interference by appealing to vaguer and more indefinite claims, based on the supposed "sanctity" of the family relations, and the spiritual interests of society. But here we are passing into the realm of generalities where it is next to impossible to lay down any limiting clauses that will hold. We do not owe duties ultimately to institutions, nor do they possess rights as against us. The whole point I am trying to maintain is that such claims should be localized and particularized before they pass scrutiny. Under any form of marriage law, both parties are bound to take upon themselves at least a minimum of obligation consciously implied in undergoing the marriage ceremony. So also relationships which adult persons choose to assume when both are legally free, will automatically create obligations in case children happen to be born. But aside from this, if persons who supposedly are old enough to know what they want choose deliberately to follow their own path, it is hard to see how the state gets its right to say anything to them. It may be that the "sanctity of the family" has to others a definite meaning such as can be made a source of political obligation. But for my own part, when I try to get away from generalities, and to locate the precise claim which it may be supposed to exert upon me, I find no plain answer except this, that I am to be kept forcibly to certain lines of conduct to the end that I may *set a good example* to my fellows, and not discredit in their minds an estimable institution. But few principles need a more suspicious scrutiny than that which lays it upon me always so to act

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as not to shock the accepted expression of public opinion which corresponds roughly to the average welfare. The habit of acquiescing on grounds of abstract and average good which are lacking in direct personal appeal, is one of the strongest reasons why in questions that really matter it is so difficult to get men to take an attitude of self-assertion against the *status quo*, in whose favor it is always possible to adduce plausibly such general recommendations. The consequence is that things are likely to persist for which no one in particular stands sponsor, but which get an illusory support because each person takes for granted an assumed benefit to the rest. Thus few men profess to find in the conventional forms of social gathering anything personally worth their while but they continue to patronize them on the ground that otherwise the usages of society could not be kept up; they bore themselves, in other words, to the intent that people may be given further chances to bore themselves in the future. And even granting that we have an institution of honest or even paramount social value, it is quite within the realm of moral possibility that it is not the best for all in all possible cases; and to shut off arbitrarily the right to judge for oneself is a dangerous moral precedent. If violating a general rule will mean definite injury to individuals who can be identified, then the rule may be enforced. But in so far as it concerns directly only the man himself and other individuals who voluntarily consent, then the plea of setting an example is absolutely irrelevant. What may I not be called upon to do, if to set a good example is a part of my legal obligation?

But now one such definite element of injury exists in the case of the sexual relations, of which it seems possible that more might be made than has commonly been done. As a source of disease, which moreover is certain in the end to fall upon the innocent along with the guilty, it renders itself liable to social interference. The traditional method here of refusing a permit save on the basis of medical examination has the obvious drawback that it

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gives to a highly doubtful situation a quasi-legal standing; and also by making vice safer it may seem to encourage rather than to check it. It might be more effective, as it certainly could be more easily justified in theory, if instead of aiming directly at health, one were to fall back on the simple legal standard of injury inflicted. To punish severely any person who was shown to have communicated disease, would be in accord with the simplest principles of justice; and it might with sufficient public and medical opinion back of it be capable of being put into effect. Theoretically its advantage would be that it separates sharply the question of injury from that of vice, while at the same time it frees the state from even apparent complicity in a dubious traffic.

The general outcome is, then, that while the business side of vice is a matter which the state must necessarily take in charge, and in connection with which it may readily be allowed a rather free hand, the personal side, in so far as this still is possible when organized purveyance is restricted, may well be left to individual taste, unless it leads to acts which independently come within the restrictive powers of the state. Now in two of the three main cases—gambling and sexual irregularity—the possibility of the act would still remain even if it were wholly prohibited in the form of an organized business. The third case, however, that of the liquor habit, stands on a partially different footing, since a total prohibition of the liquor traffic would totally prohibit drinking also, and so result in a far-reaching interference with the personal habits of the citizen. Over against this, however, there is one new consideration of a general sort which, though it is extremely difficult to measure, can hardly be left out of account. I have objected to introducing vague and unlocalized public consequences as a reason for interfering with liberty; but such consequences conceivably may attain a magnitude which causes them to take on in a secondary way a specific form, even if they cannot be connected directly with individual harm. Thus the waste of

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money spent on vices is in general no decisive point. Money can be wasted in any number of ways; and experience shows the futility of attempts to legislate personal economy. But a given form of waste might conceivably become so vast as visibly to endanger the industrial efficiency of a country; and in such a case the government would be compelled to deal drastically with it. Or, a vice might become so prevalent as to undermine the health and manhood of the nation, in a way to endanger, for example, its safety in case of war. It would, for example, seem a somewhat captious insistence on the abstraction of liberty to object to the Chinese prohibition of opium. Once more, such an argument is not to be taken as applying generally; but it does apply to an evil when it reaches a certain indefinite magnitude.

Now in America, intemperance is the only vice that at present can reasonably be supposed to stand on such a footing. The same danger might exist in the case of sexual immorality. Prostitution might reach a degree of excess which would threaten the destruction of the population. Or the passion for gambling might become so prevalent as to destroy the habits of industry necessary to the national life. But neither of these things is as a matter of fact true with us, whereas a considerable number of people are convinced that the diffusive effects of alcohol are such that the vital interests of the country are at stake. And the coincidence of opium and alcohol suggests another aspect of the situation which can be used to back the contention. The whole justification of liberty is based on the presumption that men generally are capable of resisting temptation. While some will always prove too weak for this, that is a chance which nevertheless has to be taken to secure conditions for a desirable development of character; and the general trend will be toward a growth of self control. But what if the habit is such as in its very nature to have a tendency, more or less pronounced, toward weakening self control? Of course any bad habit, indulged in, will grow less easy to resist; but the peculiarity here is

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that the object itself which ministers to the habit, physiologically, and through its natural properties, occasions a general deterioration of the power of the will. Of course, often the tendency will not be consummated. But nevertheless the risk is present; and this is a matter not of mere moral opinion, but of science. May it not, then, put such habits in a class by themselves, and in view of the undoubted mass of attendent evils, counsel total suppression as a matter of caution? Such an argument applies much less clearly to alcohol than it does to opium or similar drugs, for which last also it is far less easy to make out a case on the ground of a positive value for human life; but it does apply in a measure to alcohol also. How strong the argument will seem, depends wholly on one's total impression of the greatness of the evils following from the traffic; and as there is no definite standard conceivable by which to judge this authoritatively, we may expect to see opinions continuing to differ, even supposing men should be able to agree on the general principle. It remains true, however, that on the formula I am defending the burden of proof rests distinctly on the advocate of total prohibition.

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THE CHURCH AND DIVORCE.

HENRY C. CORRANCE.

THERE is an universal ideal element interwoven with the history of the race and individual and underlying all human affairs and institutions, which rises by gradual stages from subjection to the merely material and determined till it issues in freedom, in self-determination. Its development is most conspicuous on the intellectual side, but mere intellectualism, without a higher principle, tends to revert to the service of the mechanical.

Freedom depends ultimately upon an ideal aim, which seeks self-realisation, and is summed up in the notion of "the Best." That aim manifests itself as the secular striving of life to rise superior to its surroundings, to raise itself to a higher plane, of which the final stage is the effort of man to gain freedom of development for his higher nature. There is, then, throughout the whole of life, and especially in man, an unceasing conflict between the ideal and the actual, which asserts itself most strongly in the most fundamental relations—the sexual. It was as a means of regulating these relations that the institution of marriage originated. It was a necessary outgrowth of social life and, therefore, largely conditioned by material forces. But from the beginning it could not be the mere resultant of those forces; it was bound to share the higher and more spiritual aspect of universal life. In its early stages the utilitarian and sensual elements predominated. In the struggle for existence material aims necessarily preponderated over the purely intellectual. The latter were mainly the ministers of the former and their development was due to the pressure of bodily needs. The savage woman sought a husband who was strong and cunning enough to win support for herself and her children in the struggle with nature and his fellow-man. He sought a wife who could best keep the home and aid him by the

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manufacture of household goods and even weapons of the chase. The utilitarian basis of marriage can never be entirely eliminated, though its form alters with changing needs and conditions. But even in the savage state, and much lower down the scale of life—among the animals inferior to man—the ideal element is present. So long as the union is merely a selfish *liaison*, in which each values the other only as ministering to personal wants, it is obvious that the higher element is lacking. When each considers the other as much as, if not more than, self, even to the extent of mutual self-sacrifice, a great advance has been made.

The ideal or free element which breaks the bonds of individualism has been so far victorious. It is foreshadowed in the love of mate and offspring, in the frequent self-sacrifice for the latter, which is seen among many kinds of animals, and in the life-long attachment of some monogamous species. But here the ideal is only adumbrated, for it lacks the self-conscious purpose which is found in man alone. It does, however, indicate the lines on which the spiritual element in sexual relations must manifest itself. It might seem, indeed, as if nothing could be more opposed to freedom than monogamy as a strict, undeviating rule, and doubtless this is true if it is a mere rule. To be really free such a union must be willing. And there lies the crux, for, on the other hand, "free love" could only introduce chaos into the sexual as all other human relations. And mankind has long ago decided, both on social and other grounds, that this is impossible. Whether in the form of promiscuity or temporary *liaisons*, no ideal relations could be so established between individuals.

Of the settled forms of the institution, the great rival of monogamy, both in the animal and human world, is polygamy. Others, such as polyandry, are hardly to be considered, since the objections to the one, from an ideal standpoint, have, with certain modifications, equal force against the other. From the utilitarian standpoint it might be urged that the different forms of the institution,

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being adapted to different races, are therefore the best for them. From this point of view polygamy, polyandry and even some forms of sexual communism, are justified in the countries in which they prevail. They are the outgrowth, as is monogamy, of all those conditions which have given the particular race its present form; they represent the reciprocal action and reaction of all its laws and institutions over a long past, with which, therefore, they are co-ordinated and inter-related in such a way that they could not be fundamentally altered without a complete social revolution; they represent one aspect of its whole religious, intellectual, moral and social attainment. Therefore, they, with all other institutions, have no absolute value, but one which is strictly relative to the general conditions of the race. The argument, so stated is unexceptionable, in fact almost a truism, but does not touch the real question involved in the idea of general progress, viz.: What existing form of the institution represents its higher stage? To the assumption of a static absolute, true for all times and places, it gives an answer that cannot be gainsaid, but does not affect the idea of an immanent absolute which is progressive in its manifestation. The argument certainly holds good against revolutionary changes in the institutions of a people not prepared for their reception. Such an uprooting of their social habits would do more harm than good. If it is not the result of their own self-determination, it could only be superficial, and would bring in more evils than it removed. But, apart from this purely negative and relative argument, which reduces all forms of marriage to the same level, it must be admitted that there is some force in the positive contention that monogamous countries are subject to evils from which polygamous are almost entirely free. In countries where polygamy prevails the so-called "social evil," which is such a blot upon European civilisation, is alleged to be practically non-existent. On the other hand, the strength of this argument is largely discounted by the presence of other evils, such as the prevalence of non-

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natural vice, the degradation attendant upon forced concubinage and the consequent lowered position of women. Nor can it be contended that this form of the institution is useful in producing a better race, either physically or mentally. On the contrary, there is much that points in the opposite direction. The races among which it prevails are the most stationary and backward, are lacking in all progressive elements and are even distinctly retrograde. This is precisely what would be expected of a system which makes it impossible that a father should take the same interest in the mental and moral training of his too numerous offspring as in the smaller families of the West, while the mothers are kept in such a state of subjection and ignorance that they would not be fitted for the task. This form of the institution, then, is not even the best for fulfilling the utilitarian ideal of providing good citizens for the state. In fact, the ideal contained in polygamy is simply and purely sensual and is set before the faithful as their ultimate aim and goal in the Paradise of Mahomed. What may be called the barnyard argument, is the only one of any weight and makes its appeal entirely to the lower nature of man, to the brute instincts which he shares with inferior animals.

Polygamy, then, is calculated to promote neither the utilitarian nor the higher ideal. The latter has been confined to monogamous institutions and has grown up with them, for such a union between two individuals implies no mere soulless civil contract, but that union of heart and mind which this form of the institution alone renders possible. That it is seldom, or inadequately, realized affords no justification for ignoring the higher element. To treat it with the cold calculation of utilitarianism is impossible for living beings of complex spiritual nature. And, however much it may be left out of account, it is sure to revenge itself sooner or later. *Mariages de convenance* are proverbially unhappy.

Two prevailing conservative views of the marriage bond are those of the man of the world and the Church. That

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of the former varies with different individuals, but, on the whole, it inclines to the purely formal and conventional, at least in its expectation from others. He regards it in the first place as a matter of rule and custom, to which external conduct must strictly conform, whatever private relaxations may be sought. Marriage is, in the view of many of his class at any rate, mainly a matter of social convention, though this does not preclude his personal relations with the lady of his choice from yielding moderate satisfaction. In his general view, however, this element is not only subordinate to the other, but is not even essential. It is very good in its way, because it helps to make matters easier and pleasanter, but there are other considerations of far greater importance, such as money and social position. If inner harmony is lacking, the correct course of conduct for a married couple is, by a mutual understanding, to face the world together smiling, while going their several ways in private. From this point of view there is no need for reform in the marriage laws. Individual interests must be sacrificed to the good of society. This last proposition contains a general truth, but those who maintain it are apt to forget that society is an abstraction, that it is composed of individuals, and that the plea for society against the individual can only be maintained when the individuals concerned remain a small minority. When they form a large, increasing and discontented minority, the restrictions and disabilities, under which they labour, become a peril to the state instead of a protection. In fact, the situation cannot be better summed up than in adapting the words of one, whose winged rebukes to the sticklers for convention of his age have come down to us through the centuries: Institutions were made for man, not man for institutions. Man has made them, Man can unmake, reform, adapt them to his own needs and purposes. But there is one element which he can hinder and pervert, but not destroy, the ideal of freedom and betterment which is within, but yet superior to, him.

Every law and institution made or founded in the past

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has been either abolished, or else amended from time to time to meet the changing circumstances and conditions of humanity. Nothing human has been free from this law of change, and can marriage be exempt? "Yes," say the men of the world, on utilitarian grounds, or, more often, on grounds of pure inertia, "leave it alone. It is true the edifice is fairly rotten in some respects, but that is the very reason for not touching it. If you do so, it will fall to pieces and great will be the fall thereof. Besides, it is a question of considerable complexity, delicacy and difficulty to adjust exactly the conflicting interests of society and the individual, of one sex and the other. We are not blind to the defects of the present system, but the difficulties of reform are very great. Therefore, let us leave it alone!" The argument is strong in its appeal to spiritual sloth. The difficulty must be shirked; it is easier to proceed on the lines of least resistance. The man of the world does not see the need of reform because he does not explicitly admit the ideal. To do this would require more thought than he is able or willing to give to the subject. So far as he admits it, he places it in a subordinate position. He frankly prides himself upon his "practical" view. And the practical view is, in some respects, a very necessary one. There are plenty of foolish young people who imagine themselves to have mutually conceived a love which will be life-long; only to find, after they have been married a month, that they have made the mistake of their lives. Then, what plea of love can justify a man in marrying before he can adequately support his wife or provide for the education of children? Such "love" is no more than veiled selfishness, which will reveal its true nature later on. It is under such circumstances that the cold-water douche administered by the practical, common sense of the worldly-wise father is invaluable, and has probably saved many an unhappy union. But the practical attitude, in most cases, embraces the assumption that, as young men cannot marry early, they must "sow their wild oats." In other words, the "social evil," with all its hideous and repulsive

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consequences, is taken to be part of the necessary order of society, as is also the custom of temporary *liaisons*, with its unequal, and sometimes cruel, treatment of the woman and children, which compares ill with the justice and humanity of early Jewish polygamy,[1] or even with that of the Turk.

Totally opposed to this attitude in some of its fundamental assumptions, while agreeing with its main conclusion against reform, is that of the Church. The basal difference between the two views consists in the Church's unswerving maintenance of the ideal as essential to the institution and to sexual relations in general. What the world passes by with a shrug of the shoulders the Church, following the plain teaching of the New Testament, and especially of Paul, brands deadly sin. The man of the world advocates self-restraint only so far as is necessary for social appearances and efficiency. The Church does so from ideal motives. She says in effect: "It is not only your friends, your social position, your health or work which are to be considered, but your spiritual development, which can only be promoted by seeking to subdue the natural instincts which you have in common with the lower animals." But the Church is dealing with a very different issue, which nevertheless she endeavours to confuse with the above, when she goes on to insist that, when once the marriage ceremony has been performed, the union is absolute, there is no place for divorce. The reason of this is that, for her, the marriage law is part of her moral dogma, which, like her metaphysical dogma, is as "the law of the Medes and Persians that altereth not." The authority for it rests on Christ's reported saying, as interpreted by the *Western* Church, the Eastern differing in an important particular. In spite of this radical difference, Absolutists, both Catholic and Anglican, declare that the marriage-bond is inviolable. The latter are more absolutists than the former, as throughout the whole range of dogma; and

[1] Exodus 21: 10.

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with less reason, seeing that their Church does not, as a whole, endorse their views and that they allow the Greek Church co-ordinate authority with their own while the Catholic Church regards both as schismatic. They pretend that to relax the bond, to alter its conditions by ever so little, would be a breach of God's ordinance, and destroy the foundations of religion and morality. It is true that the Catholic Church, in practice though not in theory, less absolutist than High Anglicanism, recognises that there are certain circumstances under which a divorce may be allowed, though it is seldom granted and then only on alleged grounds of nullity.

Thus, while differing so widely in principle, the conservative views of the man of the world and of the Church are both agreed in uncompromising opposition to reform.

Neither of these views tends to promote the ideal. While the man of the world frankly disregards it, the Church, in theory at least and mostly in practice, maintains a strict and unbending attitude, which obliges men and women to remain in marital bondage after their complete incompatibility has long been proved. And this spiritual tyranny can only be maintained by the support of the man of the world, whose leading motives are very different. The ideal fares badly in either case, both at the hands of those who would imprison it in the bonds of unyielding dogma and those who would ignore it and substitute social convention.

Over against these two typical attitudes, so opposed in principle, so united in consequences, is set that of the free mind in quest of truth, which recognises the ideal alone as absolute, and as never yet realised in any moral dogma or convention. It recognises, in fact, that the ideal has a history, dating back to prehistoric and even pre-human ages. Some form of monogamy, together with the ideal involved in it, is far older than Christ, and his reported saying concerning it could not be complete or final. It is idealistic and general, and assent could be yielded to the inseparability of those whom "God hath joined together" without allowing that this could apply to the large majority

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of marriages. The Church has embroidered it with legal details and ceremonial trappings in order to meet the circumstances through which she has passed. Everything in this world changes, and it is the task of the philosopher, while recognising this truth, to endeavour so to affect the course of thought that this change may serve the twofold yet single purpose of promoting the ideal and human welfare. For, from the ideal standpoint, the two aims are one. Utilitarianism, like Materialism, is only at fault when it denies the supremacy of Idealism. And the standpoint of the latter, as we have seen, agrees with that of the Church in so far as it represents the very opposite of the "barnyard" theory, or Mahommedan Paradise, of Polygamy. It cannot, indeed, escape the physical relations implied in marriage, which are so prominent in the passage from Genesis adopted by Christ. The Church's ideal of virginity is a separate, though closely related, subject, which is not now to be considered. For the question at issue is not that of individual perfecting, but the secular and racial advancement of the ideal. It does not concern a doctrine, which, if universally followed, would destroy the race; but the most fundamental aspect of the strange dualism of universal life, the conflict between the ideal and the actual; not that simplification of it which would cut the Gordian knot. It concerns the ever pressing problem of the reconciliation of the ideal with the conditions of its origin and development, to which, in their baser aspect, it is utterly opposed. The Catholic Church recognises the one question as complementary to the other; it is only in Buddhism that the stricter theory is made absolute. The ideal, in monogamy, takes human facts as they are and seeks to elevate them to a higher plane; its aim is to spiritualise the primitive sexual relationship. One side of it, then, necessarily implies inhibition, restriction, restraint. The couple should be faithful to each other and their union should be life-long. To secure this it must be founded on something far higher than mere physical relations, however necessary these may be. They

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cannot be eliminated, but must sink back into their due proportion to intellectual, affective, moral and social qualities, and that compatibility of disposition which is essential.

The Church's doctrine is at one with this ideal in its rejection of all soulless *liaisons*. The difference arises in her insistence on its mere formal embodiment which hinders its manifestation and evolution.

There probably always have been, as no doubt there are now, many examples of wedded life in which some approximation has been made to it. But, on the whole, Christian history seems one record of its failure; a failure, it is true, which is not confined to the sexual, but extends to all those human relations which Christ's teaching sought to uplift and spiritualise.

We are, however, here concerned with one aspect only of this general question, and rather with the present and the future than with the past. No one can maintain, with any semblance of truth, that the state of things is satisfactory at the present time. And has the Church, as the great upholder of the ideal, done all that is possible for its furtherance? It is not enough to lay the blame on human nature, to preach sermons, to hear confessions, to play the rôle of physician of souls, if such an office degenerates into the mere recognition and treatment of a chronic disease, if no effort is made to better the conditions, to make the higher life possible of attainment. Such an attitude is only too common and well harmonises with the doctrine of an external pardon, whether sacramental or mystical, and that insistence on the letter of the law which negates the spirituality and inwardness of Christianity. Mere legal proscriptions and prohibitions have little effect on the inner life, though they may secure an external, and often hypocritical recognition. Punctiliousness as to form and inward license are frequently associated. The vanished order of social life which "called a spade a spade" was not really worse than ours. The only way to lead man upwards is to give him high aims and objects which

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may absorb the lower, to turn his superfluous energies into healthy channels.

These general observations apply to marriage. As "the cowl does not make the monk," so no dogmatic and legal rigidity can make two people live happily together, if their natures are utterly unsuited. It is not always possible to peep behind the scenes, and, when the curtain is lifted, there is often but a partial and temporary glimpse. Therefore, it is impossible to say, with any degree of exactness, to what extent the institution has been a failure. But those, who have lived long in the world and have had some experience of life, are aware that very many marriages are only external, even when it is considered necessary for social reasons to keep up appearances. And, in any case, it is generally acknowledged that marriage, as an institution, does not apparently attain even that measure of success which it seemed to have in the past, when the choice was made by the parent without reference to his daughter's wishes, on grounds mainly social and financial.

Perhaps it was owing to this very system that the measure of success was greater, since it implied a social order in which the position of women was strictly defined, instead of being, as now, in an unsettled, because transitional, state. In the old days, monogamy, like polygamy, was simplified by the complete subjection of the wife to the will of her husband, which was maintained by the whole force of religious and social opinion. Even corporal chastisement was allowed. Such subjection, in fact, has always been the teaching of Christianity, as is seen in the New Testament and in the marriage service. But, in England and America, at least, the gradual emancipation of woman has to be recognised as a fact of increasing importance, and woman's assertion of her right as a reasoning being to form her own judgments and be responsible for her own actions has made a modification of her position inevitable. This is partly due to the more liberal education of women, which widens and stimulates their minds, causing them to seek occupations by which they may attain independence,

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and when once the sweets of liberty have been tasted, the girl is very different from one who never left her home or parents' authority until she was handed over to that of her husband.

Not only this, but the whole mental atmosphere has changed; it is in many respects much freer and, therefore, more full of hope, though also of danger, for freedom is the only soil in which the ideal can flourish. Life is not so simple as it was; fresh interests have arisen, vaster horizons have dawned which have encouraged the growth of free spirits. It is owing to these causes that the more or less "educated classes" are the most affected in this respect. "The masses" live a more primitive life, where wants and interests are mainly material and, therefore, common. The education of "the classes" may in some respects be superficial, their thinking shallow and unoriginal, yet they pick up more quickly than the others the modern ideas which are in the air, even if they pervert and distort them, while they have not the common material interests which keep the others together.

It is impossible, even if it were desirable, to turn the hands of the clock back and alter this state of things, and though the clergy continue to teach the subjection of women on Pauline lines, that teaching is losing its effect. Yet without such subjection how is the institution to be maintained unreformed? It has been said that it is easier to make two watches keep time together than for two human beings to remain long in agreement. If marriage harmony was rare when difficulties were smoothed by the submission of one mind to the other, the independence of the modern woman will make it rarer still. Aims, tastes, sentiments, mental and moral dispositions vary with each individual, and, however careful the mutual choice may be, it is often not till the common daily life reveals them that differences become prominent. As the principle of subjection is breaking down, nothing remains as the bond of union but the most potent unifying element—love. In those rare cases where dispositions are nearly in accord,

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the task of love is easy, but with the first clash of will or judgment its trial begins, and it need be strongly rooted and of genuine quality to survive. It must be aided by common sense, by the will to accommodate, but without mutual love there can be no real and lasting union.

It is not surprising, then, that there is an increase of late years in the number of divorces and separations, judicial and otherwise. It is not surprising that marriages are fewer and later, for men and women have learnt to realise more fully the immense difficulties of the wedded life, and the Church's refusal to sanction any further relaxations in the marriage laws is, to a great extent, responsible for the disfavour into which the institution has fallen.

Yet it is not evil in itself. In some form or other, as has been already pointed out, such an institution is necessary to social life. Civilised races could not leave unregulated so fundamental a relation; while, as regards the ideal, it has been seen that monogamy is the only form which, however imperfectly, embodies it. It is partly because they realise this and partly owing to sheer traditionalism that the clergy, as a body, are so opposed to any reform. But it is a short-sighted policy on their part, for, in seeking to keep the institution unmodified, they will end by destroying it; no lesson from the past being clearer than that all institutions must change if they are to survive under changed conditions.

But though they may destroy the institution, the ideal remains indestructible, for it exists free and independent in the moral intuitions of the community and will assert itself outside the institution until this last is remodelled by the force of public opinion.

Seeing the great risks of matrimony, as at present ordered, an increasing number of enlightened members of both sexes may be willing to brave social ostracism by living together, and only when they have proved their mutual compatibility will they seek, if possible, to legalise the union on account of the social disabilities involved in its neglect. For, let it be plainly understood, the ideal

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does not depend upon the institution, but the institution on the ideal. Men or women, who, through no fault of their own but force of circumstances, have found themselves unequally yoked, and who, again through no fault of their own, are unable to dissolve the legal bonds, take to themselves another partner. If theirs is a marriage of heart and soul, if they remain true and constant, they so far fulfil the ideal which they found impossible of fulfilment under the legal conditions. Such is the attitude which the uncompromising opposition of an influential section of the clergy to all reform is contributing to create in many minds. The clerics have their stronghold in their apparent maintenance of the ideal, in the conservative attitude of many men of the world, in the fact that society demands some institution and that women's rights would not be safe without it owing to the selfishness of men, but at least it is evident that they are wrong in identifying the ideal with the institution itself, or in attaching a moral stigma to what may be called informal wedlock. Nor do they help their case by accusing those who live together outside the marital bond of yielding to the lower passions. This is the case with those irregular and temporary connections which are often the accompaniment of an unhappy marriage, but a man and woman living faithfully together and bringing up their children properly can afford to despise such aspersions. Their disability is simply a legal and external one, owing to the state of human law which is supported by the clergy. Moral reforms are originated by the action of the higher, not the lower, nature, and their appeal is made to reason, justice and truth. No alteration of the law can of itself directly promote the growth of this ideal element, but the state of the law can and does hinder its development. It is a truism that law cannot alter human nature. Moral and intellectual training alone can do this. Religion is still a power in the land. It is still, as it has been called—"the metaphysic of the many." Unfortunately the Church hinders, almost as much as she furthers, the real work of religion by identifying it with irrationality

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and dogma. This is bad enough in the case of matters speculative and historical, but far worse in the region of morals and conduct, which more intimately concern life and action.

That only the men and women best suited to each other should be united in matrimony is a practical ideal both for the state and the individual. It is best from a utilitarian standpoint, for the work of the nation can be better performed where there is no friction in the home. It is better for the production and training of children to be citizens in the state. It is better for the furtherance and development of the higher qualities in the individual. To keep two people in perpetual bondage, who have discovered their mistake in marrying, is certainly not calculated to further these great objects. How long will a matter, so important to the state and individual, be the only one in which a lifelong penalty is attached to a single mistake, to the detriment of both?

It is the high idealist, who, in his dealings with women, is placed at the greatest disadvantage. It is the man of the world, with a large and varied experience, who can make the best choice in his own interests. Thus there is some truth in the saying that "A reformed rake makes the best husband." Yet the idealist must be given but his one chance, and, thereafter, if, on failure of the first essay, he ventures on another in the only way left open to him, social ostracism awaits him and her whom he has chosen. It is true that, under certain circumstances, he can claim a divorce; but, such is the state of the law that, to do this, one or the other party must be guilty of unfaithfulness, or cruelty, or both. Thus the law puts a premium upon the baser passions, and public opinion does the same, for, if the rake's marriage is a failure, he can console himself in the way he so well knows, and that the world will allow so long as he is content to treat his partner as a mistress and not as a wife. Can anything be more calculated, then, to depress, discourage and hamper the ideal than the state of the law and conventional opinion? Anyone, who is

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not obsessed and blinded by the absolutism of moral dogma or the hard crust of convention, must allow that there is urgent need for some reform.

Doubtless what is required is reform, not revolution. It is quite possible to make divorce so easy that marriage, as an institution, becomes practically obsolete, and the evils of this are obvious.

Mankind advances through a series of actions and reactions. In the long run the movement is like that of the tide, a slow and orderly progress, but its most conspicuous feature are the forward bounds and regressions of its waves. The two tendencies are always present together simultaneously. At times they are in equipoise, but more often one or the other is dominant. At the present moment, in the matter under consideration, reaction is in the ascendant, because the evils of the opposite extreme are very patent. The laxity of the divorce laws in some American states has given the reactionaries an excuse which they have not been slow to use in maintaining an attitude blankly negative of all criticism or reform.

Far be it from the writer to adopt the common fallacy that the truth lies between two extremes. For between absolutism and complete license there can be no middle course. They tend, in fact, to the same goal. Both are destructive of the ideal, the one deliberately, the other under the plea of defending it. With the last it has nothing in common, and only seeks to be delivered from the trammels which the other would impose upon its free action and growth. Its real friends must endeavour to accomplish its deliverance. There is no question of destroying institutions, relaxation of morals, or concession to lower instincts, but of recognising outstanding facts with a view, not to make vice easier, but to give freer scope to high aims.

In order to qualify for divorce, the parties should have proved by many years of separation that there is no longer anything in common between them, and also by years of steady cohabitation that they have really found their ideal and intend to keep to it.

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From this point of view the latest proposition put forward for a Parliamentary bill is worthy of support: that complete separation for a certain term of years should in itself constitute a sufficient qualification for dissolution of marriage. One of the most important factors in the case is the length of time required. The scandal created, and the handle given to reactionaries, by the relaxation of the marriage laws in some American states, was due mainly to the frequency with which divorces were granted to the same people in a comparatively short time, and not only to the trivial reasons for which they could be obtained. Hence parties were divorced and married again several times within a short period, sometimes to their former partners. It is obvious that such a state of things renders the institution nugatory, and must seriously complicate legal questions as to status and property. A long probationary period can alone ensure a stable choice. The law must not make it easy for mere caprice or fancy or baser feelings to seek their temporary satisfaction. Better than this would be the most rigorous conservatism, though it is to be feared that, in the long run, it would be equally destructive of the institution.

Three years, the time suggested in the bill recently outlined,[1] seems too short a time. A longer period should elapse, both as some kind of penalty for the first error, and to ensure that the next alliance shall be entered into with greater circumspection. And the knowledge that a probationary period of—say—ten years had to be faced, with its social disabilities, before freedom could be won in this way, would effectually hinder applications for divorce as the consequence of some temporary quarrel or misunderstanding, or the mere desire for change. Such a period would leave ample time for the legitimation of children born to the new union before they could feel the deprivation of social or legal status.

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[1] Since these words were written, the bill has been thrown out by the vote of the Archbishops and Bishops of the Church of England in the House of Lords.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE PRESENT CONFLICT OF IDEALS: A Study of the Philosophical Background of the War. By Ralph Barton Perry. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918. Pp. xiii+549.

As a "companion volume" to his *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, to quote his own description, Professor Perry has recently published this contribution to the literature of the war. His readers, it is true, are sure to wonder if the second book, thus said to be companionable with the first, would have taken its present form, had no war intervened. The war, however, did intervene and it has affected many companionships of things earlier and later. The war has disturbed the orderly going of men in other things besides the making of books. If, then, Professor Perry has wished to follow his work dealing with "technicalities and fundamentals" by a work dealing with "the moral, emotional, political and religious implications," his interested public is not going to complain; although two things have to be regretted. The companionship is not altogether successful. Yet, secondly, the war seems not to have been sufficiently advanced in 1918 to bring to his realism any real reconstruction. Nor is Professor Perry's public going to complain that out of two fields of interest, the conflict of philosophical isms and the conflict of national traits, he has made one continuous if not very successfully unified book. Lacking somewhat in logical integrity and perspective, his book is still readable throughout, affording as it does useful and often stimulating surveys of those two fields —chapters I–XXV and XXVI–XXXV. His learning is considerable; his reading wide; and, best of all, he frequently shows insight and he has a style that, while often too didactic for a book, is also often vigorous and realistic; the latter at times even "to a degree."

In certain general remarks about the war Professor Perry shows how times have changed since he wrote or rather since he delivered these Mills Foundation lectures. In the later days of let-down, reaction, discouragement, would he still express himself quite as follows? "The citizens of the British Empire and the fellow soldiers of the Allies are at this moment being so firmly cemented by the common cause which they are serving on the

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soil of France that half the circumference of the earth can in the future no longer divide them" (p. 392). Again: "We went to war on a moral issue. I believe that is the case also with our allies, but with us, I think, there can be no question. We went to war deliberately; in a sense, and I thank God for it, we went *out of our way* to go to war." Nowadays such exaltation is experiencing many rebuffs. Yet the meaning here is not that these ideal views should not be cultivated, but that they are now more difficult, being in defiance of many things quite extra-Teutonic. Germany is no longer the only foe of better things and fine purposes.

Many readers, skipping the first series of chapters, may turn to the second because of its concern with topics of more popular interest. Doing so, whatever their loss, they will find much that is worth while. In his analysis of national characters, writing of German traits, of France, of Great Britain and of America, he has exhibited a good deal of discrimination and appreciation. Perhaps the treatment of the German is the best of these analyses, coming nearer to some originality than any of the others; but the clear reiteration of common truths, for example, about the "American tradition and ideal" will well repay reading. With our "buoyant and sanguine temper," our "belief in a fortunate destiny," our "spirit of equality," our "ideal of social democracy," we have no need of foreseeing even out of the present unrest "revolution or even grave disorder," although "far-reaching changes" must of course be expected (p. 530–539).

But the first and larger part of this two-in-one volume is given to the important philosophical isms of the present time. These and many of their interesting retinue and with them all many men, Kant, Spencer, Darwin, Nietzsche and Bergson among many more, are marshalled before the reader. Marshalled fairly well, too; yet, on the whole, presenting an array more diverting than convincing. To what does it come? At least for any one not a "new realist" the array and the arrangement seem somewhat perverted. The introduction, it is true, announces a definite order, the same in fact as that of the earlier *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, but at least one reader's impression is rather of a sequence, interesting in its details, than of a plan which as it is worked out really accomplishes something at the finish. Naturalism, idealism, pragmatism and realism are of course isms of the time and in this order they do make an inter-

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esting series of chapters, or groups of chapters; but Professor Perry himself says that he has become "less and less confident" of their being coordinate and certainly they are not coordinate. So why treat naturalism and idealism, that is, scientificism or the cult of reason and idealism, the "champion of moral and religious faith," as the two great opponents, and then, turning to the others, on the whole as if they were coordinate, fail in any satisfactory and candid way to connect them with the great issue of the first two?

Pragmatism and realism are both, the latter surely no less than the former, the honest offspring of naturalism or scientificism. Pragmatism is so largely biologism. It shows the influence of evolution, regarding consciousness, knowledge, belief, as a vital function, a device in life's economy of adaptation, whose value is determined only by its service; while realism is another, a somewhat later and especially a skilfully philosophized or sublimated achievement of scientificism. Realism, which Perry boasts as "theoretical" rather than, like pragmatism, "practical," would replace biologism with a subtle but still discoverable psychologism, psychology simply being the latest of the sciences to captivate philosophy. Does not the new realist say that "consciousness is homogeneous and interactive with its environment" (p. 379), that "consciousness differs from bodies very much as one bodily system differs from another," being "capable both of affecting and being affected by them" (p. 377), and that "spirit is one of the many kinds of things that may be found by any observer in the same field of observable experience with mountains, rivers and stars?" (p. 377–8). Could scientificism or specifically psychologism have greater triumph than this? The rule of that homogeneity, it should be realized, is a poor rule if it does not work both ways. Realism indeed on these terms quite outdoes panpsychism! Idealism were almost as suitable a name for it as realism. Merely to have made the conscious self so real, so individual and at the same time so candidly organic to the natural environment is a notable thing, the acme of performance; but it does not justify just realism however "new."

So long as philosophy was captive or handmaid, not of psychology, but of theology (middle ages), mechanics (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) or biology (nineteenth century), man was regarded as being and living with reference to something at one remove or another non-human and so was, as it were, between

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the ideal and the real as two abstractions incongruous at once with each other and with him. Idealism, too, and realism were easily distinguished and were in real opposition, either being incapable of mingling unreservedly with the other. But in recent times psychology, at last bringing man to himself, bringing him and his experience together, has gone far to remove both the abstractness and the incongruity, revealing man and nature, the ideal and the real, as interactively one, as even homogeneous either with the other. Whence, while one's philosophy may or indeed must be realistic, it can not be an anti-idealistic realism without being still abstract, partisan *and untimely*. When Perry, patting his approved new realism on the back, says that it is "individualistic, democratic and humanitarian in its ethics," that it is "theistic and melioristic in its religion," and that it "distinguishes the good from the evil, and seeks to promote it not with a sense of assured triumph but rather with the confidence that springs from resolution," he shows himself at least willing to be a new idealist as well as, what he is so avowedly, a new realist.

But why should he prejudice the best meaning of the day's thinking and feeling by his partisan name? Or why should he be so blind to his new realism, if merely realism, being only the latest thing in scientificism. The agnile ideal may not thus lie down *within* the leonine real! Far better, if values must be taken as facts (p. 376) or if consciousness be indeed only "one kind of thing among many" (p. 376), to talk of a natural and immediate dualism. An immediate and empirical dualism would offer none of the difficulties of a metaphysical dualism and would also escape the one-sidedness of either of the abstractions. Even at cost of his realism, then, can not Professor Perry agree, is it not his own actual purpose only carried to its finish, that in these times thinking and feeling and willing must avoid, not some, but all abstractions?

"Natural and immediate dualism" may suggest an intellectual impossibility, but it somehow does report the philosophical fact of the time, as no partisan philosophy can. Life today, since the war more obviously and assertively than ever, is a close, immediate conflict of the real and the ideal; either being immediate in life and experience; life itself being, as not before, a personal and natural affair. Either ideal or real is become only "one kind of thing among many," whether spirits or stars.

ALFRED H. LLOYD.

University of Michigan.

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STRIFE OF SYSTEMS AND PRODUCTIVE DUALITY: An Essay in Philosophy. By Wilmon Henry Sheldon. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918. Pp. x, 534.

The aim of this work is to discover an ultimate metaphysical principle which shall provide a plan for a general map of the universe, and shall be actually useful when applied to concrete problems. The author is not deterred by the failure of so many and so diverse previous attempts to construct a definitive metaphysics; indeed he would make the principle revealed by these failures itself the basis of his own metaphysics.

The greater part of the book is, therefore, given to a detailed critical examination of the principal metaphysical tendencies manifested in the history of philosophy, especially of recent philosophy. While the systems examined are arranged ingeniously in correlative pairs, on successive levels, the discussion of them is reasonably objective, scholarly, acute, and most illuminating. It is beyond the scope of this review to outline these more historical chapters; but it ought to be said that they well repay reading, and that to many readers they may prove to be the most valuable part of the book.

To the author, however, they are significant only as steps on the way in the long search for a metaphysics. Each previous system in turn appears to have suffered from a defect of exclusiveness. Each has occupied a legitimate view point, and in so far has been true enough; but at some critical place in the system it has failed to take into account a correlative and equally legitimate viewpoint. This "strife of systems" exhibits a dialectic from which emerges the principle of "productive dualism." No statement of this principle is perhaps quite fair which lacks the force of the whole argument behind it. Put briefly, it may be stated as the harmonization of internal and external relations. Every entity, when seen in the two-foldness of its external and internal relations,—and this is the purely empirical and common sense way of considering any object whatever,—proves to be productive of further aspects of the entity and of genuine understanding of reality. This is the last induction, the highest principle of knowledge, and represents an essential character of all reality. Professor Sheldon believes that he has here escaped vicious *a priorism*, and has secured a principle transcending the mere strife of other systems, and capable of actually useful appli-

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cation to the details furnished by empirical inquiry in every special field of investigation.

Criticism of the thesis is embarrassed by the very richness of the author's historical approach. From whatever position one would attack it, one finds oneself already met and disposed of at some point in the strife of systems whose dialectic gives this very metaphysics. Even if one deny the possibility or the worth of any metaphysics at all, one finds that this denial has been already utilized along the way. The system, in other words, is ingenious and many-sided.

And the principle in which it emerges is undoubtedly true. But it seems to the reviewer to be irrelevant. Applicable everywhere, how can it be fruitfully applied anywhere? Explaining everything equally, does it explain anything in fact? The author, indeed, protests beforehand against this criticism, and expounds with skill certain illustrations of the useful application of his principle both in the physical and in the social sciences. These ought of course to be met on their merits. The reviewer can only testify that the significance attributed to the principles seems to him to arise, especially in the social field, entirely out of the special subject matter, and would have had exactly the same fertility without any reference to a metaphysical basis.

Indeed the strife of systems seems to be due to a similar defect, the failure to use distinctions within the limits of their relevance. The author sees in their strife a dialectic which leads him metaphysically beyond them. May it not be truer to see in these endless controversies the evidence that men of diverse interests, experience, and insights, having formulated concepts by which they might interpret and further these, have then carried their concepts beyond the point where their application could have genuine meaning? The author's fine critical discussions could, it would seem, by a very little turn be given this direction, with a different metaphysical result.

Professor Sheldon expresses the hope that he may be able to give much more extended applications of his principle in these and other fields. Such discussions by him are to be welcomed; whether metaphysically convincing or not, they are sure to be enlightening. And if they do prove convincing, such an issue would be of fundamental importance for the moralist. Into the field of ethics, if Sheldon is right, an independent principle can be brought which will help us to construe the subject matter in

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this field. This would furnish a metaphysical contribution to ethical judgments. His work is at least a serious attempt to justify such a contribution.

J. F. CRAWFORD.

Beloit, Wisconsin.

THE MEANING OF NATIONAL GUILDS. By C. E. Bechhofer and M. B. Reckitt. London: Cecil Palmer and Hayward, 1918. Pp. 452. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

This book continues the argument in favour of National Guilds which began about five years ago and of which the most recent exposition was given in Mr. G. D. H. Cole's book, *Self-government in Industry*. Mr. Bechhofer and Mr. Reckitt aim at explaining first the fundamental principle underlying the Guild idea. It is that the wage-system is a form of slavery and that control by the workers over the circumstances of their working life is the only true freedom. Further, this Guild idea involves a criticism of social and economic organisation from the point of view of the producer, wherever the earlier forms of Socialism appear not to have emphasised the need of liberty for producers. One of the most effective arguments of the supporters of National Guilds is that human labour is always an employer of the instruments of production and should, therefore, never be regarded as one among these instruments. The distinction between employer and employed should, then, be abolished and each worker, whether in manual labour or in brain labour, should be recognised as part of an economic group which may be called a guild.

In the book under notice here, the position of the middle classes is analysed and it is shown that they have no real community of interest with the capital-owning classes. The authors then proceed to discuss Trade Unionism, on which the Guilds they advocate must be founded. A chapter on "The Mirage of Reconstruction" contains a condemnation of sentimental goodwill. The proposals of the Whitley Committee are severely criticised. The argument then shows the nature and functions of the Guilds and their relation to the State. The distinction between Syndicalism and this newer school of thought is well rendered; and the book ends with an emphatic repetition of the belief in the social destiny of labour. The whole argument is valuable; and the authors have added considerably to the devel-

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opment of the idea of National Guilds. But we can hardly separate their work from that of the small group whose works they continually quote. It seems clear that the idea of National Guilds is the only vigorous and original contribution to political, economic and social theory during the past ten years. We cannot yet estimate its effect; but already it is more than "a school." The practical effect on Trade Unionism in England is already beginning to be seen.

Apart, however, from the substance of the argument, we may find much to criticise in the manner of its presentation. Too much attention is given by the writers on National Guilds to the various individuals or schools of thought with whom they disagree on minor points. The disagreement between the contributors to the *New Age*, for example, leaves the rest of the world entirely cold: and it would perhaps be well if the writers on National Guilds would distinguish between the great names in the history of thought and modern schoolboys who write to the papers. There is a feeling, which the reader cannot escape, that the writers of such books as we now have under review live in a very small world.

C. D. B.

SHORTER NOTICES.

ROADS TO FREEDOM: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism. By Bertrand Russell. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 213. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

Mr. Bertrand Russell summarises the history of the three "roads to Freedom," Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism; and extracts the essence of these three movements. His opinion is that pure Anarchism—which is opposed to every kind of forcible government—is for the present impossible, and would not survive more than a year or two were it adopted. His personal sympathies are with guild socialism which advocates a system of federalism among trades for reasons similar to those which have recommended federalism among nations, but which has at present a small party of supporters. Besides the analysis of the three movements (chapters i–ii), Mr. Russell deals with "the world as it could be made" in the manner of the *Free Man's Worship*, and also gives (p. 193 and ff.) a brief survey of his Utopia.

Education should, he thinks, be compulsory up to the age of sixteen or perhaps longer; after that it should be continued or not at the option of the pupil, but remain free (for those who desire it) up to at least the age of twenty-one. When education is finished, no one should be *compelled* to work, and those who choose not to work should receive a bare livelihood and be left completely free. The whole community, he believes, could be kept in comfort by means of four hours' work a day on the part of the great

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majority who will not choose idleness, and payment will be made for willingness to work, not only for work actually performed; government and law will be reduced to a minimum.

Mr. Russell seems to rely upon a general willingness to work for about four hours a day, which, on Prince Kropotkin's theory, would be all that is needful to provide the necessaries of life for everyone. It is possible that this willingness is not so general as he imagines and that the recipients of what he calls the vagabond's wage would be more numerous than he bargains for. It will be noted that Mr. Russell's ideal is essentially that of Kropotkin.

Among minor defects are passages such as that on magistrates, where it is said that "the pleasures of vindictiveness and Moral superiority are so great that there is no difficulty in finding elderly gentlemen who are willing, without pay, to send helpless wretches to the torture of prison," and an index in which the entries "ants" and "button hooks" find place.

M. J.

London, England.

LABOUR IN THE COMMONWEALTH. By G. H. D. Cole, M.A. London: Headley Bros., Ltd., 1919. Pp. 223. Price, 5s. 6d. net.

Mr. Cole's book is a restatement of the humanity of labour; a rescue of labour from the dismal penumbra of abstractions which have prevailed in industrial theory since the Industrial Revolution of the last century. "Labour," which the economists have loved to contrast with "capital," is an abstraction, he believes which has vitiated thinking and perverted economic science from its proper function. Mr. Cole, therefore, who is one of the few members of the English intelligenzia who have gained the full confidence of the labour party, writes not of abstract labour as a "thing" but of individual men and women forming the majority of the people in any commonwealth; and gives us his personal theory of labour's place in the commonwealth and what labour and the labour movement are like This theory is that labour should have control in the industrial sphere.

E. F.

OUTLINES OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By J. S. Mackenzie, Litt.D., LL.D., Emeritus Professor of Logic and Philosophy in University College, Cardiff. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1918. Pp. 280. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

This volume forms No. 52 in the series of monographs by writers connected with the London School of Economics. In his preface Dr. Mackenzie suggests that it may be regarded as taking the place of his well-known *Introduction to Social Philosophy* which has long been out of print.

In its concern with existing social institutions the present volume exemplifies the tendency of "political philosophy" to become "political science." It is easy to see how this tendency has come to be. The earlier Hegelian "philosophy of politics" sought to exhibit an ideal society whose nature was determined by the structure of reality as a whole. It was not a study of existing society, and hence (as Dr. McTaggart clearly showed) could not legitimately give any guidance in social action. It is not surprising that Hegelians (following Hegel himself) should refuse to rest content with the construction of "imaginary commonwealths"; but they must be willing to accept the consequences of their descent into the workaday world. Dr. Bosanquet's complaint that his critics fasten on the defects of states which belong to them "not in so far as they are states, but in so far as they

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are not states" amounts to a claim for protection from factual criticism which can only be granted in return for acknowledgment of the impotence of idealistic theories in the field of actual fact. The evil results which follow from taking what is determined of an ideal state as referring to existing states needs no elaboration nowadays; and wider recognition of them has been followed by a limiting of the idealising—without, however, a complete breaking away from it. Thus we reach, as in this book, a watery mixture of philosophy and science without the rationality of the one or the sturdy empiricism of the other; and concepts like the General Will appear in hybrid shape as neither ideal nor natural.

It would be unfair not to add that Dr. Mackenzie's impartial account of, and many references to, modern work on the subject renders his book very valuable to the student.

A. E. HEATH.

ECONOMIC STATESMANSHIP. By J. Ellis Barker. London: John Murray, 1918. Pp. x, 408. Price, 15s. net.

Mr. Barker's study is a statesmanlike survey of the pressing economic problems of the near future; and an indictment of the policy of *laissez faire*, or drift, in economic matters. "At last," he writes, "it has become clear even to the most narrow-minded individualists that nation-wide co-operation, the harmonised and ordered effort of all the citizens for the furtherance of the common good, is a more potent factor for ensuring the national welfare than unfettered competition, an internecine war of all against all, the *bellum omnium contra omnes* of Thomas Hobbes."

To this individualism England has been disposed by temperament and the plain lesson of the profit and loss account, resulting from the English neglect of her iron and steel industry, her relatively low industrial and agricultural productivity, which has been little heeded. It is, as Mr. Barker shows, necessary to follow the lead of America; for the American production per worker in manufacturing, mining, transport and agriculture is three times as great as the British. And this trebled production showed treble the income of masters and workmen, and incidentally raised the peoples' standard of life, thus solving many of the pressing economic and social problems of democracy. Mr. Barker advocates reform of transport (chapter iii) and education (chapter vi), and the abolition of the systematic restriction of British Workers' labour, to which the men and their representatives are still wedded. As a result of Americanisation of British industries, the old drudgery, dirt and poverty and ignorance of the working classes will disappear. There is a remarkably good analytical index.

M. R.

London.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RABINDRANATH TAGORE. By S. Radhakrishnan. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. xii, 294. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

This book is an attempt to state and interpret the philosophy of Sir Rabindranath Tagore, who is in Professor Radhakrishnan's opinion the veritable voice of India. "In his work, India finds the lost word she was seeking. His idealism is a true child of India's own past and his philosophy is thoroughly Indian both in origin and development" (p. 3). He has, therefore, little sympathy with certain western critics, among them the writer of an article in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS of April, 1916, who hold that Tagore has freely borrowed from Christian and western teaching. The earlier part of the book is concerned with setting

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out, by almost too copious quotations from Tagore's work, the philosophy which informs them, and has the disadvantage of any systematic summary of the implied ideas in a work of art. What, however, gives the book both deep force and interest is the account of Tagore's views about Nationalism in the East and West, in chapters ii and v, which should be read by all lovers of India. It is instinct with Tagore's own intense naturalism.

"It is a sign that God has not lost all hope of India," writes the professor, "that Rabindranath is born in this age." He is the authentic voice of the Indian community, the warning voice of a prophet warning his people to pursue the path of spirit and relinquish that of matter; and to cease the mistaken assimilation of western education. His point is that the national culture dwindles, its soul is subdued, and that all that makes a nation great is inevitably melting away. It is the yoke of the mind, the disease of the soul he points his finger at and tells India that it ails. As regards remedies, Tagore is a modernist, opposing the caste system (p. 180), but even more important is his attitude towards the economic troubles of industrialism that are pressing for solution in the East as well as in the West, and his conviction of the necessity of self-government for India.

M. J.

London, England.

THE RED CAP ON THE CROSS. By Richard Roberts. London: Headley Bros., 1918. Pp. 127. Price, 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

Mr. Roberts is a disciple of Lammenais and owes a good deal more to him than the title of his book, which is borrowed from a brilliant description of that great preacher's *Paroles d'un Croyant*. The aim of the book is specific. It assumes that the dominating fact of the moment is the proletarian rising which had its origin in Russia: "Russia has lighted a light and set up a beacon which will be the rallying point for the workers of the whole world"—a prediction which no one will deny at the present time, when wild fires are lit in various countries of Europe from the Bolshevik torch. The new socialism that will emerge will be not the Marxian Socialism, but a socialism touched with a new spirit, "the generous dream of a comparative commonwealth," and what has to be reckoned with is not a formula or a doctrine, but an idealism and a religion. While limiting himself to the spiritual and moral conditions of the new society he foresees, Mr. Roberts believes, with a well-known group of thinkers, that its economic framework must take some such shape as that described by the advocates of National Guilds.

M. J.

THE BLIGHT OF KULTUR. By G. Hamilton MacLeod. London & Edinburgh: Sampson, Low, Marston & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. xviii, 238. Price, 5*s.* net.

Mr. MacLeod's book is an indictment of a nation. "We are told," he writes, "that there are good as well as bad among the Huns. It is difficult to believe that there is truth in that statement." He does not find it difficult to believe in the story current as to the German *post mortem* employment of its cannon fodder. To most people actual records of German frightfulness give rise to more than an expression of disgust, even though it occupies more than two hundred pages.

M. J.

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CAN MANKIND SURVIVE. By Morrison I. Swift. Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1919. Pp. 201. Price, $1.50 net.

If any one wishes his black painted black without any white or even gray, he will find it here. The process of human evolution in Swift's view has been unqualifiedly bad. "The chief part of human energy has been spent in mutual repression and defeat." Evolved human nature may be defined as "the organized enmity of all men for one another tending to the suicide of the human race." "An artificial selection of cunning, unscrupulous brains" has been at work; man now regards it as a basic truth "that one man has a right to live on another." This is the "ultimate tribunal and determinant of human morality and behavior." The Hebrew choice to renounce the world has been one outcome. Intelligence has been systematically destroyed or repressed. The elders and all the institutions of repressive education compress children into the stunted deforming moulds of their parents, whereas the animal races have been preserved by their incapacity to educate their posterity. Education extenuates and justifies the world's present infamous condition instead of boldly facing it and aiding in its reform. The German effort on the one hand, the Bolsheviki on the other, have equally expressed the civilization-logic of man-live-on-man. Mankind can survive only by creating a new order of things in which they are slaves neither to the desire for riches nor to the rich.

J. H. T.

WE MODERNS: ENIGMAS AND GUESSES. By Edward Moore. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 247. Price, 4*s*. 6*d*. net.

"The reader will look in vain in this book for a system. But he will find there an attitude," according to the preface; and detached *pensées* upon Original Sin, Love, the Tragic View and Myth. The attitude and the style owe not a little to Nietzsche, who, with all his qualities, is a dangerous model. "We all know what the weak have suffered from the strong; but who shall compute what the strong have suffered from the weak" is in the full Nietzschean manner, as are also the deliberately fragmentary statements of Mr. Moore's various positions or "attitudes." When Mr. Moore states that in Greece there was no "bad conscience" in our sense, he does not look sufficiently close into Greek tragedy.

M. J.

JAMES HINTON: A SKETCH. By Mrs. Havelock Ellis. With a preface by Havelock Ellis. Illustrated. London: Stanley Paul & Co., 1918. Pp. XIX, 315. Price, 10*s*. net.

The personality and message of James Hinton were neither understood nor valued in his lifetime, and this book is a carefully documented criticism of one pioneer by another, and bears the hallmark of Edith Ellis's work, namely, strong authentic emotion and independence of traditional standards. Unfortunately, the two first chapters were written later than the main portion of the work, and when fatal illness had somewhat impaired her mental power. But the main part is a comprehensive, sympathetic yet shrewdly critical presentation of the core of Hinton's later work, including his conception of genius, as a psychic faculty, wholly distinct from specialised ability or moral force, his views on nature, and on the actual and ideal relationships between men and women. Mrs. Ellis does full justice to the insight and candor of Hinton's attack on prostitution and on legal marriage as at present constituted. At the same time, she points out that his ideal polygamy is always polygynous, never polyan-

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drous: "he forgot to emphasize the important point in modern life that what applies to man, applies to woman." He erred, too,—and fundamentally—in ignoring the need for entire economic independence of the sexual relationship.

"An interrogative fever is often his substitute for rational thinking. At times, a schoolmaster's or a clergyman's dogmatism seems to clash with the insight of a seer." Nevertheless, with all the incompleteness and bias of Hinton's revolt and plea for a new order, his interpreter makes us feel how finely true it is. In her own words: "If we all wait for a miracle to pave the way toward equality and experiment, we shall remain where we are. The forerunner sees and dares—the conventionalist sees and shrinks."

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

THE PROBLEM OF CREATION: AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE CHARACTER AND TREND OF THE COSMIC PROCESS. By The Rt. Rev. J. E. Mercer. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. Pp. 324. Price, 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

This is a treatise, in popular form, on what used to be called "natural theology." Dr. Mercer attempts to show that we can trace Will, Consciousness, Purpose and Reason in the Cosmos at large. He keeps "as far as may be to the direct deliverances of experience," avoiding what he calls transcendental subtleties. He gives great weight to scientific concepts, especially the later development of the idea of evolution. Matter and Energy are discussed; and the conclusions are that the usual beliefs of liberal-minded Christians are correct. It must be confessed that it appears from the whole book that the conclusions have preceded the evidence in the author's mind; but this is no great evil, if the evidence is adequate. To show ground for accepting or for rejecting Dr. Mercer's evidence would be a long task; but whether or not the book is a contribution to philosophic knowledge it is at least valuable in showing how the devout churchman looks at the problems implied in the traditional religious beliefs. Science is no longer anathema and all the concepts which were once regarded as subversive of true religion are now used as its supports. Even the history of religion is used to show the absolute correctness of the religious beliefs current among Western nations.

C. D. B.

A NOT IMPOSSIBLE RELIGION. By Silvanus P. Thompson. London: John Lane. New York: John Lane Co., 1918. Pp. xvii, 335. Price, 6*s.* net.

This book is the earnest attack by a religious scientific man not upon religion (which was evidently to him the most important thing in life), but upon theology, the ossification of religion by the churches. Dr. Silvanus Thompson was at the time of his death in 1916 at work upon the presentment of his own simple and spiritual Christianity, and though he did not live to finish and revise those chapters they are essentially complete. It is not for nothing that he was, as he tells us, "born into a family of simple-minded, intensely devout, educated Evangelical Christians"; this strain persists, and even though he was "driven towards agnosticism by the pretentious clerics and their bigotry towards science" he cannot adopt a Laodicean attitude.

The keynote of the book is therefore "woe unto you, theologians and bigots, perverting the good news," and this animus, justifiable as it is,

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leads the critic of theologians into an occasional crudity, as when he advances, when attacking the dogma of the virgin birth that "the phenomenon of virgin (asexual) birth is by no means unknown in science. The aphis, or green plant louse is parthenogenetic, yet no one dreams of thinking it a sacred insect."

He gives us instead of the religion of orthodoxy a revalued religion, without theology or obscurantism; and this is simply the following of the man Christ. The book is, in its way, as sincerely the result of the religious spirit as the *Imitation*.

M. W.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MR. B*RTR*ND R*SS*LL: With an Appendix of Leading Passages from Certain Other Works. Edited by Philip E. B. Jourdain. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; Chicago. The Open Court Publishing Company, 1918. Pp. 96. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

This book, with its significant motto from *Through the Looking-Glass*, "Even a joke should have some meaning," belongs to a rare class, that of *jeux d'esprit*. It purports to be the fragmentary papers of a Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll, who, following the advice of Mr. William James, "got into touch with reality," and in July, 1911, was torn to pieces by anti-suffragists. No one, not even a reviewer, has taken this fable seriously; and the book has been recognised as a close, sympathetic, but critical appreciation of Mr. Bertrand Russell's philosophical writings. As a study of Mr. Russell's literary phases it would be difficult to improve upon the passage in the "Editor's Note," where it is stated that "the fictitious Mr. R*ss*ll's literary style fortunately reminds us more of Mr. Russell's later clear and charming subtleties than his earlier brilliant, and no less subtle obscurities."

It is an open secret that Mr. Russell was advised by William James to "get into touch with reality,"—an injunction which he has carried out in the years of war. Many traces of Mr. Russell's letters and conversation are to be found, as for instance his opinion of *Gedankenexperimente* and Evolutionary Ethics (p. 88). The imaginary Mr. R*ss*ll is used as an ideal Mr. Russell, possessing superior logical rigour, who would not have fallen into the error of obtaining a conclusion by means of one of those vicious circle fallacies to which Mr. Russell has drawn attention, whereas the real Mr. Russell concluded a review of Bergson's book on *Laughter* with the reflection that "it would seem impossible to find any such formula as M. Bergson seeks. Every formula treats what is living as if it were mechanical, and is, therefore, by his own rule a fitting object of laughter" (p. 87). But, for one palpable hit at Mr. Russell, there were a dozen at other eminent persons; such as Schoenflies (p. 77), the Cambridge mathematicians (pp. 42, and 163), the Pragmatists (p. 32)—whose theory that truth is belief that works well is criticised as being far more difficult to apply than the Bellman's in *The Hunting of the Snark* and gives results just as insecure, Dr. Schiller and Mr. G. K. Chesterton (p. 41), and finally Herbert Spencer—whose doctrine of the Unknowable gives an opportunity (pp. 70–71) for a very amusing analysis and illustration. After Mr. Russell, this brilliant book owes its largest debt to the works of Lewis Carroll, and the leading significant passages in his books are conveniently arranged for reference in the appendix, where, among the number of works referred to, Lewis Carroll's name appears side by side with those of Frege and Mach. Lewis Carroll's latent subtleties are carefully hidden away in pleasant fables and obvious humours, and it was left for the fictitious Mr. R*ss*ll to point out (p. 22) the distinction made by the White Knight between sign

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and signification (Appendix G) and the nominalism of the Hatter (p. 24 and Appendix H).

It is difficult to give a fair idea of this amusing book without large quotations. As an example of the method, the note on *Gedankenexperimente* may be taken as a sample. "These experiments," Mr. R*ss*ll writes (p. 88), "upon which so much weight has been laid by Mach and Heymans, had already been investigated by the White Queen, who, however, seems to have perceived that the results of such experiments are not always logically valid. The psychological founding of logic appears to be not without analogy with the surprising method of advocates of evolutionary ethics, who expect to discover what *is* good by enquiring what cannibals have *thought* good. I sometimes feel inclined to apply the historical method to the multiplication table. I should make a statistical inquiry among school-children before their pristine wisdom had been biassed by teachers. I should put down their answers as to what 6 times 9 amounts to; I should work out the average of their answers to six places of decimals; and should then decide that, at the present stage of human development, this average is the value of 6 times 9."

No reader should miss the gentle but pointed sarcasms on what may be described as "the *à priori* historical method" of Mr. Russell (p. 12), on certain politicians (p. 17), on Dr. G. E. Moore's use of the principle of identity in ethics (p. 19), on dignity (p. 43), on mortality (pp. 48–52), and on a slip (noted in the editor's note, p. 81) made by Mr. Russell into an almost elementary form of humour.

The book should be carefully read, and, by a careful reader, it will be found to be no unworthy successor to the *Alices*, though not like the *Alices*, meat for babes.

E. M.

London, England.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MYSTICAL AND THE SENSIBLE WORLDS. By Herbert N. G. Newlyn. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 128. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

Mr. Newlyn, in his book, gives the "existence of a wide-spread and deep desire implanted in the human mind" as a reason for the "Experience that is its object must indeed be a Reality." There is an appendix of evidences of super-phenomenal experiences from various sources.

M. J.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By L. Oppenheim. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1919. Pp. xii, 84. Price, 6s. net.

Professor Oppenheim has collected in this volume three lectures upon the history of and problems associated with the League of Nations, in which he is a firm believer. He is of opinion that after the map of Europe has been redrawn by the Peace Congress, the third conference ought to assemble at the Hague for the purpose of establishing the league. Professional international lawyers have not abandoned their belief in the value of the work of the Hague Conferences, in spite of the conduct of the present war, and he looks forward to the conferences of the future as a permanent organ of the League of Nations for the provision of international law—a very wide field, for international law in its present state is in many points both controversial and incomplete. Professor Oppenheim suggests (pp. 65 and *seq.*) a reasonable expedient for solving the problem of the setting up and manning of the international courts of the future.

E. F.

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EVOLUTION IN CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. By Percy Gardner. (The Crown Theological Library.) London: Williams & Norgate, 1918. Pp. xviii, 241. Price 5s. net.

Professor Gardner, the Oxford archaeologist, has produced as a *parergon* a little review of Christian doctrine in the spirit of Broad Church Anglicanism, or, as he chooses to call it, Modernism. He attacks the cataclysmic view of Christianity, and yet admits in the end that "if evolutionary views in religion led directly to a necessarian and quasi-materialist view of the universe, excluding from it all exercise of divine providence and direction," then he for one would prefer, at any intellectual sacrifice, to adhere to the miraculous and cataclysmic outlook. He gives some shrewd thrusts at the Anglican Church in its relation to the proletariat (p. 240).

M. J.

RELIGIOUS REALITY: A BOOK FOR MEN. By A. E. J. Rawlinson, with a preface by the Bishop of Lichfield. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918. Pp. xi, 183. Price 4s. 6d. net.

Mr. Rawlinson writes as a plain man for plain men, and his book, which is a text-book of the faith and practice of the Anglican Church, is both pleasant and candid. In the first part he discusses the Christian faith persuasively from the critical Modernist point of view. In the second part he deals with problems of Christian Ethics, as they appear to-day. He has some very plain speaking about the artificial restriction of parentage and the weakness of the Church in respect of its dealings with labor and the present war. He regrets that the Church, in so far as she has been represented by her clergy, has been "too anxious to be identified with a merely jingo patriotism, to exercise any very appreciable influence in restraint of unchristian passions." It is a symptom of life in the Church to note Mr. Rawlinson's enthusiasm for the new Education Bill, and his appreciation of the spirit of idealism and world-wide brotherhood by which the labor movement is inspired.

D. R.

THE WORLD REBUILT. By Walter Walsh, D.D. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1917. Pp. 96. Price 2/6 net.

A statement of his views by the leader of the free religious movement towards world religion and world brotherhood.

N. C.

CHRISTIANITY AND IMMORTALITY. By Vernon F. Storr. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918. Pp. x, 195. Price 7s. 6d. net.

This book, which is an expansion of Canon Storr's lectures given in 1916, is, like the recent symposium on immortality edited by Canon Streeter, occupied with the necessity of a restatement of the belief in a future life. The defence is familiar; that the evidence in favor of human survival is cumulative, consisting of a number of converging lines of argument which, taken in their totality, provide a satisfactory foundation for a reasonable faith; but the treatment is fresh and arresting throughout. Among points to be noticed is the theory of the post-Resurrection appearances of Christ, based on a paper by the Rev. R. Vaughan in the *Church Quarterly Review*, January, 1916, to which Canon Storr gives due prominence.

M. J.

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PAST AND FUTURE. By "Jason." London: Chatto & Windus, 1918. Pp. xii, 192. Price 3s. 6d. net.

"Jason's" examination of certain aspects of English industrial life during the present crisis is a most effective and vivid appeal. Its leading idea is the necessity of accommodating the industrial system to the needs of human nature, and the demands of human will, and it expresses the sympathetic and enlightened modern attitude towards labor and its followers. Though the book does not lay down a definite program, it emphasizes the new schemes outlined by the Whitley reports in relation to industrial councils, which are among the most far-reaching of recent contributions to industrial problems. Apart from the operation of the Whitley councils, "Jason" appears to expect a continuation of vigorous State control of our industries after the war, by means of a Ministry of Industry which is to be the guide and philosopher to business men. To others, the constant State control of industries during the war period does not suggest a milennium. What is attractive and arresting in the book is the author's feeling for the promise of youth and for that "first duty of a civilized State, to see no man's life is wasted."

M. J.

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY AND OTHER SERMONS, 1916–1917. By Herbert Hensley Henson, D.D., Lord Bishop of Hereford. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. xxi, 340. Price, 6s. net.

This volume of sermons is a defence but by no means an apology for the Bishop of Hereford's teaching, which he tells us in the preface "has been sound and constructive in effect as it certainly was in design." They are model sermons, short, effective and rising to eloquence at moments, but they are not controversial and do not deal with the vexed question of the bishop's orthodoxy, to which attention was drawn at the date of his appointment. The bishop protests vainly against the assumptions in which that past agitation proceeded; viz., that there are two standards of orthodoxy in the church, so that teaching which is tolerated in a priest becomes intolerable in a bishop, and that a bishop may rightly be called upon before his consecration to supplement the legally required declarations of belief by "such other assurances of orthodoxy as may be demanded by suspicious individuals."

The sermons on war subjects are reminiscent of patriotic leaders in "respectable" newspapers.

M. W.

DOMINUS NOSTER: A STUDY IN THE PROGRESSIVE RECOGNITION OF JESUS CHRIST OUR LORD. By C. A. Anderson Scott. Cambridge: Heffer and Sons, Ltd., 1918. Pp. x, 232. Price, 6s. net.

This book is an attempt to trace the development of the idea of Christ's character in the New Testament. The concept of evolution in the Christian tradition is accepted; but it is not clear whether the historical basis for all the changes of the New Testament is conceived to be a Jesus of the type presented in St. Mark's Gospel or of the type presented by St. Paul. The usual theological attitude of early Protestantism is adopted by the author, apparently without his being conscious that any other exists.

C. D. B.

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CONSCIENCE, CREEDS AND CRITICS: A PLEA FOR LIBERTY OF CRITICISM WITHIN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. By the Rev. C. W. Emmet, M.A., B.D. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. xii, 119. Price, 3s. net.

Mr. Emmet has written a frank and incisive statement of the case for liberty of criticism, which should be of value to the lay public and to orthodox and liberal thinkers within the church. He devotes two chapters to an account of the dealings of authority with what was regarded as erroneous teaching on the part of certain clergymen, such as Bishop Colenso, Mr. Voysey, F. D. Maurice, and the Tractarians, and has no difficulty in showing firstly, how unlucky has been the attitude of authority in the constant friction that has arisen in periods of growth between the external and conservative authority of the Church and the movements of thought within it; and secondly, that the heresy of one generation is the orthodoxy of the next. The plea for liberty of thought and criticism is everywhere by everyone admitted, except within the bounds of the church, and Mr. Emmet's book is of interest as showing the futility—to use no stronger word—of the attempts to suppress supposed unorthodox opinions by the exercise of authority, since though the tale of such attempts is a long one, the moral of each attempt is monotonously the same. Mr. Emmet's own attitude, it should be noted, is that of one of the many who feel difficulties with regard to the Virgin Birth and the physical Resurrection of Christ (p. viii) but whose belief in the essentials of Christianity does not stand or fall with any final decision which he may reach on these questions.

A. F.

FAITH AND FREEDOM: BEING CONSTRUCTIVE ESSAYS IN THE APPLICATION OF MODERNIST PRINCIPLES TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. Edited by the Rev. C. H. S. Matthews. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. xii, 371. Price, 6s. net.

This is a collection of essays in the application of modernist principles to the great ideas of the Church, and is, like the earlier companion volume, *Faith or Fear*, the result of collaboration, under the same editorship. Each writer, however, is quite independent. The editor invited various authors, who in spite of many differences from one another, shared already a certain common outlook, to write in complete independence upon several subjects of vital importance. But no contributor has any responsibility at all for any essay but his own. Each chose his own method of restatement of the leading ideas of religion in the light of modern evolutionary knowledge.

The most important papers are "The Development of Christian Institutions and Beliefs," by the Rev. Alfred Fawkes, and "The Holy Spirit," by the Rev. Charles E. Raven. The editor, besides an introduction, contributes a chapter on the Incarnation in which he describes creation as the self-expression of God; and the universe, God's incarnation, as it were. He also wisely protests against the theory that traditional views are to be defended in the supposed interests of the humble poor; and testifies to their welcome to frankly modernist teaching. Of less weight is Mr. Clutton Brock's paper on the Church and Morality. In spite of the difficulties attendant upon its production (p. viii) this important modernist study is an adequate expression of the faith that is in the group of thinkers who are responsible for the chapters.

A. F.

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INTERNATIONAL WAR: Its Causes and Its Cure. By Oscar T. Crosby, LL.D., F.R.G.S. London: Macmillan and Co., 1919. Pp. xiv, 378. Price, 12s. net.

This book is an amplification of a pamphlet written by the author in 1911, and reinforced by the lessons of the war. He urges that war is not inevitable (chapters xxiv and *seq.*) and that peace could be ensured by an armed central control. The most interesting part of this comprehensive and unconventionally written book is the analysis of the various causes of war.

M. J.

PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY G. Lowes Dickinson. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. xxiv, 205. Price, 6s. net.

All the papers in this volume, except the last three, are reproduced from the *Recueil de Rapports* published by the Central Organization for a durable peace, an international association founded at the Hague in 1915. The value for English-speaking peoples is their presentment of the views of Continental thinkers—such as Bernstein, Dr. W. Schucking, and Dr. H. Lammasch.

M. R.

POLICY AND PRINCIPLES. 1. General Aims (of the British Society for the study of sex psychology). 2. The Erotic Rights of Women. The Objects of Marriage. Two essays by Havelock Ellis. (Publications of the B.S.S.P., 6d. and 1/—. (Sold only to adult students of Social Questions.)

The British Society of Sex Psychology was established for the consideration of problems and questions connected with sexual psychology, from their medical, juridical, and sociological aspects. Its inaugural meeting was held about three weeks before the outbreak of the war, and its activities, while they have in one sense been hindered, have in another doubtless been furthered, by that world convulsion. For to the war we owe it, that the free discussion of sex problems in the English vernacular, no longer evokes shouts of "Police!" Certain sex problems, that is to say semi-official advertisements upon the subject of venereal disease, certainly thrust themselves upon the attention in the columns of the most respectable periodicals, but sex inversion is still under the ban, and light is urgently needed upon this, and many other among the problems. Despite the violent dislocations of conventional thought since July, 1914, fear is still the predominant emotion excited in many minds by a glimpse at the phenomena of sex. Are we, asks the writer of the first of the two pamphlets under review, "to treat human nature as the early Victorian lady treated telegrams?—the lady, I mean who, whenever one of these modern portents came to the door, rushed upstairs with it and hid it at the back of the top shelf of her linen cupboard, as though by such action she could wipe out facts or arrest catastrophe."

The attitude of the B. S. S. P. towards the subjects it undertakes to consider is summarised in the following terms: First, it maintains that we must never be afraid to investigate. Secondly, it contends that we must never assume phenomena to be unimportant or negligible, merely because science happens to have neglected them or because society happens to dislike them. Thirdly, it protests against the hasty condemnation of any-

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thing that has obviously missed a scientific investigation. The main aim of the society, says the writer is the coeducation of grown men and women in matters which vitally concern both sexes alike.

Havelock Ellis's two essays form the most recent of the B. S. S. P.'s publications. Acton, we learn, "who was regarded half a century ago as the chief English authority on sexual matters, declared that 'happily for society' the supposition that women possess sexual feelings could be put aside as 'a vile aspersion.'" This contention was based on the purely masculine outlook of a man-made world, in which men, as Ellis says, "were perpetually striving by ways the most methodical, the most subtle, the most far-reaching to achieve a result in women, which when achieved, men themselves viewed with dismay."

C. & E. P.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

ADAMS, GEORGE BURTON. The British Empire and a League of Peace, together with an analysis of Federal Government, its functions and its method. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1919. Pp. 115. Price, $1.00.

ASQUITH, H. H. (Edited by.) The Idea of Public Right: Being the first four prize essays in each of the three divisions of the *Nation* Essay Competition. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1918. Pp. xx, 324. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

BABBITT, IRVING. Rousseau and Romanticism. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919. Pp. xxiii, 426. Price, $3.50 net.

BARKER, ERNEST. Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. xiv, 403. Price, 14s. net.

BARKER, J. ELLIS. Economic Statesmanship: The Great Industrial and Financial Problems Arising from the War. London: John Murray, 1918. Pp. x, 408. Price, 15s. net.

BRISSENDEN, PAUL FREDERICH. The I. W. W.: A Study of American Syndicalism. Columbia University Studies in Political Science. Vol. LXXXIII. Pp. 432. Price, $3.50.

BROOKE, TUCKER, and CANBY, HENRY SEIDEL. War Aims and Poem Ideals: Selections in Prose and Verse Illustrating the Aspirations of the Modern World. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1919. Pp. xi, 264. Price, $1.80.

BRYCE, JAMES VISCOUNT. Essays and Addresses in Wartime. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. viii, 190. Price, 6s. net.

COLCORD, JOANNA C. Broken Homes, a study of family desertion and its social treatment. Social Work Series. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1919. Pp. 208. Price, $0.75 net.

COLE, G. H. D. Labour in the Commonwealth. London: Headley Bros., Ltd., 1919. Pp. 223. Price, 5s. 6d. net.

CROSBY, O. T. International War: Its Causes and Its Cure. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. xiv, 378. Price, 12s. net.

CUNNINGHAM, W. The Secret of Progress. Cambridge: University Press, 1918 Pp. xii, 179. Price, 5s. net.

DICKINSON, G. LOWES. Problems of the International Settlement. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. xxiv, 205. Price, 6s. net.

HALL, FRED S. and BROOKE, ELISABETH W. American Marriage Laws in Their Social Aspects, A Digest. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1919. Pp. 132.

HANDBOOK FOR SPEAKERS ON A LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Compiled by the League of Nations Society for the Use of Students and Speakers. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 107. Price, 1s. 6d. net.

HASTINGS, J. (Edited by.) Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics. Vol. X. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918. Pp. xx, 916. Price, cloth, 32s. net; half morocco, 40s. net.

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HIGBY, CHESTER PENN. The Religious Policy of the Bavarian Government During the Napoleonic Period. Columbia University Studies in Political Science. Vol. LXXXV, No. 1. Pp. 346. Price, $3.00.

JASTROW, MORRIS, JR. A Gentle Cynic. Being the Book of Ecclesiastes. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1919. Pp. 255. Price, $2.00 net.

JOURDAIN, PHILIP E. B. The Philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll: With an Appendix of Leading Passages from Certain Other Works. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1918. Pp. 96. Price 3s. 6d. net.

LADD, GEORGE TRUMBULL. Knowledge, Life and Reality. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918. Pp. 549.

MACKENZIE, J. S., Litt.D., LL.D. Outlines of Social Philosophy. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 280. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

MACKINTOSH, D. C., PH.D. God in a World at War. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 60. Price, 1s. net.

NEWLYN, HERBERT N. G The Relationship between the Mystical and the Sensible Worlds. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 128. Price. 4s. 6d. net.

OPPENHEIM, L. The League of Nations. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1919. Pp. xii, 84. Price, 6s. net.

RADHAKRISHNAN, S. The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. xii, 294. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

RECONSTRUCTION REPRINTS—Number 1. Towards a New World, being the reconstruction program of the British Labor Party; together with an introductory article by Mr. Arthur Henderson. New York: 1919, W. R. Browne. Pp. 34. Price, $0.10, 100 copies $8.00.

RUSK, R. R. Experimental Education. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1919. Pp. viii, 346. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

RUSSELL, THE HON. B. Roads to Freedom. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 215. Price, 7s. 6d. net. New York: Henry Holt & Co. Price, $1.50.

SHARP, FRANK CHAPMAN. Education for Character. Moral Training in the School and Home. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1917. Pp. 453.

SINGER, I. The Rival Philosophies of Jesus and of Paul. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1919. Pp. 347. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

SMITH, E. J. Housing: the Present Opportunity. London: P. S. King and Son, Ltd., 1918. Pp. 98. Price, 1s. net.

SORLEY, W. R. Moral Values and the Idea of God. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen in 1914 and 1915. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1919. Pp. xix, 534. Price, $5.00 net.

STEIN, LUDWIG. Philosophical Currents of the Present Day. Translated by Shishirkumar Maitra. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1918, 1919. Vol. I, pp. xvi, 234; Vol. II, pp. 235-393.

SUMNER, WILLIAM GRAHAM. The Forgotten Man and other Essays. Edited by Albert Galloway Keller. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918. Pp. 559. Price, $2.50.

SWIFT, FLETCHER HARPER. Education in Ancient Israel from Earliest Times to 70 A. D. Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1919. Pp. xii, 134. Price, $1.25 net.

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